



Heritage at War

PLAN AND PREPARE

**Edited by Mark Dunkley,
Lisa Mol and Anna Tulliach**

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Professor Lisa Mol is an expert in heritage stone deterioration, in particular deterioration associated with active combat, at the University of the West of England. She leads a wide range of funded projects, including 'Heritage in the Crossfire' and 'Partnership for Heritage', and supports initiatives and colleagues in conflict zones in the documentation and remediation of damage to built heritage. She teaches a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in physical geography.

Captain Ankie Petersen works as a Staff Officer Cultural Property Protection in the Royal Dutch Armed Forces. She works at the Section for Cultural Affairs and Information, part of the 1 Civil-Military Cooperation Command (1CMlco) in the city of Apeldoorn. Here, she leads and coordinates efforts to implement CPP within the Dutch Armed Forces, including designing training programmes and tools for the military and projects for the implementation of CPP in military planning processes, and engaging in civil-military collaboration projects for the advancement of CPP and the implementation of the Hague Convention on both a national and international stage. Ankie has a background in critical heritage studies, with an MA in Heritage Studies and an MA in Design Cultures from Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and a BA in Language and Culture Studies from Utrecht University. She previously worked for the Dutch National Commission to UNESCO in the role of policy coordinator in culture and heritage (including the UNESCO 1954 Hague Convention) and as a lecturer in World Heritage and Conflict at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

Vernon Rapley is the Director of Cultural Heritage Protection and Security at the Victoria & Albert Museum where he founded and directs the global Culture in Crisis Programme. He is the Chair of the International Council of Museums Committee for Museum Security, a Special Advisor for the UK Government's

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Cultural Heritage Protection Fund, Chair of the National Museum Security Group and the Security of Major Museums Europe Group. Before joining the V&A in 2010, Vernon served as a Scotland Yard Detective for 24 years; the last ten years spent as the head of the Art & Antiques Unit. He was a member of The Interpol Tracking Task Force (Iraq) and represented UK Law Enforcement on International initiatives to combat the illicit trade of cultural goods. He has written and published on various aspects of cultural heritage protection and was elected a Fellow of Society of Antiquaries in 2022.

Professor Peter Stone is the UNESCO Chair in Cultural Property Protection (CPP) and Peace at Newcastle University, UK; and President of the Blue Shield, the advisory body to the inter-governmental Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. In 2003, Peter was advisor to the UK's Ministry of Defence regarding the identification and protection of the archaeological cultural heritage in Iraq. He has remained active in working with the military to refine attitudes and develop processes for the better protection of cultural property in times of conflict. His article 'The Four-Tier Approach to the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict' in the *British Army Review* (2013) helped establish the Cultural Property Protection Unit within the British Army.

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FOREWORD

The Victoria and Albert Museum is an institution that bears the scars of war. Inside our great domed entrance, memorials honour those museum staff who lost their lives during two world wars. Scattered bomb damage still marks the stone facade of our South Kensington site: the result of countless incendiary bombs dropped on the V&A's buildings during the London Blitz. A commemorative inscription explains how the shrapnel damage was deliberately left unrepaired, 'as a memorial to the enduring values of this great museum in a time of conflict'.

Our institutional archives speak of the incredible measures taken by V&A staff during the Second World War. All portable objects were evacuated to places of safety: some to an underground quarry in Wiltshire, others to Montacute House in Somerset, while others still were too large to remove. The monumental Raphael Cartoons were bricked into a bomb-proof shelter and shielded behind sandbags. With limited displays, the dismantled museum remained open to the public, even as certain galleries became a school for evacuated children or were transformed into a military canteen.

A report by the then-director Sir Eric Maclagan describes fires in the roof, staff wading ankle-deep through flooded corridors, and a 'cascade of water mixed with lumps of charred wood pouring down the staircase in the Secretariat'. Despite all this, very few objects were lost.

We owe a great debt to our wartime colleagues for these immense efforts to safeguard collections of international importance. For this is a museum with an extraordinary range of material culture from around the world: a guardianship that stretches over 5,000 years, from Europe to South-East Asia, the Middle East to North Africa and beyond. What museums tell is the complex, interwoven story of exchange and adaptation, over centuries, and across peoples. As part of our duty of care to these global collections, we invest in cultural collaborations across borders: whether through research partnerships, touring exhibitions and loans, or training for heritage professionals.

Ten years ago, the V&A sought to reaffirm this commitment to cultural dialogue and partnership, so we began exploring ways to leverage institutional expertise to play a more active safeguarding role, beyond the traditional scope of the museum. We hoped to be part of a vital and timely international conversa-

tion that could draw together the global heritage community, while reaching out to individuals and organisations active in the field, all to better protect cultural heritage at risk. In the face of armed conflict, criminal acts or climate disaster it becomes ever more urgent to safeguard our civil society and cultural ecology.

Conceived against the backdrop of the mass destruction of historic cultural sites in Iraq, Yemen and Syria, the V&A's Culture in Crisis Programme – initiated in 2014 – has become a vital part of this mission. The programme brings together those with a shared interest in protecting cultural heritage, before, during and after times of crisis. It provides a forum for sharing knowledge, inspiring and supporting action and raising public awareness. We are proud to play our small role in this global pursuit.

We approach this in many ways: from the Culture in Crisis Portal – the world's largest and most accessible database of heritage protection projects from around the globe – to our ongoing series of talks, working groups and conferences. Each seeks to build connection among diverse groups from a variety of backgrounds and disciplines: academics, conservators and heritage bodies alongside humanitarian, law-enforcement, or military professionals. Besides strong institutional voices, it has been critical to collaborate with individuals, communities, and grassroots enterprise – many of whom are working in isolation in turbulent environments or even direct conflict.

In 2017, the UK Government ratified the 1954 Hague Convention, passing into law the responsibility to protect cultural heritage during conflict, under any circumstances. Culture in Crisis had – alongside other UK organisations, such as Blue Shield, UNESCO and the UK Armed Forces – been an active member of the working group supporting the UK Government towards this momentous legislation. With this new legal commitment there also came a requirement to plan for war. In 2018, Culture in Crisis convened the *Planning for the Unthinkable: Protecting the National Heritage Sector* conference, in partnership with DCMS and the UK Armed Forces, to share ideas on the future of catastrophe planning with other heritage institutions.

As the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine passed in February 2023, the 'unthinkable' scenarios framed at the conference have become a hideous reality. For as the Russian invasion of Ukraine grinds on with untold human casualty, Ukraine's rich cultural heritage and identity is also under threat from irreversible damage. Cultural sites, museums and archival collections have been caught in the crossfire, with on-the-ground officials and volunteers fighting to safeguard treasures amid a rapidly shifting situation.

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In collaboration with ALIPH, one of the most active heritage funders working around the globe, the V&A and Culture in Crisis were able to donate a shipment of museum crates and emergency equipment to help Ukraine's museums, galleries and libraries. This joined donations from many other UK institutions.

But Culture in Crisis is also working hard to focus international attention on Ukraine. Because, while the war has been reported widely, there have been notable cases of misinformation. Ongoing collaboration with Ukrainian colleagues – both within the country and across the diaspora – has enabled first-hand accounts of the widespread threat to Ukraine's cultural heritage. Since 2022, valuable contributions from Dr Kateryna Goncharova, Ukrainian Heritage Crisis Specialist at the World Monuments Fund; Dr Ihor Poshyvailo, Director General of the Maidan Museum, Vice-Chair of ICOM-DRMC and Co-founder of Ukraine's Heritage Emergency Response Initiative (HERI); Dr Anastasiia Cherednychenko, Chair of ICOM Ukraine; and many others, have helped to shape international understanding and assistance for their country's recovery efforts.

It is also essential for Culture in Crisis to situate these discussions within a broader, international context. In February 2023, the *Heritage at War: Plan and Prepare* conference, in partnership with the School of Museum Studies at the University of Leicester, sought to build on the themes of the 2018 conference, initiated in the wake of the Hague Convention. At the V&A in London, representatives from 41 different countries, across five continents, questioned how the heritage sector, military and other stakeholders might best collaborate to protect cultural heritage under attack. This book expands on those important conversations, making the vital and unexplored connection between cultural heritage and human security. The V&A and the Culture in Crisis programme are delighted to contribute to such a pioneering sourcebook.

Dr Tristram Hunt
London, UK

PREFACE

In 2003, at the height of the looting of nearly all cultural institutions following the ill-advised and quite probably illegal USA and UK-led Coalition invasion of Iraq, John Curtis, then of the British Museum and recently returned from a hair-raising visit to Iraq that had nearly cost him his life, suggested to me that the appalling failure to protect the archaeological sites, archives, libraries, museums and religious places in Iraq, would prompt a number of Ph.D. theses and a plethora of new academic research. I was not convinced, but John was absolutely correct. I alone have supervised/am supervising a number of Ph.D.s and research Masters, produced numerous articles, and (co-)/edited two multi-authored volumes (Stone and Farchakh Bajjaly 2008; Stone 2011). *Heritage at War: Plan and Prepare* is a very welcome addition to that literature as the academic and professional communities still wrestle to clearly articulate the importance of cultural property protection (CPP) and struggle to put emerging theory into effective practice. The V&A and its Culture in Crisis team should be applauded for organising the conference from which most of these contributions originated.

Over the last 21 years, my own publication history charts the development of thinking around this topic and, I like to believe, a growing sophistication around its complexity. Much of the early writing (my own and generally) focused on the loss of irreplaceable archaeological sites and collections, as if, with little or no justification, it was obvious to everyone why such places and objects were so important that they should have been taken into consideration during pre-invasion political and military planning and for post-conflict stabilisation and economic recovery. We all squarely blamed the military for the failure to protect. The lack of organised protection by those troops on the ground ‘in theatre’ was certainly a failure of considerable, if not epic, proportions but was itself the result of the almost total absence of political or senior military thinking, awareness or planning.

In a military operation, little happens on the ground unless there are orders for it to happen. It was as if no-one had even heard of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict or its two Protocols. Certainly, neither the USA nor the UK had ratified the Convention or either of its Protocols. The UK weakly, and stretching

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the bounds of credibility to, if not well beyond, breaking point, claimed that its forces ‘abided by the spirit of the Convention’. It took until 2009 for the USA to ratify the Convention, but neither of its Protocols, and until 2017 for the UK to ratify the Convention and both Protocols.

At the end of the First World War, the international community reacted to the carnage and devastation partly caused by the failure of European royal families to avert, or quickly end, the war, by creating the League of Nations as many of the royal families disappeared. The League aspired to achieve international peace and security through (over-simplistically) a reduction in arms held by all nations, diplomacy and arbitration – emphasising political and economic solutions to diffuse potential conflicts. In 1939, having at its height only a membership of 58 nations (and never some key ones such as the USA), the League failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. In 1945 it was replaced by the United Nations (UN). While retaining many of the League’s approaches the UN acknowledged that, to achieve world peace, it would have to add to the League’s methods and identified the central role of ‘humanity’s moral and intellectual solidarity’ in maintaining peace. This new aspect was to be spearheaded by the UN’s agency for education, science and culture, UNESCO.

The creation of UNESCO in 1945 was part of a general realisation of the importance of culture and (in the language of the time) cultural property (what we would normally refer to now as ‘heritage’) to world peace and, conversely, its use as a weapon of war. This thinking was not new (it can be traced back two and a half thousand years to Sun Tzu) and had led to treaties such as the 1935 Roerich Pact. It was also a key element in the early drafts of the 1948 Genocide Convention produced by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who escaped to the USA as Germany invaded Poland in 1939. Lemkin, a lawyer, had been appalled by the fate of the Armenian people under the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and had been researching similar attacks on minority groups. Lemkin actually created the word ‘genocide’ to cover such atrocities. Initial drafts of the Genocide Convention included two forms of genocide: ‘barbarism’ – genocide against a human population; and ‘vandalism’ – genocide against their cultural property. Lemkin argued that vandalism frequently preceded barbarism and could be used as a warning sign for the latter.

Lemkin was forced, however, to drop the text on ‘vandalism’ at a meeting in October 1948. Opposition was led by those countries with large indigenous populations, supported by ex-colonial powers such as the UK, who were against the inclusion of ‘cultural genocide’ (Lemkin’s ‘vandalism’) as they

thought it might be used against them for past, and continuing, oppression of their indigenous populations.

However, while ‘vandalism’ was forced out of the Genocide Convention, ‘the genie was out of the bottle’. The leaders of the Nazis prosecuted in Nuremburg were tried predominantly for crimes against civilians (Lemkin’s ‘barbarism’), but several were also prosecuted for crimes against cultural property (Lemkin’s ‘vandalism’). The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights added to this general understanding by establishing access to culture, and by implication cultural property, as a human right. The same understanding was fundamental to those who drafted the 1954 Hague Convention, who were convinced that ‘damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind [sic], since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world’.

In his opening speech on 21 July 1953, at the meeting of the Committee of Experts for the drafting of the 1954 Hague Convention, Luther Evans, Director-General of UNESCO, revealed the underlying ambitions of those behind the Convention:

It is our object today, Gentlemen, to lay the foundations of what I may call the Red Cross of cultural property, and have it accepted by all States and by public opinion, *that property of cultural value is entitled to the respect which civilised peoples recognise as due to civilians, prisoners of war, medical personnel, and hospitals* (my emphasis.)

Following Evans’s lead, and the broader context provided by Lemkin, those who finalised the text of the Convention envisioned the establishment of the ‘Red Cross for cultural property’ that was renamed by the drafters as the ‘Blue and White Shield’ (the agreed emblem of the Convention) and intended to be a mirror organisation to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Writing with this commitment in 1955, R.J. Wilhelm of the ICRC asserted:

In the future the Red Cross should be no longer alone in its campaign against indiscriminate methods of warfare; in any case, it should be able to count among its most faithful allies all those who worked to establish the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, and all those who consider it to be a valuable acquisition. May all the efforts pursued, both under the Red Cross and under the Blue and White Shield, be mutually upheld in order that the aim in view may be more easily attained (1955: 87).

Unfortunately, for reasons unknown but probably more to do with resources than desire, this did not begin to happen until 42 years later when the Blue Shield was finally established. In 1996 the so-called ‘Founding Four’

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international NGOs for Archives, Museums, Sites and Monuments, and Libraries (ICA, ICOM, ICOMOS, and IFLA) created the International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) to coordinate heritage response in crises across the four sectors. Its remit was:

- To facilitate international responses to threats or emergencies threatening cultural property;
- To encourage safeguarding and respect for cultural property, especially by promoting risk preparedness;
- To train experts at national and regional level to prevent, control and recover from disasters;
- To act in an advisory capacity for the protection of endangered heritage; and
- To consult and co-operate with other bodies including UNESCO, ICCROM and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The ICBS encouraged the establishment of national committees, another continuing cornerstone of the current Blue Shield. Unfortunately, the ICBS was created with no funding and, despite some early successes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only thing it was able to do on the eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq was for its President to write to Presidents Bush and Hussein and Prime Minister Blair urging them to ‘take all necessary steps to protect cultural property in the event of war breaking out’.

It was not until 2017 that, for the first time in its history, the Blue Shield received some very limited funding as part of Newcastle University’s contribution to its UNESCO Chair in Cultural Property Protection & Peace established in 2016. It is an astonishing fact that it has fallen to one university in the UK to begin to fulfil the aspirations of Lemkin, Evans, the drafters of the 1954 Convention and the ICRC.

Recently, as we approached the seventieth anniversary of the signing of the 1954 Hague Convention, I have been asked in numerous general, academic and professional interviews whether the Convention is ‘fit for purpose’. My response has been the same to all. The Hague Convention is a good Convention, written and influenced by those who had been through two World Wars, who understood the importance of cultural property/heritage to communities ravaged by war. It is made stronger by its two Protocols of 1954 and 1999.

However, there are three key issues that weaken the Convention and its current use. First, while the Convention crucially emphasises (eight times)

Professor Peter G. Stone

that, for CPP to be effective, it must be implemented ‘in times of peace’, few countries have done so. Waiting for a conflict to start before addressing CPP issues, as most recently happened (with a few notable exceptions) in Ukraine, is far too late and results in considerably more damage than necessary. This is not criticising colleagues in Ukraine. This is a widespread global failure. Culture Ministries globally are usually the poor relation in government and priorities go to fixing the roof and conserving collections rather than preparing for something no-one wishes to contemplate as a real possibility. Second, the legal profession has shied away from using the 1954 Convention and has relied on specific legal opportunities for prosecutions of crimes against cultural property such as provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the more general 1998 Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court. It was under the Rome Statute, for example, that Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to nine years in prison and identified as liable for 2.7 million euros in expenses for individual and collective reparations to the community of Timbuktu for the war crime of ‘intentionally directing attacks against 10 buildings of a religious and historical character’ in 2012.¹ Third, the wider framework, and especially a properly funded ‘Blue and White Shield’ organisation, seen by those involved in the drafting of the Convention as central to its effective implementation, has never been established. While the Blue Shield is now starting to provide this role, it is stretched to its limits by requests for assistance and even its current limited funding is not guaranteed² – despite the fact that perhaps never before has it been needed so urgently.

Professor Peter G. Stone
Newcastle, UK

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1. See <https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi>

2. See <https://theblueshield.org/about-us/what-is-the-blue-shield/>

Introduction

HERITAGE AT WAR – PLAN AND PREPARE

Mark Dunkley, Anna Tulliach and Lisa Mol

We will...continue to strengthen our human security approach related to the protection of civilians and cultural property

Washington Summit Declaration – issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.
10 July 2024

Exactly seventy years ago, in the aftermath of the Second World War, an international conference of 56 States was held in The Hague which drafted, and then adopted, the ‘Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict’ (UNESCO 2022). This agreement entered into force on 7 August 1956 and remains the most comprehensive multilateral treaty dedicated exclusively to the protection of cultural heritage in times of armed conflict.

Regrettably, the devastating effects of conflict upon cultural heritage have been well documented since the initial conference in 1954. Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 coupled with Israeli retaliatory assaults against Hamas’ attacks launched on Israel on 7 October 2023 have shown that culture, once again, finds itself on war’s frontline.¹ The UN Human Rights Commissioner has suggested that there may be as many as 1,000 incidents of damage to cultural infrastructure in Ukraine since the war began there, with an estimated cost of US\$9bn (Читомо [Chytomo] 2024), while over 200 cultural landmarks are reported as being seriously damaged – and as many as sixty mosques have been destroyed – across Gaza since 7 October 2023 (DAWN 2023; Wither 2024). Significantly, two important museums have been completely destroyed by Israel Defence Forces (IDF) airstrikes: The Rafah Museum and the Al-Qarara Cultural Museum, the latter levelled by

1. See also Clack and Dunkley (2023).

nearby explosions (Kendall Adams 2023). Recognising the deliberate targeting of places of worship in Gaza, the International Federation for Human Rights is calling for the International Criminal Court to intervene in what it is calling ‘international crimes against Palestinians and an unfolding genocide’ (ReliefWeb 2023), while the International Court of Justice announced in January 2024 that there was ‘a real and imminent risk’ to the rights of Palestinians under the Genocide Convention.² The connection between a community, its material past and its expressions of cultural identity runs deep.

While the war in Europe has no obvious and immediate end, and with the Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu warning on 27 December 2023 that the campaign in Gaza was ‘not close to being over’, a focus on conflict in Africa linked to a succession of eight coups across three years is raising concerns about the security of a region where key allies of Western powers are seeking to contain insurgencies by groups linked to al Qaeda and Islamic State (France24 2023). Separately, there is a risk that Sudan’s rich archaeological heritage could share the same fate as that of Iraq and Syria in terms of widespread looting and loss as a result of the current conflict there between rival factions of the military government. Added to this, retaliatory strikes between Iran and Pakistan in January 2024, coupled with wider instability across the Middle East and the Red Sea, have led some commentators to consider whether we are either on the brink of World War 3 (Dooley and Hoare 2024) or have actually been fighting it for some time (Glasser 2022).

Nevertheless, the right of access to, and enjoyment of, cultural heritage is based on various human rights norms and the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflict is a cross-cutting theme as far as Human Security is concerned. Human Security is a multi-sectoral approach to security that gives primacy to people, and the UK’s Joint Service Publication 985 *Human Security in Defence* (2021) recognises that ‘the protection of cultural property will preserve and enhance [the UK’s] reputation locally and globally, maintain

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2. International Court of Justice. Summary of the Order of 26 January 2024 in Case 192: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel; Document Number: 192-20240126-SUM-01-00-EN). In a separate case, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court applied for arrest warrants in May 2024 for the Israeli Prime Minister, the Israeli Defence Minister and Hamas’ leaders and military chief in Gaza for War Crimes. Karim Khan KC said that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the men bore criminal responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity from at least 7 October 2023.

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its ability to influence those amongst whom it operates and contributes to force protection and freedom of manoeuvre'. Publication of the British Army's Doctrine Note on *Human Security* in 2023 further identified the need to assure the protection of cultural property as part of a Human Security wrap, in order to act as a wider force for good. Similarly for NATO, Human Security encompasses five areas: combatting trafficking in human beings; protection of children in armed conflict; preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence; protection of civilians; and cultural property protection.³ Indeed, the 2016 NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians states that the protection of civilians in NATO-led operations and missions can include the protection not only of persons but also of *objects* (NATO 2016). Reinforcing this view, in January 2024 a statement condemning violence against people and their cultural heritage by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) with reference to the security situation in the Gaza Strip made explicit reference to the link between cultural heritage and human security by calling for the immediate cessation of any actions that put civilians in danger and their cultural heritage at risk of damage, destruction, theft, looting or illicit trafficking (ICOM 2024).

Heritage at War—Plan and Prepare thus brings together military, academic and heritage practitioners' voices from across the Euro-Atlantic, North Africa and the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific to explore how lessons learned from past experiences of conflict can inform approaches to the safeguarding of cultural heritage today. This book addresses how the military, the heritage sector and other stakeholders can, and must, collaborate to protect cultural heritage under attack, navigating the specific risks of direct military conflict on the ground, and relate this to emerging Allied doctrine in relation to Human Security.

Heritage under threat

The destruction of cultural heritage has become an integral part of warfare and remains a feature of contemporary conflicts. Throughout history, cultural heritage has been systematically targeted during conflict for several reasons. Recently, numerous scholars have theorised that the destruction of cultural property during conflict is caused by different factors (Clack and Dunkley 2023, Cunliffe 2023, Pollard 2020 and 2023, Stone 2022, Smith 2023 and Viejo-Rose 2022).

First, heritage can be subjected to deliberate or targeted damage—namely, an action perpetrated with the purpose of annihilating the 'enemy' by targeting

3. See NATO – Topic: Human security.

its cultural, national and religious identity, ‘motivated by a more general desire to destroy something of value to the enemy as punishment for resistance, or a combination of the two’ (Pollard 2023: 260). This is defined by Clack and Dunkley (2023: 3) as ‘culturecide’ – an intentional and premeditated direct attack on a group’s identity and its culture, by striking against both its tangible and intangible heritage (see also Curtis and Dunkley, this volume).

Remarkable examples of deliberate damage to cultural heritage are the process of ethnic cleansing and cultural erasure put in place by the Nazis during the first half of the twentieth century against Jewish and Roma peoples; and, more recently, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, with the will of Russia to deliberately target the cultural identity of the Ukrainian people by destroying their heritage, aiming at re-installing Russian culture as dominant in Ukraine. Another instance of targeted damage in conflict is the deliberate destruction by retreating German troops of historical buildings in Naples and surrounding areas following Hitler’s direct order ‘to reduce the city to dust and ashes’, as a revenge for Italy’s betrayal in signing the Armistice of Cassibile with the Allies in September 1943. The destroyed sites include Villa Montesano in Nola which was the storage for artworks and historical documents of the Naples State Archive, the Filangieri Museum and the Overseas Lands Exhibition (Pollard 2019: 672–73).

Rightly, Viejo-Rose (2022: 31) emphasises that in contemporary times media have focused their attention on deliberate destructive acts during conflict to ‘make headlines worldwide’. This behaviour has shifted public attention exclusively onto this typology of threats. Consequently, measures adopted for the protection of cultural property in time of war have largely been focused on deliberate targeting – or conversely No Strike Lists – while threats to heritage can, in fact, derive from several factors.

Apart from the risk of targeted damage to cultural heritage as a means for obliterating and dehumanising a specific group of people, other significant threats to cultural property during conventional conflict come from bombing raids and ground combat operations. These threats are included in the category of collateral or accidental damage – where cultural heritage is not the primary and intended target. Frequently, monumental sites have been caught up in conflict for their proximity to a strategic objective (Clack and Dunkley 2023: 4). For example, this kind of threat was the primary cause of damage to cultural heritage during the Second World War in Italy (Pollard 2020: 171). Consider, for instance, the destruction of Cappella degli Ovetari at the Eremitani in Padua, or of Campo Santo in Pisa (1944). Cappella degli Ovetari,

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Figure 1. Campo Santo (Pisa) after wartime damage, 1944. Campo Santo's wooden roof was destroyed completely by a fire caused by a bomb that fell in close proximity. Opera della Primaziale di Pisa, via Wikimedia Commons.

with outstanding frescoes by Andrea Mantegna, was destroyed irreparably by a bomb that mistakenly fell on the church (Coccoli 2017: 348–49). The renowned Campo Santo in Pisa, meanwhile, suffered tremendous consequences from battlefield damage ([Figure 1](#)): its wooden roof was destroyed by the fire caused by a bomb fallen in the proximity, damaging the below frescoes, and leaving them exposed to weather for months (Dagnini Brey 2009: 220–21).

The high percentage of cultural sites hit by bombs in aerial attacks during Second World War in Italy – estimated as about 95 per cent of the damage to ‘major monuments’ in the region – was due to the inaccuracy of bombing technology at that time, making it nearly impossible to prevent the destruction of monumental sites close to intended strategic targets, such as railways and munitions factories (Pollard 2023: 258, 264).

Deliberate and collateral are specific threats occurring during the combat period. Threats to heritage also happen during the post-combat and occupation periods. They are mainly identified with occupiers’ neglect and vandalism and their lack of awareness of the importance of protecting cultural property. A noteworthy example comes again from the Second World War.

In Second World War Italy, after the liberation of cities, Anglo-American soldiers occupied monumental buildings (museums, historic archives, archaeological sites, private historic villas, etc.), transforming them into military hospitals, army bases, military storages, and even welfare clubs. This wrongful occupation of historical sites frequently resulted in damage and destruction – mainly due to the change of use – but also in the looting of cultural objects still preserved there – stolen for pecuniary profit, as spoils of war or as souvenirs. This happened, for example, at Palazzo Reale in Naples, Reggia di Caserta, Palazzo Margherita in Rome, Museo Stibbert in Florence and Paestum archaeological site ([Figure 2](#)) among many others. The situation concerning Allied troops’ exploitation of monumental sites was highly detrimental, especially in Southern Italy. Instances gradually decreased with troops’ northward advance in the Italian peninsula, although they never disappeared completely, being a constant presence during the entire course of the Allied occupation of Italian cities (Tulliach 2022).

A point worth nothing is that, throughout history, the looting and pilaging of cultural objects has always been a constant during conflict, especially in the meaning of spoils of war. Examples date back to the dawn of civilisation, with troops in the Ancient Rome bringing enemy’s artistic treasures back to Rome as a sign of triumph and of humiliation for the vanquished. In more recent conflicts, looting has taken many forms: from illicit excavations at archaeological sites, through theft from museums and galleries, to stealing from residences and civilians (Clack and Dunkley 2023: 6).

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Figure 2. American soldiers billeted in the archaeological area of Paestum, 22 September 1943. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., RG 111 Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Series Photographs of American Military Activities: <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/531170?objectPage=3>

Some artefacts, however, can be said to be of such artistic significance that they have an allure to dictators wishing to curate a collection of exceptional works of art. Examples here include the Ghent Altarpiece (van Eyck, 1432) and the Madonna of Bruges (Michelangelo, 1501–04) which were both looted from Belgium by the French Imperial Army during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) and again by the Wehrmacht during the Second World War (Roxan and Wanstall 1966: 166).

Threats to cultural heritage during asymmetric warfare, where the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other, can be characterised on a scale of increasing severity by armed non-state actors: vandalism, looting (for threat finance purposes),⁴ iconoclasm (for ideological purposes), and whole site destruction (for media impact and recruiting purposes). In these instances, cultural heritage and property have been weaponised as a means of conveying power and achieving influence. There is therefore a clear link between armed non-state actors, the destruction of cultural property and culturecide but, although the 1954 Convention applies to States Parties, the original signatory parties had the foresight to consider conflicts not of an international character. Within a non-international armed conflict occurring within the territory of a State Party, parties to the armed conflict are bound by the 1954 Convention, including armed non-state actors (Dunkley 2021).

Stone (2022: 199–203) adds to all the above-mentioned threats to cultural heritage during conflict in combat and post-combat operations: lack of advance planning – which can lead to the damage and destruction of archaeological sites, museums, archives, libraries, and art galleries, including the looting of their contents; enforced neglect – due to the impossibility of constant expert monitoring over cultural heritage during conflict; and development – the demolishing or appropriation of cultural property for a personal gain, caused primarily by the ‘vacuum of authority’ during armed conflicts.

Other causes of damage and destruction to cultural properties in time of war are identified by Clack and Dunkley (2023: 5) as: retaliation – an attack in return of a similar attack, as for instance the Second World War Allied ‘carpet bombing’ of Hamburg as reprisal for the Blitz; propaganda – used to promote a political view or a specific point of view, like the annihilation of the ‘Bamiyan Buddhas’ by the Taliban in 2001 to promote the idea that the international

4. Threat finance refers to the methods and channels through which illicit actors, such as terrorist organisations or criminal enterprises, obtain and move funds to support their activities, including money laundering, illicit trade and fundraising.

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community was more interested in the destruction of ancient idols than in people; and iconoclasm – the damage of symbols of power and religion for political and religious reasons, such as the defacement of statues in the Mosul Museum by ISIL in 2015. Smith (2023: 38) distinguishes between political iconoclasm – the destruction of symbols and icons for political purposes; and religious iconoclasm – the targeting of icons primarily for religious beliefs.

This volume in some way addresses all the mentioned threats to heritage in time of war, specifically exploring the past and present risks of military conflict to heritage and threats from direct combat operations.

Historical lessons for contemporary practices

The value of past conflicts as historical lessons for today's cultural property protection planning is fundamental. Consider again the Second World War. The high public interest and indignation, especially in the US, over the instances of Allied troops' wrongdoing against Italian cultural heritage – together with the will of Anglo-American governments to contrast Nazi propagandist allegations that the Allies were deploying art dealers in Europe to strip occupied countries of their art treasures – triggered a series of events that led to the creation of governmental bodies and the issuing of rules and regulations specifically addressing cultural property protection, which can both be relevant to today's practices in heritage safekeeping (Tulliach 2022: 291–92).

Firstly, in June 1943, the 'American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe' was created. It is widely known as 'Roberts Commission', from the name of its chairman, Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. This was followed, in the UK, by the foundation, in May 1944, of the 'Macmillan Committee', or the 'British Committee for the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives and Other Material in Enemy Hands'. At the core of both governmental bodies' activities were the protection of historic monuments and buildings, the restitution of looted works of art and the prosecution of war criminals involved with art looting (Coccoli 2017: 38, 42).

Despite the fundamental role of these institutions, the most important legacy deriving from Second World War practices in cultural property protection was the creation of the Monuments, Fine Arts & Archives sub-commission (MFAA). It was founded in October 1943 within the Roberts Commission. It comprised museum curators, academics, art historians, archivists and architects deployed in the war field, working to provide first-aid assistance to damaged

monuments, contrasting with troops' exploitation of cultural properties, and investigating on Nazi looted art (Coccoli 2017: 43–52; Tulliach 2022: 290–91).

Secondly, another crucial inheritance deriving from Second World War activities in heritage safekeeping is the range of measures adopted by Anglo-American governments to counter destruction of cultural heritage. These included orders issued by the Allied Military Government and addressed to unit commanders and their troops, regulating the primary responsibility that these had in preventing the damage and looting of cultural properties in occupied countries (e.g., Administrative Instruction n. 19, December 1943; General Order n. 68, December 1943; Preservation of Works of Art in Italy, May 1944). A central tool in the protection of cultural properties by Allied troops was the distribution of *Lists of Protected Monuments*, including lists of monumental sites to be safeguarded because recognised as having a significant cultural value – not to be targeted during bombing raids and ground combat operations, and not to be exploited in the occupation period (Coccoli 2017: 105–08).

Another fundamental measure adopted by the Allied Military Government to sensitise soldiers to the importance of cultural property protection was the arrangement – in cooperation with the MFAA – of an educational programme. This took the form of a real awareness-raising campaign, comprising the organisation of tours for troops, the dissemination of guides about cities of historic relevance (*Soldier's Guides*), the organisation of special exhibitions to show troops examples of artworks they were called to protect, and the publication of articles about monuments, art and archaeology in newspapers distributed in the war theatre (Tulliach 2022: 293).

As can be seen, the Second World War was the first major conflict where cultural property protection was put at the centre of military activities, and where a significant variety of measures were adopted to try to mitigate as much as possible damage and destruction to heritage – procedures that can work as valuable historical lessons for contemporary practices in cultural property protection.

Protecting heritage during conflict

What happened after the Second World War? The on-field experiences of Second World War led to the immediate issue of the 1954 *Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict*, which incorporates lessons learned from both World Wars (1914–18; 1939–45) and from the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) (Cunliffe and Fox 2022: 3). The Convention was the first multilateral treaty to be focused entirely on cultural property protection during

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conflict, and nowadays continues to be the primary significant international legislation on the matter (with its subsequent Protocols).

Provisions dictated by the 1954 Hague Convention include the establishment of cultural property protection measures to be adopted during conflict, but also in peacetime. As effectively summarised by Rush and Millington (2015: 5), the Convention establishes that signatories should identify and protect their own cultural property in peacetime, and also provide for the safeguarding of heritage of other countries in time of war.

The Convention mandates that, in peacetime, signatories should protect heritage through planning safeguarding measures for historical areas, developing lists of cultural sites to be granted protection, preparing storage facilities for movable properties and transport to these refuges, and providing training for civilian and military authorities on cultural property protection (Stone 2022: xviii).

During conflict, protection should be afforded to ‘movable and immovable properties of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’ (Art. 1). Accordingly, signatories of the Convention should ‘prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property’ (Art. 4). Thus, to allow cultural property protection in time of war, signatories should, in peacetime, allow for the arrangement of appropriate safeguarding measures, like the preparation of inventories, the establishment of emergency response and removal procedures, and the development of relevant skills and capacity (Clack and Dunkley 2023: 10).

In relation to the military exploitation of cultural properties in occupied territories, the 1954 Hague Convention enforces occupying and occupied countries not to use monumental sites as military bases, or for purposes that could expose them to the risk of destruction and vandalism (Art. 4). Special protection in this sense is provided to all the properties included in the ‘International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection’ – those properties should not be used for military purposes (Art. 9). Moreover, under the Convention, the occupying country is required to protect all cultural properties of the occupied territories, especially the ones marked with a distinctive emblem (a blue shield), introduced by the same Convention. The monumental sites marked with the emblem have immunity from military targeting (Art. 6).

Another important point regulated by the 1954 Hague Convention is the need to establish, in peacetime, cultural property protection specialists within armed forces, whose purpose would be to secure respect for cultural

property and to co-operate with the civilian authorities responsible for its safeguarding (Art. 7).

The First Protocol to the Convention (1954) regulates prevention procedures against the illicit appropriation and trafficking of cultural objects from occupied countries and obliges the return of such properties. The Second Protocol (1999) introduces the concept of ‘military necessity’ (see Malmquist, this volume), establishing that it should be invoked only in situations which expose cultural properties to an immediate risk and exclusively if another option is unfeasible (Art. 6). Furthermore, Article 15 of the Second Protocol clearly dictates that serious violations of the Protocol comprise the use of protected cultural properties in support of military actions, and their destruction, misappropriation, and vandalism.

As of September 2023, 134 countries have ratified the Convention, 111 have signed the First Protocol, and 87 have ratified the Second Protocol.⁵ However, despite the high number of countries that have endorsed the Convention, the provisions contained in it are in many cases still far from being put into action. One of the most striking examples has been, recently, the destruction of monuments by Russia during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia ratified the Convention in January 1957.

Unfortunately, the issuing of the 1954 Hague Convention was the sole immediate outcome deriving from Second World War experiences. Indeed, many of the lessons learned in the cultural property protection field were later mostly forgotten. In this context, Pollard (2020: 7–9) cites instances of damage, destruction and looting during recent conflicts in Yugoslavia, Africa and the Middle East.

Yet the military exploitation of cultural properties has been a relevant issue in contemporary conflicts: ‘souvenir and trophy collection’ was, until recently, identified as a characteristic of troops and others returning from conflict (Stone 2016: 45). Stone adds that personnel today steal cultural objects with two purposes: souvenir collection and trophy hunting. As an example, a decorative architectural feature stolen as a war trophy by American soldiers from one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces in Iraq is currently on display in an American military museum (Rush 2012: 42).

Instances of troops dealing wrongfully with cultural properties abound. The perils mainly take the form of neglect and vandalism, as during the Second World War. Strikingly, American and Polish forces, in April 2003, occupied the

5. See: <https://en.unesco.org/protecting-heritage/convention-and-protocols/states-parties> (accessed 18 Sept. 2023).

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city of Babylon (Iraq) without caring for its precious archaeological significance, transforming the area into a military base – ‘Camp Alpha’ – by excavating, bulldozing and crushing the site (Alcala 2015: 209). As reported by Rush, ironically, armed forces had been assigned to occupy the site with the precise intent of protecting it (Rush 2023: 84). Fortunately, in response to lessons learned in Iraq, procedures regarding the establishment of military bases in occupied territories have been updated. Today, it is no longer possible for army units to set up a base in a location without first considering the impact that this could have on the cultural heritage of the area (Rush 2023: 87).

In Iraq, American soldiers also occupied historical buildings, transforming them into headquarters and billeting sites. A remarkable example is represented by two pictures displayed at the temporary exhibition *Richard Mosse: Displaced* (Fondazione MAST, Bologna, 7 May–19 September 2021). The two images show American soldiers in occupation of the Al-Faw Palace in Baghdad – one of Saddam Hussein’s imperial palaces, converted into the US Central Command headquarters, ‘Camp Victory’. The first picture captures an officer smoking a cigar and practising in the gym installed in the Palace’s cloister. The second photograph portrays another American soldier smoking a cigarette from the cloistered balcony overlooking the Palace’s moat (Stahel 2021: 18–20, 140). Other pictures that Mosse took in 2009 in Iraq – not displayed at Fondazione MAST – reproduce the high level of appropriation by American troops of Saddam Hussein’s palaces, transformed into military headquarters (Al-Salam Palace and Al-Faw Palace in Baghdad, and Birthday Palace in Tikrit). They changed the palaces’ appearance by building room partitions to locate dormitories, telephone kiosks and military offices (Manaugh 2009).⁶

All the mentioned occurrences are strikingly similar to the actions of Allied soldiers in Second World War Europe. For instance, as described in the previous section, in Italy troops exploited a high number of historical buildings. Among them, Museo di San Martino and Museo Duca di Martina at Villa Floridiana (Naples). The occupation of the first lasted three years (1943–46). During this period, the museum building suffered enormous consequences from the presence of troops: marble paving slabs were ruined by the frequent

6. The photographs referred to are the following: Richard Mosse, *US-built partition and air conditioning units within Al-Salam Palace, Baghdad, Iraq, 2009*, from the series Breach; Richard Mosse, *US military telephone kiosks built within Birthday Palace Interior, Tikrit, Iraq, 2009*, from the series Breach; Richard Mosse, *American dormitories built within Saddam’s Birthday Palace, Tikrit, Iraq, 2009*, from the series Breach; Richard Mosse, *Provisional office wall partitions within at Al-Faw Palace, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq, 2009*, from the series Breach.

passage of hundreds of soldiers, wagons and motorcycles; partitions for kitchens and toilets were built in the museum rooms; and walls were painted with lime without taking care of architectural and sculptural elements. A similar fate was met by Museo Duca di Martina. Occupied by Allied soldiers from 1943 to 1945, it experienced invasive modifications: showers, sinks and kitchens were placed in rooms decorated with stucco and gilt; electric wires, vents and pipes were installed on walls covered with silk, perforating pavements and painted ceilings; and iron grating was attached to windows (Molajoli 1948).

Thus, Richard Mosse's pictures from Iraq constitute testimonies that history repeats itself, and that many of the lessons learned in Second World War were later forgotten. Nevertheless, the catastrophic outcomes of the lack of military awareness about heritage safekeeping in Iraq later encouraged armies to develop cultural property protection measures in military operations.

Pollard (2020: 216) suggests that the fundamental lessons to be taken from Second World War practices in preventing the exploitation of cultural properties are: securing collections away from troops and civilians; controlling access within the building as well as external entrances through the use of patrolling units and 'off-limits' signs; forbidding mixed occupation of buildings; and avoiding general permissiveness in an early phase of troops' advance in new territories, especially through rigid control over soldiers' actions. Moreover, in a planning operational phase it is necessary to sensitise and educate soldiers on the importance of protecting cultural heritage—especially through awareness-raising campaigns—and to regulate the responsibility of combatant troops towards cultural properties by implementing clear orders as to the military occupation of all the existing typologies of monumental sites (archaeological areas, museums, libraries, archives, historic villas and palaces, etc.). Those regulations should be properly distributed to troops. Moreover, the use of lists like Second World War *Lists of Protected Monuments* is essential. Some steps in this direction have been taken by the Blue Shield, which has provided lists of cultural properties to be protected during the recent conflicts in Libya, Mali, Syria, and Northern Iraq (Stone 2016: 45). Moreover, the Blue Shield International is currently developing, in cooperation with NATO, a template for geospatial data of cultural heritage to be protected in conflict areas (Stone 2022: 196).

Furthermore, the placing of cultural specialists within the army or, better, the establishment of a military unit dedicated to the safeguarding of heritage in the combat field can have a positive effect during conflict. A unit of this kind is essential during the planning of military operations, and subsequently in the war

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field, in preventing art looting, disciplining troops' treatment of heritage and providing first-aid assistance to historical sites damaged by the passage of war.

The establishment of the above-mentioned Blue Shield (formerly known as The International Committee of the Blue Shield) was a step in this direction. It was founded in 1996, within the precepts of the 1954 Hague Convention, by the International Council of Archives (ICA), the International Council of Museums (ICOM), the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA). It is an international non-government organisation – working within the context of the United Nations and following the framework of UNESCO's conventions and cultural property protection strategies – pursuing the safeguarding of world's cultural heritage in the event of armed conflict, and of natural- or human-made disaster. It is composed of thirty national committees, coordinated by the Blue Shield International (Stone 2022: 192). In some way, the Blue Shield assumes some of the functions of the former MFAA. However, the Blue Shield is an independent body, cooperating with army forces in conflict situations.

A military unit more similar to the MFAA was established in September 2018 within the British Army: the Cultural Property Protection Unit (CPPU – see Curtis and Dunkley, this volume). Its tasks comprise preventing and investigating art looting activities; protecting cultural heritage; providing first-aid assistance to damaged cultural properties; and sensitising soldiers about having respect for cultural heritage.⁷ Two years earlier, in February 2016, Italy founded a unit known as 'Unite4Heritage', comprising officers from the Carabinieri TPC (*Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale*), and functionaries from the Italian Ministry of Culture (art historians, curators, architects, etc.). The unit is at disposal of UNESCO for activities in the protection of and first-aid repair to cultural heritage during conflicts and natural disasters. It was first employed in 2016 after a major earthquake that hit Central Italy, and later worked in Mexico, Albania, Croatia and Lebanon.⁸ In April 2022, following the threat posed to cultural heritage during the Ukraine-Russia conflict, Dario Franceschini – the Italian Minister of Culture at that time – reactivated the unit, which changed its name to *Caschi Blu della Cultura*.⁹

7. See <https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2018/11/21/how-the-uk-has-revived-its-monuments-men> (accessed 10 April 2022).

8. See <https://www.com.usi.ch/it/feeds/9421> (accessed 12 April 2022).

9. See <https://www.beniculturali.it/comunicato/dm-128-31032022-task-force-caschi-blu-della-cultura> (accessed 7 May 2022).

As a matter of fact, Italy has been pioneering in the creation of a military body specifically dedicated to the protection of cultural heritage in danger. As early as 1969, they created the above-mentioned Carabinieri TPC unit. The unit today works primarily in Italy in countering the illicit trafficking of objects, in combatting forgery, in prosecutions over damage to monuments and in first-aid assistance to heritage after natural disasters, but it has also been deployed overseas during armed conflicts and has provided training for several other nations' military forces (Rush and Millington 2015: 11–12; Stone 2022: 198). The Carabinieri TPC unit is defined by Rush and Millington (2015: 1) as 'the most effective military policing force in the world for protecting works of art and archaeological property', because 'there is no other force that can match the operational organisation, range of expertise, capabilities, nor the record of Carabinieri TPC accomplishment'. Italy was the first country in the world to establish such a unit dedicated exclusively to the protection of cultural heritage from any form of risk (Rush and Millington 2015: 7).

As far as the United States are concerned, the US Army organises cultural property protection training for Civil Affairs personnel through the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative. This, in collaboration with the US Committee of the Blue Shield, has provided guidance to more than 500 soldiers. Cultural property protection training includes study of the 1954 Hague Convention, information on basic object conservation, and lectures on archaeological history. In Fall 2020, the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative established the Army Monuments Officer Training (AMOT) thanks to a Memorandum of Understanding with the US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne). The training programme is specifically addressed to Army Reserve Civil Affairs Soldiers.¹⁰ In addition to this, at Fort Drum, Army Archaeologist Laurie Rush provides cultural property training opportunities for the 10th Mountain Division, the National Guard and Reserve Units, in terms of both subject matter expertise and on-site cultural property archaeology training (Rush 2023: 84). A summary of other Countries' approaches to capabilities within military formations can be found elsewhere (see, for example, Rush 2019) and papers from British, French, US and Dutch Officers can be found within this volume. More recently, on 26th October 2023, the press service for Ukraine's Territorial Defence Forces (part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) reported that a new Unit comprising both military personnel and civilians has been created to address the preservation of cultural heritage as part of a pilot

10. See <https://culturalrescue.si.edu/what-we-do/resilience/military-training/> (accessed 11 February 2023).

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project (Ukrainska Pravda 2023). The Unit will be deployed in areas where hostilities are currently underway and in grey zones, and will be tasked with monitoring damage to cultural heritage sites in order to gather evidence for the International Criminal Court (see also see Curtis and Dunkley, this volume).

The path to the final recognition of the importance of preserving cultural heritage during military operations today is lengthy. Nevertheless, the steps forward taken in the last decade through learning lessons from Second World War practices provide hope that progress will not take long.

Scope and aims

In drawing together a number of studies on heritage and warfare spanning a long period of time (from 70 CE with the Roman-Jewish War, through the twentieth century and the Second World War, to 2022 with the illegal and unprovoked Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine), this volume aims to draw guidance from past experiences for the implementation of cultural property protection strategies for the present, and to investigate how the military and the heritage sector can successfully work to protect cultural property from the risks of direct ground attack today.

The book is divided into two sections. The first, *Learning from the Past*, analyses case studies from previous conflicts which highlight interdisciplinary efforts to protect heritage, and traces successes and failures in the safekeeping of cultural property during the Roman-Jewish war, the Second World War and more recent conflicts. It begins with an analysis by Malmquist on early Imperial Roman attitudes toward cultural heritage during armed conflict, examined through the burning of the Second Temple during the First Roman-Jewish War (70 CE). The second paper moves attention towards the Second World War, with Coccoli presenting an investigation into the Allied Army's programme to limit war damage to Italy's cultural heritage, reflecting on its effectiveness and limitations. The first section also addresses issues relating to cultural property protection in more recent conflicts. Curtis and Dunkley acknowledge that it is a reality that armed conflict may result in the destruction of cultural heritage. As the law obliges UK Defence to conduct Cultural Property Protection during armed conflict and belligerent occupation, this chapter sets out how the UK Ministry of Defence is delivering on its obligations within the context of Human Security. With particular reference to the Korean Peninsula, Chang-hun explores how cultural property can be protected in the event of armed conflict on the Peninsula. Through lessons from the Korean War and experiences after the armistice agreement, Chang-hun presents the roles of cultural

administration, armed forces and a military museum. Finally, Mol sets out to shed light on current scientific understanding of ballistic damage, long-term stone deterioration and the outlook for long-term stability of an affected site. This knowledge can be used to inform forensic investigations of armed conflict damage to built heritage.

The second section, *Preparing for the Present*, investigates the role of the heritage sector and the military in protecting cultural heritage during conflict today, establishing the importance of advance planning operations. The section opens with an analysis by Petersen on how the work of Cultural Property Protection has evolved in the Dutch military, and what efforts are being made to improve international and civil-military collaboration. Tevzadvze addresses the emergency preparedness measures undertaken in the museum of the war affected town of Gori. The presented case features the multitude of efforts, such as developing a DRM plan, planning and implementing training and creating digital inventories, led by Blue Shield Georgia in cooperation with museum staff and involving an array of local and national stakeholders. Le Berre reviews how the French Army, through its military curator branch, has a long history when it comes to better protecting cultural heritage during military operations. This expertise has been revived to better respond to the challenges of today's conflicts. Sadik Aly explores how the last two decades have revealed that heritage is a main target and a vital element in conflict dynamics, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (MENAP) region, and that providing protection measures is not the complete solution to creating resilience, promoting recovery and bringing about peace. Building on this, Rapley examines how the V&A Culture in Crisis programme brings together those with a shared interest in protecting cultural heritage, providing a forum for sharing information, inspiring and supporting action and raising public awareness. The chapter also explains how curatorial colleagues work closely to support law enforcement – both nationally and internationally – and the British Armed Forces to develop strategies to prevent the illicit trade of cultural goods.

Overall, this edited volume considers how, throughout history, cultural heritage has been systematically targeted for several reasons, and what might be done to reduce the risk of heritage destruction today. It analyses the past to find possible solutions that can be applied to the present and future. It also acknowledges the degree to which the cultural property protection field has embraced change to improve practice and implementation.

This volume is therefore important because it discusses how past experiences can work as historical lessons for the implementation of cultural property

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protection strategies for the present to reduce the risk of damage to cultural heritage in time of war. Three crucial points emerge. Firstly, the fundamental role that the military has in protecting cultural property during conflict and in limiting the further destruction of cultural heritage and the illicit trafficking of artworks and artefacts. Secondly, the primary importance of advance planning in improving effective cultural property protection measures. Thirdly, the crucial significance of establishing fruitful cooperation between governments, military authorities and heritage practitioners before, during and after a conflict situation, so as to facilitate the safeguarding of cultural property.

Despite these important considerations, the debate around possible solutions in limiting heritage destruction during conflict does not stop here. This is an ongoing discussion that should be constantly updated, taking into consideration new threats to cultural heritage that come out from contemporary conflicts. The hope is that, as 2024 marks the seventieth anniversary of the 1954 Hague Convention, more countries will ratify it and its Protocols, and more military and heritage bodies – along with governmental institutions – will be sensitised to the importance of developing cultural property protection policies during conflict, embedding them firmly within activities related to Human Security. The full and proper implementation of the Convention still has a long way to go.

One feature of heritage protection that this book does not address is an assessment of the impact of artificial intelligence (AI), augmented reality and machine-learning on the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict. There are lessons from the heritage and archaeological community that can be brought to bear here: the European Parliamentary Research Service has addressed new opportunities posed by AI with research showing that AI was able to assist in the reconstruction of Rembrandt's famous painting 'The Night Watch' and helped complete Beethoven's unfinished Tenth Symphony (European Parliament 2023: 3). The implications for cultural heritage in conflict could include automatic damage assessment through a comparison of digital terrain-type models, the use of autonomous survey vehicles to assist with reconstruction programmes and predictive modelling. Such technologies are already in play and include the Ukrainian project 'Scan UA', a volunteer-based digital scanning project, which is generating AI-powered modelling through a standard digital camera fitted to a quadcopter to capture 3-D models of historic objects and structures.¹¹ Examples include the Voznesens'ka church, Lukashivka, damaged by artillery

11. See <https://scanua.com>

on 23 April 2022. The implications for effects-measurement and battle-damage assessment to the military mind are obvious.¹²

As well as the 1954 Hague Convention now being seventy years old, in January 1954, engineers from Bell Labs and the US Army built the first computer without vacuum tubes. Known as TRADIC (the TRAnsistorized DIgital Computer), the machine could perform a million logical operations every second, operating on less than 100 watts of power. Computing power has since advanced faster and further than humanity's ability to prevent conflict and warfare but, in June 2023, as an experiment, ChatGPT-3.5 (an AI-powered language model) was asked by one of the editors of this book to create a sonnet based on the destruction of cultural heritage in conflict – the result is presented below. What is significant in the poetry produced by ChatGPT is the clear connection between tangible cultural artefacts and the intangible human mourning of loss for those artefacts. Even to artificial intelligence, then, cultural loss is equated with human emotion, thus forging the link between cultural heritage and human security in both the real and the virtual worlds.

Shattered Beauty: On War's Cultural Cost

*In shadowed days, when drums of war resound,
A tragic symphony of loss unfurls,
Where flames of hatred burn, and skies astound,
Cultural treasures perish as the world hurls.*

*Where statues stood, majestic and sublime,
Now stands a void, a void of history's breath,
Gone are the whispers from a bygone time,
As sorrow weaves its mournful dirge, a death.*

*A thousand tales engraved on ancient walls,
Reduced to ash by violence's cruel flame,
The echoes of the past forever stalls,
In hearts that weep, lamenting what we blame.*

*Oh, how we yearn for wisdom's sacred grace,
To shield and save, preserving every trace.*

12. See, for example, UK Joint Doctrine Note 1/23: *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance* (MOD 2023)

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*Yet still, amidst the ruins, hope shall rise,
From shards and fragments, strength begins to soar,
With steadfast hearts, we'll seek to harmonize,
The threads of heritage that we adore.*

*We'll stand as guardians, unwavering, strong,
Rebuilding what was lost, piece by sacred piece,
For culture's essence should forever belong,
To future generations, bound by peace.*

*Though scars remain, we'll mend them, hand in hand,
Inscribed in stone, the promise to restore,
To honour those who perished in this land,
Their legacy reborn, forevermore.*

*Let history be a testament to learn,
From devastation, unity we'll earn.¹³*

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PART I. LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Chapter 1.

ROME AND THE SECOND TEMPLE: EARLY IMPERIAL ROMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CULTURAL HERITAGE DURING ARMED CONFLICT

Kevin Malmquist

Introduction

We can trace the relationship between cultural property and warfare back over 4,500 years (Bahrani 2017); however, the overwhelming majority of scholarship discussing this important intersection gravitates toward contemporary examples, anchored predominantly by cases after the 1954 Hague Convention, and even more so from the last thirty years.¹ Cultural Property Protection practitioners and scholars have good reason to focus on modern examples, given that the character of war and the legal landscape have drastically changed over the last century. The air domain is just over 100 years old, and the space and cyber domains are still in their infancy, to say nothing of the monumental changes in the land and maritime domains. While the 1899 Hague Convention was the first international legislation to codify the protection of cultural property, it was only in the 1954 Hague Convention that the legal apparatuses began to evolve and these have grown substantially in breadth and depth over the last seventy years. The rapidly changing military and legal situations have resulted in even more narrow approaches that dominate the field and focus on conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans over the last thirty years.

This focus, while utilitarian and understandable, cedes the exploration of questions about the nature of warfare and the role of cultural property

1. Bahrani discusses a 4,500-year-old Mesopotamian monument that describes an oath taken by two warring parties not to harm the monument.

in conflict throughout time. If the nature of war is constant, as Carl von Clausewitz argued (Clausewitz 1989: 75), can examples from a time before codified international law, when the character of war was vastly different from the modern cases that dominate the conversation, offer insights and lessons to practitioners and scholars alike? An examination of early Imperial Roman attitudes toward cultural heritage during armed conflict, through the example of the burning of the Second Temple during the First Roman-Jewish War (70 CE), will demonstrate that the Roman relationship with cultural property in the context of war was subject to many of the same factors that influence modern conflict. At the centre of the intersection between war and cultural property was, and remains, military necessity. A concept at odds with the laws to which it is attached, a better understanding of the role military necessity plays in the clash of wills offers lessons and perspective on how the military practitioner sees and interacts with cultural property.

The Burning of the Second Temple during the First Roman-Jewish War offers a unique example of cultural property destruction during armed conflict. While there is evidence of several instances in the ancient world, such as the destruction of the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem by the Babylonians, the burning of the Acropolis in Athens by the Persians, and the burning of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus during one of Rome's civil wars, only the Jewish War has the depth, breadth and context necessary for an in-depth examination of Roman attitudes toward cultural property during armed conflict. The details of the First Roman-Jewish War are primarily preserved in two pieces, *The Jewish War* and *Antiquities of the Jews*, both authored by the Jewish priest and general turned Roman historian, Flavius Josephus. While other ancient texts and archaeological items illuminate what we know about this event, our understanding would be severely limited without Josephus.

Roman attitudes toward cultural property in warfare were grounded in what was and was not permissible in the context of the laws and customs of war and military necessity. While it is difficult to say anything with an abundance of confidence regarding the laws of warfare in ancient Rome, there is sufficient evidence that indicates that Roman custom permitted the destruction of cultural property. To some extent, it was expected. Additionally, the principle of military necessity played a central role in forming the Roman attitude toward the Temple. While the Romans did not use this term, the 2015 NATO definition, 'the principle whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any measures that are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation and that are not forbidden by the Law of War', (NATOTermOTAN 2022)

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could have been applied seamlessly to the situation in Jerusalem. The tactical situation dictated the need to capture the Temple, although its destruction was unnecessary to conclude the Siege of Jerusalem successfully.

Josephus, as a historian, presents an interesting problem since he began the war as a Judean priest and general and ended the war under the patronage of the Flavians; hence the name by which we refer to him, Flavius Josephus. This switching of sides and the backing of the family that came to rule the Roman Empire while the war continued to rage in Judea has led many scholars to question how much we can trust Josephus as a source. The literature on Josephus is considerable and has proliferated over the last fifty years. This growth is primarily because of reconsideration of the validity of Josephus as a source, not only for the First Roman-Jewish War but for much of what he discusses across all four of his works: *Jewish War*, *The Life of Flavius Josephus*, *Antiquities of the Jews* and *Against Apion*. Before the 1970s, the negative perception of Josephus, what scholar Per Bilde described as the *classical conception of Josephus*, asserted that his output was a sloppy conglomeration of other people's work that could not be relied on because he was a Flavian lackey (Bilde 1988: 128). When considering the First Roman-Jewish War, scholars who favour this view tend to prefer versions of events as other ancient authors portray, wherever available.

Researchers began reconsidering some of these long-held beliefs at the end of the twentieth century. One of the earliest and most pivotal reconsiderations was Tessa Rajak's 1983 *Josephus: The Historian and His Society*, which convincingly argued for the validity of several parts of Josephus' work. New interpretations counter the 'propaganda lackey' theme by pointing out several areas of *Jewish War* and his other works that were unflattering to the Romans and Flavians (Gruen 2011). They also point out that, since the work was published recently after the war, the historical accuracy that Josephus claims to adhere to is believable since contemporary witnesses would have been able to challenge his claims (Josephus 2017, 1.1–30). With this change, the number of scholars who receive Josephus favourably has begun to shift (Mason 2016a: 17). Many have come to accept that there is much valuable information in his works and that we must approach each part with equal scepticism while acknowledging that flaws and faults in one part do not devalue others. We now have various edited volumes that dissect Josephus' work in minute detail, evaluating the writing, themes, reception and other topics.

Using ancient texts to establish precisely what happened naturally rests on several assumptions concerning the relationship between the historical event and the historical text. This chapter's preference for the work of Josephus

is based heavily on the temporal closeness of the events and the publication of the work. Even where we may be more sceptical about the factual nature of specific passages where Josephus relays information that he likely did not witness, such as speeches, events relating to the Jews inside the city and events after his departure from Judea, they are worth considering since they represent his contemporary interpretation of events.

The laws of war

Ancient sources provide numerous examples of laws, rules and customs, but to what extent those examples represent universally enforced dicta should be severely scrutinised. Even without the confidence necessary to assert that any particular rule of warfare was completely, or even preponderantly, enforced, an examination of what ancient authors had to say reveals that Roman laws of war did impact their attitude toward cultural property during warfare.

The ancient world did not possess a body to create and enforce international law. Despite this absence, Rome and many of the entities with which it interacted seem to have shared a common understanding regarding certain topics, specifically regarding the conduct of warfare (Watson 1993: XII).² The phrases *iure belli*, *iura belli* and *lege belli*, translated into variations of ‘laws of war’, appear in numerous ancient texts by at least 28 authors.³ While no comprehensive list of laws appears to have existed, we can begin to glean a few things by examining these various references.

Generally, the language used when referring to the laws of war indicates two essential things. First, Rome and most of its allies and enemies commonly recognised the laws. A prime example is an excerpt from the Peace of Apamea, Rome’s treaty with Antiochus III, which stated that,

In the case of any allies of the Roman people attacking Antiochus without cause, he shall have the right to fend off force with force, provided that he neither hold in subjection any city under the rules of war nor accept any in an alliance. The two parties shall settle their differences by legal and judicial procedure or, if both agree, by war (Livy 1936: 38.38.16).

The general use of the phrase ‘rules of war’ in what is effectively a piece of international law, indicates a common understanding of the use of that phrase across boundaries. Livy explicitly stated that the Roman consul and King An-

2. Watson argued that war was the primary space for international law.

3. English and Latin searches on various permutations of the phrases ‘iure belli’ and ‘laws of war’ using the Loeb Classical Library Online yielded 87 references by 28 authors.

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tiochus III swore oaths to uphold the treaty, but he did not mention how the treaty would be disseminated to Rome's allies. Presuming that Rome would have made this treaty known to its allies, the allies' assumed observance of the rule of war referenced in the treaty indicates a common understanding, if not adherence to it. How widely any laws or rules of war were followed is difficult, if not impossible, to determine, but transmission throughout the Roman sphere of influence can be safely assumed.

Second, the laws provided for what was permissible rather than forbidden. We often see concepts such as 'right' or 'permitted' used in conjunction with references to the laws, and in many cases, the phrase is translated as 'right of war'. For example, in Josephus' *Antiquities*, we read, 'but Elisha prevented him from doing this, saying that it was right to kill those who were captured by the law of war' (Josephus 1937: 9.58). Another example can be found in Suetonius' *Lives of the Caesars*, in which it is clear that, because of the laws of war, Nero was permitted to pillage wealthy Gallic provinces that had risen against him (Suetonius 1914: 40.4). Having laws provide for what was permissible rather than forbidden stands in stark contrast to current international laws of warfare, which focus as much on what is outlawed as what is acceptable.

Most of the references to laws of war found in the ancient sources dealt with the aftermath of battle, especially the treatment of prisoners and the distribution of spoils. These references often arose in the texts as part of debates or discussions and were stated as reminders that territory was conquered per the laws of war or that the laws of war permitted the killing or enslavement of prisoners. The non-extant nature of a comprehensive list, the universality of the laws and the permissible nature as opposed to the prohibitive seem to indicate that these laws were understood widely enough not to require codification and that they were likely driven by some cultural or social morality that negated the need to prohibit specific actions (Cicero 1913: 2.69).⁴

The rules of war regarding siege warfare were clear enough and, in the same way that the victor of a battle was afforded nearly 'anything in his victory', once the siege had become violent, the besiegers had the right to commit almost any act of violence they chose. Once a city was besieged, the defenders typically had the option to surrender under terms as long as the besieger had not yet attacked the walls with a ram, any other siege instrument or troops (Levithan 2013: 75–76). After that point, however, the besieged population could only hope for the kind of mercy that Cicero advocated for in his discus-

4. Cicero's discussion on the distinction between civil law and moral law, while not related to the laws of warfare, may support this idea.

sion of duties owed to those who have wronged the Romans: 'Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even though the battering-ram has hammered at their walls' (Cicero 1913: 1.35). Despite the free hand afforded to the victors of a siege, custom may have provided some additional consideration for religious sites.

The references concerning the treatment of holy sites in conquest are far less clear than those concerning sieges, captives' treatment and property seizure. Two opposing views exist in the sources, one by Josephus, supported by a story from Livy, and the opposite view proffered by Polybius. In Josephus' *Jewish War*, there are two examples where the Temple's destruction was discussed in terms of the laws of war. The first example came during a war council held by the Roman general and future emperor, Titus, before the final attack on the Temple Mount. He queried the leaders that he gathered and asked them their opinion on how to handle the Temple: 'some took the view that the usual rule of war should be enforced, as there would be no end to Jewish revolts as long as the temple still stood as a rallying point for Jews all over the world' (Josephus 2017: 6.239). The second example came during a speech where Titus pleaded with the rebel leaders to surrender after the Temple had been destroyed, pointing out that 'when I was coming close to the temple I deliberately ignored the usual rules of war' (Josephus 2017: 6.346). After rejecting Titus' terms, but asking for safe passage out of the city, Titus, then enraged, committed to applying all the rules of war and permitted his troops to burn and sack the city. It is clear from these two stories that the destruction of the Temple was permissible by the rules of war. They can be further interpreted in the extreme that the destruction of temples was not only permitted but also required.

In Livy, we find the story of a heated confrontation between Marcus Fulvius Nobilior and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus over Fulvius' sack of Ambracia, which supports Josephus' take on the law of war. The Romans laid siege to Ambracia, but the conflict ended with peace terms. When the Romans entered the city, they stripped the city's temples and palaces of their statues and paintings to be carried back to Rome (Livy 1976a: 38.9). In defence of Nobilior's behaviour, Senator Gaius Flaminius exclaimed that these actions were 'usually done when cities are captured' (Livy, 1976a: 39.4).⁵ Nobilior also defended himself by comparing his treatment of Ambracia to the treatment of Syracuse and other

5. It should be noted that a group of Ambraciotes brought on the case against Nobilior at the behest of Lepidus, who harboured a personal grudge against Nobilior.

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captured towns where no issue arose due to the despoilation of enemy temples (Livy 1976a: 39.4). While this example is focused on the plunder of religious sites rather than their outright destruction, the story provides an example outside of Josephus to add some weight to his perspective on how sacred sites could be treated after a successful siege, even when it ended peacefully. It also expands the period in which we should consider these laws and rules to have been in effect since the story being described occurred in 187 BCE.⁶

These three examples are further supported by events such as the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BCE. The cities, including the temples and holy sites, were effectively destroyed in both cases (Cassius Dio 1914: 8.89, 8.127). Combined, these examples make the case that during warfare, particularly when dealing with the siege of a city, the sacred places and temples within were fair game for plunder and destruction. However, Polybius argued that this may not have been the case, or at least that temple looting and destruction should have been frowned upon.

In his *Histories*, Polybius provided a digression on the treatment of holy sites concerning Philip V's war against the Aetolians. Polybius connected Philip's actions to previous incidents involving the Aetolians. In Book Four, he described how they had sacked the city of Dium and burned 'the colonnade round the sanctuary and destroy[ed] all the other monuments of piety' (Polybius 2011a: 4.62). Later, Polybius explained how they destroyed the temple to Zeus in Dodona, asserting that 'we may say that for the Aetolians no restrictions exist either in peace or war, but that in both circumstances they pursue their designs in defiance of the common usages and principles of mankind' (Polybius 2011a: 4.67). Polybius seemed to have claimed that the destruction of temples fell outside common practice and basic humanity.

Later on in Book Five, while discussing Philip V's war against the Aetolians, Polybius noted that most of Philip's campaign was right by the laws of war; however, he castigated Philip severely for his destruction of temples, religious votives and statues, further noting that he only spared those statues which depicted or were dedicated to gods (Polybius 2011b: 5.9). He then described how Philip's ancestors treated temples respectfully during their sieges to draw a stark comparison (Polybius 2011b: 5.9-12). Polybius' point is best demonstrated in one passage:

6. Livy wrote at the end of the last century BCE, so it is possible that his understanding of the laws of warfare was influenced by the laws of his own time. Even then, it demonstrates that these rules were prevalent before the First Jewish War. If they do reflect the laws of the period that his history discusses, this demonstrates even greater continuity over time.

For it is one thing to seize on and destroy the enemy's forts, harbours, cities, men, ships, crops and other things of a like nature, by depriving him of which we weaken him, while strengthening our own resources and furthering our plans: all these indeed are measures forced on us by the usages and laws of war. But to do wanton damage to temples, statues and all such works with absolutely no prospect of any resulting advantage in the war to our own cause or detriment to that of the enemy must be characterised as the work of a frenzied mind at the height of its fury (Polybius 2011b: 5.11).

Polybius did not assert that destroying temples was against the law of war but simply a lousy practice. Indeed, he noted that, on account of their behaviour at Dium and Dodona, the Aetolians would have been aware that 'Philip was now at liberty to do exactly what he wished, and even if he acted most ruthlessly would be held to have done right as far at least as concerned themselves.'⁷ While the law of war permitted the destruction of temples, Polybius believed that common practice and basic humanity should have preserved them (Polybius 2012: 23.15; Walbank 1957: 549).⁸ The question remains to what extent others shared Polybius' point of view.

A final note on the rules of warfare is that they were always flexible and often breakable. In the absence of a body to enforce them, other than the peerage of the generals typically debated in the Senate, there were few means to hold anyone accountable. The example found in Livy, discussed above, demonstrates how politics interacted with the laws of warfare (Livy 1976a: 31.30).⁹ Acting under the rules of war, as they were widely understood, might still result in a spirited debate in the Senate. Political manoeuvrings, both internally within the Roman political sphere and externally as they interacted with other political entities, meant that the enforcement of any particular law might have been utterly disregarded, or acts of violence within the laws and customs of warfare might be punished despite their legality. While it is difficult to say anything

7. Polybius likely meant to assert that Philip was at liberty to destroy Aetolian temples as recompense for the destruction at Dium and Dodona, but it seems clear that, taken altogether, the rules of warfare permitted the destruction of temples.

8. It is worth noting that Polybius was against any wanton destruction that did not advance the war's aims, but only if the enemy was Greek. Barbarians did not merit the same treatment.

9. Another example bears mentioning, which helps illustrate this point further. In this passage, both the Romans and the Athenians (at the behest of the Romans) accepted that certain of Philip's behaviours, such as burning crops, destroying homes, and carrying off men and livestock, were acceptable, but they levied a grievance against Philip for destroying tombs and temples. It seems as though the Romans were happy to flexibly interpret the limits of the laws of war to fit their goals.

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with an abundance of confidence, some basic rules regarding sieges and the treatment of sacred sites are concrete enough to understand the Romans' expectations regarding them during the Siege of Jerusalem.

Military necessity

Military necessity was the second major factor that governed Roman attitudes toward cultural property during warfare. Military necessity was and remains a driving force in military operations. The nature of war is that it is 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will' (Clausewitz 1989: 75). As such, a commander will 'apply any measures that are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation' (NATOTermOTAN 2022). The example of the Temple provides a superior example of this concept in action. The geography of Jerusalem and the Jewish rebels' decision to turn the Temple into a fortress made the Temple a military objective and caused the Roman army to attack it. As will be shown, there was a genuine military necessity to attack the Temple; however, there was no military necessity to burn it.

Jerusalem was composed of several districts that developed as the city expanded. Walls were built around these districts, resulting in a defensive layout that created something akin to defence-in-depth. To take the entire city, one would have to conduct multiple sieges to take each part. Titus built five sets of siege ramps to attack various parts of the city throughout the nearly five-month-long siege.¹⁰ The city's most prominent feature was undoubtedly the Temple complex, situated high on the Temple Mount, overlooking the entire city. From this position, it commanded the whole city. As such, as long as the Temple complex remained in enemy hands, the Romans would be subjected to attack from above from hand-thrown missiles, spear-throwers, catapults, and stone-throwers (Josephus 2017: 5.13–14).

Before the siege, the city was dominated by three independent parties of rebels led by three men named Eleazar, John and Simon. Eleazar controlled the inner portions of the Temple, John controlled the remainder of the Temple complex, including the Temple's outer courts, and Simon controlled the Upper City and portions of the Lower City. Josephus described each of their positions in tactical relationship to the other, noting that John had an inferior position to Eleazar but a superior position to Simon (Josephus 2017: 5.12–13). Each faction could attack the other successfully, particularly with artillery devices.

10. For a detailed map including the location of the Roman siege ramps, see Mason, 2016b: 437.

John's men could inflict casualties inside the Temple, even killing several non-combatants that Eleazar had permitted to make sacrifices, but John suffered more casualties due to the inferior elevation of his position (Josephus, 2017: 5.14–18). This demonstrates that if rebels held the high ground, the Romans would have, at best, a tenuous hold on the city.

Another comment from Josephus drives home the tactical necessity of controlling the Temple complex; when explaining Titus' plan to capture the Antonia Fortress to access the Temple Mount, he pointed out that 'if the temple was not secured any hold on the town could only be precarious' (Josephus 2017: 5.357). Furthermore, the Temple complex was a citadel, a veritable fortress with walls, towers and gates. Thanks to the Temple's extensive supply of provisions meant as offerings, belligerents may have resisted from within the Temple for a long time (Josephus 2017: 5.8). Despite the consecrated nature of these goods, the rebels had little difficulty justifying their consumption, viewing themselves as protectors of the Temple and thusly entitled to its fruits.¹¹ Thus, the Temple complex and the Temple itself were tactical targets that threatened the Romans; as long as the rebels held them and used them as defensive structures, there was a clear military necessity to capture the Temple complex. As long as the rebels ensconced themselves within, a direct attack was the only viable method of capture.

It is possible that the Temple could have been besieged for an extended period with the hope of starving the rebels out and forcing them to accept terms of surrender, thus sparing the Temple from a direct assault, but several factors made this an unpalatable option for the Romans. First, Titus and the Romans had been besieging Jerusalem for four months when they began their attack on the Temple complex. The pressure and stress the troops were under and their desire to end the siege would have made an additional prolonged siege to starve out the rebels challenging to sustain. While the city had experienced widespread famine, it is likely that the rebels within the Temple could still draw on the Temple's provisions for some time. Second, the Romans would have been attacked from the Temple, just as Simon and John had been while Eleazar controlled it. Third, the Romans did not control the entire city yet, so they would have had to continue the siege while being attacked from other parts of the city. Subduing the rest of the city would have involved other hurdles,

11. Here, Josephus mentions abundant supplies of wine and oil inside the Temple. Earlier, he mentioned that access to water had been an issue before the Romans arrived but, once they did, the springs began to flow again, providing the Romans with ample water (*War* 5.409). It is unclear what the sanitation situation was for those ensconced on the Temple Mount. *War* 5.563–565.

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including other impressive defensive positions in the Upper City, namely the famous towers Phasaël, Hippicus, Mariamme and Herod's Palace. The rebels only gave up these highly defensible positions after the sack of the Temple, and it would have proved exceedingly difficult to besiege them while the Temple remained in rebel hands. In fact, Josephus claimed that the towers could never have been taken with military force and that 'only starvation could have overcome them' (Josephus 2017: 6.399). Lastly, Titus was likely intent on finishing the siege and quelling the rebellion in Judea as rapidly as possible. His father, Vespasian, had only recently ascended the throne, and civil war still lingered in parts of the empire (Tacitus 2009: books IV and V *passim*). The political capital and legitimacy that would be gained by ending the rebellion and the ability to redeploy forces as necessary would have provided adequate incentive to end the siege as rapidly as possible. Thus, a prolonged siege of the Temple complex was not a viable course of action for the Romans, and an attack was the only alternative.

Titus and the Temple

Interpretations of Roman laws of war and tactical analysis of the Siege of Jerusalem offer significant insight into Roman attitudes toward cultural property during armed conflict, but Josephus also provides numerous direct discussions about the destruction of the Temple, which offer rich contrast to both law and military necessity. One of the continuing debates surrounding the destruction of the Temple is about whether Titus had planned to destroy or preserve it. There are at least fifteen examples in *Jewish War* where Josephus related information that indicated Titus' desire to preserve the Temple and at least five that may be interpreted as his desire to destroy it. These cases are not all contradictory to each other. Instead, they reflect the emotional turmoil of the siege, to which Titus was not immune.

From the beginning of *Jewish War*, Josephus asserted that Titus delayed his attacks on the city multiple times to allow the rebel Jews to change their minds and that, when the Temple was burned, it was against his wishes (Josephus 2017: 1.9–11, 1.27–28). Throughout books five and six, which primarily concern the Siege of Jerusalem, numerous other instances were offered to describe how Titus wanted to preserve the Temple and how the Romans had always respected their enemies' religions, leaving their shrines untouched as they admired them from afar (Josephus 2017: 5.333–334, 5.363, 5.409, 6.112–123). More extreme offers were made as well; at several points, Titus asked the rebels to come out from the city with as many men as they wanted

to conduct a fight away from the Temple, the city and its people (Josephus 2017: 6.95, 6.118–120, 6.128). While it is possible that Titus merely wished to goad the rebels into fighting a pitched battle on open ground, which would almost certainly have favoured the well-trained Roman legions, the message that Josephus relayed was consistent.

One of the more debated parts of this narrative is Titus' war council concerning the Temple shortly before its destruction. This event has been interpreted differently by subsequent ancient authors.¹² With an assault on the Temple forthcoming, Titus gathered the leaders of his army to discuss how to handle the Temple. Some argued for destroying the Temple outright, asserting it would be a focal point of Jewish rebellion as long as it stood. Others stated that it should be preserved as long as the rebels did not use it for defensive purposes, but, if they did, it would no longer be a temple but rather a fortress and thus have to be destroyed. Titus, however, thought that, regardless of the rebels' use of the Temple as a fortress, they would not destroy it (Josephus 2017: 6.236–243).

Despite his wishes, Roman soldiers set the Temple ablaze in the ensuing struggle to put out flames that had been lit the day before to destroy the gates to the Temple. Upon hearing this, Titus is said to have rushed from his tent to attempt to stop the fire. Josephus described Titus frantically running around the Temple area and trying to prevent it from being burnt further, which ultimately failed as the inner sanctuary began to burn. What is striking about this story is that Titus allegedly made desperate pleas to his troops to help stop the fire, but this went unnoticed by the soldiers as they fought (Josephus 2017: 6.256, 6.265–266). The idea of troops ignoring their general is curious, especially since they would typically do anything they could to stand out for recognition from their commander. J.E. Lendon argued that soldiers in this period would have been motivated by a deep sense of competition with their fellow soldiers, doing whatever they could to earn personal glory on the battlefield (Lendon 2005: 242–55). Several anecdotes support this concept in Josephus. During the attack on the second wall, Josephus noted that 'With the Romans the incentive to courageous performance were their usual experience of victory and unfamiliarity with defeat, their constant campaigns and continuous training, and above all the presence of Titus, there for all of them always and everywhere' (Josephus 2017: 5.310–316). Here, the presence of Titus and the possibility that he would be aware of a man's courage was enough to motivate the legionar-

12. For a detailed analysis of the various versions of Titus' war council, see Mason 2016: 490–98; Severus 2015: 157–58.

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ies to ‘extravagant displays of prowess’.¹³ It is also worth noting that Josephus portrayed Titus as very direct with his troops. On numerous occasions, Titus was shown to issue orders directly to his men rather than delegating them to his subordinate officers.¹⁴ How likely is it, then, that these same soldiers would disobey Titus when he was right in the middle of the action?

Furthermore, the nature of Roman military discipline, or at least its most idyllic form, makes it less plausible that Titus’ troops ignored him. A story in Livy, written less than a century before the sack of Jerusalem, conveyed what might be considered the ideal conception of military discipline (Brand 1968: 59–60). Livy described the execution of Titus Manlius, the son of the consul Titus Manlius Torquatus, after the son ignored the orders of his father, the consul (Livy 1982: 8.6–7). Regardless of whether or not the story was true, it conveyed what Livy believed was the ideal conception of Roman military discipline. If this ideal held any weight at the time of Livy’s writing or during the Siege of Jerusalem, it is difficult to think that Titus’s legions would have ignored him so brazenly.

However, this was not the first time the Roman troops had disobeyed Titus. There are seven other examples of indiscipline, five before the burning of the Temple and two after (Josephus 2017: 5.76–81, 5.91–94, 5.113–129, 5.293–295, 6.179–182, 6.284, 6.415). For example, at an earlier part of the siege, some Romans fell victim to a ruse and were baited into attacking despite being ordered to remain in place by Titus (Josephus 2017: 5.109–127). The Roman folly resulted in several casualties, and those who survived were only spared death sentences because of Titus’ mercy. Roman discipline was not as perfect as its most idyllic representations, either during the First Roman-Jewish War or in Roman military history more broadly. Scholar Lee L. Brice identified 72 examples of military indiscipline over sixty years, from 90 BCE to 30 BCE (Brice 2020a: 247–248). While he noted that this figure exceeded that of any previous century, it is clear that the Roman legions were not the obedient automata that Livy or our popular conceptions might hope to believe them to have been.¹⁵ It is possible that the burning of the Temple represented one of these lapses in discipline.

13. Additional examples of individual and group courage enhanced by Titus’ presence can be found in *War*, 6.54–57, 6.81–88, and 6.142–143.

14. Examples of Titus directly commanding or issuing orders can be found in *War* 5.81–82, 5.96–97 and 5.295.

15. For more on Roman military indiscipline, see also Brice, 2020b.

Josephus asserted as much in his description of the sack of the Temple. After Titus arrived and commanded his troops to extinguish the flames, Josephus exclaimed that ‘his voice was drowned in the greater din filling their ears, and his hand signals went unnoticed by men concentrating on the fight or the satisfaction of their rage. When the legions poured in, no persuasion or threat could stop their intent—passion alone was their commander’ (Josephus 2017: 6.256–257). This was only in response to fire catching in the rooms lining the inner sanctuary, not the sanctuary itself. At this point, Titus, seeing that the sanctuary was not on fire, took the time to enter the building and see what was inside. After that, Titus, realising that the sanctuary could still be saved, allegedly made personal appeals to his troops to extinguish the flames. According to Josephus, ‘respect for Caesar or fear of the officer ordering them back was eclipsed by the men’s fury, their detestation of the Jews, and a lust for battle yet more consuming than either’ (Josephus 2017: 6.261–263).

This kind of fury was not uncommon in siege warfare. Joshua Levithan discussed how in siege warfare the sieging troops were wound up like a ratchet with the stress of conducting the siege.¹⁶ Typically, the attackers had minimal opportunity to retaliate while under constant attack from the defenders as they attempted to breach walls and fortifications by constructing siege equipment and ramps. Whenever there was a breakthrough in the siege, that ratchet was unleashed in a wave of violence as the attackers sought to release their pent-up fury (Levithan 2013: 48). Commanders could quickly lose control of their forces in these situations, and it is possible that the breakthrough into the inner court and the sanctuary represented one of these moments of violent release. One might equate this pent-up aggression to the ‘frenzied mind’ that Polybius referred to in his discussion about sacking temples.

However, it is not very likely that Josephus was present at this time of the battle. As such, embellishment or exaggeration should be expected, especially if Josephus was trying to paint Titus in a particular light in his writings. Any embellishment could not have been extreme but, as long as Titus was somewhere near the action and the event was even partially as chaotic as Josephus made it out to be, contemporary witnesses to the sack of the Temple would have had minimal room to argue about what Titus did or did not do.

There are also a handful of examples where Josephus had Titus express a markedly different position, advocating for the destruction of the Temple in favour of preserving his troops. Three of these examples happened before the

16. For further discussions on the conduct of ancient siege warfare, see also Eph’al 2009; Ziolkowski 1997.

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burning of the Temple. In the first example, Titus fell victim to trickery due to the pity he was showing the Jews, and Josephus explained that, as a result, Titus resolved to be more brutal and relentless (Josephus 2017: 5.329). The second example came after a particularly gruesome story of cannibalism reached Titus. A starving woman named Mary was said to have roasted and eaten her child and, when confronted by rebels, offered the remaining half to them. Upon hearing of this abomination, Josephus claimed that Titus committed to erasing the city from the earth (Josephus 2017: 6.201–219). The fires that contributed to the Temple's eventual burning came during the third example. After failing to breach the inner court with siege equipment or by undermining, the Romans attempted to scale the walls with ladders, a hazardous form of attack. The Jews repulsed the attack at a high cost to the Romans, causing Titus to realise that 'his attempt to spare a foreign temple was only causing injury and death to his own men', at which point he ordered the gates to be burned (Josephus 2017: 6.228). All three reactions indicate a wavering Titus, less resolved to preserve the Temple than the previously attributed examples claim. However, they can be viewed as emotional reactions when considered more critically. They were responses that were tempered with time and the counsel of comrades, as we saw with the war council that was held after all three of these events.

The other, more damning evidence lies in the fate of the Temple after it was burned. Descriptions of the Temple describe it as made almost entirely of stone and marble; only the ceilings and gates were made of wood (Josephus 2017: 5.184–226). After the Temple was burned, some of the structure remained intact enough to be used as a holding area. After Titus captured the final portion of Jerusalem, the Upper City, his men held captives for sale into slavery in the Women's Court of the Temple (Josephus 2017: 6.415). While this was not the sanctuary, and it was the least holy and likely least ornate, one must ask to what extent the Temple was damaged overall. Furthermore, after the final victory, Titus is said to have 'ordered the army to raze to the ground the whole city and the temple, leaving only the three preeminent towers, Phasaël, Hippicus, and Mariamme ... to give posterity some idea of the importance and defensive strength of a city which for all that had still been defeated by Roman valour' (Josephus 2017: 7.1–2). Again, the language implies that the Temple had not been wholly destroyed. Perhaps the damage was significant enough to be beyond repair but, if enough of the Temple remained for it to be rebuilt, Titus' actions would take on a new character.

Conclusion

Did this final destruction demonstrate Titus' true feelings toward the Temple, and was it characteristic of Roman attitudes toward cultural property during armed conflict? The customs of war clearly permitted the destruction of holy sites, and the language used by Josephus seems to indicate that such acts of preservation were counter to the law of war, making the further argument that temple destruction was not only authorised but also expected. There was a genuine military necessity to capture the Temple but not to destroy it. Josephus described Titus as desiring to preserve the Temple but also tempered this against Titus' responsibilities to his troops. Perhaps Titus was familiar with Polybius and took his counsel regarding temples but ultimately succumbed to unbridled violence inherent to siege warfare, or maybe all of Titus' exhortations were merely rhetoric and theatre.

The examination of this ancient example demonstrates that many of the fundamental issues that surround cultural property protection during armed conflict today are millennia-old problems. While what we know about the Roman law of war is not concrete, it is clear that the Romans thought about holy sites and that the law permitted their destruction, regardless of military necessity. It is also apparent from conversations in both Polybius and Josephus that, while destruction was permitted, it was not always a forgone conclusion or a desired course of action. What is most relevant to the modern military practitioner and those who are invested in cultural property protection is that military necessity will always be a defining factor in determining how to proceed regarding cultural property.

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Chapter 2.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST. LAND WARFARE AND CULTURAL HERITAGE IN SECOND WORLD WAR ITALY: THE ROLE OF THE MFAA

Carlotta Coccoli

The increasing centrality of cultural heritage in the conflicts of recent decades – both as a direct and deliberate target for destruction and as an effective propaganda weapon – has highlighted the strategic significance of Cultural Property Protection (CPP) in the broader context of military operations. It has also stimulated interest in the study and analysis of the heritage protection programmes used in previous conflicts – particularly the Second World War, when the Anglo-American Allies implemented a vast and ambitious strategy, first tested in Italy and then gradually improved and implemented in the rest of wartime Europe, up to and including the Pacific theatre.

Understanding what happened during the Second World War can help inform the debate on how to protect cultural heritage threatened by contemporary wars and crises using more effective strategies and techniques (Rush 2023).

Preventive safeguarding measures in Second World War Italy

The experience of Italian art cities being bombed by Austria during the First World War led to a series of experiments and subsequent recommendations about the best methods for protecting the national artistic heritage (Ogetti 1917), leading the Italian government to draw up plans for the protection of monuments in the event of armed conflict as early as the late 1920s. However, it soon became apparent that the lessons learned during the First World War would not be sufficient to deal with the increasing intensity of aerial bombardment. Due to the increased potency of contemporary weapons and their much wider range, experts predicted that no Italian region would be secure (Giovannoni 1935).

As part of more general preparation for a possible conflict, entrusted to the Ministry of War, decrees and circulars were issued regarding the protection of monuments and works of art in the event of an aerial attack. The role of the Superintendencies became fundamental. Ministerial Circular 107 of 31 December 1934 instructed these to make lists of the most important monuments; to draw up plans for their protection with roofs and walls of non-combustible material; and to plan for the transfer of movable works of art to safe places (Franchi 2006).

The year 1938 was crucial for the protection of the national artistic heritage. The Minister of National Education, Giuseppe Bottai, intervened in the debate on the dangers of air raids and robbery by possible invaders, disagreeing with proposals from some scholars on the advisability of transferring works of art to neutral countries. Fascist Italy, the Minister insisted, 'precisely because it feels ... deeply responsible for its artistic heritage, cannot leave the task of defending it in the event of war to others' (Bottai 1938). On 8 July 1938, the Law of War was enacted, which, applying the international standards of the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare, dealt in Article 44 with the 'protection of certain buildings and monuments [with] distinctive signs' to be affixed to selected sites on the basis of their recognised artistic importance. The Directorate General for Antiquities and Arts then decided that the works of art to be conserved should be divided into three groups: the first for artworks of outstanding artistic interest and most exposed to the dangers of war; the second for those of some artistic interest, exposed to the dangers of war; the third group for the remaining works of art (Coccoli 2010).

Italian legislative activity and debate eventually led to the 1940 Law on the 'Protection of Things of Artistic, Historical, Bibliographical and Cultural Interest to the Nation in the Event of War' (Law no. 1041 of 6 June) which provided for the transfer of museum collections and movable works of art housed in churches and palaces to sites chosen for their isolation and distance from military targets, as well as the in-situ protection of monuments and works of art that were difficult to remove. The erection of sturdy wooden or steel tube scaffolding with sandbags or protective walls in brick or concrete structures were the two most common protection systems used by the Italian authorities to protect monuments. However, this method could not be applied on a large scale, so, when forced to decide priorities, the authorities chose the oldest structures and applied protective measures only to the most important components, such as portals, altars and decorations. The spectacular armouring operations

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that were supposed to transform Italian monuments from north to south of the peninsula into 'surely impregnable fortresses of Italian civilisation' – in the rhetorical and over-optimistic words of the regime's Director General for the Arts, Marino Lazzari – were guaranteed for a few select remnants, documented by the spectacular images in official publications (Direzione Generale delle Arti 1942) [Figure 1](#).



Figure 1. Rome: Piazza Colonna after completion of anti-aircraft protection works on the Antonine Column. Direzione Generale delle Arti, 1942.

However, the reality was very different. The jute, or sometimes paper, bags containing sand deteriorated rapidly, and even the wooden scaffolding was expected to last no more than two years. In many cases, this resulted in gradual replacement at considerable cost (Terenzio 1941).

Much more widespread, at least on paper, was the programme to provide numerous Italian monuments with special distinctive signs (a rectangle in a yellow field divided along a diagonal into two triangles: one black, the other white); according to Mussolini's decree of 17 June 1940, 'Determination of the distinctive signs for the protection of buildings and monuments against bombing', had to be easily visible from a great distance and at high altitude.

Fascist plans for protecting the cultural heritage, however, focused almost exclusively on the threat from aerial bombardment, since the dictatorship believed that an invasion of Italian soil was inconceivable. Nonetheless, in 1943 Italy became the first country in Europe to suffer ground fighting after bombing raids, with underestimated consequences for cultural properties.

We now know that 95 per cent of the damage to Italian monuments was caused by bombing, but there was also damage from ground fighting, particularly in the early stages of the invasion. Cultural property was most at risk from destruction by ground forces engaged in military operations (such as looting or artillery fire), damage caused by troops being housed in historically significant buildings, and deliberate attacks or looting by retreating German troops, as in the well-known cases of the bridges of Florence and Verona (Coccoli 2017: 188–91).

After the Allied landings in Sicily, for example, in addition to bombing, the requisitioning of monuments by the army caused a great deal of damage, as did looting by Allied troops or Italian civilians. Much of the damage could have been avoided if an expert in the protection of historic monuments had been available to advise and guide the Allied commanders in their decisions and to ensure that soldiers did not damage the monuments (Pollard 2019).

Joint Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Programme

The Italian government was not alone in its concern about threats to cultural heritage. From the early 1940s, news from war-torn Europe made the US public aware of the dangers to the historical and artistic heritage. Within a few years, in the spring of 1943, two separate volunteer committees had begun to function: the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) Committee on the Protection of Cultural Treasures in War Areas and the American Defense-Harvard Group's Committee on the Protection of Monuments. The Harvard Committee's first task was to compile lists of monuments (called *Harvard Lists*) in European and Asian areas likely to be involved in military operations, which were then forwarded to the military authorities. The ACLS Committee first looked at graphic representation of areas likely to be affected by military operations, specially prepared with monuments and collections indicated, with lists of key monuments and personnel, which could be placed in the hands of any officer of the occupation forces, or even used in connection with preliminary aerial bombing (*Special Meeting* 1943). Named after the Frick Art Reference Library in New York, where they were made, these are known as the *Frick Maps*.

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These activities led those influential cultural institutions and academic organisations to persuade the US government to support a comprehensive strategy to protect European (and later Asian) artistic heritage, to prevent and avoid further destruction caused by military action.

From the British point of view, it was mainly experience from North Africa that convinced the government to follow its US ally in this matter. Indeed, when the British Army occupied Cyrenaica in early 1941, it was faced with the delicate issue of protecting monuments involved in wartime operations. After the brief British occupation, the Italian government regained control of its former colony and launched a vigorous propaganda campaign against the enemy. In the summer of 1941 a pamphlet entitled *Che cosa hanno fatto gli inglesi in Cirenaica* ('What the English did in Cyrenaica') was published, claiming that the enemy army had damaged the Cyrene Museum and archaeological sites (Ministero della Cultura Popolare 1941). The claims of damage, while exaggerated for propaganda purposes, had some basis in truth, enough to cause concern within the British War Office, which began to regard the issue of protecting antiquities in war zones as a matter of military interest (Pollard 2020).

The role of propaganda became particularly crucial after the Allies decided to hit Italy hard in early 1942, carpet-bombing the main cities of the peninsula. According to British strategists, the targets were to be 'cities such as Rome, Naples, Florence, Genoa and Venice, which are closest to the hearts of Italians' (Gribaudi 2005: 84). As is well known, the aim was to force the nation out of the war in order to weaken Germany, which would be forced to divert troops from the Eastern Front in its probable attempt to occupy Italy.

The news that the enemy was about to launch indiscriminate attacks on their art cities particularly horrified the Italian people, who identified almost physically with the historical monuments that shared their fate. The despondent reaction of the firemen who put out the devastating fire in the port of Genoa during the first carpet-bombing raid on Italian territory on 22 October 1942, is paradigmatic. They were reached by the superintendent who shouted, 'San Giorgio Palace is on fire!' When asked for help, one firefighter, under orders not to move from his assigned task, could only reply in a heartfelt tone at the thought of not being able to save the city's most important historic building: 'I'd rather my own house burned down' (Ceschi 1949).

Thus, one of the most effective weapons in the Nazi-Fascist arsenal against the 'flying terrorists' was vicious propaganda about the destruction of Italy's national artistic heritage ([Figure 2](#)). One example will suffice. A text

among the many from that period, entitled *La guerra contro l'arte* (The War Against Art), reads:

We wonder how the Anglo-American tourist, accustomed to finding in our things the refreshment of his spirit and the nourishment of his culture, will one day be able to justify such a blatant disregard for a collective heritage of art and beauty, caused by the fierce ignorance of his nation's pilots who have flown our skies in the name of freedom and justice. (*La guerra contro l'arte* 1944: 6)




Figure 2. Collage of some propaganda publications issued in Italy during the Second World War.

Within this delicate framework, the formalisation of initiatives taken in the United States to safeguard Europe's war-threatened artistic heritage met the army's need to equip itself with effective tools to counter Nazi-fascist propaganda (Dagnini Brey 2009: 42). This led President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in the summer of 1943, to formalise the creation of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, better known as the Roberts Commission (named after its chairman, Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts). As stated in the minutes of its first organisational meeting, held in the Board Room of the National Gallery of Art in Washington DC on 25 August 1943 (*Organization Meeting* 1943), the function of the Commission during the war was:

1. To work with the appropriate branch of the United States Army, for the purpose of furnishing to the General Staff of the Army, museum officials and art historians, so that, so far as is consistent with military necessity, works of cultural value may be protected in countries occupied by armies of the United Nations ...
2. To compile, through the assistance of refugee historians of art and librarians, lists of property appropriated by the Axis invading forces, by representatives of Axis governments, and by private citizens of Axis countries.

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It should be remembered that this important first meeting was attended by some representatives of the military authorities, who had been invited to express their agencies' views of the Commission's purpose and programme. Of particular importance was the intervention by the representative of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. He explained that the War Department had recognised the need to take special measures in occupied territories to protect historical monuments and art treasures, and to prevent black markets in art objects looted by the enemy. Consequently, it was the responsibility of the Civil Affairs Division to relate the activities of the Roberts Commission to Army operations in enemy and liberated areas, since that Division was concerned with the general policy of Military Government in occupied territories. He reported that, in connection with the imminent invasion of Sicily, the US president had instructed General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Theatre, that every effort consistent with military necessity should be made to preserve cultural treasures. Accordingly, specific instructions should be given to the commanders of tactical units to take all possible measures to achieve this objective. Among other things, the Civil Affairs Division had already provided the Allied Force Headquarters with the *Frick Maps* prepared by the ACLS Committee, which showed the location of artistic and historic objects in seventy Italian cities.

The representative also explained that the Allied Military Government's organisation chart included officers (US and British) who would be given the specific task of drawing up plans for the preservation of art objects and advising on technical problems of recovery and restoration. On the US side, the Civil Affairs Division was in the process of selecting these officers on the basis of ACLS Committee recommendations. They would serve as staff officers in a special Education and Fine Arts Division of the Allied Military Government or on the staff of the Commanding General, as appropriate. The Arts and Monuments Officers would have no other functions and would carry out the duties of staff officers in their particular fields. The meeting also mentioned the request from the US Department of State to the British Foreign Office to consider the creation of a body similar to the Roberts Commission (*Organization Meeting* 1943).

The British administration, however, took a different view. In fact, any decision regarding the preservation of works of art in war zones was considered to be a strictly military matter, and therefore the interference of civilian associations in this area or the creation of an ad hoc commission was not considered permissible. The solution was to find an experienced interlocutor within the

military ranks. The choice fell on the eminent archaeologist Sir Leonard Woolley, a Major in the British War Office, who was appointed Archaeological Adviser to the War Office on 1 November 1943 with the task of directing and supervising the protection and conservation of ancient monuments and works of art in areas where British troops were operating (Woolley 1947: 5–6). In the British case, under Woolley's careful supervision, the art experts to be sent to the theatre of war were recruited on the recommendation of the directors of the major museums and art galleries, while the Royal Institute of British Architects played a leading role in selecting the most suitable architects for the task. In Woolley's view, it was architects who would play a fundamental role in the early stages of the occupation. Faced with uncovered monuments or crumbling walls, their technical expertise would be invaluable. Only after the structures had been secured with temporary protection and consolidation would art historians be able to intervene to protect the deteriorating decorative apparatus.

By the end of 1943, therefore, the two Anglo-American allies had come to the same conclusion, albeit in different ways and Churchill, though less inclined to embrace the cause of monuments, did make some concessions to the demands of his home front, eventually accepting the US invitation to collaborate on the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Program (Woolley 1947: 7–10).

This programme was to be carried out under strict military supervision and was to be implemented after the invasion of Sicily, when the changing situation became so complex that the Roberts Commission in the United States and Archaeological Adviser Woolley from London followed the first uncertain steps of their programme with apprehension. On both sides of the Atlantic, there was a commitment to developing more effective tools to facilitate the work of art experts in the field throughout the war, as can be seen by following the advance of the Allied Army from the south to the north of Italy until its complete liberation in the spring of 1945.

Initially, it was agreed that the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Program would come under the Subcommittee for Education in the Allied Administration's Civil Affairs Department. In Italy, through various subcommittees, this department proposed areas of responsibility for the Italian ministries it was dealing with. During the Fascist regime, when the Directorate General of the Arts was placed under the Ministry of National Education, protection of the artistic heritage was entrusted to the Subcommittee for Education (Dinsmoor 1944). However, subordination to this body proved far from sufficient. In order to carry out a successful protection operation, it would be necessary to have specialists at the front with the combat troops or capable of reaching

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the newly-liberated cities as quickly as possible. The task of the Education Officers, on the other hand, was to reactivate the administrative apparatus and return civilian life to normal only once the Allies had taken control of the occupied territory. This delay in calling in art experts could be disastrous for the conservation of monuments already damaged by war and those at risk of being damaged, as was often the case in Sicily and on the Italian mainland.

To solve this problem, it was decided to split the Subcommittee for Education and Fine Arts into two separate subcommittees. The decision was announced on 25 October 1943, and two days later its name was officially changed to the Subcommittee for Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFAA S/C), with the addition of responsibility for the protection of archives (Baillie Reynolds 1943). Once it was separated from the Subcommittee for Education, the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Program was freed from direct dependence on the Roberts Commission and was placed under exclusive military control.

The MFAA in Italy then gradually adopted its definitive pyramidal structure (Figure 3): a number of Monuments Officers were posted to the headquarters of the Allied Control Commission, reporting to the Director and Deputy Director of the MFAA. The task of this office was to re-establish the Italian art administration system and to maintain contact with the Allied forces in liberated cities. From the spring of 1944 they were joined by other personnel assigned to the army's advanced units, who were thus able to move around the



Figure 3. Pyramidal structure of the Subcommittee for Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives in Italy (elaboration by the author).

territory more easily and, from time to time, reach the places where their work was most needed, including the front line. Their task was to prevent damage to monuments in the early days of a city's invasion. Two Monuments Officers were therefore permanently attached to the US Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army respectively. Finally, there were officers attached to the staff of the Regional Commissioners (known as Regional MFAA Officers). Appointed once an area was securely in Allied hands, they maintained close contact with the Italian authorities, supported long-term programmes to repair damaged buildings and sought to recover works of art from museums and churches.

It is useful to be reminded of the mission of the MFAA S/C, whose official definition is included in every text concerning its history:

To prevent as far as possible destruction of and damage to historical monuments, buildings, works of art and historical records of Italy; to safeguard and preserve them, and to give first-aid in repairs when needed; and to assist in the recovery and restitution to their rightful owners of any works of art which have been looted, removed, or otherwise misappropriated. (American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas 1946).

It is also helpful to better describe the operational responsibilities carried out by MFAA officers during their two years in Italy. A first group of tasks can be classified as 'preventive', with the aim of avoiding damage to cultural heritage, mostly caused by bombing, by providing the military authorities with location information that was useful for planning air raids. Tasks included: advising on orders issued by commanders for the protection and safeguarding of monuments, buildings and works of art; liaising with ground and air forces; drawing up and distributing plans and directives; collaborating with other subcommissions; preparing and approving publicity for monuments and works of art; submitting regular reports on conservation and protection matters.

Once on Italian territory, a second group of tasks can be classified as 'first aid for monuments', aimed at protecting damaged monuments, preventing further deterioration and ensuring that movable works of art were not stolen or dispersed. These included: compiling and distributing lists of protected monuments to regional and provincial commissioners and units; providing protection in Allied occupied areas and advising unit commanders on the requisition of national monuments; providing information on war damage to monuments; investigating reports of alleged looting and recommending appropriate action for restitution; producing guidebooks for military personnel and working with the Red Cross and Special Services to organise tours for them; acting in an advisory capacity to the Italian Ministry of Education and assisting Italian

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government agencies on conservation issues, including urgent repairs and the protection of works of art and historical records (American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas 1946).

In view of the thousands of Italian monuments that had been damaged or destroyed, the Subcommittee's task was very specific: it was not to promote full restoration – a matter that was considered strictly Italian and that should be postponed until the end of the conflict – but to carry out only those operations that were strictly necessary to prevent further damage. This indication seems clear from the Subcommittee's first experience in Sicily. In a memorandum dated 5 November 1943, addressed to the Chief of AMG HQ and written by MFAA officers Mason Hammond and Fred Maxse, we read, 'Here the strict rule has been that only the measures most urgently needed to conserve from further deterioration would be undertaken and that no restoration beyond this would be approved' (Hammond and Maxse 1943). As a result, much of the work funded by the Allies focused on repairing roofs, protecting monuments from the elements, carrying out temporary consolidations, sifting through rubble for surviving ornaments, securing frescoes and preventing theft and looting. In some circumstances, however, full restoration could be justified by economic convenience, and thus desired by the Allies themselves (Coccoli 2017: 19). Since the first experiences of the MFAA officers in Sicily in the summer of 1943, a practice had been established which was to be followed in the other Italian regions to be liberated. The projects, cost estimates and execution of urgent works were carried out by the Italian Superintendencies, while their supervision was the responsibility of the Allied experts, who were responsible for analysing, approving or rejecting them on the basis of their own assessments (Coccoli 2017: 64).

The role of the MFAA in the Italian campaign

The gradual refinement of the procedures and standards used by the Subcommittee can be better understood by dividing its work in Italy into three phases, which lasted from the summer of 1943 to the end of 1945.

The first phase, of an 'experimental' nature, began when the Allies landed in Sicily in July 1943 and ended in May 1944, just before the capture of Rome. During this phase – which covered the islands and the southern half of the peninsula up to the Eternal City – operational strategies were defined on the basis of first-hand experience, and the military authorities issued important directives for the protection of monuments threatened by the conflict that would be applied in the later phases of the Italian campaign. In this period, the

Subcommission focused its efforts on preventing the requisitioning of historic buildings and developing a campaign to raise awareness among troops of the importance of respecting antiquities in captured territories.

The first few months, however, were marked by widespread vandalism, aggravated by the late arrival of monuments officers in liberated towns. Experience in both Sicily and Campania, for example, showed that the greatest damage to monuments and works of art (after bombing) was caused by army requisitioning, followed by looting by Allied troops or civilians. 'Damage is being done by one section of the Army, and another section created to prevent such damage is powerless to intervene', complained the director of the MFAA S/C, pointing out that the low military rank of his officers prevented them from having a serious say in the matter (Baillie Reynolds 1944). Suffice to mention the British military occupation of the National Museum of Naples in 1943–1944, which led to the establishment of a military Commission of Enquiry (the Collier Commission). This commission was instrumental in holding military commanders to account and establishing effective procedures for the protection of historic buildings in Allied occupied territory, ensuring that such problems did not recur later in the Italian campaign. The consternation caused by the occupation of the museum had a positive effect: the issuance of General Orders no. 68 entitled 'Historical Monuments'. Dated 29 December 1943, it prohibited the use for military purposes – without the explicit permission of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief – of all the buildings listed in the 'Works of Art' sections of the Zone Handbooks for Italy, the manuals intended for officers of the Allied Military Government. The order, issued directly by General Eisenhower, was the first significant step towards limiting the damage caused by ground troops to Italy's cultural heritage (Coccoli 2017: 64).

The chronic lack of adequate transport for MFAA officers was related to this problem. As a testimony from February 1944 shows, in areas already liberated and under Allied control, the problem could be overcome by managing to get to almost all the sites 'by fitting in with the movements of other officers, by cadging from chance acquaintances, and by hitch-hiking', even if it was an inconvenient, slow and wasteful method. But in the advanced areas, where the time factor was considered 'vital, for the great bulk of the stupid and preventable damage is done at the early stage of occupation', this was not possible, and lack of transport prevented assistance (Ward-Perkins 1944a). On the other hand, the MFAA S/C's initial lack, and later scarcity, of means of transport would later make it difficult to carry out the timely and regular inspections necessary to quantify the extent of the damage and to respond with

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precautionary first aid for monuments and damaged works of art throughout the Italian campaign.

On the eve of the capture of Rome, at the beginning of June 1944, these problems began to be addressed. In this second phase, which lasted until the crossing of the Gothic Line at the end of April 1945, the work of the Sub-commission in central Italy was characterised by more efficient management of operations and the decision to finally integrate two Monuments Officers into the Fifth and Eighth Armies so they could follow the troops as they liberated an area. Among the first areas to benefit were Molise and Abruzzo, regions of central Italy overlooking the Adriatic Sea, when MFAA officer Norman Newton was transferred to the Eighth Army at the end of March 1944 'to be immediately available in the event of a forward movement' (Ward-Perkins 1944b).

In the weeks that followed, Newton was able to carry out a series of inspections in areas that would otherwise have been difficult to reach, thanks in part to the initial availability of his own vehicle, intervening in some cases promptly and armed with new tools useful for his work. In fact, from the beginning of 1944, the 'equipment' of the Monuments Officers included new inventories, known as *Lists of Protected Monuments*, which were grouped according to a geographical criterion and listed the most important monuments and collections of artistic value. These lists were widely circulated throughout the military hierarchy, since, according to Administrative Instruction no. 10 of 30 March 1944, the historic buildings listed in them could not be requisitioned if there was an alternative or without the express written permission of a competent commander (Woolley 1947: 68–69). The *Lists of Protected Monuments* would thus slowly become the best weapon in the hands of the Monuments Officers to ensure that the buildings included in them received all possible assistance, both in terms of protection against the risks of requisition and acts of vandalism, and in terms of financing the operations of first aid and repair. As Newton himself notes in his reports, enforcing these rules was undoubtedly difficult at first, but things improved significantly as the Allies moved into new areas and as the Army's knowledge of the subject increased.

The lists were also used effectively by the MFAA officers to carry out inspections of the monuments listed, to assess the extent of possible war damage, and to determine the nature and method of financing first aid and repair operations. On the other hand, it should be noted that, if an important monument was not on these lists (as was often the case), it was more difficult for the Allied experts to assist the Italian superintendents in repairing it (Coccoli 2017: 107–08).

Despite the fierce resistance of the German Army, which, after the fall of Rome, tried to halt the Allied advance by involving numerous villages and towns in a devastating battle, and dug the Gothic Line fortifications north of Florence, the case of Tuscany is representative of the organisation and human resources deployed by the MFAA S/C in this second phase of its work in Italy ([Figure 4](#)).

Captain Deane Keller was the first Monuments Officer to arrive in Tuscany. He came from Lazio and followed the Fifth Army into the province of Grosseto on 22 June 1944. Following the troops that liberated the city, he arrived in Siena on 3 July and immediately took steps to protect up to fifty monuments listed as protected in the city by putting up 'off-limits' signs (Keller 1944). This was exactly what was intended: using the 'time factor' to prevent avoidable damage by placing MFAA officers within the Armies proved to be a successful solution.




Figure 4. Montepulciano (Tuscany): Sangallo's House (San Biagio parsonage). Ink drawing on cardboard, made in September 1944 by the Monuments Officer Captain Basil Marriott during one of his inspections in the area. Artwork in private archive.

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In Tuscany, the Monuments Officers were able to work more closely with the Italian superintendents, some of whom, more than others they had met before, showed great competence and initiative. In these more favourable conditions, efforts were stepped up to reactivate the local administrative machinery, to define first aid and repair programmes for damaged buildings, and to provide logistical and financial support.

The vast area of northern Italy above the Gothic Line, which had been severely damaged by Allied bombing of historic cities and their monuments, was the focus of the third and final phase, limited to the few months between 25 April 1945 and the closure of the MFAA S/C offices in Italy in early 1946. Nearly two years after the landing in Sicily, when the Allies eventually made it to these areas, most of the emergency repairs to damaged monuments had already been completed by the local superintendents. One cannot fail to mention, for example, the admirable work carried out in eastern Veneto by the Superintendent of Venice, Ferdinando Forlati, to whom we owe not only the bold restoration of important monuments (the Church of the Eremitani in Padua, the Palazzo dei Trecento in Treviso), but also the ability to simultaneously coordinate numerous restorations of minor buildings with the aim of preserving and recovering the characteristic and precious urban physiognomies of historic cities devastated by bombing (Sorbo 2011).

The fact that the Italian authorities had already organised emergency aid for the protection of the artistic heritage in these vast regions, and that several MFAA officers who had participated in the Italian campaign were going to Austria to carry out similar work, led to a sense of demobilisation in the Subcommission. However, with better organisation and more experience, the Monuments Officers were still able to carry out important tasks, such as the recovery of Florentine works of art that the Germans had transferred to South Tyrol (Dagnini Brey 2009: 229–53), and financial and logistical support for a large number of repairs that the Italian superintendencies still had to carry out (Coccoli 2017: 357–58).

Inspiring contemporary practice for monuments at risk from conflicts

This brief summary of the work done by the MFAA S/C in Italy during the Second World War provides some food for thought about the effectiveness of the actions taken and prompts reflection on whether lessons can be learned for contemporary conflicts, albeit with different characteristics.

The examples recalled here relate mainly to cases of war damage and emergency repairs to historic buildings or sites of monumental character, since

movable works of art, although also subject to serious risk of destruction or looting, present somewhat different problems and solutions, which have recently been discussed (Pollard 2019). It is useful to begin by pointing out some of the weaknesses that, despite the efforts made first in Italy and then in the rest of Europe and Japan (Coccoli 2013), have never been radically resolved.

The Allies were well aware that Italy's vast architectural and artistic heritage was an important part of their current cultural heritage, and warned that, 'if through our fault they are not also a part of the future, posterity will brush aside any explanation which this generation can make' (*The Protection of a Cultural Heritage* 1944?: 33). Despite the military authorities' receptivity to the MFAA's work, sad losses that could never be rectified were always regarded as unavoidable. General Eisenhower himself stated that monuments might be spared in many cases without jeopardising operational needs, but he also highlighted that nothing could stand in the way of the argument of military necessity (Subcommission for Monuments Fine Arts and Archives 1946, Appendix C-1: 42): this was the insurmountable restriction within which the MFAA had to fight.

The MFAA policy was not developed before the conflict, which means that, as we have seen, it was experiencing initial failures in Italy that made it increasingly successful. This delay had serious consequences for the bombing strategy. The lists and maps produced in 1943 to identify the location of monuments – to which more sophisticated tools were added during the Italian campaign (February 1944), such as special aerial photographs produced by the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) 'for the use of aerial planning' (Woolley 1947: 28) – were largely ignored in the bombing preparations. In the light of the facts, it can now be said that these tools were not as effective as hoped in preventing damage to monuments from aerial bombardment, as they did not have a significant impact on the Allied bombing strategy.

It should also be remembered that the lack of initial preparation delayed the creation of an operational body such as the MFAA Subcommission until the end of October 1943, three years after the first bombing of Italian cities. This considerable delay, together with the fact that, at its peak, the MFAA Subcommission had only about twenty officers permanently based in Italy, must be seen as a fundamental shortcoming.

However, the personnel assigned to this delicate task were highly qualified, with extensive previous experience in the field of art or heritage conservation, often backed up by specific knowledge of Italian history and language. This must certainly be considered a strength of the MFAA programme, along with

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the successful decision to seek the close cooperation of local art authorities in the early stages of the emergency. On the other hand, as *New York Times* war correspondent Herbert Matthews acutely pointed out during a conversation with representatives of the War Department and the American Commission in April 1944: 'you could have all the Baedekers and the information in the world but unless you talked to the people in the area who know where various objects of art have been taken for safekeeping, it is impossible to take precautions against their destruction' (Newton 1944).

In the Italian case, where the Fine Arts Administration was considered by the Allies to be one of the most advanced in the world, the Superintendencies retained the basic technical role, planning interventions and estimating costs, while the MFAA Subcommission assumed the role of mediator and facilitator in relations with the Allied Military Government, guaranteeing bureaucratic and financial support for the implementation of repairs. During the Second World War, the close relationship between the Allies and Italian civilian experts was a winning choice that should not be forgotten, because what they achieved together allowed the Italians to ensure the reconstruction in the post-war period of an artistic heritage that had been much damaged by the fury of war.

In conclusion, it can be said that the experience of the Second World War demonstrated the need for high-level political and military officials to work together to ensure that cultural heritage is prioritised in the event of war. It also showed that it would be far more effective to develop national peacetime plans for the protection of cultural heritage in the event of conflict, and to develop specific training in cultural heritage protection tailored to the needs of different audiences, such as military and civilian personnel. Indeed, cooperation and networking between civil and military institutions and the creation of coordination networks are crucial to effectively manage a crisis involving cultural heritage.

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Chapter 3.

CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION ISSUES PAST AND PRESENT: CURRENT UK APPROACH AND DELIVERY

Roger Curtis and Mark Dunkley

It is a reality that armed conflict may result in the destruction of cultural heritage.
UK Ministry of Defence, *Human Security in Defence* (2021)

Background

The United Kingdom was an early signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (HC54), on 30 December 1954, but it was not until 12 September 2017 that the UK Government ratified the Convention and its two protocols. The political background to this long delay is complex and will not be examined here. Rather, this paper will examine the UK's response to the obligations under Article 7 'to introduce in time of peace into their military regulations or instructions such provisions as may ensure observance of the present Convention, and to foster in the members of their armed forces a spirit of respect for the culture and cultural property of all peoples' (Art. 7.1) and 'to plan or establish in peace time, within their armed forces, services or specialist personnel whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property and to co-operate with the civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding it' (Art. 7.2).

Strategic context

Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was, strategically, an extension of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in February and March 2014. As at 12 June 2024, UNESCO has verified dam-

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age to 412 Ukrainian cultural sites since the Russian invasion, including 137 religious sites and 201 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest (UNESCO 2024). However, the Office of the UN Human Rights Commissioner has suggested numbers probably higher than UNESCO's estimate; other assessments suggest that there may be as many as 1,000 incidents of damage to Cultural Infrastructure during the war.

On 16 March 2022, the Russian Air Force dropped two FAB-500kg bombs on the Drama Theatre in Mariupol despite the Russian word for 'children' being marked on the ground in large white letters in front of the Theatre to warn aircraft away from the building. At the time of the attack, the Theatre was being used as an air raid shelter during the siege of Mariupol sheltering a large number of civilians (BBC News 2022). Estimates of civilian deaths vary and range from at least a dozen (Amnesty International) to 600 (Associated Press). Satellite imagery published by the *Guardian* newspaper showed the wider extent of the damage to Mariupol which also saw attacks on residential areas, a maternity hospital and shopping centres (Rachwani 2022). The Russian Ministry of Defence immediately denied accusations of the airstrike on the Theatre, but both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Amnesty International have explicitly identified the bombing of the Theatre as a War Crime. This tragic incident serves to illustrate the relationship between cultural infrastructure – so often used as a refuge in time of war – and the human security paradigm for protecting individuals during conflict.

Recent Crises in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and now southern Israel (where reporting by the *Jordan News* on 30 December 2023 indicated the destruction of over 200 heritage sites in the Gaza Strip, including historic mosques, churches, schools, museums and ancient houses, since the beginning of Israeli retaliatory assaults against Hamas on 7 October 2023) have all illustrated the relationship between culture, identity and warfare. Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has led to approximately six million deaths since 1996, with conflict related human migration and displacement affecting the natural environment too, particularly the habitat of the protected Mountain Gorilla in Virunga National Park – a World Heritage Site.

There are, of course, numerous examples from history concerning the destruction of cultural heritage (see also Malmquist, this volume): the famous burning of Persepolis by Alexander in 330 BC, or rather Thaïs as Plutarch would have us believe, as retribution for Xerxes' burning of Athens fifty years earlier which destroyed the Acropolis and the 'Old' Temple of Athena (Goldsworthy 2021: 351); the recapture of Delhi by British forces was a decisive moment in

the suppression of the 1857–58 Indian Mutiny against British rule – extensive looting and civilian deaths followed; the city of Reims and its Cathedral, a major Gothic masterpiece where the kings of France were consecrated, were severely damaged in September 1914 shortly before the arrival of German troops; and the Temple of Wat Piyawat is the only surviving Buddhist temple in the Phonsavan area that survived the US carpet bombings in Laos under Operation Barrel Roll between December 1964 and March 1973.

Examples closer to home in the UK include: the ‘slighting’ of Corfe Castle by Parliamentary Forces in March 1645 following a siege and assault during the English Civil War; St Michael’s Church in Linlithgow shows damage from musket shot dated to 1651; scars that disfigure the pedestal of ‘Cleopatra’s Needle’ and the sphinxes at the base of the obelisk date to the first raid on London by German aircraft a few minutes before midnight on 4 September 1917; and Charles Church in Plymouth – once the second oldest parish church in England – now stands derelict following incendiary attack during the Plymouth Blitz in March 1941.

Cultural heritage protection in a military context

For military practitioners, it is necessary to take a holistic view of cultural heritage when seen through the lens of human security to address both tangible and intangible heritage. Tangible heritage includes historic buildings and archaeological artefacts (in fact, the main components of HC54) and intangible heritage relates to identity such as rituals, customs and crafts. The destruction of tangible heritage can be described as culturecide and the destruction of intangible heritage can be described as genocide. In conflict, the destruction of cultural heritage spans an arc between culturecide on one hand and genocide on the other. It is for this reason that cultural property protection in a military context is so closely wedded to human security.

The nature of war is visceral and violent; Carl von Clausewitz’s treatise *On War* theorised that the nature of war, seen as the clash of actively opposed wills, is unchanging with the human condition (von Clausewitz, 2008). However, the character of war changes over time by continuously evolving to new circumstances, technologies and methods. Indeed, the modern joint battlespace can be characterised by the ‘5 Cs’ – Contested, Congested, Connected, Cluttered and Constrained (MOD 2014) – indicating that confrontations will not be won by force, but by precision. Seen through the lens of the spectrum

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of conflict ranging from a defence posture between peace and war, deterrence and major conflict, and across high and low intensity of conflict, it is easy to consider cultural property protection across the five domains of conflict: Land (protection/destruction of cultural heritage), Sea (protection/destruction of underwater cultural heritage), Air (air power as applied to the avoidance/destruction of cultural heritage), Space (space heritage site protection / use of space-based technologies) and Cyber (inclusive of information warfare, denial of service, deletion of digital archives etc). This underpins the need for the strategic application of socio-cultural intelligence into the military planning cycle (NATO 2014a: 46).

Law of Armed Conflict and heritage protection

The internationally recognised Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC – a branch of international law with the 1949 Geneva Conventions at its core and accepted by almost every member State of the United Nations) is founded on four principles: military necessity (i.e., the legitimacy or mandate for waging war), proportionality (where potential losses must be weighed against any advantage gained), humanity (i.e., the prevention of unnecessary suffering) and distinction (i.e., identifying objects and persons protected from attack). LOAC applies even if there has been no formal declaration of war and applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts (ICRC 2002). Insofar as the protection of cultural heritage is concerned, the LOAC principle of distinction is significant as it underpins HC54. Breaches of LOAC are punishable under International Criminal Law; Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998, in force 2002) defines war crimes as inclusive of ‘intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments ... provided they are not military objectives’ (ICC 2002, Article 8, 2(b)(ix) and 2(e)(iv)).

Conflict and destructive trends towards heritage

Recent work has developed a spectrum of violent trends (impacts) towards heritage during conflict (see Dunkley 2021). This spectrum ranges across vandalism, looting, iconoclasm and whole site destruction:

Table 1. Spectrum of conflict impacts on heritage

Type of Impact	Example
Vandalism	Paint applied in Ukrainian colours to a Soviet War Memorial, Sofia 2014
Looting	Theft of thousands of artefacts, Baghdad museum, 2003
Iconoclasm	ISIS use of sledgehammers and power tools in Nimrud, Iraq, 2015
Site Destruction	ISIS destruction of tetrapylon monument, Palmyra, Syria, 2017

In addition, buried archaeological remains can also be impacted by conflict; trench systems excavated to the north and west of the village of Pikuzy, a small village in eastern Ukraine, in 2019 probably by Russian proxy forces impacted a Bronze Age landscape with one barrow topped by an observation post (Dunkley and Clack, 2023: 129). It is not known whether any archaeological artefacts was discovered during the excavations. Similarly, soldiers from the 126th Territorial Defence Regiment discovered ‘ancient amphorae’ while digging defensive trenches in Odesa in May 2022. The amphorae were later transported to a museum (Milligan 2022).

Establishment of a UK CPP capability

Legal framework

In tandem with ratification of HC54, those parts of the Convention that necessitated changes in domestic law were enacted by means of the Cultural Property Protection (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017: these established relevant offences and put in place protection for the Convention’s Blue Shield emblem. Responsibility for adhering to HC54 obligations rests with Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS); this Department of State is therefore the reporting body back to the sponsors of the Hague Convention, UNESCO, and fulfils the duty on all HC54 signatories to report every four years on the state of their compliance with Convention obligations.

Military directives

Independently of the 2017 Act, moves by the UK Ministry of Defence towards fulfilling the Article 7 (military) obligations were already under way, with the Army Command Plan 2017 mandating creation of a Cultural Property Protection Unit, formed of Reserve Officers with experience of heritage matters. The directive was passed to the Field Army in 2018, and an establishment order was issued regarding the formation of the Unit, which came into being on

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1 September 2018. The Unit was directed to deliver a CPP capability to the Armed Services and across Defence. Initially the Unit was to number fifteen Officers from all services; this has subsequently been reduced to six Officers from the British Army Reserve.

Policy framework

At Ministry or strategic level, CPP is considered to sit with the protection of the civilian domain, termed Human Security, alongside such themes as modern slavery and human trafficking, conflict-related sexual violence and the use of child soldiers. This approach is outlined in the Ministry of Defence publication JSP 985, *Human Security in Defence*. This complements, without precisely mirroring, NATO approaches where CPP is considered a cross cutting theme in military planning.

British Army doctrine

To develop the application of CPP in the British Army, a Doctrine Note was published in 2019 (Ministry of Defence 2019), setting out the requirement to adhere to HC and other obligations of the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC), including customary obligations. Importantly, the doctrine note articulates the benefits deriving to the mission if the right approach is taken to cultural heritage. In addition, the Army Field Manual: Tactics for Stability Operations 2017 addresses CPP in an Annex (Ministry of Defence 2017). From these texts, and international material, the actual tasks of a UK CPP Officer have been developed, primarily to advise the commander on approaches to CPP that keep them within the law while fulfilling the mission.

Overall, CPP should not be viewed as merely another compliance obligation (although it is that), but as a way of understanding a physical and emotional environment where military activity is taking place; this is sometimes called ‘human terrain analysis’ (HTA), which as a mission tasking is delivered by reconnaissance forces. The information from this will assist commanders in understanding the environment in which they are operating and in making the right calls regarding planned and reactive activity across the spectrum of military options, from the kinetic to the influence.

Other CPP guidance and doctrine

In delivering CPP, UK Defence is also cognisant of the guidance published by UNESCO, whose Military Manual on CPP gives a good framework seen from

a civilian standpoint (UNESCO 2016). NATO has been aware of the requirement for CPP for some time, and the Bi-Strategic Directive of 2019 clearly states that CPP should be a factor in the planning and delivery of exercises and operations. How this is delivered will be discussed later in this chapter.

In delivery on the ground, the process of CPP has many overlaps with the discipline of Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC), where military operatives engage with civilian authorities concerning a range of aspects of local administration and provision of services where there is military activity or presence. In the United States military, Civil Affairs Officers (among them the US Army's Monuments Officers) operate in this area. In NATO, the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) takes a lead on CPP training for the alliance, with courses and publications, as well as the Centre of Excellence for Stability Policing Units (CoESPU) also delivers CPP training and activity. While CPP is a cross cutting theme in NATO, the delivery mechanisms on the ground are generally within a CIMIC framework.

Building CPP capacity

Recruitment and development of UK CPP officers

Recruitment of UK Reserve Officers with the right experience progressed from 2018, with initial 'special to arms' training delivered in late 2019. Some Officers were already serving in the Reserves, while others were civilians recruited specifically for the role as Specialist Reserve Officers. In recruiting and training, the approach is that, while CPP Officers will always be in a specialist role, they will be required to operate as part of a wider force; they must be regarded as military officers first, and CPP / Human Security practitioners second. This is to ensure that CPP personnel are mindful of the wider context of factors when giving support and advice to the commander. Therefore, much initial training is concerned with integration into a military environment and aligning their civilian heritage skills into those of a professional military force, followed by the detail of how CPP is carried out with UK and allied forces. This is achieved through classroom work, practical drills and procedures and, where circumstances permit, CPP training with foreign militaries. This has so far happened with the US Army, the Austrian Armed Forces and the French Army. To consolidate learning and commence the practitioner phase, Officers will participate in national and allied exercises as part of a headquarters staff. In all, development of CPP Officers can take around two years, depending on their availability from regular employment.

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Feedback and development

In developing a UK CPP capability there is a feedback loop – in a new discipline how you train a capability will be shaped by how the capability is actually used, and this will shift and evolve as experience is acquired and requests for tasking, support and advice comes in. This was evident in what has been learnt by the Unit since its establishment in 2019, when the first special to arms course was run, to the latest iteration in Winter 2023, when a better appreciation of what a UK CPP Officer will do has been learnt after four years of activity and support to UK forces. The course now features a greater emphasis on the training and preparation of CPP material in order to give support to deploying forces.

How CPP is delivered

The outputs of the CPPU are varied, but are best described in thematic areas where the unit has been active since its formation: training and awareness for individuals; exercise design; input to training in advance of operations; supporting operations; and advice to commanders. These themes are discussed below:

Individual training

A significant element in the HC54 requirement is to train your own military in the correct legal approach to the protection of cultural heritage – in the Convention's words, to 'foster ... a spirit of respect for the culture and cultural property of all peoples' in the nation's armed forces. At the most basic level, this is delivered with annual mandatory core training to all military personnel in modules on values and standards, where international law and HC54 are introduced. These themes are developed in a classroom environment as part of further training for junior and senior leaders.

Exercise design and delivery

An Army maxim is 'you train as you fight', so if CPP is not practised in exercises, it will not be delivered on operations. The inclusion of CPP in NATO training and operations was mandated in 2019, with the Bi-Command Strategic Directive, and now many national and allied exercise series adopt CPP in the design and detail of the storylines and events. These storylines often involve developing a scenario with a full or partial timeline of a conflict, evolving through the cycle of tension, crisis, conflict, stabilisation and return to post-conflict stability. The Hague Convention has applicability in all these phases, and exercise

events are configured and designed to test commanders, their staff and exercise participants on the handling of cultural heritage matters. In many cases this overlaps with other training objectives. The CPPU has assisted with storyline creation and development with CPP themes as part of BALTOPS 22 and 23. In the scripting for this joint land and sea exercise, basic scenarios were developed to test various aspects of HC54 and international law regarding cultural heritage, with serials covering CP on land and under water. Examples include an amphibious landing where pre-landing activity will involve mine clearance operations, potentially interacting with underwater heritage; or the landing force having to engage with an insurgent force in the vicinity of a CP refuge.

Training for deployments

More in-depth teaching on the understanding of CPP is approached through targeted training for specific operations. In this case classroom and scenario-based training is delivered to personnel as part of their pre-deployment training (PDT) package. This is normally at Company level, with in-person briefings to key staff on CPP and scenarios relating to expected conditions in theatre. Briefings cover the history and context of a country and region, notable CP and specific areas, as well as an introduction to the types of buildings, objects and intangible cultural heritage they might encounter and, most importantly, how they might make inferences from what they see; all contributing to the HTA approach mentioned above. A written brief is also provided to the deploying unit, with further details of the cultural heritage in their AOR. Some operations have an inherent focus on CPP, with the built environment and its expression of perceived cultural, ethnic, religious or other social divisions being a key element in the circumstances addressed by the deployment. Thus, in Kosovo, where the UK contributed a HTA reconnaissance component to the UN Mission, the sensitivities surrounding CP (including a UNESCO World Heritage Site) were central to the very instabilities that the mission is intended to address.

Preparation for operations

Proper delivery of CPP requires dialogue and planning in advance of military activity. Such preparation will allow a military force to understand where they might operate with or without limitations. It will also prevent missteps in logistics and other areas where facilities have been placed on important physical or spiritual sites in ignorance. To this end, the Hague Convention encourages links and relationships to be forged with host nation heritage ministries and

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agencies, as well as academics and others in the area concerned in advance of military activity. Furthermore, the domestic UK academic sector has historically been, for a range of reasons, markedly international in outlook, recruitment and network-building capability, and this applies with particular force to relevant fields such as archaeology, geography, history, economics, anthropology and sociology. British archaeologists, ancient historians and human geographers have longstanding links with their counterparts all over the world, not limited to those parts where 'British Schools' have been set up overseas – though such institutions are a clear manifestation of the phenomenon and continue to play a vital role. Engagement with academics can contribute to a practical understanding of what constitutes the cultural heritage of a specific nation or region, where it is and who values it. Ideally, the outcome of such engagement is an essential corrective to the simplistic idea that CPP in preparation for operations simply means getting the right heritage sites on the no-strike lists. While this is an important element of the task, and ensuring that those in the field have the right CP laydown or data feed for their combat systems is the central objective, it is clearly insufficient. There is no operational area where all significant CP is listed or recorded. Understanding the character and social role of what is valued locally as heritage will enhance the likelihood of extending respect and protection beyond what is explicitly recognised to CP that is not listed or recorded nationally but may be equally significant.

Evidently this applies to the CP of potential adversaries as well as to allies; cultural property must be protected and respected regardless of whose it is. Engagement with subject-matter expertise – in the host nation, domestically or wherever it is to be found – is one way to improve the likelihood of an impartial approach to CP in theatre.

Support to operations

As the Hague Convention requires, CPP should be part of the military staff planning process, and the CPPU will have input into the Combat Estimate, the UK military planning process, allowing shaping of the options that are prepared for consideration by a commander. Once a force is deployed, with a confirmed mission and plan, support on CPP is also given, using links developed during the PDT phase. The in-theatre Operations cell can call on advice from the UK should a CP situation develop in their area of operation. In most cases the full-time presence of a CPP Officer is not justified in theatre, and the on-call service is described as 'reachback'. This has been used successfully by UK forces in Mali on two occasions.

Roger Curtis and Mark Dunkley

Advice to commanders

While the Hague Convention seeks to ensure the protection of cultural heritage in conflict, it acknowledges that the military mission requirements are likely to come first, and this might raise the possibility of military activity that causes damage to CP. The CPP Officer must advise commanders of the requirement to minimise damage, explore options to do so and ensure robust justification is made and recorded if damage or destruction of CP is unavoidable. In this role the CPP officer will work with the Staff Legal Advisor (LEGAD). More generally, the two will work together to ensure that UK forces are following the spirit and letter of the convention and international law. This may be done in theatre, or via reachback. The LEGAD may also advise on the rules of engagement (RoE) related to combatants and the protection of cultural heritage. Whether lethal force is permitted to protect CP, for instance, will depend on the mission – though in general for UK forces on operations lethal force is not permitted to protect property, unlike for instance US forces who will be so permitted. Different approaches such as this, in a coalition environment, can give rise to RoE issues and advice to operations staff and commanders on CPP will take this into account.

Ongoing security and protection of cultural heritage

CPP clearly has applications beyond the kinetic phase of a campaign and will also play a major part in the stabilisation and reconstruction effort. That is, indeed, part of the theme of the conference that gave rise to this book. The UK recognises this and the location of CPPU within a Brigade tasked specifically with ‘Security Force Assistance’ emphasises that often CPP will be delivered by host nation forces in a non-kinetic but still potentially unstable environment; the role of the CPP Officer in such circumstances will be to assist the proper appreciation of the role of CP – for good and bad – in the stabilisation process. HC54 covers these areas in some detail, under the duties of an occupying power, or, in more currently applicable terms, the duties of an ally to the host nation to safeguard CP. In this phase there will be a different emphasis, more on security and establishment of the rule of law and a secure and stable environment. In this, the prevention of looting and illegal excavation will be part of the role; not providing direct security but advising those with responsibility in the area or district on what may need protecting, and how that may be achieved. Close working with host nation heritage institutions will be important, and lessons learnt from the experience of the British Army in the North Africa Campaign

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in 1942 are especially applicable, notably the re-instatement of local guides and security staff on sites. In some circumstances, support will be given in the collection of evidence and information if a war crime is believed to have been committed in relation to CP, and to this end CPPU works together with the UK War Crimes Network.

Conclusion

The UK Ministry of Defence has required the creation of a CPP capability within the UK Armed Forces to fulfil its obligations under HC54. In addition to these requirements, the appropriate use of CPP in tension, crisis, war and return to normality can improve mission success and improve dialogues with allies, hosts and other stakeholders. The UK has developed this capability and it is utilised in support to exercises and operations. The CPP capability gives additional understanding, which, along with other HS related actions, can ensure that the commander has the best understanding of their environment to achieve tactical and mission objectives. Insofar as the delivery of military Cultural Property Protection in the UK is concerned, five key points can be identified:

- Armed conflict may result in the destruction of Cultural Heritage.
- Cultural Heritage is a factor of Human Security.
- The law obliges UK Defence to conduct CPP during armed conflict and (belligerent) occupation.
- UK Defence aims to deliver the same standards of CPP during counterinsurgency, stabilisation and disaster relief operations.
- LOAC breaches are punishable under International Criminal Law.

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Chapter 4.

CHALLENGES AND PRACTICES FOR PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF KOREA

Yang Chang-hun

Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed ... The wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.

– The Constitution of UNESCO

Introduction

The year 2023 marked the seventieth anniversary of the signing of the Korean War Armistice. However, the Korean Peninsula is not at the end of the war, but in a state of armistice, or truce – a frozen conflict. Since the war, there have been more than 3,000 ongoing conflicts between North and South Korea. More than a million troops are deployed near the military demarcation line between North and South Korea. If war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, it would be catastrophic, with nuclear and chemical weapons, long-range artillery and missiles deployed on both sides. The Korean Peninsula is a space where armed conflict is a constant possibility. In an armed conflict, the military's primary objective is to subdue and defeat the enemy and, due to the nature of the Korean Peninsula, the military will always prioritise military necessity.

During the Korean War (25 June 1950–27 July 1953), cultural heritage was devastated across the Korean Peninsula. During the post-war recovery process, cultural properties were not given a high priority and it wasn't until 1999 that the Cultural Heritage Administration, the main ministry in charge of cultural property management, was established. The damage caused by the war is ongoing today, seventy years after the armistice, meaning that protecting

cultural property during armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not a past or future issue, but a present one.

The world has tried to protect cultural property during various armed conflicts in the past. The Korean Peninsula presents a somewhat unique situation in terms of cultural property protection. It is not an ethnic, religious or national armed conflict, but an armed conflict within the same ethnic group. In this context, education and training to raise and maintain the military's awareness of cultural property protection must be prioritised before administrative measures such as laws and institutions.

Therefore, this chapter will examine past examples in South Korea and efforts to protect cultural property after the armistice and will consider how to protect cultural property in the event of future armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, with a particular focus on the role of war and military museums.

What we learned from the Korean War

Destruction of cultural property

In the twentieth century, the Korean Peninsula experienced irreparable damage to the cultural heritage of various peoples due to the Japanese occupation, the division of Korea into North and South Korea after liberation, and the outbreak of the Korean war. This paper will examine key examples from the post-liberation period of the US military government and the Korean War to draw lessons for cultural property protection.

US Military Government

The unconditional surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945 ended the Second World War, but the Korean Peninsula was placed back into the East–West Cold War structure with the US–Soviet bilateral axis in the process of reshaping the world order. On 11 February 1945, the leaders of the US, UK, and Soviet Union met at the Yalta Conference to discuss post-war affairs. At the time, the USA set up the 38th parallel and had the Soviet army take charge of the surrender and disarmament of the Japanese army in the northern part and the US army do so in the southern part. The period from 8 September 1945, when United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was established, to 15 August 1948, when the sole government of South Korea was established, is known as the US Military Government.

In the United States, as early as the Second World War, the Roberts Commission advised the War Department on cultural issues to protect Europe's cultural heritage during the war, and a small specialised agency, the Monu-

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ments, Fine Arts, and Archives sub-commission (MFAA), was tasked with protecting cultural property from 1943 to 1946 (Pollard 2022). Thus, while it was to be expected that the military government on the Korean Peninsula would maintain a similar policy based on experience in the Second World War, the US military government does not appear to have had a specific plan for cultural policy in Korea.

A separate directive does mention the protection of cultural property, with orders to 'Take appropriate measures to protect cultural properties from looting, help Korean experts improve their management capabilities, and preserve and investigate historical documents of the Japanese occupation and successive dynasties' (Jeong 1995). The US military government seems to have emphasised the protection of historical, cultural and religious artefacts. The military government took several steps to protect cultural assets, including reopening the National Museum, which was closed at the end of the Japanese occupation, reorganising the system in a westernised manner and designating a week for the protection of historic sites (Ahn 2006).

However, during the military regime, there were several cases of cultural heritage destruction and illegal removal of cultural property by the US military. Koreans also raised legitimate demands for the return of cultural property stolen by Japan during the colonial period, but the US appeared to prioritise political considerations for its occupation policy.

The Deoksugung Palace and Manwoldae incidents are prime examples. In 1945, after the US military government decided to use Seokjojeon in Deoksugung Palace as a venue for the US-Soviet Joint Commission: US soldiers entered Seokjojeon and destroyed the facility. (Kim 1991). In the spring of the following year, the attempt to build a US military barracks at Manwoldae in Kaesong, which was the site of Palace of the Goryeo Dynasty, was halted. When the ruins were desecrated, the citizens of Kaesong protested strongly and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo ordered the US 8th Army Command in Korea to stop the construction (Jeong 1992). It is not uncommon for armies occupying a country after a war to destroy and loot cultural property, and this was the case with the US military. Some US military officers illegally shipped ceramics and other artwork left behind by the Japanese to the United States (Lee 1996).

MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, publicly opposed the return of Korean cultural property from Japan in May 1948, stating that he was 'strongly opposed'. Even if this was a minority view of the idea of restitution of cultural property lost or destroyed as a result of military action

and occupation, his reasoning was that it would exacerbate Japanese feelings toward the United States, make Japan vulnerable to ideological pressure, and provide fertile ground for subversive behaviour (TIME 2002).

In summary, although the US military government outwardly proclaimed the need to protect Korea's cultural assets and took some positive steps, in reality it prioritised US national interests by focusing on political considerations and intelligence gathering on Japanese occupation policies.

The Korean War

The Korean War started with surprise attack by North Korea in the early morning of 25 June 1950 with the intention to communise South Korea supported by the Soviet Union and China. In the beginning, North Korea had powerful weapons such as T-34 tanks, self-propelled artillery and fighter aircraft whereas the military in the southern Republic of Korea (ROK) did not have any tanks or fighter aircraft. North Korea captured the capital, Seoul, in three days using their dominant military power and reached the Nakdong River in less than one and a half months. The ROK Armed Forces waged an all-out war with all citizens against the communist army of North Korea in spite of their inferiority in military power. The United Nations passed resolutions for a military aid programme for Korea to punish the unprovoked invasion by the North and 22 United Nations member states participated in the Korean War under the UN flag, driving out the invading army and protecting the freedom of ROK. An armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, but it did not mean the end of the war.

As a result of the Korean War, eighty per cent of the country was destroyed. The vandalism of cultural property during the Korean War was a result of large-scale aerial attacks, ideological clashes in the form of skirmishes on the ground, the construction of facilities necessary for military operations, and the unwitting actions of soldiers. Some examples include the following.

Buddhist cultural property damage

While most wooden and stone structures were damaged during the Korean War, many Buddhist temples were destroyed and damaged. Beginning in 2002, the Korean Buddhist Jogye Order published five volumes of *Hangukjeonjaeng-gwa bulgyomunhwajae*, the Korean War and Buddhist Cultural Properties (Daehan 2003–2007), surveying temple damage in major areas during the Korean War. However, seventy years after the end of the war, we still do not have a comprehensive account of the damage.

What we do know is that most of the damage was caused by UN and South Korean forces. Temples were subjected to ground battles, aerial bombard-

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ment and deliberate arson to prevent them from being used as war installations by the enemy, and Buddhist cultural properties were used as targets for military exercises. Additionally, the soldiers did not recognise the temple's treasures as respectable or cultural assets and transported many of them illegally as 'trophyes'.

In October 1952, Prof. Min Young-kyu, under the direction of the Minister of Education, surveyed the damage to temple cultural properties in Gyeongsangbuk-do Province, writing in a press article at the time:

The stone Buddhas scattered here and there ... have become targets of fire for the South Korean soldiers ... destroying our treasured cultural properties ... The resentment of nearby residents is high ... It is urgent that strong efforts be made to increase the cultural awareness of the soldiers (Bulgyosinmun 2019).

The Bombing of Seoul and damage to the palaces

The hardest-hit city during the Korean War was Seoul, the capital of South Korea, where every palace in the city was either heavily damaged or destroyed by the war. Seoul was reduced to ruins due to aerial bombardment by the US military, which had air superiority, and fierce street fighting during the operation to recapture Seoul. In particular, Gwanghwamun Gate, the main entrance to Gyeongbokgung Palace, the most iconic building in Seoul, was reduced to ashes, with only the lower stone pillars remaining, and Manchunjeon was completely destroyed by bombing.

By September 1950, three months into the Korean War, a US military counter-offensive was planned and a massive aerial bombardment of Seoul was anticipated. In response, the South Korean government was able to negotiate with the Allied command to exclude major cultural centers from the bombing. However, according to accounts of the time, General MacArthur, the Commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command (UNC), was quoted as saying,

It is inevitable that a city, once it has suffered a stroke of genius or a call of war, will rise again as a new city, many times larger and better than the old one, and in the case of Korea, we, the United States, will take responsibility and help to build and rebuild, so Seoul will be transformed into an ideal modern city in the future (Son 1996).

As with his thoughts on the return of Korean cultural properties from Japan under the US military government, MacArthur's response provides a clear insight into his perception of cultural property protection during the Korean War.

General Eisenhower's policy in the Second World War was very different: in December 1943, he ordered all commanders fighting through southern Italy

to respect monuments as much as the war permitted. In May 1944, he ordered that the ‘preservation of historical monuments’ in Europe was the responsibility of all commanders, who should protect and respect historical monuments and cultural centres as much as possible (Brown and Shortland 2019). This shows how important a commander’s perception can be in protecting cultural property.

Suwon Hwaseong fortress

Suwon, a city about an hour south of Seoul is a transportation hub with three railroads, National Highway 1 leading to Busan, the southernmost city on the Korean Peninsula, and an airfield. The Soviet Union’s Military Advisory Group, which started the war, identified Suwon as a first-stage target in its southern invasion plan. Suwon is also home to the Hwaseong Fortress, which was registered as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997.

The North Korean army began its invasion of the South on 25 June 1950, and entered Suwon on 4 July. At the time, the South Korean army deployed troops around Jangnamun, part of Suwon Hwaseong Fortress, to cover the withdrawal of the army headquarters. Colonel Choi Chang-sik, the engineer commander, wanted to blow up Jangnamun to block the road to stop the North Korean tanks, but the order was cancelled by Colonel Lee Jong-chan, the head of the Capital Division. A split-second decision by the commander could have reduced a precious cultural heritage site to ashes (Yang et al. 2005). When the UN forces retook Suwon three months later in a major counteroffensive, aircraft from the US Navy Air Forces bombed Cheongryongmun, including the east gate of Suwon Hwaseong destroying the pavilion above the gate. Suwon became an important target for both sides in the immediate aftermath of the war, causing not only human casualties but also significant damage to cultural heritage, industrial facilities and public buildings.

Protection of cultural property

However, there have been efforts to protect cultural property during wartime. In the Korean War, there are many examples of courageous actions by experts, museum staffs, soldiers, and civilians who recognised the importance of cultural property and preserved it.

During wartime, the protection of ancient cultural sites becomes a major issue for policy departments. This was the case in South Korea. Early in the war, on 28 July 1950, a document sent by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Supreme Allied Commander for the Allied Forces included a cultural protection plan that recommended protecting Gyeongju, the ancient capital of

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the Silla Dynasty and home to numerous historical and cultural monuments and treasures. The idea came from the AD-HQ Committee for the Protection of Monuments, chaired by Harvard University professor Langdon Warner, a historian of Oriental art. It is a great example of how the right experts can help protect cultural property and shows that the US government at the time was utilising the knowledge of local experts and constantly gathering information to protect cultural resources (Kim 2014).

The Korean government and the National Museum of Korea also made great sacrifices and efforts to maintain and preserve cultural properties. During the war, the Korean government recognised the importance of protecting cultural assets and ordered the Ministry of National Defence to move important cultural assets from Gyeongju to the United States. In July 1950, the artefacts were excavated from a burial mound in the ancient Silla region and shipped to the Bank of America in San Francisco along with gold bars from the Bank of Korea. In December 1950, when the tide turned and the capital city of Seoul fell back into enemy hands due to the intervention of the Chinese Communist Army, the National Museum of Korea moved 430 boxes of artefacts from the main collections of the National Museum of Korea and the Deoksugung Palace Art Museum to Busan in the south of the peninsula to protect them (Jang 2019). These examples demonstrate that a sense of mission and commitment to preserving cultural assets is key to cultural preservation.

Meanwhile, there are also notable examples of cultural property protection by troops engaged in direct combat. After the Incheon landings began on 15 September 1950, North Korean troops retreated into the Sobaek Mountains and Jirisan and fierce fighting broke out between the two sides in the area around Haeinsa Temple. The ROK Air Force was also involved in the hunt for them. Colonel Kim Young-hwan, the squadron commander of the Sachon Squadron, was ordered to bomb Haeinsa Temple on 18 December 1951 but he ordered no bombs to be used; only machine gun fire to protect the cultural property, as he felt that Haeinsa Temple and the Palmandaejang-gyeong, Tripitaka Koreana should be protected. Haeinsa Temple was miraculously saved from being reduced to ashes. In response to a protest by a US military reconnaissance officer at the time, he replied:

It's not that the temple is more important than the country, but the temple is more important than communist guerrillas. They don't form a front, so even if you drive them out of the area, they'll just come back in, and killing a few hundred of them won't decide the war. Haeinsa Temple is home to the Palmandaejang-gyeong, a national treasure. Even reconnaissance officers will

recognize that the closest example is the failure to bomb Paris in Europe and Kyoto in Japan in World War II (Seo 1979).

Immediately following the landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950, the US 7th Division moved directly into Seoul. Although stiff North Korean resistance delayed the initial advance, the Seventh Division crossed the Han River on 24 September and continued its advance toward the centre of Seoul. At that time, First Lieutenant James H. Dill, assigned as an artillery observer in support of the 32nd Regiment of the US 7th Division, received a radio report from a forward observer that enemy forces were continuing to converge on Deoksugung Palace, a historic Korean pavilion. He discussed the shelling of the area with a colleague and recalled the Second World War example of Monte Casino Abbey. He knew that his conscience would not allow him to launch a barrage that would destroy hundreds of enemy troops and equipment, while also destroying a palace and the relics of a nation with a long history. In the end, he called in his fire support team to begin bombarding the palace shortly after the enemy had cleared it after several hours (Gugbang 1996).

It is entirely thanks to him that we are able to see Deoksugung Palace today, a beautiful palace in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. There are always wise people in tough wartime situations and military thinking is very important. This is difficult if the right values are not inculcated in everyday life.

What we have achieved since the Armistice Agreement

Governments' steps

This section will examine what governments and militaries have done to protect cultural property since the Korean War. There are many ways to protect cultural property in the event of armed conflict, but I'll look at the most basic method through international law, especially the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. This was the first multilateral international treaty to focus on the protection of cultural property in armed conflict and, while it has limited effectiveness, it remains the foundation of how cultural property is protected in armed conflict.

Throughout the two world wars, the main source of international law on the treatment of cultural property in armed conflict was the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention (IV)). However, this provision did not adequately ensure the protection of cultural property in modern warfare with the development of aircraft and long-range missiles, and consequently did not prevent the destruction of many

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cultural properties in the course of the First and Second World Wars. In response, the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was adopted by the Fifth UNESCO General Conference in 1954. The First Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, which provides for the return of looted cultural property in occupied territories, and the Second Protocol of 1999, which provides for the criminal liability of individuals who violate the protection of cultural property, were subsequently adopted. As of February 2022, 133 countries around the world are parties to the 1954 Hague Convention, with 110 parties to the First Protocol and 85 parties to the Second Protocol. However, Republic of Korea is not yet a party to either the 1954 Hague Convention or its two Protocols.

In 2001 the Republic of Korea, led by the Cultural Heritage Administration, pushed for accession to the 1954 Hague Convention, but had been cautiously considering the fact that the United States had not acceded to the Convention, given the possibility that it would limit its military actions. Following the US ratification of the convention in March 2009, a task force was set up in 2010 by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defence to promote accession, but the National Assembly failed to pass the relevant legislation.

The Ministry of National Defence, the largest party to the Convention at the time, emphasised that Republic of Korea was in a state of military confrontation with North Korea, and judged that the listing of cultural properties with special or enhanced protection under the Convention would severely restrict military operations around them and could result in their being used as targets for enemy attacks. Accordingly, it was recommended to accede to the Convention and its First Protocol, but to reserve the right to list cultural properties under special protection. It also did not agree to sign the Second Protocol. The Ministry of National Defence said that it should be cautious about joining the Second Protocol, which recognises the ‘universal jurisdiction’ to be tried in other countries, because South Korea is at constant risk of armed conflict and has troops in many countries (News 1 2012).

However, not being a signatory to the Hague Convention does not prevent South Korea from being held liable in the event of an armed conflict. According to Article 6 of the Korean Constitution, treaties to which Republic of Korea is a party have the same force and effect as domestic law. South Korea is obligated to review domestic laws and comply with them by ratifying UNESCO and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore,

ROK has a moral responsibility to abide by the 1954 Hague Convention as it is recognised as customary international law.

The Cultural Heritage Administration failed to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol in 2010, but in 2012 it prepared a bill to protect cultural property in armed conflict. The bill is a draft for future ratification.

Military efforts to protect cultural property

Apart from ratifying international conventions, the military, as the largest party in an armed conflict, has established and operated its own provisions for the protection of cultural property. The Ministry of National Defence operates separate cultural property protection provisions for South Korea and North Korea.

First, the *Gun munhwajaeboho hunhyeong*, Military Cultural Property Protection Directive in the South (Gun 2021) was established for the efficient management of cultural and military property within the protection zones of state-owned land, civilian lines and military facilities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defence, or held in military museums. The directive specifies the duties of units at all levels, division of duties, management of cultural properties, investigation and protection of buried cultural properties, application for registration and management of defence-related registered cultural properties, management of military properties, operation of military museums, establishment of cultural property management plans, education, utilisation, and protection during emergencies.

The directive requires units at all levels to designate a civil affairs officer as the military cultural affairs officer to ensure that military cultural affairs are conducted in an organised manner. The chiefs of staff of each military branch develops and incorporates cultural property protection into doctrine and guidance, which is currently reflected in the military manual FM 31-2 *Civil Affairs*.

In addition, units at all levels are required to develop a cultural property management plan to protect cultural properties within their jurisdiction and to maintain a cultural property distribution map by garrison. When planning outdoor tactical exercises, units should utilise the geographic information system (GIS) of cultural assets in the area to check the distribution of cultural assets so that areas with cultural assets are not selected as bivouac sites or targets.

When damage to cultural properties and museum facilities within their jurisdiction is expected, they must take necessary measures such as moving them to a safe area or burying them, and the heads of units and organisations that manage cultural and military properties must establish and prepare to im-

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mediately implement measures to protect cultural properties in case of wars, accidents or similar emergencies.

Meanwhile, it stipulates that training related to the protection of cultural properties in wartime and peacetime should be conducted at least once a year, and that each unit should receive intensive training, collective training for all enlisted soldiers and field trips to nearby military museums during unit training. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is obligated to provide education on the cultural property protection policies of the deploying country during the collective education of overseas deployed units, and to reflect relevant contents such as 'cultural property protection' and 'Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict' in subjects such as war history and military law at educational institutions such as joint military colleges and military academies, so as to strengthen the effectiveness of cultural property protection through continuous education.

In the event of an armed conflict, the protection of cultural properties in North Korea is guided by the *Jeonsi bughan munhwajae bohojichim*: 'Guidelines for the Protection of Cultural Properties in North Korea in Wartime' prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In brief, the guidelines call for preserving cultural properties in North Korea in their original state, implementing necessary measures to minimise damage to cultural properties between military operations and other activities, and prohibiting the privatisation, transfer to other areas, damage and loss of North Korean cultural properties. In particular, the guidance specifies that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to include North Korea's national treasure sites and major museums on the no-attack list and to seek legal advice from targeting committees. It also prohibits military use of cultural properties and areas adjacent to cultural properties during military operations, prohibits targeting of 'cultural property under enhanced protection', requires approval from commanders at the division commander level and above for attacks on national treasure sites or sites of conservation status, and prohibits attacks on UNESCO-designated World Heritage Sites under any circumstances (Lee 2013).

While these orders and guidelines are significant as a proactive institutional foundation for the protection of cultural properties on the Korean Peninsula, there are several problems with the military cultural property protection orders in practice.

First, most of the provisions related to the protection of cultural property focus on peacetime activities rather than armed conflict. The directive is primarily concerned with peacetime cultural property protection and management. The sections on cultural property protection activities in the field

during the deployment of overseas troops, the development of doctrine for civilian operations related to cultural property protection and the protection of cultural property during emergencies, which can be considered relevant to the protection of cultural property during armed conflicts, lack specificity and effectiveness. It is necessary to prepare new regulations based on various international and national laws related to cultural property in armed conflicts apart from the regulations on cultural property in peacetime.

Second, it delegates the management of cultural property to military commanders whose primary activity is combat missions. It also calls for the appointment of civil affairs officers as military cultural property officers and ensuring that they have the necessary expertise to fulfil their duties. In practice, however, unit or agency leaders and practitioners often lack expertise in cultural property management or preservation. To compensate for this, consideration could be given to establishing specialised organisations within the military or using experts from other civil organisations.

Third, more important than laws and regulations for the protection of cultural property, is the need to change and raise the awareness of military personnel about cultural property in actual armed conflicts. This can only be realised through ongoing peacetime education of military personnel. While the mandate calls for timely, customised and context-specific education, in practice there is a lack of effective educational materials and programmes, and a lack of continuity. It is necessary to work with museums and the Cultural Heritage Administration to come up with a more realistic and effective plan for such education.

What we can do in possible armed conflicts

Government

In terms of policy, there are several things we can do. First, the Cultural Heritage Administration should re-promote the ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol, as well as an inter-Korean agreement for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. While some have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of these instruments, their symbolic importance is significant.

Second, some studies have called for the establishment of a cultural property protection officer/military personnel system in the Ministry of National Defence by adopting the Austrian 'cultural property protection officer' system. In addition, if it is difficult to create a new position in the Ministry of National

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Defence, it is recommended that existing departments be assigned the task of protecting cultural assets and that relevant training be provided (Na 2011). Based on the author's military experience, it is difficult for the ROK military to assign cultural property duties and training to existing units. Rather, it would be more effective to introduce a system of cultural property officers utilising reservists or trained civilians.

Third, it would be very useful for the military to conduct joint cultural resource protection training or education with the United Nations Command and the United States Forces Korea. Currently, the Smithsonian Institution conducts a training programme called Army Monuments Officer Training (AMOT). The Republic of Korea military, which conducts joint exercises with the US every year, should include ROK soldiers in such cultural property protection training in addition to military exercises to train cultural property protection personnel.

Fourth, it is absolutely necessary to change and improve the awareness of military personnel regarding cultural properties. As has been shown, it is difficult to make sound judgments in a crisis situation of armed conflict without basic knowledge and skills regarding cultural properties.

War Memorial of Korea: Social platform and education hub

In practical terms, the government's role in protecting cultural property is limited. The protection of cultural property requires close cooperation between the government, military and cultural institutions. It requires a combination of policies, institutions and practices to create a synergistic effect.

Among the institutions that produce such culture, museums play an important role. Museums contribute, among other things, to establishing a common interest in the public sphere. Museums exercise a kind of hegemony through the presentation of their collections, where the public experiences a sense of belonging, identity and otherness, and participates in collective thinking about cultural heritage. In particular, the emerging museum culture invites us to reflect on what memory is and how it operates in the present, how ambiguous and contradictory it is, and how it plays a role in our consciousness to deny or affirm history (Dominique 2014).

Among these museums, the War Memorial of Korea (WMoK), which specialises in war and military history, holds a unique position in Korea. The WMoK is a special corporation established under the War Commemoration Service Association Act. It is classified as a private museum according to the standards of the Korean Museum Act. However, in the South Korean govern-

ment organisation chart, it is a public institution that receives subsidies from the government. Currently, the WMoK is under the supervision of the ROK Ministry of National Defence. It is a museum and memorial dedicated to war and military history, with an average annual attendance of over two million visitors. It's worth noting that in 2015, it was ranked the number one attraction in South Korea by Trip Advisor.

As such, the WMoK is a focal point for effective connections between the public and private sectors. The WMoK maintains a close relationship with the military due to its easy accessibility. They also have a working relationship with the Ministry of National Defence, which means they can be used as a direct policy proponent and enforcer of cultural heritage protection. Using these institutional characteristics, the WMoK seeks to contribute to cultural property protection in four areas.

First, in terms of system, when the Ministry of National Defence prepared the directive in 2008, the WMoK requested that activities related to the War Memorial of Korea be specified in the directive provisions. At that time, the WMoK was asked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include one provision related to mandatory donations. Article 18 of that directive requires the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transfer to the WMoK any equipment and materiel used by overseas deployed units that is worthy of preservation. Article 18 of the directive spells out the role specifically.

Second, in terms of education, the War Memorial of Korea developed a new programme in 2019 for practitioners at each military history museum of the ROK Armed Forces. Most units have their own history museums or small exhibition centres. The first targets were the military history museum practitioners of more than 130 units. They are not the civil authorities responsible for protecting cultural property in the event of armed conflict. They are managers of their facilities, but the WMoK started an educational programme to increase their awareness of cultural property protection. The WMoK convened annual meetings and trained them. Even during COVID-19, the WMoK prepared training packages and videos and conducted training online. In 2014, the WMoK also launched the War and Military Cooperation Network project, which also holds annual meetings. As of 2023, a total of fifty institutions have joined the network, which holds regular working group meetings and trainings. These programmes are designed to train cultural property experts in their respective institutions, serve as a field trip and training venue for military units scattered throughout the country, and serve as a civilian expert organisation

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for the protection of cultural properties in the region in the event of armed conflict in the future.

Third, in terms of raising awareness of cultural heritage, the WMoK is indirectly working to engage military personnel. ROK currently adopts a conscription system. That is why the WMoK is always trying to ensure that soldiers can visit. The WMoK consulted with the Ministry of National Defence several years ago and proposed ways to attract soldiers to the museum. It was a very simple idea that soldiers on leave would get a day off if they visited the War Memorial of Korea, and it had a great effect. The WMoK also operates an exhibition room on overseas deployments, including PKO, and held a special exhibition in 2021, co-sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unfortunately, there are no exhibits or contents on cultural property protection in galleries of the museum. It is necessary to include content related to cultural property protection when remodelling the exhibition hall in the future.

Conclusion

The Korean War is far from over. The war, which was halted by an armistice, remains a source of conflict between North and South Korea. The Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone are maintained by the United Nations Command to prevent armed conflict. Beyond the conflict between North and South Korea, the DMZ continues to function as a site of Cold War conflict between world systems.

The Korean War is an unfinished war – a frozen conflict. A ceasefire, not an end to the conflict, always carries the possibility of armed conflict. As a result of the Korean War, which has been called a tragedy of fratricide, countless cultural properties were destroyed and some were recovered. Although the war came before a systematic foundation for cultural property protection could be established, some conscious individuals were able to save a significant number of cultural properties. Those who defended cultural heritage in the face of threats to their lives were not just courageous, but had knowledge and beliefs about cultural heritage that enabled them to act so firmly.

Seventy years after the Korean War, there has been little reflection or action on cultural property protection, and this paper considered what we can do to protect cultural property in the event of future conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Examples from the Korean War and subsequent government and military actions have been presented, but it is military thinking that is most important. War and military museums occupy different positions in each country, but they

can play an important role in protecting cultural property. Situated between the public and private spheres, war and military museums are key connectors between the two. Second, war and military museums can be a social platform to improve awareness of the military. They can also become educational hubs to protect valuable cultural heritage. As I quoted from the UNESCO Charter at the beginning, war originates in the human mind. And the main actor in the war is the military; in the end, protecting cultural properties will be a distant task if the awareness of the military is not raised. Lastly, all of this cannot be accomplished by one individual or institution. If we can form solidarity and cooperation with other organisations, we can create greater opportunities.

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Chapter 5.

FROM SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION TO EVIDENCE: INVESTIGATING ARMED CONFLICT DAMAGE TO IMMOVABLE HERITAGE

Lisa Mol

Introduction

Immovable heritage is, by nature, difficult to protect as it cannot be placed within a refuge and is very difficult or even impossible to shield from impact sustained during combat operations. At the time of writing, extensive damage is reported across Ukraine and Gaza, and there is continued reporting of damage and destruction caused by the long-standing conflicts in the *Middle East and North Africa* (MENA) region. But damage is not limited to contemporary combat; indeed, for as long as armed conflict has taken place, sites and objects of cultural and social importance have been damaged, destroyed and looted.

It is therefore no surprise that, in both historic and active combat zones, damage sustained to immovable heritage can be extensive, leading not only to aesthetic scarring of historic structures but also to enhanced risk of collapse and rapid decay if no timely interventions are made. This is particularly problematic in light of the friable nature of heritage sites; these sites have been exposed to natural decay processes for years, centuries or even millennia. Even relatively resilient building materials such as igneous or metamorphic stone will experience a reduction in strength over these timespans, resulting in loss of material and structural strength. Regular maintenance and care can mitigate a rapid pace of decay, but we need to assume that, at the time of conflict impact, the heritage site is likely to have been affected by decay processes that would increase its fragility. While some of this damage may be sustained accidentally during armed conflict, it is also possible that it is sustained during targeted attacks and thus falls within the remit of criminal investigations. However, to correctly collate the

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damage and look beyond the immediate impact towards the long-term effects of impacts on the security and stability of the affected heritage, it is imperative to understand the physical nature of the damage. Heritage building materials are often already friable after decades, centuries or even millennia exposed to the elements, and at severe risk of enhanced decay. So, to fully understand the implications of conflict damage for heritage structures, we need to look towards a combination of decay, impact and environmental studies. The nature and condition of the impacted material will direct the shape and intensity of the damage inflicted and will also direct potential retention of forensic evidence of the events that led to the damage. In this chapter, we explore our current scientific understanding of damage within the context of long-term stone decay, damage upon impact and outlook for long-term stability of the site. Importantly, such knowledge can be used to inform forensic investigations of armed conflict damage to built heritage.

Armed conflict and the built environment

The documentation of destruction of heritage in the built environment is extensive, both in terms of reported cases and the inherent threat that conflict poses to this heritage (Stone 2015). Because of its societal value, heritage is often deliberately targeted (Burns 2017; Russo and Giusti 2017) as part of a wider ‘cultural cleansing’ (Pasikowska-Schnass 2016), despite its protected status under the Laws of Armed Conflict and the 1954 Hague Convention (Stone 2015; Brosché et al. 2017; Dogar et al. 2023), and international protection from cultural heritage organisations such as ICOMOS and Blue Shield (Kosciejew 2023). Furthermore, heritage is particularly vulnerable as not only is it irreplaceable and cannot simply be replicated or rebuilt with modern materials, but it will also be subject to the strains experienced in post-conflict situations where scarcity of resources can lead to neglect and abandonment (Al-Barzngy and Khayat 2023; Tsyrfya et al. 2023). As much as it would be preferable to be able to protect all built heritage from damage during conflict, the nature and often the size of immovable heritage makes it difficult to protect *in situ*. Operational measures that could otherwise protect heritage, such as evacuation and placement in refuges (Pollard 2020; Legnér 2023), are not applicable to such immovable sites, and often these sites are too large for anything other than selective protection of particularly fragile sections through the use of sandbags and boarding up (Strufe 1999; Thawani et al. 2021, [Figure 1](#)).



Figure 1. Sandbags protecting windows in Lviv, Ukraine. CC BY-SA 4.0 by Cogitato via Wikimedia Commons.

Further complication is added by the infinite number of damage scenarios that need to be addressed, as each conflict will be shaped by its unique circumstances, arms usage and environmental conditions; the ever-changing nature of artillery and ammunition; the circumstances of combat, including distance of fighting; the infinite range of environments that conflict takes place in, ranging from hyper-arid deserts to highly variable continental climates; and diverse nature of the combat areas such as urban or agricultural makes it impossible to develop a one-size-fits-all approach to heritage preservation in conflict areas. Ideally, the blanket policy is to ensure that no heritage is harmed during armed engagement, but unfortunately this is an impossible scenario to pursue. The use of no-strike lists, as well as the international legal protection afforded to heritage, provides some protection, but accidental damage as well as targeted destruction of heritage sites remains the reality we continue to face.

Conflict-damaged heritage and decay

Heritage sites are, by nature, often long-standing structures that have enjoyed varying degrees of maintenance and renewal through the ages. Rarely are they homogenous in the use of materials, with combinations of brick, stone, wood, metal and plaster commonly found in structures. These materials each deteriorate at varying rates, both in terms of temporal rate of decay and relative response rates to environmental strain such as humidity and temperature stress. For the majority of materials, these decay rates and responses are well-researched (see for example Eppes 2022; Grottesi et al. 2023; La Russa and Ruffolo 2021 for a small selection), and a large body of conservation strategies can advise on their maintenance and support, such as those collated by the Getty Conservation Institute Publications Collection (GCI 2023). When we consider armed conflict impacts to be extremely rapid forms of this decay, we can incorporate this in our damage documentation and modelling. For example, the stress of thermal cycles can create fracture networks within stonework, as well as cavernous features such as alveoli and tafoni (Groom et al. 2015). The impact of a bullet creates a cavernous feature, referred to as the crater, with an associated network of fractures at sub-surface and surface level. This impact point is shown to alter the movement of moisture, and associated solutes, through the stonework, disproportionately affecting the damaged area. This means that an initially fragile heritage surface has suffered the instantaneous loss of structural strength associated with the moment of impact and energy transfer from the tip of the bullet to the stonework, to be then further subjected to naturally present decay processes in its increasingly fragile state (Maniscalco 2007).

At the time of impact, the energy contained in a projectile is transferred from the point of impact into the material that is impacted upon. Simply put, at the point where a projectile such as a bullet or a piece of shrapnel hits a surface, the energy within the projectile is first transferred to the impacted material and then absorbed accordingly. The energy available for transfer will be variable dependent on the velocity with which the projectile hits the surface, notably the residual velocity within the projectile at the time of impact (Duan et al. 2006). The response of the impacted material is dependent on the flexural strength of both the site of impact and of the wider structure; for example, when a stone-built wall is impacted, the ability of the mortar to absorb the energy as it travels away from the direct impact zone and further out through the structure will determine how the wider damage profile develops.

The increased presence of the (enhanced) fracture network in particular poses a threat to the long-term future of a heritage structure. In stonework in

particular, the loss of cohesion in the stone matrix (Figure 2) will accelerate the loss of material from the surface and lead to recession of surfaces as well as potential loss of decorative elements.




Figure 2. Scanning Electron Microscopy image of sandstone affected by ballistic impact, showing parallel fracturing at sub-surface level and associated loss of structural coherence of the stone. Image by the author.

The accelerated rate of decay is of particular importance when considering the extent of a potential Crime Against Culture; we deny future generations enjoyment of heritage because of active combat damage, as well as the reduction in its longevity through ensuing instability and decay. Best practice in heritage conservation looks ahead to long-term preservation of the sites and their use, should we therefore not assess the damage done accordingly?

Damage assessment techniques

There are two considerable obstacles to damage documentation in conflict zones. The first is one that restricts assessments of heritage under any circumstance, which is the limitations placed on destructive sampling and testing, as all techniques are preferably non-contact or at least non-destructive (Tejedor et al. 2022; Moropoulou et al. 2005). Careful consideration therefore has to be

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given to the absolute need for using any method that would remove material from the site or leave any kind of mark.

The second consideration is the safety concern associated with accessing sites in an area of active conflict or recently affected by conflict. Personal security might be affected by both political and/or social instability, and also the instability of the sites damaged by heavy fighting. It is therefore prudent to consider remote investigations of damage as a primary investigation route and use this as a means to pinpoint sites where in-person investigations are absolutely necessary.

The severity of the impact largely depends on six factors that have been identified in some of the recent literature:

- a. The material type – limestones, for example, are far more susceptible to severe damage at the time of impact than sandstones (Campbell et al. 2022b), granite or even marble. The brittleness and compressive strength of the material are key in its response to a ballistic impact. For example, when working with fragile materials such as glass (Rivera et al. 2019), plasterwork and wood, the impact can lead to full destruction of larger areas.
- b. The pre-existing decay of the material – stonework exposed to temperature changes, moisture and, often, salt and/or pollution depositions has already been weakened. Equally, wood and plasterwork that have been exposed to decay processes can be left less resilient in the absorption and dissipation of energy transfer associated with a ballistic impact (Mol et al. 2017).
- c. The bullet type – in particular the composition of the bullet interior such as the presence of a steel tip. For example, experimental work showed that a 5.56×45 mm steel-tipped cartridge fired at a simulated distance of 400m with an assault rifle excavated deeper craters than a 7.62×39 mm cartridge fired from the same distance and rifle simulation (Campbell et al. 2022b).
- d. The distance of the shot – as with human bullet wounds, the distance at which a shot is fired will influence the damage the impact can cause on stonework.
- e. The angle of impact – a straight-on shot will transfer all its energy into the stone surface where it dissipates throughout the block. An angled shot will deflect a proportionate amount of energy towards the surface,

leading to greater superficial damage but less damage at subsurface level (Campbell et al. 2022a).

- f. The surface morphology of the affected surface – morphometrically more complicated objects, such as statues, decorations and multi-angled structures are more susceptible to removal of stone material such as scrollwork, anatomical parts (e.g., arms or noses) or other fragile structure sections (Mol and Gomez-Heras 2018).

Non-destructive testing approaches

A large range of non-destructive testing techniques are available, such as Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR; Matias et al. 2021), chemical analysis through p-XRF and Raman (Gómez-Laserna et al. 2015)) and Thermal Imaging (Kilic 2015) to name a few. These methods provide high-resolution imaging and quantification of structures, structural stability and measures of decay. However, within the context of active or recent conflict zones, the assumption that high-level technology and expertise is available cannot be made. The methods proposed below are therefore pared down to those which require widely available technology and rapid training.

Surface condition

Differentiating between pre-existing damage and damage directly associated with conflict can be difficult, as the natural loss of hardened surfaces and patina through decay processes can precede the damage done. Equally, damage can be exacerbated post-impact as the affected area can become an area of enhanced moisture flow and soluble salts and minerals deposition. For example, [Figure 3](#) shows a pillar at the Royal Garrison Church (Portsmouth, UK) which is in very close proximity to the sea. This church was damaged by an incendiary device in 1941, which destroyed the roof of the nave and damaged the pillars. The shrapnel impacts are still clearly demarcated by the craters visible on the columns, as is the subsequent fire-related alteration which mobilised and oxidised moveable irons within the stonework (McCabe et al. 2007). Since then, the saline environment has resulted in the capillary rise of soluble salts which have subsequently decayed the stonework of the pillars. Visually, this damage is relatively easily recognisable.

Further surface condition measurements could include the use of permeametry to assess the extent to which crack formation has propagated through the material, surface hardness testers to quantify relative loss of surface cohesion

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in and near impacted areas, and spatial assessment of crack and flake formation associated with impact fragmentation.



Figure 3. Combined bomb blast, fire, and salt weathering damage on a pillar of the Royal Garrison Church, Portsmouth, UK. Photograph by the author.

Field techniques for professionals; need to translate scientific investigation into realistic approaches

The reality of data gathering and analysis in conflict and post-conflict situation necessitates a fine balancing between the level of data density needed for a plausible documentation and interpretation of damage, and what is possible in the context of personal and site safety. The following techniques are therefore recommended for quick data collection, which can be achieved without specialist equipment beyond a DSLR camera, paper and pen, and, where available, smartphone apps and drones with video recording capacity:

1. Semi-quantitative documentation of the damage (see text box 1 for an example of this type of approach).

This 'rough and ready' approach can help with estimating the severity of the damage within the context of existing decay of the material. Ideally, surveys would be carried out during peace time so the extent of the damage unambiguously attributed to the conflict can be documented. These surveys are low cost, can require relatively little training and can be adjusted to reflect the dominant decay types observed at a site.

2. Photographic evidence.

One of the most accessible visual means of gathering evidence of damage is photogrammetry. The development of smartphone technology, and its worldwide accessibility, has greatly enhanced the possibility of documenting events and damage even under very difficult circumstances. It can therefore be extremely useful in the documentation of heritage both prior to conflict and in the event of damage, as a means of establishing ownership, condition and characteristics and establishing if criminal behaviour such as looting and vandalism have taken place (Vella et al. 2015). On its own, however, it will be subjected to scrutiny of metadata to confirm geolocation and date as well as assessment of the potential of AI-generated images. With the rise of increasing AI-generated imagery, the assumption that a photograph without metadata will suffice is increasingly questionable (Alon et al. 2022). Any practitioner gathering photographic evidence will therefore need to be able to provide geolocation and time/date stamp.

3. Photogrammetric evidence.

Where available, 3D digital documentation can be a valuable tool for the collection of data on volumetric loss, especially impact crater shape and size, large fracture formation and structural problems and discolouration associated with fire damage. If drone footage were possible, this would be ideal, as the drone video capture would include georeferencing. However, a DSLR camera can be used to selectively capture damaged heritage, using an overlapping photo technique (see [Figure 4](#)). Further options include the use of LiDAR, which is increasingly available as a tool on iPads and other handheld devices (Spreafico et al. 2021), or free-of-charge apps that can be downloaded on smartphones (Dabove et al. 2019). As with semi-quantitative surveys, ideally this data is gathered during peace time or when a threat becomes evident. This would give the best possible

chance of the data being accepted as evidence. For processing of the data and the generation of 3D models, a plethora of research is available that instructs users on commercial software such as Agisoft Metashape and Pix4Dmapper (Kingsland 2020) and open source software such as MicMac (Cutugno et al. 2022) to create Structure-from-motion (SfM) models (Jones and Church 2020; Mol and Clarke 2015).




Figure 4. A simplified photogrammetric approach for SfM. Modified from Mol and Clarke, 2015.

Longer term (environmental) monitoring might be recommended, based on the structural alterations associated with the damage, as fracture networks and crumbling can leave a material more susceptible to capillary moisture movement, which, in turn, can exacerbate accelerated decay through the deposition of solubles such as salts, as was observed in the Royal Garrison Church. Furthermore, the formation of large fissures and cracks can destabilise a structure if loadbearing elements are affected, which could result in collapse. For example, Al Quahira Castle in Taiz, Yemen was badly affected by armed combat between the Houthi Rebels and Yemeni Government Forces in 2015. Extensive damage was inflicted through the use of artillery and long-range missiles which left the walls structurally unstable and the museum destroyed. Due to the political instability in the area, the castle decayed further, posing a threat to the people living in the neighbourhoods further down the slope. During ongoing remediation work to stabilise the outer castle walls in 2023 and remediate the most immediate threat to people within the vicinity, the gate house sadly collapsed ([Figure 5](#)). Although eight years had lapsed between the armed conflict and the collapse, there is no doubt that this event can be directly attributed to conflict damage rather than natural decay.



*Figure 5. (a) Al Quahira Castle, Yemen, with conflict damage, November 2023.
Courtesy of Heritage for Peace (Isber Sabine).*



*Figure 5. (b) Al Quahira Castle gate house, Yemen, after collapse, February 2024.
Courtesy of Heritage for Peace (Isber Sabine).*

Destructive assessment techniques

Destructive testing is generally speaking not recommended on heritage as it, by nature, requires removal of material which cannot be returned to site and replaced within the original context without leaving a mark. Examples include sampling stonework for thin section analysis, taking wood cores to test the progression of damage into support beams, or removal of mortar between stones to test composition and decay. While highly valuable for generating a detailed understanding of the nature and condition of the building materials, this suite of methods would be recommended for longer-term investigations rather than the immediate damage assessment discussed in this chapter.

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On the damage section:					
1: Is there case hardening visible on the surface around the site? (see assessment score sheet)					
Value (circle)					
0	1	2	3	4	5
2: Are there lots of cracks in the stone? (see assessment score sheet) Value (circle)					
0	1	2	3	4	5
3: Are there are lot of bedding planes in the stone? (see assessment score sheet) Value (circle)					
0	1	2	3	4	5
4: Is the surface flaking a lot? Value (circle)					
0	1	2	3	4	5
5: Is there evidence of previous damage?					
Fire (black sooth deposits; camping / wildfire etc)					Yes / No
Graffiti painted (spray cans, markers etc)					Yes / No
Graffiti scratched (names or symbols scratched in with pocket knife etc)					Yes / No
Water-related damage (incl rising damp and evaporation)					Yes / No
Can you scratch the surface with:					
Finger nail	Copper coin	Pocket knife			
Yes / No	Yes / No	Yes / No			
Are there:					
Salts	Insects	Lichen	Algae	Vegetation (plants)	
Yes / No	Yes / No	Yes / No	Yes / No	Yes / No	
Sketch of damaged site, including any tafoni (include scale if possible)					
Any other notes:					
- Severity and extend of the damage - Climate (temperature and sun exposure) - Context of site (irrigation, coast, topography etc) - Recent repairs					

Text box 1. Example of a simplified semi-quantitative damage assessment sheet.

Potential for forensic investigations

With the inclusion of Crimes Against Culture under the Rome Statutes and the increasing criminalisation of intentional destruction of cultural heritage (Vrdoljak 2017) the interest in conflict damage is no longer restricted to sustainable conservation, but indeed has attracted the attention of the international law community. This highlights an increasing need for standardisation of evidence gathering that will be admissible to court. Time sensitivity of forensic investigations remains problematic in times when access to a site might be severely restricted due to safety concerns. This includes difficulty travelling to and through the area, and accessing sites that may have become structurally unsafe. However, it is possible to reconstruct events using the damage so long as contextual evidence can also be gathered. Furthermore, the strongest case can be made if condition assessments and documentation were gathered both before and after armed conflict incidents (Rose 2007) so damage can be directly attributed to the period in which weaponry was used in the area. Then, the caveats previously mentioned such as the increasing need for sound metadata and detailed documentation apply.

The prime aim for such an investigation should be the collection of forensic evidence to an admissible standard, where the quality of the evidence needs to be in line with the probability of the event (Choo 2021: 47). This includes verifiable documentation of not only the damage itself, but also the material context, the consequences for the longevity of the wider structure and any contextual data regarding the incident itself. While not formalised yet in international law, damage to heritage should not be assessed solely as a snapshot, but indeed as the damage done to its adjusted lifespan and therefore the reduction in its accessibility and enjoyment for future generations.

As discussed in the previous section, some of the contextual data can be inferred by analysis of the impact crater shape, which can give some indication of original direction of fire and potentially weaponry used. However, the clarity of this type of evidence is heavily dependent on the data being gathered before substantial alteration of the impact site takes place through further (natural) decay. For example, the fracture networks associated with impacts leave the material vulnerable to loss of volume through spalling, crumbling and dislocation of severed fragments. This can significantly alter the shape and size of the impact, and remove residue retained at the (near) surface if sufficient time has passed since the original incident. While scientific investigations could aid in the calculation of likely shape and size of the original impact, it would be considered a reconstruction rather than directly gathered evidence. Therefore,

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a combination of the field techniques including 3D documentation and condition surveys would be of most use in this case.

Residue

The collection of residues from impact sites is a well-established forensic technique to establish potential firearms use and composition of the projectile such as a bullet (Karger 2008; Chang et al. 2013). The majority of these studies centre around bullet wounds in human victims, whereas residue analysis in inanimate objects, such as a wall, appear to be less well-known. Vermeij et al. (2012) performed a comprehensive study into bullet residues in common building materials such as MDF and plasterboard and found that residues were present around the impacts. However, as Nordin et al. (2019) and Campbell et al. (2022a) note, the actual interaction and subsequent possibility for residue deposition are dependent on the nature of the impacted surface, the projectile velocity and the angle of impact, which can lead to either the creation of an impact crater where the bullet rebounds away from the impact zone, the bullet gets lodged within the impact crater or the bullet ricochets off. Understanding the angle of impact can therefore be of use in determining the likelihood of residue presence in the impact zone.

While encouraging, the nature of heritage materials is such that the materials most likely to contain residue (i.e., the direct impact zone) are also the most likely to be removed as shards and crumbs during impact. Before any sample collection for residue analysis is undertaken, the practitioner will need to assess how much of the original impact crater is still intact, and therefore how likely it is that such an analysis would be fruitful. That said, it should not be wholly dismissed as a possibility for further investigation; work by Mol et al. (2017) showed that lead from a bullet impact lodged within the fractures of quartz within impacted sandstone, which could yield viable results for bullet composition and origin analysis. If residue is successfully collected, further laboratory analysis using methods such as Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy (ICPMS) could be useful in generating forensic evidence (Udey et al. 2011).

Crater analysis and photogrammetry

When investigating the formation of craters associated with armed conflict in heritage materials, recent research into commonly used sedimentary stone (e.g., sandstone and limestone) showed that the primary driver of crater shape and size is the target material rather than the projectile energy (Campbell et al. 2022b). The implication is that the person tasked with gathering forensic

evidence will need to familiarise themselves first and foremost with the material which a structure is built from.

Further complexity is added by the fragility of heritage materials; while modern materials might yield forensic clues such as striations on the material, on fragile materials any such subtle marks are unlikely to survive the general formation of the crater, the expelling of material in this process and the further removal of shards as the fracture networks establish. The bullets themselves are rarely left lodged into the material, as would be more common with, for example, homicide, but more frequently ricochet off. This makes reconstruction of which ballistic object hit which part of the structure far more difficult, although, according to the work of Nishshanka et al. (2022), not impossible.

However, recent research (Campbell 2022a and b) shows that crater analysis can indicate from which direction a ballistic object originated. While the caveats mentioned above need to be considered, crater angle analysis can confirm contextual information regarding movement of armed forces and documented engagements in which heritage could have been damaged. Crater analysis could also indicate unidirectional or multidirectional fire, the former more likely to be indicative of vandalism and deliberate targeting and the latter more likely indicative of accidental damage during armed engagement of combatants. A study of conflict damage at the Roman Theatre in Sabratha (Leone et al. 2022) indicated that the crossfire could indeed be identified, as shown in [Figure 6](#).

Narrative building together with contextual evidence

The key to the gathering of forensic evidence at such impacted sites is to establish the correct diagnostic interpretation of the marks left by the presumed impact (Iovita et al. 2014). For example, stone cutting marks, accidental historical damage or natural decay can create craters akin to those observed in ballistic impacts. Any attempt at documenting the damage should therefore be critical of over-interpretation of indentations as ballistic impacts and compare the impacts against known non-ballistic marks. One of the most reliable means of circumnavigating this complexity is to compare, where possible, the damage to the most recent pre-conflict documentation of the structure under investigation. Ideally, this documentation is carried out as a precautionary measure during peace times, and the potential existence of such documentation should be pursued as part of a forensic investigation. If this is not possible, detailed documentation of the suspected impacts needs to be gathered using the methods suggested in the previous section, after which they can be assessed off-site.

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


Figure 6. A diagram showing reconstructed exchanges of small arms fire around the Roman theatre in Sabratha, Libya. (Oscar Gilbert; adapted from Caputo 1959).

Difficulties differentiating between deliberate and incidental damage

Unfortunately, whether a heritage site has been damaged through deliberate targeting or accidental crossfire can be extremely difficult to conclusively prove. However, there are contextual indications that could point towards deliberate damage. For example, additional damage such as graffiti sustained during the same period could be an indication of general vandalism.

Equally, destruction targeted at decorative elements, such as defacing statues or damaging wall decorations, would indicate deliberate intent rather than crossfire. This could be repeated targeting of religious figures, including targeting elements such as noses or hands, the removal of culturally important text, and the destruction of structures that provide shelter for heritage such as libraries and museums.

Lastly, an absence of contextual evidence of skirmishes or other armed engagement in the area could indicate vandalism and deliberate destruction rather than accidental damage. However, this will need to be cross-verified with eyewitness accounts and any other evidence of admissible standard.

One of the potential solutions for this problem is the increasing possibility for remote collaboration between personnel *in situ* and advanced analytical techniques through data and knowledge exchange on an international level. Techniques such as immersive 3D projection using photogrammetry data now allow for unprecedented interaction with damaged sites even where heritage professionals are unable to access the site due to visa restrictions or other health and safety related travel barriers. The global Covid-19 pandemic was devastating on many levels, but one of the few positive outcomes was the acceleration of remote collaboration techniques that can now be employed to document, analyse and evidence conflict damage across international teams of experts (Chacón-Labelle et al. 2021), techniques now successfully applied in, for example, Ukraine (da Costa and Santos 2023). There is an increasing use of online databases to store and access 3D data, one of the most useful sources of evidence in this context, as well as documentation of destruction (Abate et al. 2017). It is hoped that these opportunities will be developed and utilised to optimise the potential for forensic investigations into conflict damage, working around the time constraints of loss of evidence in a decaying site.

Long-term implications for conservation strategies and heritage professionals in combat zones

As mentioned in the previous sections, time could be of the essence when either, or both, evidence gathering and emergency stabilisation are required at a site. The relatively rapid pace of decay associated with conflict impacts can lead to a loss of definition within impact sites, losing crucial information such as shape and size of the crater that could otherwise have provided good evidence of direction of fire and potential responsibility for the damage, as well as evidence of crossfire vs vandalism. In the short term, the emphasis should therefore be on documentation of the damage as well as reversible emergency interventions that can prevent collapse of a site.

Looking slightly further forward, in the medium term (the years following the conflict), it is imperative to develop a sustainable conservation and stabilisation plan. As illustrated by the case study of Al Quahira Castle (Figures 5a and b), conflict damage can take years to progress towards further decay and even collapse. It is therefore not sufficient from a safeguarding perspective to

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simply document the conflict damage as a snapshot, longer-term monitoring of decay progress is necessary to pinpoint sites or sections at particular risk and put timely (emergency) interventions in place.

In the long term, climate change and climate instability are projected to become more pronounced in the coming decades, leading to an increase in extreme events such as droughts and flooding as well as higher average temperatures. Research by von Uexkull and Buhaug (2021) suggests that the increasing pressure on resources, such as fresh water and arable land, could link to increased conflict within areas that will see the most intense changes due to climate change. Furthermore, the link between climate change and heritage deterioration is well documented (Orr et al. 2021; Sesana et al. 2021), leading to a double threat of fragile heritage damaged by conflict decaying at an even more accelerated rate. [Figure 7](#) shows a summary overview of the timeline actions for heritage damaged by conflict.




Figure 7. A simplified timeline for heritage documentation and support in the post-conflict period.

Conclusion

The increasing legal protection for heritage in armed conflict provides an opportunity to enhance the presence of preventative action within policy but has also opened a window of opportunity for legal justice. Drawing on existing forensic techniques can be useful, but heritage sites pose challenges that are

unique to the fragility and complexity of these sites. The long-term exposure to decay processes alters materials, creating surfaces prone to cracking, flaking, crumbling and other volume loss mechanisms associated with decay. When ballistics impact these surfaces during armed conflict, complex fracture networks develop around impact craters. These impacts can be analysed for forensic purposes but, as this chapter shows, there are time sensitivities and technical difficulties that need to be worked around. The rise of digital documentation provides an excellent opportunity not only to document damage for the sake of justice, but also to develop sustainable intervention and conservation practices. Digitisation as a key tool in documentation also offers a far greater scope for data and knowledge transfer, allowing for quick and simple field techniques to be employed, reducing risk to on site personnel, which can then be successfully used for more complex analysis off-site. As discussed, climate change increasingly poses a threat to heritage, not only because of the physical pressure it puts on the materials, but also because of its potential role as a trigger for further conflict. Working within this nexus of pressures and challenges, heritage protection personnel have a crucial role in reporting and quantifying damage, but can also increasingly be instrumental in the pursuit of justice for these sites and their associated communities.

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PART II. PREPARING FOR THE PRESENT

Chapter 6.

THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND BEYOND: CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN THE NETHERLANDS

Ankie Petersen

Introduction

‘Is the military involved in the protection of cultural heritage?’ This is a question that is frequently asked when I mention my work. As a Liaison Officer for Cultural Property Protection in the Royal Netherlands Army, I am part of a niche group of cultural experts working on cultural awareness in the Netherlands Armed Forces, within the Cultural Affairs and Information Section (CAI). For me, specifically, my job is about developing training material and exercises for the protection of cultural heritage in times of conflict. It is not a job people assume for someone with a background in architectural history and cultural studies or even an occupation they entirely think exists.

Still, the topic I’m involved in has proved to be increasingly important in conflicts worldwide. Especially since the start of the full-scale invasion by Russia of Ukraine in 2022, numerous conferences, workshops and meetings have been organised to discuss the implications of cultural heritage destruction for the safety and security of communities in times of conflict and its effect on the post-conflict stabilisation phase. For the 2022 conference *Heritage and War: Plan and Prepare* at the Victoria & Albert Museum in London, I prepared a brief on the work of the CAI Section in the field of the protection of cultural heritage and how this topic should be seen in the context of today’s warfare. Based on that paper, this chapter discusses the evolution of CPP in the Netherlands, including the evolution of the CAI Section, and reflects on the significant challenges for CPP today. This chapter represents personal views

and experiences and is in no way a representation of the views of the Royal Netherlands Army.

Art bunkers and heritage maps

When explaining to an average audience what military Cultural Property Protection is about, it is often most effective to start with the example of the ‘Monuments Men’ of the Second World War. Officially known as the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) programme, this group was established in 1943 by the Allied forces. The Monuments Men were art historians, museum curators, archivists and other experts in cultural heritage who joined the Allied forces as reservists. Their core activities can be narrowed down to the following:

- They brought together information on cultural heritage locations (such as monuments, museums and archives) in Nazi-occupied areas before military operations;
- They advised commanders on cultural heritage protection during military operations; and
- They were involved in locating and repatriating cultural objects, artworks, book collections, etc.

In the Netherlands, the MFAA officers first came into action in 1944. Together with two Dutch officers stationed in Brussels, they put together a manual with information about the cultural landscape of the Netherlands – locations of important monuments and museums, as well as names and, where possible, contact details of local authorities ([Figure 1](#)). They aimed to preserve as much of the country’s cultural heritage as possible by gathering this information (Otter 2000: 360).

A small number of Dutch individuals were involved in the MFAA programme. The Dutch Monuments Men specifically contributed to protecting and recovering the Netherlands’ cultural heritage, amongst other activities, to retrieving artworks and artefacts threatened by theft, damage or destruction. One of these Dutch ‘Monuments Men’ was Dr D.P.M. Graswinckel, an archivist who was involved in the return of several book collections looted by the Nazis. Before the Second World War started in the Netherlands with the invasion of Nazi Germany in 1940, Graswinckel had already made recommendations (in 1938) for protective measures for archives in wartime. During the occupation, in 1942 he was given an active role in transferring archives from the coastal

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Figure 1. A copy of the 1944 US Army Civil Affairs Handbook on the Netherlands, Section 17: Cultural Institutions. Photograph by Dr Laurie Rush.

provinces to bomb-proof bunkers and other fortified structures elsewhere in the country (Kaajan n.d.).

In 1944, Dr Graswinckel took a vacation in the southern province of North Brabant, coincidentally or not, at precisely the right time. He experienced the

liberation of the South of the Netherlands in October 1944 and was subsequently assigned to the military authority in Breda as a reserve major (*Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde te Leiden* 1961). From this position, he worked as a Dutch Liaison Officer to retrieve book collections and other archival material that the Nazis looted. Among other things, he coordinated important book shipments from the American 'Central Collecting Point' in Offenbach-on-Main, such as the restitution of the Bibliotheca Rosenthalia and objects belonging to the Jewish History Museum in Amsterdam (Hoogewoud 1992: 158–92). There, he worked, amongst others, with the better-known US Army 'Monuments Man' Captain Seymour J. Pomrenze (Figure 2). Overall, Graswinckel was involved in the restitution of thousands of books and objects.



Figure 2. On the far right: Capt. Pomrenze with the Dutch State Archivist Dr. D.P.M. Graswinckel (1888–1960) and other officers of the Offenbach Archival Depot on 12 April 1946 (NA, The Hague, Graswinckel Archives, 2.14.03, inv.nr. 3359).

Following the examples of the work of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives programme and its aftermath, the Dutch government established a military unit within the Royal Netherlands Army in 1953 to protect cultural

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property. This coincided with the Dutch involvement in drafting the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict. In 1953, Dr D.P.M. Graswinckel re-entered military service as a reserve colonel. As an officer for special services at the General Staff, he was appointed head of the art protection officers section (the 'Bureau of Cultural Heritage'), an ideal position for someone with his experiences before and during World War II. In that position, he took part in the 1954 conference for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict in the Hague, in preparation for an international convention in this area (*Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde te Leiden* 1961: 73–74).

Initially, the Dutch 'Art Protection Officers' unit consisted of twelve reserve officers who would function as a liaison between military and civilian authorities in times of crisis, natural disaster or armed conflict. Following the military tasks listed under Articles 7.1 and 7.2 of the Hague Convention of 1954, their tasks consisted of advising military commanders, mapping and gathering information on cultural heritage in the national territory and liaising with civilian authorities on the protection of cultural heritage and, if needed, assisting in times of calamity (Otter 2000: 361). The 'Art Protection Officers' tasks and setup would stay roughly the same until a turning point in the early 1990s.

A different world, a different defence

Within the Cold War context from the post-war period until the 1990s, the tasks of the reserve officers of the 'Bureau of Cultural Heritage' focused on protecting cultural property on national territory. They kept track of the locations of big art and archival collections, the most important monuments, and possible locations to store art in an emergency, forming the bridge between military and civilian authorities. Throughout the Netherlands, remnants of this time can still be found in former art bunkers, such as the one in Paasloo, constructed during the Second World War, with walls as thick as 4.5 metres built from reinforced concrete ([Figure 3](#)). The Dutch government used this bunker as art storage until 1989, after which it was renovated and rented to several local museums as storage space.



Figure 3. The former Art Bunker in Paasloo, the Netherlands. CC BY-SA 4.0 by Tulp8.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War tremendously influenced the tasks of the Bureau of Cultural Heritage and its officers. The turning point in defence policy was marked with the publication of the policy document 'Another World, another Defence', published on 12 January 1993. In this document, former Minister of Defence Relus ter Beek presents a blueprint for the downsizing and restructuring the Dutch Defence apparatus. Part of this document comprised plans for significantly downsizing the entire defence apparatus. Moreover, one of the main tasks of the Dutch Armed Forces would be to participate in peace operations. As a professional army would be more suitable for expeditionary tasks, the government suspended compulsory attendance for conscripts. Conscriptioin was to continue, but as long as there are no serious threats, conscripts no longer had to serve actively (Ministry of Defence 1993).

Through taking part in numerous new international operations in the 1990s, members of the Dutch Armed Forces came increasingly into contact with foreign communities and cultures. How Dutch servicemen and women should act in these environments was an entirely new question to be answered. In response to this matter, the Bureau of Cultural Heritage – by then renamed the Section for Cultural Heritage – was tasked to teach cultural awareness in the pre-deployment phase. The Dutch involvement in the UNPROFOR mis-

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sion in Bosnia was the first mission where the need for this kind of information came to the fore – the working area of the Section broadened from cultural property protection to cultural awareness and cross-cultural communication. Topics included in these classes were, for example, who fights who in a particular conflict? What are the cultural and religious backgrounds of different communities? What should and should not be done in terms of behaviour? What cultural heritage is present in the mission area, and why is this important to know? Information about the Hague Convention of 1954 remained included in these lessons (Otter 2000: 364).

In 1995, a reorganisation took place within the Royal Netherlands Army in which the Section for Cultural Heritage was renamed the Cultural Affairs and Information Section. In light of the new Defence policy, the role of the Art Protection Officers in protecting the country's cultural property faded into the background of the Section's daily business. A big part of the CAI Section's mandate was the Commanders directive, 'CDS Aanwijzing A-700' (2004), which stated that 'every member of the military taking part in a deployment needs to have adequate knowledge of the culture, cultural heritage, local norms and values of the mission area' (Gooren 2009: 9). It is fair to assume that today every Armed Forces member, no matter their rank or specific role, will, at some point in their career, be in contact with people from different cultures. Moreover, they may be deployed in countries with different ethnicities, religions, traditions and monuments from those they are used to. Therefore, cultural heritage protection, The Hague Convention of 1954 and cultural awareness have remained essential elements in all classes and briefings of the Section.

CPP in 'Information Manoeuvre'

The latest developments within the Royal Netherlands Army have marked a new way of thinking about the environment in which we, as armed forces, operate. Where the focus once lay on kinetic warfare, terms such as hybrid warfare recognise the asymmetry of and multi-domain perspective on what happens in times of war. In the Netherlands, the term 'Information Manoeuvre' has come to the fore to describe and analyse this new way of looking at the operating environment. While the use of information in armed conflict is nothing new, the informatisation of the last decades – including the emergence of cyberspace and social media – has significantly impacted society. In response, the 'Information Manoeuvre' concept was introduced in the Royal Netherlands Army with the founding of the 'Information Manoeuvre Arm' (Duchaine et al. 2021: 258–67). Simultaneously, a new vision document, 'Manoeuvring in

the Information Environment', was adopted (Royal Netherlands Army 2020, [Figure 4](#)).

In a comprehensive essay, Brigadier-General Paul Ducheine from the Netherlands Defence Academy and Marije Timmer lay down the core concepts behind 'Information Manoeuvre' (Ducheine and Timmer 2023: 543–55). One of the main points is the differentiation between working in the so-called cognitive, virtual and physical dimensions. This layered approach allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the operating environment. 'Information Manoeuvre' then 'comprises the direction and execution of activities in the cognitive, virtual and physical dimensions of the information environment, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to an audience to accomplish a mission' (Ducheine and Timmer 2023: 545). In this conceptual way of thinking, the difference in perspective between one party and the other is important to consider. Information can be understood differently, depending on one's cultural background and experiences. Moreover, considering the dimensions mentioned above, the layered approach challenges us to consider what is happening 'on the ground', in cyberspace and in the minds of people and communities.

The field of Cultural Property Protection, as we know from the work of the Monuments Men in World War Two and, subsequently, the 1954 Hague Convention, needs to be considered differently when we put it into the perspective of the 'Information Manoeuvre' approach. Several considerations come to the fore. First of all, the notion of 'cultural property' as listed under the 1954 Hague Convention, which limits the term to tangible objects and structures, needs to be broadened to be able to include intangible forms of cultural heritage, such as rituals and anniversary dates, which are part of people's cognitive dimension. Moreover, narratives concerning history don't only exist in the cognitive dimension but can also be seen in communication in cyberspace, in the virtual domain. The same goes for influencing activities and the exploitation of cultural heritage through (fake) news and targeted messaging.

Recent studies show the relevance of the military looking at cultural heritage in not only the physical but also the virtual and cognitive domains. What narratives are being used to influence people's behaviour? Where can these narratives be seen? What effects do these narratives have on cultural heritage on the ground? Amongst others, the 2022 policy brief by Dr Dan Shultz and Dr Christopher Jasparro, 'How Does Russia Exploit History and Cultural Heritage for Information Warfare? Recommendations for NATO', outlines how they see the uses of historical propaganda targeting the Baltic States and Ukraine, combined with effects in the physical domain with regards to, amongst oth-

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


Figure 4. *The Information Environment visualised. Taken from Royal Netherlands Army, Information-Driven Operations for the Royal Netherlands Army: Manoeuvring in the Information Environment (2020).*

ers, the vandalism of certain historical monuments and heritage sites. Another study from 2020 by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence has studied the ‘growing trend of Russia’s use of historical propaganda to further its foreign policy goals’ (Juurvee et al. 2021). By analysing cultural heritage destruction and intentional targeting and the exploitation of cultural heritage and narratives of history they show a certain overall instrumentalisation of cultural heritage in its broadest sense to achieve certain effects.

A new direction for military CPP

Currently, the CAI Section is part of the 1 Civil and Military Cooperation Command staff based in Apeldoorn, which falls under the Information Manoeuvre Arm. At the time of writing this chapter in early 2024, it comprises five full-time civilian and three military (reserve) employees working three to four days a week at the Section. The core activities of the team are as follows:

- Providing cultural awareness and CPP briefings for pre-deployment training and different levels of vocational education, such as during the officer training programme at the Military Academy for cadets and for special requests such as one-time deployments or exercises abroad;
- Researching the relationship between culture, cultural heritage and conflict in areas where the Netherlands has military deployments;
- Supporting the preparation of military exercises through briefings, scripting and storyline management;
- Serving as a cultural advisor or CPP specialist during military exercises and on deployment; and
- Acting as a Liaison Officer for Cultural Property Protection during national crises.

Due to the Section's organisational placement within the 1CMI Command, there is a large emphasis in our work on civil-military interaction and related areas, such as strategic communication, military public affairs and psychological operations. Nevertheless, the Section can provide research, briefings and training for all armed forces.

One of the foremost contemporary challenges to the military protection of cultural property is to look at the topic from a new, multi-dimensional perspective. In the CAI Section in the Netherlands, which has developed a position as the knowledge institute on socio-cultural backgrounds of mission areas in the Dutch Armed Forces, we incorporate this perspective in our briefings, training and military exercises. Cultural awareness training is a foundational element in this. Our briefings have been developed and designed to give military personnel on deployment a better insight into the cultural context of a conflict and sensitivities to consider when operating there, as these are matters that can affect not only personal safety but the security situation of military forces and also the success of a mission in general.

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Cultural awareness is considered here to be a baseline requirement for the application of a multi-dimensional perspective to cultural property protection. In this, we regard cultural heritage (tangible and intangible) as a social construct: the result of social processes bound in place and time. Culture is, therefore, not a collection of objects but a sequence of processes (Ashworth and Graham 2005). Objects, collections and monuments are recognised as cultural heritage through conscious decisions, and intrinsic values of peoples and institutions and are modelled by social context and processes. Because of the link with cultural identity, cultural heritage has often become a target during (armed) conflict between ethnic, religious or social groups because of the immaterial value for the community it represents. In our training programmes, physical traces of culture, such as monuments or statues, are linked to underlying traditions, rituals and values. With this, we emphasise that, for example, the destruction of heritage cannot be seen as an isolated event but ought to be placed within a larger context of targeting communities at the heart of their existence.

Why is this a matter for the military? Several reasons come to mind. As cultural objects can be targeted during armed conflict because they represent the values of a community, this destruction can be seen as part of a process of ethnic cleansing. Plundering of cultural goods can contribute to a war economy and, therefore, perpetuate a conflict. Intentional destruction or removal of cultural heritage can enhance or worsen political and cultural differences and let conflict re-emerge in a post-conflict situation. The destruction of cultural heritage and attacks on culture can be seen as a conflict-determining aspect of war instead of a side effect. Practical examples from armed conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Mali and Ukraine illustrate this.

Conclusion

The twentieth-century concept of Cultural Property Protection has, thanks to its link with the 1954 Hague Convention, found more and more footing in military organisations. As it is part of the Law of Armed Conflict, it is, by default, a topic for any legal department and legal advisor working in a military organisation. Increasingly, Armed Forces around the world are dedicating specialised personnel to CPP. However, CPP, as understood in the 1954 Hague Convention, provides a limited understanding and, therefore, limited application of the subject within military operations.

Thanks to, amongst others, the pioneering work of Dr Graswinckel before, during and after the Second World War, the CAI Section has built a long-standing track record of addressing cultural heritage protection in the

military. In recent years, we have worked on new ways of approaching the subject by applying the 'Information Manoeuvre' framework in our briefings and taking the sociological approach to cultural heritage as part of communities' culture and identity. We also take this multi-domain approach in our military exercises, for example, in the bi-annual 'Common Ground', which focuses on civil-military cooperation and psychological operations. We script CPP-related storylines that comprise challenges on the ground and in cyberspace and local communities' behaviour and communication.

Together with allies and partners from other militaries and civil society, we are working to make this approach commonplace. This is necessary to ensure CPP remains a relevant and recognised topic to military organisations. In the end, our challenge today is not just to plan and prepare as was done before and during the Second World War but to plan and prepare for the complexity of twenty-first-century conflicts, of which culture and cultural heritage are part and parcel.

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Chapter 7.

PEACE-TIME PREPARATIONS FOR A MUSEUM NEAR THE OCCUPATION LINE IN GEORGIA: NGO-LED EFFORTS

Manana Tevzadze

This chapter highlights the emergency preparedness measures undertaken in the museum of the war-affected town of Gori, Georgia in 2020–2022. The presented case features the multitude of efforts, such as developing a disaster risk management (DRM) plan, planning and implementing professional training and creating digital inventories, led by Blue Shield Georgia in co-operation with museum staff and involving an array of local and national stakeholders and partners.

It highlights the lessons learnt from a two-year process of studying and analysing the various threats and risks and planning response actions to various crisis scenarios as well as implementing the planned actions in the form of practical training and field exercises involving multiple relevant stakeholders. In addition, it also focuses on the challenges of various sorts encountered both locally and at the national level during the process.

The presented case study not only features the experiences of the team in preparing the DRM plan and capacity building activities involving civil-military teams but concentrates also on the experience of creating digital inventories of the collections as an essential tool for their general safeguarding and documentation, as well as a tool to prevent illicit trafficking, as a secondary threat after looting during a possible armed conflict.

Most notably, the chapter circles around civil society-led actions and their role in the overall system of managing disasters at cultural institutions.

Background (the town, the war and the museum)

This chapter draws from a two-year long project undertaken by a civil society organisation – the Georgian National Committee of the Blue Shield (GNCBS) in the town of Gori, Georgia, aimed at safeguarding and improving the risk preparedness of the collections of Gori Sergi Makalatia Museum of Ethnography and History.


The town of Gori

Figure 1. Gori Fortress by Teramo Cristoforo Castelli, c. 1642, via Wikimedia Commons.

Gori is one of the oldest cities in Georgia and one of the ancient towns located in the eastern part of the country mentioned in eleventh century chronicles regarding the events of the seventh century AD (Kintsurashvili 1990). The town was an important military stronghold in the Middle Ages and maintains a strategic importance due to its location on the principal highway connecting the eastern and western parts of Georgia. The town is home to a fortress whose earliest layers date back to the last centuries of the first millennium BC. Archaeological finds attest that a town-like settlement already existed on its territory in the first centuries of the new millennium (Kintsurashvili 1990: 31). Later layers are from the Early Bronze Age and the Classical Period. Gori had

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least from 12 or 13 August until 22 August, when Russian troops pulled back further north toward South Ossetia (IIFMCG 2009: 318).

Gori was hit the hardest during the short Georgia-Russia war in August 2008 (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2008). Russian bombings left twelve blocks of flats needing a complete overhaul and seventy more requiring partial reconstruction.

The museum

The Historical-ethnographic (Local Lore) museum of Gori was established in 1935 as a result of the initiative and effort of renowned Georgian scholars and public figures (Pataridze 2021: 6). Despite many hardships, one of them, Sergi Makalatia – the first director of the museum – managed to establish a structure for Gori Museum and put immense effort into the creation and further enrichment as well as of systematisation of its funds and collections. This was probably a rare exception, with a museum being formed without collections. Therefore, from the first day of foundation, staff started gathering material to create museum collections. The museum began intensive field-expeditionary and scientific research works. Material from these expeditions became the basis to form the main collections of the museum, which was also being enriched with important cultural material from wider Georgia as well as from the Middle East and Asian countries (Pataridze 2021). In 2009 the number of items in the collections exceeded 85,000 and it is now above 110,000.

The Museum's cultural heritage material covers the most important collections of different periods (from the first millennium BC to the twentieth century) and includes archaeological, ethnographic and numismatic materials, applied and fine arts, Georgian and Arabic epigraphic monuments, artefacts, manuscripts and first-edition books, documents, deed charters, a photo-archive, a scientific library and periodicals (Burchuladze and Karaia 2011: 10–14). The Museum possesses a unique coin collection from Georgia and other countries, all discovered and used locally. Their date range is from the seventh century BC to the twentieth century AD. Shida Kartli, as the geo-political and cultural centre of Georgia, also had a significant role in the country's history: as a result of wars, trade and economic relations that played out on its territory over the centuries, a rich and diverse coin collection has been uncovered there and is housed in Gori Museum.

Damage and threat to the town and the museum during the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War and risks ten years later

The few days of war that took place in Gori during 2008 and the subsequent occupation during which the town was extensively looted by the Russian troops (Reliefweb 2008) posed serious threat to the museum. Indeed, Russian aircraft targeted the city before ground forces moved in and occupied Gori on 11 August.

Gori was at the heart of the fighting. During the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War, military offensives took place in various locations in the town, some as close as 600 metres to the museum. (Figure 3) (rferl.org 2013). But, during the two weeks of occupation, the museum and its collections survived by pure chance, as the Russian troops were moving around the area of the museum and miraculously bypassed it.

The then director of Sergi Makalatia Gori Historical and Ethnographic Museum, Mrs Tinatin Sosanidze described in a 2018 interview with the Georgian National Committee of the Blue Shield (GNCBS) the threats encountered and the measures taken to protect the museum and its collections during the war in August 2008. According to Mrs Sosanidze, before leaving the town, she and one other staff member of the museum removed all the information boards indicating the presence of the museum in the building, as a preventive measure. She explains that the troops might have easily considered the building a kindergarten (the building was originally built as kindergarten and is very similar to other kindergartens built in the same period). According to her narrative, the local municipality did not have a plan regarding the museum and its collections and, given the speed with which events unfolded, the lack of human and material resources, and the lack of safe transportation for evacuated collections, and also given the fact that the city was being bombed, the museum made the decision to safeguard the collections *in situ* as far as possible. The team, besides removing the museum signs, locked and sealed all the safes holding treasure, and the rooms where the safes were placed, in the hope that the invading military would not have enough time and, by creating the barriers, they would prevent intrusion into the treasury.¹

GNCBS staff also interviewed a guard of the museum who revealed that, after having helped the museum Director with the safeguarding of the building, he also fled the city. He soon returned and recalled that Russian ground forces were moving around the city and came near to his house, but they did not enter the museum gate just across from his house. He believed that, although the

1. Interview with Tinatin Sosanidze (2018) recorded by GNCBS staff.

museum yard and the building itself are clearly visible from outside the gate, as nothing dangerous or attractive was noticed by the Russians there, they did not enter and the museum was spared.²

According to these two interviews recorded as part of the GNCBS's work to document oral histories of those who experienced cultural heritage rescue during crises, following the retreat of the troops and subsequent initial examination by the Georgian police and the museum guard no losses or damage to the collections was documented.

Currently, the town of Gori potentially remains at threat of renewed hostilities and the occupation line runs about fifteen kilometres away. The security environment in the villages near Gori directly bordering the occupation line is extremely vulnerable (Civil.ge 2016). Life in those villages is characterised by cases of kidnapping and borderisation, i.e., the expansion of already illegally occupied zones by pushing the so-called Administrative Boundary Line further into Georgian territory (Democracy Research 2020). Kidnapping and detention of local villagers, denied access to religious sites along the administrative boundary line, is also a regular occurrence (Civil Georgia 2016 and 2018). As a result of regular installation of border posts and barbed wire fencing along the line, a new term – *crawling occupation* – has been coined and is often used also by foreign politicians referring to the situation in Georgia (Tevzadze et al. 2022: 248).

Case study: Gori Sergi Makalatia Historical and Ethnographic Museum (GSMHEM), Georgia

As mentioned in the introduction, this case study from Gori, Georgia highlights some of the most basic and essential peace-time measures for the protection of a museum and its collections and demonstrates the important role of cooperation across sectors.

In 2018, GNCBS embarked on a journey to fundraise for a co-operation project with the Gori Sergi Makalatia Historical and Ethnographic Museum (GSMHEM) which would focus on disaster risk preparedness for the museum. Given the present natural and manmade risks, the first proposal the team developed focused both on natural and manmade hazards and aimed to work on immovable and movable cultural heritage and prepare disaster risk management (DRM) plans for both – a selected heritage site and museum collections. Given the high seismic risk in the region – Gori experienced a destructive earthquake

2. Interview with Giorgi Qareli (2018) recorded by GNCBS staff.

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in 1920 (IDFI 2022) – and the conflict situation, it was considered logical to focus on both types of threats. The attempt to ensure funding for this endeavour via the US ambassador's Fund for Heritage Preservation was not successful but the team continued with the effort and applied to the ALIPH Foundation. In 2019, a project by GNCBS entitled 'Safeguarding the Cultural Heritage of Gori' was granted assistance to undertake safeguarding measures in the Gori Sergi Makalatia Historical and Ethnographic Museum, particularly as the museum had no digital inventories, no disaster risk management plan and almost no co-operation with its stakeholders (ALIPH 2020). By that time, the GNCBS had already collaborated with the museum and was well acquainted with its needs and capacities. In 2015, for example, GNCBS had organised a first aid for cultural heritage course in the museum, hosting museum professionals from both Gori and Mtskheta Municipalities.

Therefore, the GNCBS team, consulting the most relevant field literature and best practices, decided to focus on the risk preparedness measures and disaster risk management for the museum and its collections. The team directed the efforts on the following four main themes:

1. Capacity Building of museum staff;
2. Creating digital documentation and improving storage conditions;
3. Risk analysing and DRM planning; and
4. Developing wider stakeholder involvement and improved civil-military and international co-operation.

These four focus activities were chosen based on assessment of the needs of the museum and the field of disaster response in cultural institutions across Georgia. A preliminary study by GNCBS of the situation in Georgia's national and regional cultural institutions showed that most of the surveyed institutions had no preparedness measures in place (GNCBS 2016), while the legislative literature review showed that, although there is some legislative regulation of disaster response for cultural heritage, concrete regulatory documents outlining the roles of responsible agencies are absent. Effectively planning for, and responding to, a catastrophic natural disaster is beyond the capacity of any single agency or government, but it is generally recognised that responsibility for all aspects of disaster management – across the spectrum of prevention, preparation, response and recovery (PPRR) – is shared across government, individuals, businesses, non-government sectors and communities (Eburn, 2017: 1).

The team consulted the relevant existing literature – the various manuals of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), such as those dealing with Disaster Risk Preparedness for museums and First Aid measures for cultural heritage in times of crisis (such as Michalski 2016 and Tandon 2018) and also smaller practical guidebooks such as the Australian handbook for small museums (Be Prepared 2000). The GNCBS team members are part of the ICCROM's FAR (First Aid and Resilience for Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis) community and received regular guidance from their mentors and fellow colleagues from around the world.

Capacity building

Under this objective the team aimed to train not only the museum staff of the GSMHEM, but also about thirty employees across the twelve museums of Shida Kartli. Given the vulnerability of the entire region to the conflict, it was considered logical to offer this opportunity for professional growth and practical training to the remaining museums operating in the region. The topics chosen initially comprised:

1. Preventive Conservation;
2. First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis; and
3. Protection of Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict.

At the early stage of project implementation, a need for an additional training arose as the municipality started to renovate parts of the museum building without allocating much time or material resources for the packing, relocation and in-situ protection of the objects from the dust and debris of the construction works. Thus, additional training was provided by a preventive conservation specialist for the museum staff in packing and moving collections. The agreed plan did not envisage a phase for dismantling the exhibition and was about to commence without the proper rehousing of the collections. The team was able to negotiate a delay to the start of the works with the municipality and offered one-day training in wrapping and relocation of the collections. Following this, the museum team was able to undertake the wrapping and safe storage of the collections.

The objective to build the capacity of Gori and Shida Kartli Museums' staff in preventive conservation and first aid to museum collections in times of crisis was achieved with two three-day theoretical and practical training sessions

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conducted by local and international experts for a total of thirty employees across the twelve museums of Shida Kartli (Blue Shield 2020). The main topics of the training given by Ms Nino Kitovani, a preventive conservation specialist, included the basic concepts of preventive conservation – types of museum artefacts, aging and behaviour characteristics of various organic and inorganic materials, damaging agents in a museum environment, establishing storage and exposition spaces, adequate display and storage conditions for museum collections; and health and safety (of collections and employees) – various risks and preventive measures to protect the collections from them. Besides the theoretical part, the training also included practical sessions, an evaluation of the storage conditions for artefacts at Gori Museum and an exercise in handling, wrapping and moving of the collections.

Training in first aid to cultural heritage in times of crisis

A three-day First Aid in Times of Crisis (FAC) training course was held in July 2021, led by Ms Rebecca Kennedy, a cultural heritage first aid expert from the United States. The training was attended by 25 employees of eleven museums from the Shida Kartli region, including the staff of the Sergi Makalatia Museum in Gori. The course included lecture presentations as well as group practical exercises. Participants discussed risk and damage assessment and performed risk assessment for specific spaces in the museum, assessed simulated damage to artefacts and worked on the emergency documentation process. The training also focused on the salvaging of museum objects after a disaster and involved wet and dry salvage demonstrations. On the last day of the training, a large-scale simulation evacuation exercise was performed. Here, participants were instructed to save museum objects damaged after an earthquake and to perform salvage and emergency evacuation. Participants worked in groups to perform different tasks, such as emergency documentation, salvage, triage, packing and moving of the artefacts to a temporary storage facility.

Improving the documentation and storing condition of the collections

Another focus area of the project, which was considered by the team as critical, was to undertake digitisation of the collections and the inventories.

Creating digital documentation

The team spent time at the beginning of the project to consider the various options of existing documentation platforms. Based on a very thorough assessment by specialists and museum staff, and following consultation with

colleagues from other institutions, it was decided to use the online platform developed by the National Agency for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage of Georgia (NAPCH). Its staff kindly provided a one-day training course for the Gori Museum staff and remained accessible online for any advice or help throughout the process. Following acquisition of the necessary materials for documentation, equipment for a portable photo studio was also purchased and so a documentation and digitising station was set up and equipped in the museum.

Owing to a slow internet connection at the museum, the digitisation process initially involved compiling excel spreadsheets, and later completing online forms. The process strongly benefited from hiring interns who worked in teams with the museum staff and were very effective. As a result of this activity, the museum staff created digital documentation (including the scanning of photos, glass negatives, manuscripts and digital photographs of more than 11,000 objects). Part of the database is freely available online.³

Improving storage conditions

In the course of the project, it became evident that the museum was actually dealing with the legacy of disorganised storage, so, with the consent of the ALIPH Foundation, it was possible to reallocate funds and undertake extra activities to refurbish and reorganise the main storage room. As a result of this, storage conditions improved for up to 5,000 artefacts and the main storage room was equipped with new shelving, hangers and wrapping for storing material.

The survey to identify various risks facing the museum building and the individual spaces of the museum, including storage and exhibition spaces, helped identify the most vulnerable collections and spaces that most needed intervention. Paper-based collections were identified as being the most vulnerable and assessment of their storage condition (e.g., acidity of the storing boxes and other material was measured with specially purchased equipment) showed that the manuscript and old book storage conditions had to be improved. Special, archival-quality storage boxes were made for 120 exhibits from the Collection of Manuscripts and Rare Editions and for up to 200 exhibits of special value. In addition, the museum was provided with essential materials and equipment for monitoring the museum environment, handling the exhibits, relocation, first aid and stabilisation.

An additional activity was added towards the end of the project, to improve the main storage room housing more than 4,000 ethnographic exhibits.

3. See <https://memkvidreoba.gov.ge/objects/movable>

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While the municipality undertook the minor refurbishment of the space, the museum and project team undertook its emptying and reorganisation. With the project funds, new shelving and cabinets were purchased and installed, as well as new hangers, wrapping and storage material such as boxes.

Risk analysis: DRM planning

According to most handbooks, the basic elements of disaster preparedness are: prevention, preparation, response and recovery (e.g. Pedersoli 2016 and Tandon 2018). These elements are based on common sense: understanding the risks a museum is exposed to, trying to manage those risks and prepare for potential disasters (Be Prepared 2000). Another important activity was the work on the DRM plan undertaken by the Blue Shield and museum teams with the involvement of stakeholders. The team followed the most logical framework and, when starting to delineate for disaster preparedness and planning, the project team, with the help of contracted specialists, undertook the following studies:

1. Collections and museum environment. This study included assessment of each storage and exhibition space of the museum based on a questionnaire survey that was developed by the project team members in close consultation with the museum staff and filled by them. It was also based on interactive exercises for risk and vulnerability assessment undertaken with museum staff during various visits from the project team. Results of monitoring temperature and humidity in each space of the museum were also analysed in the study.
2. The building structure. Geophysical survey and a structural and geological study of the building's foundation were undertaken.
3. Geology of the surrounding area of the museum.
4. Engineering systems. The study surveyed the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems of the building.

Two additional studies were not planned but were undertaken as the need arose:

5. Study of storage material for the collections of old printed books.
6. Mycology of selected exhibits.

As part of the development of the plan, three stakeholder roundtable meetings were organised at each stage. The first one aimed to introduce the

plan and its objectives. In the period when meetings in physical space were restricted, the team undertook an online survey of stakeholders in order to assess their role and involvement in the planning process. At the second meeting, the team introduced the results of interactive workshops held with the museum staff on the assessment of risks, hazards and vulnerabilities and the participants were asked to engage in the development of risk scenarios and their response actions. At the third and final stakeholder meeting, a draft DRM plan was presented and discussed.

As a result of this activity, Gori Historic and Ethnographic Museum has a Disaster Risk Management (DRM) plan that is the first of its kind in Georgia. The plan is based on the thorough risk analysis and findings of various studies. Most importantly, the Plan was approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Emergency Management Service) and the local municipality.

Achieving wider stakeholder involvement and improved civil-military and international co-operation

Significantly, NGO efforts were also focused towards improving wider stakeholder involvement and civil-military and international cooperation. This activity was not as successful as the other components because, mid-way through the project, the Ministry of Culture and the National Heritage Agency stopped co-operating and did not engage further in any of the activities. Nonetheless, co-operation was achieved with partners such as:

- The National Guard
- Emergency Management Service (EMS) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
- National Security Council
- NGOs like ICOM and ICOMOS
- The National Archive
- City and Regional Government
- Blue Shield International
- ICRC Georgia
- The Red Cross Georgia
- The General Mazniashvili Youth Legion

These stakeholders were engaged in the DRM planning; some contributed to it quite actively; and, with some of them, particularly the national guard,

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EMS and the Blue Shield International, the project team planned a four-day joint civil-military training in *Protection of Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict* which included both theoretical training and a field exercise led by the Blue Shield Secretariat.

Simulation exercise – evacuation of museum artefacts in pre-conflict scenario

The main activities towards achieving the objective were the stakeholder group meetings and the exchanges that took place there, coupled with the joint planning and implementation of the interagency civil-military training on the topic Protection of Cultural Heritage in Times of Conflict. As progress had been made with the co-operation with the National Guard of the Defence Forces of Georgia, resulting in a joint field exercise with the Ministry of Internal Affairs Emergency Management Service in July 2021, three planning meetings were organised together with international invited trainers from the Blue Shield. (Figure 4)



Figure 4. Conclusion of the Civil–Military Training at Gori Museum. Photograph by Georgian National Committee of the Blue Shield (GNCBS).

While all major stakeholders and partners were invited, most of the meetings were not attended by them all. The Ministry of Culture and the National Agency representatives neither replied to the invitations nor attended any of

the planning meetings. Being the main actor in cultural heritage protection during emergencies, the Ministry of Culture's absence was questioned by the other Agencies. Nevertheless, the National Guard of the Defence Forces of Georgia were very keen to engage in the planning and implementation of the training which consisted of two parts: a theoretical component was held in Tbilisi and hosted by the National Guard, while the practical part was held in the museum in Gori itself. The lecture programme was developed in close collaboration with Blue Shield International representatives, Dr Michael Delacruz and Dr Emma Cunliffe, while the rest of the programme and the scenario of the practical exercise were developed in close co-operation with the participating National Agencies. The simulation exercise conducted on the final fourth day of the exercise involved evacuation of the museum collections prior to a potential armed conflict in a simulated country. The collections were documented, wrapped and transported to a specially dedicated space – a safe shelter in a different location. The exercise participants came from up to ten different Agencies and twelve museums of the region and it was attended by guests and observers from various Agencies, among them the EU Monitoring Mission field office representatives from Gori and Mtskheta, a total of sixty persons.

Challenges encountered and lessons learnt

The project was undertaken against the backdrop of many challenges; nonetheless, the activities were all very successful and led to tangible results and raised awareness about importance of peace time preparations. Stronger partnerships with relevant support organisations were forged and these outcomes continue to develop. For example, the National Archive of Georgia is looking at the DRM plan developed in Gori Museum as a template and has been consulting with the team to learn from the experience.

A major lack of communication with the Ministry of Culture came as a result of the appointment of a new Minister, Thea Tsulukiani – appointed the Minister of Culture, Sports and Youth in 2021 – and Georgian culture has been in turmoil ever since. Tsulukiani has dismissed long-time arts and culture professionals and installed law and order officials to managerial positions at cultural agencies (Lomsadze 2023).

During the final year of the project, following the appointment of the new Minister of Culture, the communication with the Ministry of Culture ceased. While the Ministry is one of the main partners and beneficiaries of the project, the total absence of communication resulted in only partial achievement of one of the objectives – enhanced civil-military cooperation among relevant

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State Authorities engaged with cultural heritage protection in times of disasters through multi-stakeholder planning and training exercises. To mitigate the risks from this, the team tried many channels of communication, including those involving the projects' international partners. To prevent failure of this objective, the team intensified co-operation with its other partners – the local municipality and the National Guard, the National Security Council and the emergency services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Despite these challenges, the efforts brought tangible and sustainable results for a regional museum and proved that multi-stakeholder, civil-military cooperation instigated by a rather small civil society organisation can be successful.

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Chapter 8.

ON THE ART FRONTLINE: THE EXPERIENCE OF FRENCH CONSERVATION OFFICERS IN PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY ON OPERATIONS

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Introduction

On 31 August 1870, Empress Eugénie ordered the evacuation of the Louvre in the face of the Prussian advance on the French capital during the Franco-German War. For the first time, the French military was called upon to protect works of art. This episode, which was no more than a dress rehearsal for the evacuations of the Louvre during the First and Second World Wars, illustrates the changes taking place at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth in cultural property protection. The growing importance that societies attached to their cultural heritage was confronted with new threats to its integrity posed by modern military weapons and the role of the military as an actor in its preservation during armed conflicts.

The notion of cultural heritage in France, from its origins to its contemporary evolution, is a protean concept with many meanings, as well described

1. The opinions expressed in this text are those of the author and do not represent an official position of the Ministry of the Army, the French Army or the French Foreign Legion.

by André Chastel,² Françoise Choay,³ and Jean-Michel Leniaud.⁴ In France, this crystallisation of the past through meaningful material productions has found a particular sensitivity which allow certain unique assets to benefit from a specific concept, consideration, and legislation. This material heritage of the past is the bearer of an identity, a culture, a memory, and is an integral part of the long process of transmission. What happens when this cultural heritage is confronted with man's military and warlike activities? While many authors have highlighted the threats and risks to cultural property in times of armed conflict, it is interesting to consider the corollary question of its protection. This is particularly true for actions carried out by the military itself, as the primary actors in combat.

Between destruction and protection, we'll see that the soldier's position is as singular as it is ambivalent when it comes to considering his relationship with cultural property in the context of a military operation. In France in particular, for more than a hundred years, the military has played an important role in the implementation of military protection of the nation's heritage. This experience, from its administrative organisation to the techniques used, has contributed to the specialisation of certain military personnel as true soldiers of the arts. Today, with the role assigned to the curator-officers of the *Délégation au patrimoine de l'armée de Terre*, the French Army has a unique model, adapted to the new challenges posed by the evolution of armed conflicts in the twenty-first century.

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2. André Chastel (1912–1990), French art historian. A specialist in the Italian Renaissance, he was elected Director of the *École Pratique des Hautes Études* in July 1955, then Professor at the *Collège de France*, where he held the chair of Art and Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy from 1970 to 1984. In 1975, he was elected to the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*. A close friend of André Malraux, André Chastel, along with historian Marcel Aubert, was behind the creation of the *Inventaire Général des Monuments et des richesses artistiques de la France* in 1964.
 3. Françoise Choay (1925–), French historian of architecture and urban planning. Since 1980, she has taught at the *École de Chaillot*, focusing on the notion of heritage and conservation. A critic of urban theories, she seeks to reconcile humane urban planning with respect for heritage. She translates Aloïs Riegl's work into French. On the history of the notion of heritage, see Choay 1992.
 4. Jean-Michel Leniaud (1951–), French art historian, senior civil servant and researcher. Inspector of Historic Monuments from 1977 to 1990. He also devoted himself to research into the history of monument protection. A lecturer at the *École Pratiques des Hautes Études* and the *École du Louvre*, he was also director of the *École National des Chartes* between 2011 and 2017.

Cultural Property Protection in a military context

Describing the relationship between the military and cultural property in the context of armed conflict is at once challenging and cliché, and raises fundamental questions about the ultimate legitimacy of the soldier in protecting cultural property. To speak of cultural heritage as an operational possibility is to question its recognition, its value and its use in the spectrum of military operations. Between distraction, operational environment, or military necessity, what to protect, for what purpose and to what extent, comes down to examining the ongoing ambivalence between Mars and Minerva (i.e., the coupling of warfare on the one hand, and art and wisdom on the other).

During military operations on land, the consideration of cultural property in the sense of active protection is not a matter of course for the military. However, different attitudes can be observed. The interaction between the soldier and the cultural property – and this is particularly visible when it is a monument or a site – begins when the man in uniform first recognises the object as a bearer of a special meaning, as endowed with a special value that deserves to be passed on from one generation to the next. This recognised cultural heritage, as it emerged in the West from the eighteenth century onwards, can be first experienced as a source of distraction.

This aspect, which developed during the twentieth century to the point where it became a function of the soldiers' operational efficiency (Kirsch 2007), led to the creation by the command of 'oxygenation stays', sometimes veritable organised cultural tours. The sentiments of a French soldier deployed as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), who enjoyed a three-day 'oxygenation tour' at the world heritage site of Angkor Wat, which has just been inscribed on the World Heritage List, are revealing:

The UN is authorised to come here, to enter the temples, to admire them, to contemplate them, to venerate them and to protect them. I realise what an incredible and unique opportunity and privilege it is for us to come here and have all these wonders to ourselves (Zanieri 2020).

The possibility of this kind of tourism is, of course, dependent on security and mobility factors during the mission.

In this sense, the practice of photography, which began to develop in the second half of the nineteenth century, is revealing. Often less a document than a testimony, military photography in the field is above all developed as

a representation of affirmation and presence.⁵ Although these photographs do not guarantee respect, active or passive protection on the part of the military, they demonstrate at least one aspect of the subjects' recognition of these meaningful objects.

Cultural goods are thus the receptacle of a set of protean, cumulative values that make these objects 'special' goods, a category of their own with which military personnel are confronted during operations. However, these values must also be examined through the prism of military action, i.e., at its various possible levels (strategic, operational, tactical).

At the national level, under the direction of the political authorities, a strategy is drawn up, which is then developed at the operational level in the theatres of operations, before being implemented and managed at the tactical level on the battlefield. There are several possible approaches to the protection of cultural property in military operations.

Since the desired end effect may be at least the absence of damage, its implementation, whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level, implies different actors, resources and procedures at each level. Assessing the effectiveness of the military protection of cultural property is therefore a difficult task, requiring a thorough analysis of the effects achieved and the orders given. Incorporating the protection of cultural property into these different levels means that, once its value has been recognised, appropriate measures must be developed in accordance with the legal obligations inherent in the law of armed conflict. As UNESCO describes in its *Military Manual*, 'The importance of the protection of cultural property for armed forces in armed conflict is at once abstract, strategic and legal' (UNESCO 2016: 1). The latter is embodied in the obligations of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

The protection of cultural heritage, as it may be generally perceived, especially by its civil professionals, presupposes the integral physical conservation of artefacts, monuments or sites, i.e., the absence of physical degradation between them and their environment. Here too, the mechanisms of integral conservation (or, conversely, the elimination of degradation factors) depend on the intrinsic characteristics of the cultural property and the materials and techniques used to create it. When it comes to the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, the action of 'protection' can also be defined in different ways and implies, above all, the absence of damage. Finally, in military terms, it could be described as a delaying manoeuvre, as 'a defensive battle in which

5. On tourist photographic practice, see Fossali and Dondero 2011; and Dondero 2007.

one accepts the loss of all or part of one's own property in order either to slow down the risks and thus gain time, or to bring these threats to a situation or terrain considered more favourable for suppressing them.'⁶

Protection is defined as 'the act or fact of removing someone or something from a danger or risk that could harm them; the fact of protecting oneself or being protected' (CNRTL n.d.). This is primarily the responsibility of the actors in armed conflict (military, civil or diplomatic personnel). The responsibility of the actors can also vary according to the type of conflict and its phases. The action of 'removing danger' can be carried out with different methods, distances and timeframes. There are also nuances in the terms used for implementation: protection, security, safeguarding, preservation, defence. Ultimately, all these terms reflect a particularly static view of the protection of cultural property, such as the search for an enclosure during a conflict. The protection of cultural property in zones of armed conflict thus encompasses a wide range of meanings, methods, actors, resources and mechanisms, making it a difficult subject for the military to master.

Conversely, looking at this protection from a military point of view allows us to appreciate its effects and limits from the point of view of the action of a single organisation, the military instrument and actor, and makes it possible to define what could be called the 'military protection of cultural property'. This military protection of cultural property includes the use of military procedures, personnel, resources and methods that contribute directly or indirectly to the physical preservation of cultural property. As the main actor in an armed conflict, it involves the soldier, whether voluntarily or not, interacting with an object of which he is not, *a priori*, the owner, the ordinary administrator and even less the connoisseur.

We must also distinguish between different types of conflict, ranging from major conventional engagements between states to so-called asymmetric wars against non-state actors. The intensity and scale of violence differ, as do the theatres of action. The distinction between fighting on national territory and fighting on other territories implies a completely different relationship and ownership of cultural property. Above all, we need to think about the direct and indirect effects of military action to broaden the scope of the military protection of cultural property.

Beyond the clash of temporalities – the short time of military manoeuvres and the long-time of the transfer of cultural goods – these two universes of cultural heritage and the military have different organisational cultures, vocabularies

6. For a definition of the delaying manoeuvre, see Armée de Terre 2013: 313.

and interests, which would then have to come together during the outbreak of an armed conflict in order to protect, or rather safeguard, cultural goods (Samaan and Leturcq 2018). Contrary to other areas of military life (politics, diplomacy, health), the meeting point between organised military action and cultural goods is essentially found at the time of engagement in armed conflict, with little or no link during peacetime. It is therefore also a cultural problem to be solved (Alvesson 2012: 3–4). As Isabel Hull writes, ‘organisational culture is more likely to drive action than explicit doctrine or ideology’ (Hull 2013: 92). Three factors can help to slowly develop this culture in the military: history, geography and the evolution of the operational environment, thereby maximising the effectiveness of the organisation (Mansoor and Murray 2019: 5).

Beyond the ideologies and factors that help us understand soldiers’ fatal attraction to wartime destruction and its impact on the cultural property that surrounds them, we might well ask how soldiers can better protect cultural property amidst the din of battle.

Military operations and cultural protection

Civilians regularly point to the ignorance and stupidity of the military to explain the failure to take cultural heritage into account in military operations, while the military prefer to talk about mistakes (Bardies 2021a: 58–61 and Bardies 2021b: 56–59). Is it just a matter of degree, or of point of view? There’s a taxonomy of stupidity that includes nonsense, idiocy, silliness, absurdity, ineptitude, imbecility and stupidity. Is stupidity when it comes to cultural property reduced to error alone? And is harming error enough to harm stupidity? Two human qualities transform error into human stupidity: culture and stubbornness, because a lack of culture, whether military or applied to cultural property, allows one to persevere in error with stubbornness. This allowed Raymond Aron to assert, while keeping the two concepts separate, that stupidity and ignorance are the two engines of history (Aron et al. 2012: 49). As Alain Roger develops in his *Bréviaire de la bêtise*, tautology and obstinacy become the two accomplices of crime, since the refusal to contradict and the perseverance in one’s error would be complicit traits (Roger 2009: 165).

Jesse Glenn Gray spoke of the *homo furens* in combat, obsessed by the ‘tyranny of the present’, which dulls what is ethical or moral in him (Glenn Gray 2013: 71). This image and representation of the soldier goes hand in hand with a certain pleasure in the destruction he would experience in battle, or at least a machine-like inclination, a primal impulse akin to the human desire to ‘see what

it's like'. This drive would go hand in hand with a *jouissance* well represented in literature, for example, the *jouissance* of destruction (Glenn Gray 1970).

The enjoyment of destruction, individuality and ugliness are all elements that are at odds with what underpins the transmission of cultural goods as aesthetic or historical elements that bind societies together and provide landmarks whose contemplation and enjoyment, offered to all, enable a civilisation to form a community.

As part of the terrain of military operations, they are vulnerable to the effects of violent combat or the consequences of a military operation. The potential vulnerability of cultural property depends on several factors, including the location of the property in question (close to a combat zone or military objective), its ability to be moved (sites, movable or immovable property) or its ability to be protected. This vulnerability is also a factor of the nature of the materials making up the cultural property and their reaction to the stresses (blast, mechanical, thermal) resulting from the use of force.

Strengthening these behavioural principles is also of interest in today's conflicts, since the 'utility of force', to use the title of Sir Rupert Smith's book (Smith 2007), is now to be found in the population, and the aim of any operation among the population is to gain its support (Royal 2014: 30–34). Abstaining from unworthy behaviour contributes to this support and, above all, helps to prepare or even facilitate the political solution of the conflict. In this sense, the protection of cultural property in military operations contributes directly to the effectiveness of an operation.

Lessons learned from past conflicts provide interesting insights into this much-needed link between military operations and the military protection of cultural property. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the French army has been confronted with the problem of the military protection of cultural property. An analysis of the choices made, the structuring of the military response and its implementation can provide several lessons.

Development of a military capability in France

From the very first days of the First World War, the war of the mind was unleashed almost as quickly as the war of the body. In France, as in Germany, the press, writers and politicians exploited the first acts of destruction, notably the burning of Reims Cathedral in September 1914, in the name of a war between two cultures and two civilisations. The massive destruction caused by the use of modern weapons led to a new awareness on the part of the authorities. This interest was reinforced by the new status of 'historical monument' granted to

certain objects by the law of 31 December 1913. Although the experience of protecting the national collections during the war of 1870 did not seem to lead to any preparation for large-scale protection, the focus on destruction did reinforce the ‘imaginary of war’, as Emmanuelle Danchin puts it (Danchin 2015: 142). It was for this reason, and in order to take stock of the damage, that the Ministry of War, in conjunction with the Ministry of Fine Arts and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, created the Armed Forces Photographic Section on 9 May 1915 (Guillot 2010: 110–17).

As well as the question of destruction, the question of the protection of cultural heritage became an important issue. As early as 31 July 1915, a report by the Secretary of State for the Fine Arts stressed the need to organise the protection of cultural heritage as close to the front as possible.⁷ This document was taken up in a second report by Paul-Frantz Marcou on 16 October 1916, which stressed the need to militarise the protection of cultural heritage.⁸ However, it was not until 1917 that a real organisation for the protection of cultural property was set up. Firstly, with the creation of an inter-ministerial commission for the protection of works of art in military zones and, secondly, with the creation of three protection sections.

The Commission was set up by decree on 24 May 1917 and placed under the dual authority of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Fine Arts.⁹ It was responsible for ‘research to ensure the preservation or evacuation of works of art located near the front’.¹⁰ The commission was made up of three representatives of the Ministry of War,¹¹ one representative of the Grand Quartier Général¹² and three representatives of the Ministère des Beaux-Arts,¹³ as well

7. Archives de la Médiathèque de l’Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/47/02, Hand-written report by Arsène Alexandre ‘Rapport relatif à la situation des musées de prince envahis ou menacés et aux réformes démontrées nécessaires par les événements’, 31 July 31.

8. Archives de la Médiathèque de l’Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/03/19, Report by Paul-Frantz Marcou, 16 Oct. 1916.

9. Archives Nationales, AN 313AP/136, Journal Officiel of 24 May 1917.

10. The Marcou report recommended considering a 15 km zone near the front.

11. Jean Bourguignon, Deputy Head of the Cabinet of the Minister of War; Augustin Bes-sou, Head of the Private Office of the Minister of War; and Fernand Sabatté, Engineering Administration Officer.

12. Lieutenant-Colonel Toutain.

13. Paul Léon, Head of the Architectural Services Division; Valentino, Head of the Education and Art Works Division; Alfred Cortot, Chief of Staff to the Under-Secretary of State for Fine Arts.

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as Paul-Frantz Marcou and Arsène Alexandre as special advisors. The Commission is the central body that meets in Paris and coordinates the activities of the Service de Protection.

The Service de Protection des Oeuvres d'Art en Zone des Armées was divided into three sections (North, Centre and East), which shared the front line. The militarisation of this service was already envisaged in the preparatory meetings for its creation: 'This service must be militarily constituted in order to have access to all the localities and to have the necessary corvées and transport equipment.'¹⁴ On 6 September 1917, to remain independent of army movements, the sections were attached to military regions.¹⁵ From November 1917, as the political situation evolved, the Commission and the Service became increasingly close to Georges Clémenceau's Presidency of the Council.

The section heads were chosen on the basis of their professional profile in the field of cultural heritage. Fernand Sabatté (Northern Front) was an artist and winner of the Grand Prix de Rome. André Collin (Central Front) and Robert Danis (Eastern Front) were both historic monuments architects. When the Commission was set up, it was envisaged that they would have the rank of non-commissioned officers. Their responsibilities were defined in an instruction signed on 25 September 1917.¹⁶ This instruction sets out the main guidelines for the sections and includes technical provisions on personnel, section headquarters, art storage, research, conservation, evacuation, inventories and photography.

Between May 1917 and October 1919, when its activities came to an end, the Section de Protection des Oeuvres d'Art made it possible to protect several hundred buildings *in situ*, including many churches, and to evacuate more than 40,000 public and private works of art ([Figure 1](#)). At the end of the war, the Sections also helped to gather information on missing or destroyed cultural goods, which was then used to support political negotiations aimed at establishing claims for reparations. Finally, they are involved in preserving the ruins, relics, and memories of the war for the purpose of remembrance.

In the course of their work, the military personnel of the Sections de Protections des Oeuvres d'Art en Zone des Armées are confronted with technical

14. Archives Nationales, AN 313AP/136, 'Minutes of the preparatory meeting of the Commission', 7 May 1917.

15. Archives de la Médiathèque de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/47/02, Paul Léon, *La France monumentale et la guerre*, manuscript, chapter II, 'L'organisation de la sauvegarde'.

16. Archives Nationales, AN 313AP/136, Service des recherches, de la préservation et de l'évacuation des oeuvres d'art dans la zone des armées, 25 Sept. 1917.

issues relating to both protection and evacuation. Regarding protection, they are involved in protecting buildings, making inventories and testing protective equipment. They advise commanders on evacuations and devise methods to adapt military resources to evacuations by road or rail, considering the fragility of the works. They also address the need for traceability and monitoring of inventories and the conservation of works of art.



Figure 1. Interior of Reims Cathedral following bombardment in September 1914, which destroyed the framework of the nave and its 15th century lead roof. Single shells continued to strike the ruined building for several years despite repeated pleas by Pope Benedict XV. A major restoration project began in 1919, led by Henri Deneux, Chief Architect of the Service of French Historic Monuments. Image from The Flickr Commons (no known copyright).

The trauma of the First World War and the emergency response to it led the Beaux-Arts administration to start thinking about the protection of cultural property in 1921.¹⁷ In 1935, the organisation of passive defence and mobilisation included provisions reminding prefects to ‘allow the use of specialists whose recruitment should be planned for peacetime’.¹⁸ It was only after the German

17. ‘As early as 1921, an inspector of historical monuments had been tasked with monitoring the studies undertaken on the general measures to be taken in the event of war to ensure the life of the Nation’, Archives de la Médiathèque de l’Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/35/01, René Planchenault, Rapport, La protection des monuments et œuvres d’art contre les faits de guerre en France de 1916 à 1945.

18. Service historique de la Défense, 2N196, Monuments historiques et site ‘Mobilisation’, projet du ministre de l’Éducation Nationale à l’intention de messieurs les préfets, April 1936.

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occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 that the need for a specific department for the protection of monuments and works of art became apparent. In collaboration between the Ministry of Fine Arts and the Ministry of Defence, a 'Service des monuments' was created in the Grand Quartier Général. The department was staffed by three reserve officers, René Planchenault, Lucien Prieur and Ernest Herpe, all of whom were historic monument architects. Prior to their new duties, all three had undergone training at the Section technique du Génie militaire.¹⁹

The Service des Monuments was attached to the Direction des Services du Génie, headed by General Moufflard. The head of the department was Captain Prieur, assisted by Lieutenants Planchenault and Herpe. The service had a 'mobile reparation team' in each of the ten armies, similar to the Sections de Protection des Oeuvres d'Art of the First World War.

From the first discussions on the creation of this structure, it was envisaged that its actions would focus on two complementary missions: prevention and reparation. Prevention aims to prepare for the protection and evacuation of the national heritage in peacetime, in conjunction with the Beaux-Arts administration. This preparation for peacetime is already the subject of specific instructions, in particular the Instruction on the protection of monuments and works of art in the border departments in the event of war (*Instruction sur la protection en cas de guerre des monuments et œuvres d'art dans les départements voisins de la frontière*).²⁰ As part of this work, the Service, in conjunction with the Department of Fine Arts, drew up a list of protected monuments in many départements.

The reparation work was divided into three different zones, including the 'operational zone where the military authority has full control'. These teams were set up in October 1939.²¹ They were made up of a sergeant and four to nine enlisted personnel. All had special skills, such as bricklayers, locksmiths, carpenters or photographers. They were generally placed under the authority of the military engineer administration. The role of the mobile repair teams was

19. 14 to 23 Feb. 1938, Archives de la Médiathèque de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/35/01, René Planchenault, Rapport, La protection des monuments et œuvres d'art contre les faits de guerre en France de 1916 à 1945.

20. Service historique de la Défense, 2N196, *Instruction sur la protection en cas de guerre des monuments et œuvres d'art dans les départements voisins de la frontière*, Ministère de l'Education nationale et des Beaux-Arts, 12 Aug. 1937.

21. The VIe Army and Alpine Army teams would remain 'unconstituted'.

specified in a technical instruction.²² Although they had to take their orders from the Monuments Department in Paris, they were relatively autonomous and intervened in three areas: the evacuation of transportable works of art, the protection of non-transportable works of art and the temporary consolidation of buildings damaged by the fighting.

On 1 September 1939, the General Staff of the French Army sent all its generals an order from the Minister of War to refrain from occupying historical monuments or installing defensive equipment.²³ These instructions were issued because such practices 'could be used by German propaganda to justify vandalism' and 'to avoid providing a pretext for destruction'.²⁴ At the end of 1939,²⁵ further instructions were issued to the armed forces to protect monuments from damage. These instructions were repeated and clarified in February 1940.²⁶

In January 1940, a report was produced on the work carried out by the Mobile Repair Teams since September 1939. It showed that the programme of protection adopted by the Comité des Monuments Historiques had been largely completed: 18,000m² of stained glass had been removed from 214 monuments

22. Archives de la Médiathèque de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/03/60, Instruction techniques pour les équipes mobiles de réparation, 26 Sept. 1939.

23. Note n° 62 3/EMA-N of 1 Sept. 1939 concerning the occupation of historic monuments.

24. These instructions are part of the Franco-British declaration of September 3, 1939 on the conduct of hostilities: 'The Governments of France and the United Kingdom solemnly and publicly affirm their intention to conduct any hostilities which may be imposed upon them with a firm desire to spare civilian populations and to preserve, as far as possible, the monuments of human civilization'. The text of the declaration published in the 3 September 1939 edition of *Le Temps* also added: 'In this spirit, they welcomed with deep satisfaction President Roosevelt's appeal concerning aerial bombardments. Fully sympathetic to the humanitarian sentiments which inspired this appeal, they responded in kind. Moreover, they had already sent express instructions to the commands of their armed forces that only strictly military objectives, in the narrowest sense of the term, should be bombed by air, sea or land artillery. As far as bombardment by land artillery is concerned, targets not of clearly defined military interest are to be excluded, in particular large urban agglomerations located outside the battlefields, and every effort is to be made to avoid destroying districts and buildings of civilisation-al interest'.

25. Archives de la Médiathèque de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/03/60, Note pour les Armées sur la protection des monuments historiques, Dec. 1939.

26. Archives de la Médiathèque de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/03/60, Note n° 4246-4/F/T/ relative à la protection contre l'incendie et les précautions à prendre pour la conservation en bon état d'entretien des monuments historiques, 28 Feb. 1940.

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and placed in some 7,000 suitably sized pre-prepared crates. The most important parts of 236 buildings had been protected by almost two million sandbags.

In addition to this work, the correspondence between the teams and the Commission reveals all the work involved in advising commanders and intervening to prevent damage during the occupation of sites by troops, to prevent fires and also in the event of accidental archaeological discoveries, as in the case of Bavay.

Discussions began in March 1940 with the British Expeditionary Force, whose sector did not yet have a mobile repair team. At the end of April 1940, the formation of a potentially mixed team was approved.²⁷ The German invasion of France the following May put an end to this military cooperation project for the protection of cultural property.

The department and its teams were gradually demobilised between June and July 1940. The Beaux-Arts Department then resumed its responsibilities for the preservation of monuments. This second French initiative, prepared in peacetime and inheriting its organisation and tasks from the structures set up during the First World War, demonstrates the need for and effectiveness of a military intervention structure. This experience demonstrates once again the particularities of the militarisation of such a mission and the difficulties of its implementation at all levels. When the Armistice was signed in France at the end of June 1940, the Monuments Service was disbanded. However, most of the protective measures were retained by the occupying authorities.

On 16 November 1942, the education ministers of the Allied governments convened a special conference in London. The purpose of the conference was to consider together measures to assist enemy occupied countries, as soon as possible after their liberation, to rebuild the many ruins left in the field of education and culture. Professor Paul Vaucher and Professor René Cassin represented General De Gaulle's French Committee for National Liberation. In fact, it was only after the liberation of North Africa, and Algeria in particular, at the end of 1943, that the Commissariat à l'Éducation Nationale in Algiers took over the responsibilities of the Ministère des Beaux-Arts.²⁸ In 1943, at the instigation of the British, the Conference of Ministers proposed the creation of an Allied Commission for the Protection and Restitution of Works of

27. Archives de la Médiathèque de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine, MAP 80/03/60, Compte rendu hebdomadaire pour la semaine du 21 au 28 avril 1940, 29 April 1940.

28. With the decree of 2 October 1943 on the protection of cultural property, the Governor General of Algeria took over the responsibilities of the Minister of Fine Arts.

Art. While nine British members were to be appointed,²⁹ five French experts were proposed.³⁰

On 23 June 1943, the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historical Monuments in War Areas, known as the Roberts Commission, was formed in the United States. The Commission pushed for the creation of a military branch by setting up a unit within the Civil Affairs and Military Government Section of the US Army. The Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section Unit (MFAA) thus became the armed wing of the US Army's operations in Europe.

At the beginning of February 1944, sixteen American officers were appointed by the MFAA to organise the military protection of cultural property under the direction of Colonel Webb within the G5 branch of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force created in December 1943.³¹ The latter, an American, had a British deputy and suggested that a Frenchman could also be appointed.³² Professor Claude Schaeffer,³³ archaeologist and friend of

29. Archives Nationales, F21 8654, dossier 62. Lord Simon, Lord Chancellor; Lord Macmillan, Lord of Appeal; Lord Crawford, Trustee of the British Museum, Tate Gallery and National Gallery; Professor George M. Trevelan, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge; Sir John Fordsyke, Director of the British Museum; Sir Kenneth M. Clark, Director of the National Gallery; Eric Maclagan, Director of the Victoria and Albert Museum; Sir Frederic Kenyan, Fellow of the British Academy; a representative of the Royal Fine Arts Commission.

30. Archives Nationales, F21 8654, dossier 62. Commandant Shaeffer, curator of the Musée des Antiquités nationales, professor at Oxford University; Professor Alazard, professor at Algiers University, director of the Musée des Beaux-Arts d'Alger; Mademoiselle Adolphe, doctor of law, library graduate, attached to the national library, head of the legal department at the Commissariat à l'Intérieur; Professor David, legal expert.

31. Professor Colonel Webb headed the department at Eisenhower's headquarters, while Professor Sir Leonard Woolley headed the department created at the British War Office with the rank of colonel.

32. Archives Nationales, F21 8654, diplomatic telegram no. 851 from Mr Vienot to Messrs Massigli and Capitant issued on 17 Feb. 1944.

33. Claude Frédéric Armand Schaeffer (1888–1982), curator of Strasbourg's Musée préhistorique et gallo-romain from 1929. He took part in numerous excavations in the Levant, notably at Rash Shamra. In 1940, he helped protect and then evacuate the collections of the Musée des Antiquités Nationales de Saint-Germain-en-Laye. After serving in the Royal Navy from May 1940, he joined the Free Naval Forces in January 1941 with the rank of Lieutenant-Commander. General De Gaulle appointed him head of the Service historique de la France Libre. He took part in the surveillance and protection of the British Museum during the Blitz. In 1942, he was appointed Senior Research Fellow at Saint John's College, Oxford. On Claude Schaeffer, see Vercoutter 1989.

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Sir Leonard Woolley,³⁴ was initially approached to take on the role and lead the French officers but declined.³⁵ He felt that the choice of a historic monument architect would be more appropriate. He suggested that Marcel Henri Christoffe,³⁶ a government-qualified architect and Chief Architect of Historical Monuments and National Palaces in Algeria, be appointed to the post. Marcel Henri Christoffe was appointed head of the Service de protection des monuments historiques en zones d'invasion on 17 March 1944.³⁷ He was assisted by Commandant Tony Socard.³⁸ Despite repeated requests from the British Commission and the support of Sir Leonard Woolley, the inability of Commandant Christoffe to travel to London led the Comité de Libération Nationale of the French Provisional Government to set up a service in Algiers on 9 May 1944. The creation of this autonomous service was a direct reference to the actions of the Service de Protection des Oeuvres d'Art en Zone des Armées of 1917.³⁹ This service was set up by incorporating it into the administrative liaison missions. On 16 May, the commissioner for national education asked his counterpart for war to set up two sections, one for the northern front and the other for the southern front. Staff were recruited in North Africa, mainly from among the architects of the Monuments Historiques. The lists changed several times before being finalised at the beginning of August, before the

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34. Sir Leonard Woolley (1880–1960), British archaeologist. He excavated the city of Ur in Iraq before the First World War, then joined the Intelligence Service with his assistant T.E. Lawrence in Egypt during the war. He returned to the service in 1939. From 1941, he organised the collection of information on war damage to historic monuments. He was appointed archaeological advisor to the British General Staff in June 1943, then joined SHAEF to develop the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Program. Between November and December 1943, he travelled to Algiers, Sicily and Italy.
 35. Archives Nationales, F21 8654, diplomatic telegram no. 727 from Mr Vienot to Messrs Massigli and Capitant issued on 11 Feb. 1944.
 36. Marcel Henri Christoffe (1902–1979), son of architect Marcel Christoffe, was a former student at the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris. Following in his father's footsteps, he was appointed Chief Architect of the Monuments Historiques and National Palaces of Algeria. In 1952, he was named Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur.
 37. Archives Nationales, F21 8654, Note EN/E 117 sur la désignation du chef du service de protection des monuments historiques dans les zones d'invasions en France, 17 March 1944.
 38. Paul Louis Tony Socard, known as Tony Socard (1901–1996), son of master glassmaker Edmond Socard, graduated from the École des Beaux-Arts. He moved to Algiers in 1932. From 1941 to 1943, he was Director of Urban Planning for the Algerian General Government. He left Algeria in 1962, moving to Paris before retiring to Nice.
 39. Archives Nationales, F21 8654, Note sur l'organisation futures des officiers Beaux-Arts, 5 May 1944.

men were sent to the front. The northern front section consisted of six officers under the command of Captain Christoffle.⁴⁰ The southern section consisted of nine officers under Major Socard.⁴¹ On 3 September 1944, Socard joined the staff of General Cochet, the military delegate for the southern theatres of operation in France.

In an aide-mémoire dated 28 August 1944, Commandant Socard described the duties of the Fine Arts officers.⁴² They would have the same duties as the Monuments Men: to advise commanders about cultural property and to ensure that the troops respect these monuments, but their action would be more extensive in terms of consolidating damaged monuments and collecting evidence of deliberate destruction and theft by the enemy.

French Fine Arts officers intervened in the occupied territories, carrying out numerous inspection and control missions. They were soon joined by other officers when the Commission de Récupération Artistique, chaired by Albert Henraux, was set up on 24 November 1944. However, their entry into Germany was not authorised by the Allies and only six Beaux-Arts officers were assigned to General de Lattre de Tassigny's 1st Army: Major Duchartres, Captain Rose Valland, Lieutenant Dupont, Lieutenant Gaudron and Lieutenant Rigaud.⁴³ From then on, their mission was essentially to investigate and return looted works of art. Rose Valland remained in charge until 1949. The creation of a Service de Protection des Oeuvres d'Art at the Ministry of Culture in 1952 enabled her to continue this work in France until 1969. She was particularly involved in the preparations for the ratification of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

The strategic dimension of cultural heritage, particularly in terms of reputation, was a key factor in the creation of a service for the protection of works of art. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the Beaux-Arts officers were

40. Archives Nationales, F21 8654. Northern Front: Major Christoffle, platoon leader; Major Le Caplain-Le Goupy, deputy platoon leader; Captain Delanoe; Captain Ferrand; Lieutenant Husson; Second Lieutenant Demartres.

41. Archives Nationales, F21 8654. Southern Front: Major Socard, platoon leader; Captain Tombarel, deputy platoon leader; Lieutenant Fould-Springer; Captain Salvador, Captain Blancard de Lery; Lieutenant Lesaint; Lieutenant Evin, Second Lieutenant Lathuillère, Private Grosset-Grange, secretary. Captain Rheims would complete the team in 1945.

42. Archives Nationales, F21 8654, Aide-mémoire des Officiers de liaison administrative, section de protection des monuments historiques et beaux-arts, 20 Aug. 1944.

43. Diplomatic Archives, 209SUP, 294, orders de mission.

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guaranteed by their military status and the possibility of integrating into the organisation while benefiting from its resources.

Between the 1950s and the 1990s, as the nature of military operations changed with the multiplication of overseas deployments, the issue of cultural property protection seems to have attracted the attention of military commanders only occasionally. Although there were a few examples of cultural property being protected, such as in Algeria in the 1960s or Cambodia in 1992–93, there was no overall organisation for the protection of cultural property in military operations.

During this period, the presence of military personnel responsible for heritage conservation issues is attested to in the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, but without any specific training or employment during military operations. They concentrated on the management of military archives, military symbolism and historical research. It wasn't until 1992, with the creation of the Délégation au patrimoine de l'armée de Terre, attached to the Army General Staff, that a department was set up specifically to deal with heritage protection and conservation issues. In 1996, a programme for heritage officers was set up, with training provided by the École du Louvre and the Institut National du Patrimoine (Cour des Comptes 2021: 35).

Under the aegis of the Délégation au patrimoine de l'armée de Terre, they preserve, promote, and enhance the army's cultural heritage through their work in sixteen museums. They have a unique combination of military training and culture and heritage training and culture. They therefore have an interesting profile for providing the French Army with specific skills for cultural heritage protection missions in areas of armed conflict (Aubagnac: 2014: 8).

However, between 1996 and 2015, priority was given to artefact conservation missions and the renovation of army museums, while many collections from the numerous disbanded units arrived at them. It should be noted, however, that General André Cousine, delegate for army heritage, took part in several international conferences in the 2000s. These followed the adoption by UNESCO of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. At the same time, several curator-officers took part in the creation of the 'Bouclier Bleu France' association, which aims to train, raise awareness and take action in the event of disasters affecting cultural heritage.⁴⁴ On the initiative of the Centre de Doctrine et d'Enseignement du Commandement, a doctrinal document was adopted by the French Army in 2014. This memorandum on the protection of

44. Among them are Gilles Aubagnac and Ariane Pinauld.

cultural property in the event of armed conflict was updated in 2018 following France's ratification of the Second Protocol of 1999.

Functions within current conflicts and future direction

Two exploratory missions took place in 2018 and 2019, with two curators deployed in the field. The aim of these missions was to confirm the potential role of heritage protection officers and to study the modalities of their deployment. The first mission took place in the Central African Republic, as part of a civil-military project to support the rehabilitation of the Bangui National Museum (Pinaldt 2019: 49, [Figure 2](#)). The second took place in 2019, when an officer was deployed as a command advisor in the context of the Barkhane operation in Mali ([Figure 3](#)).⁴⁵ The results of these two missions confirm the hypothesis of a useful patrimonial and operational approach that contributes to the success of the military leader.⁴⁶ Based on this experience, we can now propose the scope of intervention of these specialists, thus giving operational expression to the provisions of Article 7 of the 1954 Convention. From now on, 'heritage protection' will mean specific tasks such as identification, advice, training, intervention, cooperation, information and communication: a whole range of possible tasks that will be integrated into the overall operational process.

The operational heritage expertise of the Délégation au patrimoine de l'armée de Terre was recognised in 2020 in the mission statement entrusted to General Gilles Perchet when he took up his duties as Délégué au Patrimoine. On 22 July 2021, General Burkhard, then Chief of Staff of the Army, confirmed the relevance of the proposed analyses and the Army's interest in developing a specific operational heritage protection capability.

As far as command support is concerned, several missions were carried out in 2023 and 2024: one to the Lynx mission in Estonia by Captain Léopold Courtois, curator of the Musée des Troupes de Montagne ([Figure 4](#)), and the other by Captain Timothée Le Berre, deputy heritage adviser at the Délégation au patrimoine de l'armée de Terre in Romania. Direct support is also provided

45. Etat-Major des Armées, Barkhane (20 May 2019). Portrait of Captain Timothée, 'curator in operation' committed to heritage protection, available at: <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane/breves/barkhane-portrait-du-capitaine-timothee-conservateur-en-operation-engage-pour-la-protection-du-patrimoine> (accessed 20 April 20).

46. Délégation au patrimoine de l'armée de Terre (2020), fiche de présentation n° 503549/ ARM/EMAT/SCPS/DELPAT/NP du 23/04/2020, compte de fin de mission d'un conservateur déployé en opération.

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Figure 2. Captain Pinauld's advisory mission to the Barthélemy–Boganda National Museum in Bangui, 2018. Photo from EMA/COM via Tim Le Berre.



Figure 3. Captain Le Berre and the head of the Timbuktu cultural mission meet at the Trois-Saint cemetery, 2019. Photo from EMA/COM via Tim Le Berre.

to the Operations Planning and Management Centre and the Legal Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of the Armed Forces.



Figure 4. Inventory of cultural property during a deployment by a curator-officer, Estonia, 2023. Photo from EMA/COM via Tim Le Berre.

In terms of training, the Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan military academy has created a course dedicated to the protection of cultural property, and the first ‘Protection of Cultural Property in Operations’ course was accredited and run by the French army’s heritage delegation in June. It brings together 24 officers, curators, lawyers, communicators, military firefighters, army commander and civil-military operations specialists. Military expertise is also being developed in several civilian academic courses, notably at the École du Louvre and Sciences Po.

From 2021, the French Army Heritage Delegation was recognised at international level by UNESCO, where it will act as an expert for the Secretariat of the 1954 Convention. The approach adopted by the French Army today is therefore fully consistent with the missions entrusted to its predecessor units for the protection of cultural heritage. The missions entrusted to its personnel are also like their role in advising, intervening and liaising with civilian authorities in the context of military operations. Their training, both military and as

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heritage professionals, enables them to integrate fully into both environments. A century ago, heritage officers were primarily uniformed heritage professionals, but this paradigm has now evolved, and curator-officers are now military heritage professionals.

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Chapter 9.

THE VITAL ROLE OF NGOS IN RESCUING AND REBUILDING CULTURAL TREASURES IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND WAR

Amira Sadik Aly

Introduction

Cultural heritage embodies the dynamic interplay between land, people and time. It is the tangible and intangible legacy that provides a sense of belonging and continuity. In times of crisis and conflict, the urgency to defend these defining values and assets becomes paramount. Cultural heritage represents our roots, our identity and our very existence. It fuels a fierce protectiveness for the treasures of the past, the creations of the present and the possibilities of the future. Our cultural legacy is the ultimate expression of these aspirations, reflecting the creative spirit that defines us as a people.

Egypt possesses a remarkable wealth of cultural heritage, spanning millennia and encompassing diverse civilisations. This heritage has consistently served as a common ground for the Egyptian people, fostering a sense of shared identity and national pride. Throughout history, this shared legacy has played a pivotal role in promoting peace and resilience in the face of colonisation, conflict and social upheaval. The iconic monuments and enduring traditions of ancient Egypt, such as the pyramids, temples and hieroglyphic writing, instilled a profound sense of unity and cultural continuity among the ancient Egyptians. This shared identity contributed to the remarkable longevity and stability of their civilisation.

During periods of colonial rule, Egypt's cultural heritage became a rallying point for national identity and resistance. The rediscovery of ancient treasures and the preservation of both Islamic and Coptic heritage fueled a sense of pride and determination, contributing to the eventual struggle for independence.

Summary political context

In the wake of the Arab Spring protests that began in Tunisia in late 2010, Egypt erupted in its own revolution on 25 January 2011. Demonstrators in Cairo's Tahrir Square, an area near landmarks like the Egyptian Museum and the Geographical Society of Egypt, demanded social equality and a better quality of life (BBC 2011). Clashes broke out and, unfortunately, several heritage sites, including the Egyptian Museum, were targeted with looting, vandalism and fire (Ikram 2013).

Following President Mubarak's resignation in February 2011, the military assumed control. The Muslim Brotherhood briefly held power in 2012, but their rule was marked by controversial decisions. This led to another revolution on 30 June 2013, with Adly Mansour, head of the constitutional court, taking over as president (Al Jazeera 2020). During this period, attacks occurred on churches in Upper Egypt, and a wave of terrorism targeted police stations, often located near cultural institutions. Examples include car bomb attacks that damaged the Museum of Islamic Art in 2014 (located across the street from Cairo's central police station – see BBC 2014) and the Malawi Museum 2014 (situated beside a police station in Upper Egypt).

With the election of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, a former Field Marshal, Egypt witnessed further terrorist attacks, including bombings at the Church of Botrosiah in Cairo and the Church of Mary Virgin in Alexandria. The Sinai Peninsula became a hotspot for such violence. However, thanks to the combined efforts of the Egyptian military, police and the community, these waves of terrorism subsided by 2018 largely due to the counter-terrorism activities of Operation Martyr's Right (Eleiba 2017).

Egypt's cultural heritage under threat: A timeline of crisis and resilience in the last two decades

Egypt's cultural heritage, a testament to the nation's rich history and a cornerstone of its identity, has clearly faced significant challenges in recent decades. From the 2011 revolution onwards, a series of incidents – set out below – targeted cultural sites and artefacts, highlighting the vulnerability of cultural heritage in times of crisis. However, amidst these challenges, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have emerged as crucial players in safeguarding and promoting the recovery of this irreplaceable legacy.

- 25 January 2011: The Egyptian Revolution erupts, leading to a period of political and social unrest. Cultural heritage sites become susceptible

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to looting and vandalism during this time.

- 28 November 2011: Looting and damage occur at the Egyptian Museum in Cairo, located in the heart of the ongoing protests at El Tahrir Square (McGreal 2011). This incident raises widespread concern about the safety of cultural artefacts across the nation. Upon hearing about the attack, ordinary Egyptian citizens not involved in the protests form a human chain around the museum to protect it. This spontaneous action highlights the deep-seated respect and value the Egyptian people hold for their cultural heritage. Recognising the emergency, the army and government specialists swiftly deploy to secure the museum and its invaluable treasures. This incident exemplifies the importance of coordinated efforts among various stakeholders, including the community, government and specialised professionals, in safeguarding cultural heritage during times of crisis.
- February–April 2011: The Saqqara Necropolis, a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Lower Egypt, becomes a target for looters during this period. Looters steal artefacts from storage facilities situated in the necropolis, raising concerns about the safety of its vast collection of invaluable treasures. Facing this crisis, the Egyptian Army and security personnel swiftly respond. They work to secure the site and prevent further looting activities. This incident highlights the vulnerability of cultural heritage even in designated protected areas during times of unrest.
- 2 March 2011: During the same period of unrest, the storage areas of the Giza Plateau World Heritage Site are targeted for looting. Despite the commendable efforts of specialists and dedicated volunteers who arrive to evacuate the storage, the mission is hindered by a lack of standardised methodology for cultural heritage evacuation procedures. This situation highlights the absence of a dedicated crisis cultural heritage risk management unit within the Ministry of Antiquities and the lack of vital response plans including a risk management plan, risk mitigation plan, or a preparedness plan specific to the site. These critical oversights ultimately contribute to the unfortunate looting of the storage. Even with a swift response from the community, specialists and the army, the lack of formalised procedures and preparedness measures can hinder successful protection of cultural heritage in times of crisis. This event underscores the urgent need for specialised crisis cultural heritage risk management units and the development of comprehensive response plans to safeguard

cultural treasures during times of instability.

- 18 December 2011: Fire and looting at the Egyptian Scientific Institute. A devastating fire breaks out at the Egyptian Scientific Institute, located in the heart of the conflict zone in El Tahrir Square. This historical institute houses a vast and significant collection of manuscripts and documents. The fire, coupled with acts of vandalism and looting, leads to extensive damage. Community and military respond, challenges remain: volunteers, along with the army, swiftly arrive at the scene to rescue endangered manuscripts and transport them to the National Archives. However, a lack of established protocols for first aid, evacuation, and stabilisation of archival materials in crisis situations significantly hampers the rescue efforts, resulting in substantial losses. This event underlines the vulnerability of cultural institutions located within conflict zones. It emphasises the critical need for specialised training and preparedness plans for first responders dealing with the rescue of archival materials during times of unrest.

A call for preparedness: Recognising the need for risk management

The above events of 2011 served as a stark reminder of the vulnerability of Egypt's cultural heritage during times of crisis. Looting, fires and vandalism inflicted significant damage on iconic sites and invaluable artefacts, highlighting the lack of robust risk management strategies and specialised rescue capabilities. The situation unearthed a critical need to i) establish comprehensive risk management plans for cultural heritage sites and institutions; ii) develop protocols and methodologies for first aid, evacuation and stabilisation of cultural objects during emergencies; and iii) build a dedicated task force equipped with the knowledge, skills and resources to effectively respond to crises and protect cultural heritage.

These challenges spurred efforts towards establishing an Egyptian heritage rescue team and the realisation and vision of the Chair of the Egyptian Heritage Rescue Foundation, Abdelhamid Salah el Sherif. Subsequent sections of this chapter detail the steps taken to address these needs and the progress made towards ensuring the protection of Egypt's cultural heritage.

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Knowledge from a global leader: ICCROM's contribution

The International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) emerged as a vital source of knowledge and training in the efforts to build Egypt's cultural heritage rescue capabilities. In a pivotal development during 2011, the First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis (FAC) programme was launched under the leadership of Aparna Tandon, Project Manager and Leader of the First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis Program at ICCROM's Collections Unit.

Ms Tandon, a renowned expert in the field, became a mentor and trainer for the core group that would form the Egyptian Heritage Rescue Team. Through the FAC program, this team acquired critical knowledge and skills including:

- **Salvage Techniques:** Methods to safely retrieve cultural objects from damaged sites or unstable situations;
- **Documentation and Sorting:** Systematic techniques to record, categorise and prioritise endangered artefacts;
- **Stabilisation:** Processes to prevent further deterioration of damaged objects;
- **Handling and Transportation:** Safe methods for moving cultural property to secure locations; and
- **Relocation Strategies:** Planning and implementation for the temporary or permanent relocation of cultural collections in times of crisis.

Response and recovery at the Malawi Museum

The period following the 30th of June Revolution, which ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power, was characterised by increased terrorist activity and instability. These tumultuous times culminated in the burning of churches in Minya (Hauslohner 2013). On 14 August, during this period of civil unrest, the Malawi Museum of Egyptian antiquities in Upper Egypt was looted by pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters (Essam 2017). More than 1,100 objects were looted or destroyed and archaeologist Sameh Ahmed Abdel Hafiz was killed during the attack on the museum. These events serve as a stark reminder of the vulnerability of cultural heritage even in seemingly secure areas. However, this incident also showcases the resilience of cultural institutions and the vital role of capacity building in protecting our shared heritage.

Notably, the Malawi Museum's staff included participants from the first training programme jointly conducted by ICCROM and the Egyptian Heritage Rescue Team. This capacity-building initiative equipped and empowered them with crucial knowledge and skills for handling emergencies. In the aftermath of the attack, the museum staff leveraged their newly acquired expertise to facilitate the recovery phase with remarkable efficacy. They played a key role in turning tragedy into action by introducing risk management principles in order to analyse vulnerabilities, potential threats and exposure risks and paving the way for a safer future for the museum and its treasures. In addition, the building was redesigned to enhance security and safeguard the collection, making use of risk management principles which saw implementation of a strategic display. Here, careful consideration was given to the scenario display of the collection, ensuring a balance between accessibility and vulnerability reduction. By creating these risk mitigation plans, the museum aimed to proactively address potential future threats and minimise future losses.

This response, deemed a collaboration for success, was a testament to the successful collaboration between the Egyptian Heritage Rescue Foundation¹ (as an NGO), the Ministry of Antiquities and the Civil Defence. Their combined efforts and coordinated approach contributed significantly to the recovery process and highlighted the importance of integrated risk management in protecting cultural heritage.

December 2013–June 2014: Building resilience – train the trainers programme

In a strategic move to further strengthen Egypt's capacity to protect cultural heritage, a collaborative training program was launched in late December 2013 which was focused on training future trainers. Key participants included ICCROM (the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property), UNESCO Cairo Office, Prince Claus Fund (Financial Support), the Egyptian Ministry of Antiquities and Bibliotheca Alexandrina.

During this intensive six-month programme, the training was dramatically interrupted by the 24 January 2014 attacks following the referendum on a new constitution, targeting the central police station in Cairo, the Museum of Islamic Art and the National Archive (TADAMUN 2014). The Museum of Islamic Art was badly damaged in a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on the nearby police headquarters (BBC 2014). These

1. See <http://www.ehrf-egypt.com/>

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acts of violence served as an urgent reminder of the real-world challenges faced by cultural heritage sites and institutions (WMF 2016).

In a powerful demonstration of collaboration and knowledge-sharing, the newly formed 'Train the Trainers' team from the Egyptian Rescue Foundation, partnered with the Ministry of Antiquities and the civil defence services to respond to this crisis. They played a vital role in the emergency efforts, putting their recently acquired expertise into practice. However, this incident highlights the timeliness of the training programme in strengthening Egypt's response capabilities, the importance of building a local network of trained professionals ready to face real-world emergencies and the effectiveness of collaboration between NGOs, governmental entities and civil defence for safeguarding cultural heritage in times of crisis.

Bridging the gap: The Egyptian Heritage Rescue Foundation as a facilitator

The Egyptian Heritage Rescue Foundation (EHRF), established by Abdelhamid Salah el Sherif, with the team of trainers and members emerged as a crucial NGO dedicated to safeguarding Egypt's cultural heritage. Beyond its role in building a dedicated rescue team, the EHRF played a pivotal role in facilitating communication and collaboration between diverse stakeholders, including communities, cultural professionals, governmental entities and international partners. By fostering these connections, the EHRF helped bridge the gap between various groups, fostering mutual understanding and coordinated action in protecting cultural heritage. Indeed, in developing expertise in conducting situation analyses, the EHRF recognised the importance of regularly assessing the threats and vulnerabilities faced by cultural heritage sites and institutions. Through periodic situation analyses, the EHRF aimed to identify potential risks and areas of concern, evaluate existing capacities for response and preparedness and inform decision-making and the development of effective protection strategies.

The EHRF's expertise in facilitating collaboration and conducting situation analyses has therefore established them as a trusted partner in safeguarding Egypt's cultural heritage. Ongoing efforts contribute significantly to building a more robust and coordinated approach to cultural heritage protection in the region.

Tailored training programmes: Empowering diverse stakeholders

Recognising the need for a comprehensive approach to cultural heritage protection, the EHRF embarked on the development of a methodology and customised curriculum for training diverse stakeholders. This innovative approach catered to the specific needs and abilities of various groups:

- **Professionals:** In-depth training modules equipped professionals in cultural heritage management with advanced skills in risk management, emergency response, and first aid for cultural objects;
- **Volunteers:** Engaging training sessions provided volunteers with the foundational knowledge and practical skills necessary to effectively support cultural heritage protection efforts;
- **Elders:** Culturally appropriate training modules addressed the specific concerns and knowledge base of elders, leveraging their unique insights and fostering their vital role in safeguarding cultural heritage traditions;
- **Youth:** Interactive and engaging modules aimed to instil in young people a deep appreciation for their cultural heritage, equipping them with the knowledge and skills to become future stewards of their cultural legacy; and
- **Children:** Age-appropriate training sessions used creative and playful methods to introduce children to the concept of cultural heritage, fostering a sense of responsibility and respect for their cultural treasures.

These training programmes addressed a range of crucial topics, including:

- **Concepts of Cultural Heritage:** Building a foundation of understanding for participants to appreciate the significance and value of their cultural heritage;
- **Risk Management:** Equipping participants with the knowledge and skills to identify potential threats, assess vulnerabilities and develop mitigation strategies;
- **First Aid for Cultural Heritage:** Providing essential training on stabilising and protecting cultural objects in times of crisis; and
- **Building and Collection Protection:** Offering practical guidance on safeguarding cultural buildings and collections from damage and loss.

The development of this multi-layered training programme marked a significant step forward. By tailoring training content to the specific needs of diverse groups,

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the EHRF ensured effective knowledge dissemination and capacity building at various levels. This inclusive approach empowered individuals and communities to actively participate in the protection of their irreplaceable cultural heritage.

From advocacy to action: Pushing for institutional change

Recognising the limitations of operating solely as an NGO, the EHRF drew on the insight and expertise of its team members who were also employed within the Ministry of Antiquities and identified a critical next step: Advocating for the creation of a dedicated Risk Management (RM) sector within the Ministry's hierarchy.

In order to achieve this, the EHRF carefully studied existing legislation, governmental regulations and the Ministry's internal structure to develop a comprehensive plan for integrating a robust RM sector. Their proposed structure aimed to establish clear policies and procedures for risk assessment, mitigation, and crisis response for cultural heritage, train specialised personnel in risk management principles and emergency preparedness techniques and foster coordination between the newly formed RM sector, existing Ministry departments and external stakeholders like NGOs and Civil Defence.

To bolster this proposal, the EHRF highlighted the success of their previous training initiatives by showcasing the positive impact of the alumni from their previous specialist training programmes as well as the Museum Curators course on effective crisis response. The EHRF emphasised that the Museum of Islamic Art's preparedness plan was instrumental in minimising the impact of the January 2014 *VBIED* attack thanks to the participation of five trained museum staff who played a crucial role in the first aid mission.

The EHRF's persistent advocacy efforts, coupled with the demonstrably positive outcomes of the training programmes, ultimately yielded a significant result. In 2016, the Ministry of Antiquities officially established a dedicated Risk Management sector, marking a crucial milestone in the institutionalisation of cultural heritage protection in Egypt.

The establishment of the RM sector serves as a testament to the critical role that NGOs can play in advocating for systemic change within government institutions. The EHRF's success story showcases the effectiveness of combining strategic planning, community engagement, and demonstrable results to drive positive change. This development ensures that the valuable expertise and preparedness measures are integrated into the Ministry's structure, fostering

a more robust and long-term approach to safeguarding Egypt's irreplaceable cultural heritage.²

The El Azhar and El Ghoriya case study: A strategic partnership

The ongoing partnership between the EHRF and the Ministry of Antiquities was further solidified in a 2017–2018 study targeting the historic districts of El Azhar and El Ghoriya in Cairo Governorate. Recognising the escalating threat of fire and conflict in the area, along with the evident threat to cultural properties, the EHRF took three broad proactive steps. Firstly, utilising the risk assessment methodology established by ICCROM (Pedersoli et al. 2016), the EHRF conducted a comprehensive threat assessment of the targeted districts. This involved both desk-based research and on-site fieldwork. Secondly, the threat assessment study yielded a prioritised list of necessary mitigation measures, considering not only the vulnerability of the cultural properties and potential damage, but also their intrinsic value and significance to the local community and the whole nation. Thirdly, to underscore the urgency of action, the EHRF developed detailed risk scenarios focused on the potential consequences of fires. Additionally, they analysed vulnerabilities related to the topography, population activities (crafts and workshops), exposures and the likely impacts these could have on cultural heritage.

This study reinforced the vital role of the EHRF as an expert advisor, facilitator and capacity-builder for the newly established Risk Management (RM) sector within the Ministry of Antiquities. By incorporating the value and significance of heritage as a key factor in risk assessment, the EHRF ensured a robust and comprehensive approach to safeguarding El Azhar and El Ghoriya's cultural treasures. The results further emphasised the importance of integrated risk management approaches to proactively safeguard historic districts and their cultural treasures.

The El Azhar and El Ghoriya studies informed the RM sector's action plans and resource allocation, demonstrating how the collaboration between an NGO and a government agency can effectively address pressing concerns and inform risk mitigation strategies. This study serves as a crucial example of how factoring in the cultural and historical significance (ICCROM 2016) of heritage strengthens risk assessments and leads to more informed and impactful protection measures.

2. See <https://www.facebook.com/DRMGMMOA>

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Beyond the specific findings of the El Azhar and El Ghoriya studies, the EHRF's comprehensive and collaborative approach served as a catalyst for change within the Egyptian government, particularly as the fieldwork and risk assessment process revealed a deeper understanding of stakeholder requirements and needs.

Building collaborative networks: The importance of stakeholder mapping

In the face of emergencies, effective and coordinated action proved to be paramount in minimising damage and safeguarding cultural heritage. The EHRF recognised the importance of mapping stakeholders and clearly defining their respective roles and responsibilities as well as identifying and engaging various groups with a vested interest in cultural heritage protection, comprising Governmental entities (e.g., the Ministry of Antiquities, Civil Defence and local authorities); NGOs specialising in cultural heritage, first aid and disaster relief; and Communities (e.g., residents, religious entities and cultural practitioners).

By establishing clear roles and expectations, the EHRF facilitated a more coordinated response in times of crisis. This involved defining the responsibilities of each stakeholder group in evacuation, emergency response and recovery efforts, establishing communication channels to ensure timely and accurate information exchange during emergencies and developing collaboration strategies to leverage the unique expertise and resources of each stakeholder group.

The EHRF recognised that preparation and planning were fundamental to minimising damage and facilitating a swift and effective response in times of crisis. They aimed to achieve this by developing comprehensive plans for the safe evacuation of people, cultural objects, and even fragments of cultural heritage in case of emergencies (see Tandon 2016), investing in training programmes to enhance the response capabilities of emergency teams, NGOs and the community at large and ensuring the availability and proper functioning of fire extinguishers and other fire safety equipment in and around cultural heritage sites. In addition, the development and adoption of emergency plans based on specific risk assessments conducted for each cultural heritage site ensured a tailored approach that addressed the unique vulnerabilities of each location. Scenario-based simulations were also implemented, involving all stakeholders to test emergency plans, identify potential shortcomings, and practice coordinated responses to different crisis scenarios. Finally, an emergency contact list of key personnel was established to facilitate communication and coordination during emergencies.

By actively mapping stakeholders, defining roles and implementing these crucial pre-crisis preparedness measures, the EHRF established a solid foundation for a more coordinated and effective response to cultural heritage emergencies in Egypt. The efforts highlighted the importance of collaboration and proactive planning in safeguarding the nation's invaluable cultural treasures.

Dynamic response: Adapting roles based on real-time needs

While the importance of stakeholder mapping and pre-crisis preparedness is undeniable, the dynamic nature of emergencies necessitates the ability to adapt response actions based on real-time needs. Here's how some key stakeholders might respond in a crisis, building upon the established foundation.

In the event of a crisis, the Ministry of Antiquities is to be the first point of contact. Upon receiving reports of an incident, the Ministry would likely coordinate the overall response effort. Here, a crisis management/control room would be established to manage the crisis, facilitate communication and make critical decisions. The Ministry would also liaise with the National Committee for Crisis Disaster and Mitigation Management (established in the Minister's Cabinet in 2016) and other relevant stakeholders. This ensures coordination and access to crucial resources. Through the crisis management/control room, permissions and approval would be granted for the deployment of emergency response teams, including the EHRF and other NGOs. The Ministry would likely gather and analyse situation reports from various teams on the ground to gain a comprehensive understanding of the crisis, assess potential risks and take the lead in communicating with the media, ensuring accurate and timely information is disseminated to the public. Should the need for artefact evacuation be required, the Ministry would propose temporary storage facilities for evacuated cultural objects and collections as well as facilitate the provision of logistics such as packing materials and provision of vehicles to safely transport cultural heritage items. Depending on the scale and complexity of the crisis, the Ministry might also reach out to international organisations for expert advice and additional support.

By adapting their roles and actions based on the specific circumstances, each stakeholder plays a critical role in mitigating the impact of emergencies and ensuring the safety of cultural heritage. The established collaborative framework and pre-crisis preparedness measures lay the groundwork for a coordinated and effective response whenever cultural heritage is threatened.

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EHRF and other NGOs: On-site action

Building upon the established framework, NGOs like the EHRF would play a crucial role in on-site response and coordination during cultural heritage emergencies. Key areas of their responsibility might include:

- **Rescue Team Mobilisation:** EHRF and other NGOs would likely mobilise their trained rescue teams to the affected site as soon as possible. These teams would be equipped with the necessary expertise and resources to safely handle cultural objects and minimise damage.
- **Assessment and Documentation:** They would likely develop and distribute standardised assessment sheets for risk and damage assessment, allowing for a systematic and efficient evaluation of the situation. This data would be crucial for informing decision-making and prioritising response efforts.
- **Mission Preparation and Logistics:** EHRF and other NGOs would likely prepare for deployment missions by gathering necessary supplies, equipment, and documentation. They would also be responsible for securing logistical support, such as transportation and communication tools, to ensure efficient operations.
- **Systematic Reporting and Updates:** Throughout the response effort, the EHRF would likely provide regular and systematic reports to the Ministry of Antiquities and other stakeholders. These reports would include real-time updates on the situation analysis, ongoing activities and emerging needs.
- **First Aid for Collections:** In the critical moments of an emergency, the EHRF and other trained NGOs would be on-site to provide first aid for collections. This might involve stabilising and protecting cultural objects from further damage using appropriate techniques and specialised materials.
- **Evacuation and Temporary Storage:** During evacuations, NGOs would likely take the lead in on-site operations, carefully preparing collections for transport, implementing safe evacuation procedures, and ensuring their safe arrival at temporary storage facilities designated by the Ministry of Antiquities.
- **Comprehensive Documentation:** Throughout all phases of the response, the EHRF and other NGOs would likely maintain detailed documentation

of their actions, activities, findings, and decisions. This comprehensive documentation would serve various purposes, including facilitating future recovery efforts, providing transparency, and offering valuable insights for future preparedness and response planning.

By combining their expertise, agility and on-the-ground presence, NGOs like the EHRF play a vital role in complementing government efforts and ensuring a comprehensive and effective response to cultural heritage emergencies in Egypt.

Civil Defence: Securing the scene and protecting lives

Alongside specialised responders, the Civil Defence also plays a critical role in cultural heritage emergencies. Key areas of their responsibility might include:

- **Security and Public Safety:** One of the Civil Defence's primary functions would be to secure the affected site. This involves cordoning off the area, controlling access, and preventing looting or further damage to cultural heritage. They would also take the lead in evacuating people from the affected area and ensuring their safety and wellbeing.
- **Collaboration with Humanitarian Aid Organisations:** To address the needs of displaced individuals or those affected by the disaster, the Civil Defence would likely liaise with humanitarian aid organisations. Together, they can provide essential relief services, such as shelter, food, water and medical assistance, to impacted communities.
- **Collaboration with Firefighters:** In the event of a fire, the Civil Defence would work in close collaboration with firefighters to suppress the fire and minimise its impact on the cultural heritage site. They would assist with securing the site and facilitating access for specialised cultural heritage responders.
- **Evacuation and Logistics Support:** Civil Defence would play a significant role in developing evacuation plans and routes in consultation with the Ministry of Antiquities, NGOs, and other stakeholders. During evacuation scenarios, they would assist with coordinating transportation efforts, ensuring the safe and efficient movement of cultural objects and displaced people. They could also help with securing temporary storage spaces and providing necessary security measures to protect evacuated collections.

By emphasising the collaborative nature of emergency response, the inclusion of Civil Defence further strengthens the overall framework. Their expertise in

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site security, evacuation procedures, and logistical coordination complements the specialised skills of NGOs like EHRF, the Ministry of Antiquities and other stakeholders. The combined efforts of all these entities form a comprehensive safety net for the protection of cultural heritage and the wellbeing of affected communities.

Community engagement: Building bridges for sustainability

Beyond their immediate responses during emergencies, local communities play a vital and strategic role in the long-term protection of cultural heritage (Tandon 2018a and b). The collaborative efforts of NGOs like the EHRF have fostered strong bridges between these communities and heritage professionals. This has led to several significant contributions from the communities, including:

- **Volunteers:** Community members can offer valuable volunteer support in various stages of emergency preparedness and response. This could encompass tasks like documentation, assisting with evacuations or participating in public awareness campaigns.
- **Urgent Materials:** In the immediate aftermath of an emergency, communities can often contribute readily available materials that might be crucial for stabilising cultural objects or assisting with temporary repairs. This could range from blankets and towels to basic transportation resources.
- **Local Knowledge and Guidance:** Communities possess invaluable local knowledge and insights about the cultural heritage within their surroundings. They can provide crucial guidance and data related to specific objects, locations and potential risks, assisting in the development of effective response plans and mitigation strategies.
- **Trained First Aid Team Members:** Recognising the importance of community integration, the EHRF and other organisations have included community members in their first aid training programmes. This empowers local residents to contribute directly to the protection of their cultural heritage during emergencies.

By fostering meaningful engagement and capacity building within communities, organisations like the EHRF are nurturing a sense of ownership and responsibility for cultural heritage preservation. This collaborative approach creates a sustainable foundation for protecting cultural treasures not only in times of crisis, but also in the years to come.

Beyond the immediate response: Building back together

The successful navigation of a cultural heritage emergency relies not just on immediate response, but also on a comprehensive and well-coordinated recovery process. Stakeholders like the Ministry of Antiquities, NGOs, Civil Defence and communities collaborate throughout various stages, ensuring a sustainable and holistic approach to recovery:

Short-term recovery

- **Planning and Work Process:** Stakeholders collaborate to develop detailed recovery plans outlining the work process and defining clear phases for restoration and rehabilitation.
- **Damage Assessment and Documentation:** Comprehensive damage assessments are conducted to document the current state of affected cultural heritage sites and objects. This information is crucial for informing subsequent recovery decisions.
- **Needs and Capacity Analysis:** Stakeholders identify specific needs based on the damage assessments and evaluate existing capacities within the government, NGOs and communities. This allows for the optimal utilisation of resources and the identification of any potential gaps.
- **Mitigation Plan Development:** A mitigation plan is formulated to address identified risks and prevent future damage to the affected cultural heritage. This plan might include measures such as improved fire safety systems, environmental controls or structural reinforcements.

Medium-term recovery

- **Fundraising:** Stakeholders engage in fundraising efforts to secure the financial resources necessary for ongoing recovery and restoration activities. This might involve collaboration with international organisations, private donors and public awareness campaigns.
- **Prioritisation and Planning:** Based on the damage assessments and financial resources available, stakeholders establish clear priorities for recovery efforts. This involves considering the cultural significance, financial viability and current condition of affected cultural heritage items.
- **Capacity Building:** Recognising the ongoing need for expertise and

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resources, stakeholders collaborate to improve capacity within government agencies, NGOs and communities. This might involve training programmes, skills development initiatives and the acquisition of necessary equipment for future emergencies and preventive maintenance.

Long-term recovery

- **Infrastructure Renewal:** In some cases, infrastructure improvements might be necessary at the affected sites or surrounding areas. This could involve repairs to buildings, upgrades to security systems or the development of new storage facilities.
- **Mitigation Implementation:** The previously formulated mitigation plan is implemented to address identified risks and ensure the long-term protection of the cultural heritage.
- **Site Reopening:** Once recovery efforts are complete, the cultural heritage site can be reopened to the public. This process might involve educational initiatives to raise awareness about the importance of heritage protection and fostering community engagement.
- **Community Engagement and Activity:** To ensure the long-term sustainability of recovery efforts, stakeholders work with local communities to encourage their active participation in the management and upkeep of cultural heritage sites. This could involve increased community involvement in cultural events, volunteering opportunities, and heritage awareness programmes.

This comprehensive approach, emphasising collaboration, planning and long-term sustainability, ensures that the recovery process not only restores cultural heritage to its former state but also strengthens its resilience for the future. By working together, stakeholders can ensure that cultural treasures continue to enrich the lives of present and future generations.

Conclusion

The commendable effort of making the ICCROM FAC programme's tools available in Arabic is not solely attributable to the programme itself. Local NGOs played a significant role in facilitating this critical knowledge transfer and bridged the knowledge-gap between cultural specialists at the Ministry of Antiquities and Civil Defence partners. In particular, local NGOs often pos-

sess the linguistic expertise and cultural understanding necessary to accurately translate these valuable resources into Arabic. They ensure the translated materials are culturally appropriate and resonate with the target audience. Local NGOs have established relationships and trust within their communities. They play a crucial role in disseminating the translated materials and raising awareness about the importance of cultural heritage protection among diverse stakeholders, including community members, volunteers and cultural heritage professionals. Local NGOs can also leverage the translated resources to organise training workshops and capacity building programmes. This empowers local communities to actively participate in safeguarding their cultural heritage and contribute to its long-term preservation. The role of local NGOs can therefore be summarised as providing Translation and Dissemination, Community Engagement and Outreach and Capacity Building Initiatives.

By recognising the essential role of local NGOs in translating and disseminating the ICCROM FAC programme's resources, we acknowledge the collaborative nature of this effort. It highlights the collective responsibilities of international organisations, local communities and dedicated NGOs in ensuring the accessibility of knowledge as well as fostering a global commitment to cultural heritage protection.

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Chapter 10.

CULTURE IN CRISIS – SUPPORTING THE WORLD’S CULTURAL HERITAGE AND COMMUNITIES THAT SUFFER CULTURAL LOSS THROUGH CONFLICT

Vernon Rapley

Introduction

In early 2023, war was far from the thoughts of most museum curators, many of whom were busy creating exhibitions to celebrate the triumphs of civilisation and the creative achievements of humanity. History, however, has repeatedly shown us that peace is far from guaranteed and we are wise to think, plan and prepare for the worst.

The rich history of London bears witness to the ravages of war. Scars from the Blitz during the Second World War are still visible on the facade of London’s Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) serving as an indelible reminder of the horrors that can befall a city during times of conflict (Atlas Obscura 2019). While it may be tempting to believe that war in London is a thing of the past, the reality is that the threats to peace and security still exist and we ignore them at our peril. The world remains a complex and unpredictable place, with geopolitical tensions, ideological conflicts and the ever-present threat of terrorism. In such an environment, it is essential that we do not fall into complacency.

Thinking, planning and preparing for the worst does not mean living in a perpetual state of fear and paranoia. It means acknowledging the potential risks and taking proactive measures to mitigate them. The V&A and other museums, with their wealth of knowledge and historical context, can play a vital role in educating and reminding us all of the importance of preparedness. Museum

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programmes, such as the V&A's Culture in Crisis programme, can highlight the role of cultural diplomacy, interdisciplinary collaboration and international co-operation in maintaining peace and recovering sustainably from conflict.¹

To protect our own collections, as well as the tangible and intangible heritage we share with the world, we must collaborate with military experts to ensure mutual understanding and to plan and prepare for conflict. While war may seem distant, in the present we must never forget the lessons of history. London museums must serve as a reminder that peace is not a given and that we must actively prepare for conflict.

The museum at war

The real cost of war is always human loss and suffering. The V&A, like so many other European museums, is no stranger to human loss. Just inside the Grand Entrance on Cromwell Road, sit two memorials commemorating the loss of V&A colleagues during the First and Second World Wars. Even in times of grief, the V&A sought opportunities to enhance its collection whilst honouring fallen colleagues. Each year at eleven o'clock, on the eleventh of November, the museum places wreaths on the memorials designed by leading, contemporary typographers.

The V&A's monument to its war dead from the First World War is a simple and elegant stone sculpture, designed by Eric Gill in 1919. This memorial tablet was commissioned by the Museum to commemorate the fallen, whilst also acquiring an example of Gill's typography. The cost of the monument was covered by a voluntary subscription among the museum's staff. The inscription on the monument consists of a list of initials and surnames of the fallen, intentionally kept simple. The memorial tablet is now formally catalogued as part of the sculpture collection (Accession Number A.4-1999).

To commemorate the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War, the V&A delved into its archives to uncover the stories of the sixteen men listed on the memorial. By examining old staff lists, census records and war dead registers, basic details such as occupation, rate of pay, next of kin and military assignments have been established for most of the men. This information provides a glimpse into their lives and helps place them within the broader context of the war.

In 1951, the Committee of the 1939–1945 War Memorial Fund chose Reynolds Stone, an engraver and type designer, to create a tablet in memory

1. See <https://www.vam.ac.uk/info/culture-in-crisis/>

of the Museum staff who lost their lives in the Second World War. The Committee believed that Stone's involvement would not only serve as a tribute but also provide the Museum with an example of exceptional inscriptive lettering from that period.

The V&A archive from the Second World War documents the remarkable efforts made by the V&A to protect its collections from the devastation of war. The records highlight the heroic actions of its staff in preserving the collections for future generations as well as maintaining some sense of normality during the war (V&A Archive, nd).

Following the example set during the First World War, where objects were relocated to secure locations across England, the V&A prepared a comprehensive evacuation plan in the 1930s. This plan included utilising disused sections of the London Underground railway network, such as Brompton Road and Aldwych stations, for storing objects that were not susceptible to damage. Additionally, arrangements were made with property owners in the countryside, such as Montacute House in Somerset (now a National Trust property) and a quarry in Wiltshire, to provide safe storage (McCamley 2003). However, even these locations had unexpected challenges, including a battle with moths feasting on the V&A's tapestries and carpets stored at Montacute (Jones Rahi 2022).

In preparation for the war, the museum staff underwent training in first aid, decontamination and personal anti-gas protection. Some staff members were reassigned to different government departments or called up for military service. Air raid rehearsals were conducted, during which the staff practised moving the most valuable and portable objects into fireproof safes or to an on-site bomb-proof store. Curatorial departments were tasked with producing prioritised lists of objects for rescue which categorised objects from A to D based on their importance. The 'A' list consisted of objects of primary importance that needed to be immediately removed to a strongroom. The 'B' list included objects to be moved as soon as possible to underground tunnels. The 'C' list comprised perishable or fragile large objects to be taken to secure country houses, while the 'D' list consisted of large immovable objects to be protected in place using sandbags. Deciding which objects belonged on the 'A' list was a subject of debate, as financial value versus intrinsic value came into play. Many argued for the inclusion of objects of lesser financial value but with significant historical or artistic importance. These previous discussions are being repeated with no less passion now, as the V&A reconsiders how it should prioritise its collections.

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With the outbreak of war in 1939, the evacuation process accelerated, underground passages and country houses quickly filled with art treasures. These unconventional storage locations were closely monitored by warders, with regular visits from curatorial staff for condition checks. All these precautions proved vital during the London Blitz. The V&A was heavily bombed but, thanks to the tireless efforts of warders, who fought fires day and night, very few objects were damaged. One significant attack occurred on 19 April 1941, damaging the west side of the Museum but the collections remained largely intact. Despite the challenges, sections of the Museum remained open to the public for most of the war, except during the initial evacuation period. The National Art Library remained fully open, with its most valuable holdings moved to country houses and the Bodleian Library in Oxford. Remaining books were spread throughout the Museum to minimise the risk of complete destruction in a single attack.

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The V&A now runs the Culture in Crisis Programme to address the urgent and critical issue of cultural heritage under threat or in crisis around the world. The programme aims to raise awareness, facilitate knowledge sharing and provide practical support to safeguard cultural heritage in times of conflict, crisis or disaster. We are inspired each day by the dedicated and talented people we meet and the remarkable communities they serve.

We recognise the immense value and significance of cultural heritage as a testament to human creativity, history and identity. As an international organisation, with collections from around the globe, we have an ethical responsibility to respond to the destruction, looting and illicit trade of cultural heritage. We understand and acknowledge that cultural heritage belongs to communities and nations, and that its loss affects collective memory, identity and cultural diversity. The Culture in Crisis Programme aims to support and collaborate with communities, governments and non-governmental organisations to mitigate and prevent damage or loss wherever and whenever possible.

Within our museum sits a wealth of knowledge, expertise and resources that can be directed towards cultural heritage preservation, conservation and research projects, as required. The true strength of the V&A team, however, lies not in their immense collective knowledge and skills, but rather in an institutional desire to volunteer and help communities in any way they can. The passion, commitment and generosity of our professional colleagues never ceases to astound those of us in the Culture in Crisis team! The programme is

not about the V&A finding an answer or delivering a solution. It's about us working with others; sharing experience, knowledge and finding a way that we can contribute positively, and in concord with, the many other international organisations active in this field. Our programme has been built to share, encourage and work with others to preserve and protect cultural heritage, and ensure its survival for future generations. It showcases the impact that loss of cultural heritage has on communities, alongside examples of the efforts being made to protect and preserve heritage. The programme endeavours to raise public awareness, and encourage individuals, communities and policymakers to take action and contribute to global efforts to safeguard cultural diversity and human creativity.

In 2014, Martin Roth, the Director of the V&A at the time, spoke to me about heritage destruction and our need to do something about it, stating, '...everything is the same, but now everything is different!' He was right, everything was the same! From the burning of the Library of Alexandria in 48 BC, to the religious Iconoclasm of the Middle Ages and the plundering of Africa by European Colonists, everything was the same. Even when the twentieth century saw the creation of ever more destructive weapons of war, leading to higher levels of both deliberate and collateral heritage destruction, attitudes may have changed a little, but everything was still fundamentally the same. So what was different? In museums there grew a new understanding that we must stand up and be counted; we should no longer hide behind nations or politics but rather be leading and driving for urgent change.

In 2014 and 2015, global news was focused squarely on the rise and expansion of ISIS across Iraq, Syria and, to a lesser extent, Libya. Their extremist ideology sought to erase heritage that did not align with their narrow interpretation of Islamic history. The group's rampage through Iraq and Syria not only caused immense human suffering but also targeted some of humanity's most cherished archaeological sites and cultural landmarks.

ISIS set about a campaign of very public, deliberate destruction of cultural heritage, robbing future generations of their past and attempting to erase the diverse cultural tapestry that forms the foundation of Iraq, Syria and our shared humanity. By broadcasting and publicising their destruction of heritage sites, ISIS aimed to gain attention and spread fear among their enemies. Their actions were intended to demonstrate their power and send a message to those who opposed their ideology. On the other hand, by showcasing their willingness to destroy cultural treasures, they attracted like-minded individuals who were drawn to their radical cause. Whilst, ideologically, ISIS sought to destroy

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cultural heritage that did not conform to their interpretation of Islam, they also appear to have been willing to compromise if the heritage could be sold as a means to generate funds for military operations (Dunkley 2021).

In the run-up to the first Culture in Crisis Conference on 14 April 2015 at the V&A, global media was awash with stories and videos of ISIS destroying heritage sites. The cultural sector felt anger, but also powerlessness to act. We watched in January 2015 as ISIS destroyed parts of the Nineveh wall in Al-Tahir, Iraq, then again in February as ISIL released a film of the destruction of ancient objects inside the Mosul Museum. On 5 March, ISIL reported the demolition of the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud. Just two days later, ISIL bulldozed the UNESCO World Heritage site at Hatra. The destruction appeared endless and unstoppable but was in no way limited to ancient sites and monuments. Dozens of libraries, places of worship and other cultural sites, were blown-up, defaced or burnt to the ground (Clapperton et al. 2017). The rampage of destruction caused shock and outrage to the western world, to museums and the cultural sector, but without doubt it had a more profound and psychological impact on the local communities. For these local people, the sites were not just historical landmarks but an integral part of their cultural identity and connection to their ancestors. For us, the effort to protect and preserve cultural heritage sites has become more crucial than ever before. Little did we know that worse was still to come!

The Culture in Crisis Programme was the vision of a former Director of the V&A, Dr Martin Roth. He had been deeply affected by the events he'd seen unfold in Iraq and Syria and had witnessed first-hand the terrible humanitarian crisis in the region. He was convinced of the need to extend the programme as far as possible outside of the normal reach of museums. He wanted to include governments, the military, law-enforcement, charity workers, experts in sites and monuments, as well as experts in post-conflict reconstruction, wildlife conservation, the media and humanitarian and also refugee groups. To start the process, he introduced me to Dr Stefan Simon, who at that time was the director of the Yale University Institute for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage. Stefan is a chemist and a conservation scientist. I, on the other hand, had only been in the museum for a few years. Having previously been the head of the Metropolitan Police Art & Antiques Unit at New Scotland Yard, my experience was very much weighted towards the illicit trafficking of cultural property. Our different experiences and connections created a solid foundation, but we needed to understand more and involve more people. Together we planned an inaugural conference at the V&A held under the patronage of UNESCO in April 2015.

The conference was presented in three parts: lessons from the past, current concerns and plans for the future. We looked at case studies from the damage caused in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cyprus, Korea and Nigeria, delving not only into the extent of cultural heritage lost, but the impact that these crimes had on the local people and on their ability to recover and forgive. We then explored current concerns from experts who discussed what is really happening on the ground at that moment. Lastly, we heard plans for the future from those involved in protection and detection efforts worldwide. A panel of experts discussed the role of museums and the wider international cultural community.² The conference was free to attend and the audience was formed from a mixture of the public and invited international guests from museums, universities, embassies, governments, legislators, law enforcement, NGOs, Charities, the Art Trade and the media. The participants of the conference acceded to the creation of the 'London Declaration on Culture in Crisis' (see below).³ The Declaration was later approved by UNESCO and presented at the World Heritage Council Meeting in Bonn in June 2015.

The London Declaration recommends taking a collaborative approach to address current cultural heritage concerns. It proposes the development of long-term strategies to alter public attitudes to the destruction and sale of illicitly sourced cultural heritage. On the theme of working together, it also recommended the creation of a joint working group of political and cultural actors to 'mainstream' heritage protection and enlarge 'human security' to include a cultural dimension. It calls on everyone concerned to assist in raising public awareness and to provide reassurance to affected local communities whenever possible. Furthermore, it calls for action against those trading in illicit cultural goods and asks those involved in the trade to exercise the highest levels of due diligence and care. The declaration also encourages and supports academic research and education on cultural cleansing, illicit trafficking and forgery detection. It also advocates for heritage site and artefact documentation in an interdisciplinary way, including experts from the affected regions. Finally, it recommends providing support for cultural heritage professionals in countries suffering, or at risk of suffering, cultural crises. It appeals to every

2. See Culture in Crisis I: <https://vanda-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/2020/11/09/13/58/39/8c36d1d6-a71f-484e-bde8-22bac086eb8a/Culture%20in%20Crisis%20I.pdf>

3. See also London Declaration on Culture in Crisis: <https://vanda-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/2020/11/09/13/59/45/454256d9-e175-49aa-a98c-c41b4e1b8a25/London-declaration-on-Culture-in-Crisis.pdf>

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decision-maker, organisation and individual to be generous, innovative and dynamic in their support.

The recommendations of the London Declaration have also formed the backbone of the V&A's Culture in Crisis Programme since 2015 and can be identified within our mission statement:

- We are committed to protecting the world's cultural heritage and supporting communities that suffer cultural loss, whether through conflict, criminal acts or climate change.
- We bring together those with a shared interest in protecting cultural heritage, providing a forum for, sharing information, inspiring and supporting action and raising public awareness.
- We strive to understand the impact of cultural heritage loss on communities and the contrasting positive role its preservation can have in rebuilding.
- We aim to encourage a cross-disciplinary approach, raising public awareness and working with organisations from a variety of backgrounds to take a holistic approach to the protection of heritage in all its forms.

If any further impetus for the programme was needed, it sadly came soon after the London Declaration was agreed, with the appalling murder of Kaled-a-Asaad on 18 August 2015 and the destruction of the Temple of Baalshamin, in Palmyra, Syria. The Director General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, said of Mr Asaad, 'They killed him because he would not betray his deep commitment to Palmyra ... his work will live on far beyond the reach of these extremists... They murdered a great man, but they will never silence history' (UNESCO 2015). His commitment and bravery, and those of others like him, have been an inspiration to the Culture in Crisis team.

The destruction at Palmyra in August 2015 appears to have been a true awakening and call to action for many. Cultural destruction is as old as time itself and had become almost commonplace under ISIS. So why was Palmyra so different? Firstly, Palmyra is a UNESCO World Heritage Site designated on account of it being the monumental ruins of a great city that was one of the most important cultural centres of the ancient world. It comprises a treasure trove of ancient ruins that held immense historical and cultural value. Its well-preserved ancient architecture, including temples, colonnades, and tombs, showcased the rich history of the region and its intersection of different civilisations. Secondly, the scale and method of destruction were particularly

brutal. ISIS targeted not only the ancient structures but also the artefacts within them. They used sledgehammers, bulldozers and even explosives to obliterate these irreplaceable cultural treasures. This deliberate and systematic destruction was aimed at erasing the pre-Islamic history and heritage of the region, simply because it failed to align with their extremist ideology. But perhaps the biggest difference was that Palmyra rocked the media. Even at a time of such extreme human suffering, the destruction of Palmyra received significant global attention in part, at least, due to the use of social media by ISIS. They actively documented and publicised their acts of cultural destruction. The loss of Palmyra was recognised immediately not just as a loss for Syria but for all of humanity (Allen et al. 2016). It served as a reminder of the fragility of our shared cultural heritage and the importance of safeguarding it for future generations. The destruction at Palmyra was a watershed and can be described as ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’.

The London Conference was followed by further major international conferences: in New Haven, USA, in 2016, under the patronage of UNESCO and hosted as a satellite event to the UN Global Colloquium of University Presidents at Yale University, we focused on the ongoing destruction and loss of cultural heritage in North Africa and the Middle East. We also explored the exodus of people and talent from the region, potentially resulting in the loss of cultural knowledge as well as local arts and crafts.

In Kigali in 2016, we explored the benefits of both cultural heritage and wildlife conservation practices within the post-conflict recovery of a nation. Looking at the social and economic benefits of these activities, the output of this conference was the creation of a ‘road map to recovery’, which could be applied within more contemporaneous conflict zones.

In Pretoria in October 2018, we partnered with Yale’s Global Cultural Heritage Initiatives and the Museum für Naturkunde in Berlin, to convene a major international conference in collaboration with University of Pretoria, South Africa. The event had a unique focus on the benefits of both Wildlife and Heritage Conservation. The conference served to highlight the value of these two parallel branches of conservation, demonstrating that, through their adoption, successful sustainable development on national and international levels can be achieved.

The programme recommenced in 2022 and in partnership with the International National Trust and our friends at the V&A Dundee, we discussed the importance of both people and purpose within heritage preservation, tak-

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ing an encompassing look at heritage and the preservation of landscapes where nature and heritage co-exist.

Our public programme really progressed in 2016 with the support of Laura Searson (née Jones). She has been responsible for hosting dozens of events. Starting from the point of gathering no more than twenty people in a room, she has succeeded in building a vast network spanning the globe. She hosts events for the hundreds of people who now attend, both in real life, and virtually, bringing with them and sharing a wealth of knowledge and opportunities. Accessibility and inclusion are vital to the success of the Culture in Crisis Programme; we make every effort to remove barriers and encourage active participation from the widest possible audience. Our events are free of charge and whenever possible they are recorded and made available on our website.

We also created two podcast series. The first, 'Preservation by Design', is an eight-part podcast exploring designed solutions to threats posed to our cultural heritage.⁴ It draws from a wide spectrum of different practitioners and the designed systems they are using. We explore a broad ecosystem of preservation efforts, taking place around the globe, from the architectural design of cities, to the formation of military units specifically responsible for protecting heritage in conflict zones; from cutting edge technologies for tracing looted antiquities, to projects merging ancient craft and modern design processes. The second series, 'Fighting the Illicit Trade' explores a variety of topics, including the looting of archaeological sites, and the auctioning of stolen antiquities.⁵ It delves into the long and complex chain of criminal activity that connects the illicit trade of cultural property as it stretches through many hands and numerous countries. The podcast brings together international experts who are working to prevent the illegal trade of cultural goods and the actions taken at source, through transit and upon arrival at their destination.

In December 2019, we identified a genuine need for those engaged in cultural heritage preservation projects to understand more about what others were doing. In direct response, the V&A (with support from national and international partners) launched the online Culture in Crisis Portal. It has rapidly grown to become the world's largest and most accessible database of heritage protection projects. It is completely free to use and provides an invaluable insight into global efforts to protect and preserve endangered heritage around the world. The portal is used to learn from one another, share experiences and work more collaboratively to protect the world's cultural heritage. It connects

4. See <https://www.vam.ac.uk/info/culture-in-crisis-preservation-by-design>

5. See <https://www.vam.ac.uk/info/culture-in-crisis-podcast-fighting-the-illicit-trade>

users from 189 countries, spanning six continents, with more than 500 organisations, and a thousand Heritage Protection projects.

During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Culture in Crisis programme sought ways to operate differently and explore the opportunities created by changes in the way people were working. One of the most successful projects during this period was a series of webinars held under the banner of 'Culture in Crisis Conversations'. To deliver these, the V&A's Culture in Crisis team partnered with the UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, and the British Council. The series examined how the experiences of recent years had encouraged cultural organisations across the globe to adapt and transform in the face of global challenges. It also considers how communities had embraced new opportunities and looked to build a future that was more sustainable, equitable, and ecological. The first series, held in 2020–2021, consisted of five sessions, each convened a panel to discuss strategic subjects including sustainability, development and the role of digital technologies. Throughout the series we invited our audience to join the discussion online and contribute questions, both beforehand and during the interactive sessions. The workshops developed organically, stimulated debate, forged new connections and identified recommendations for future activities. The partnership succeeded in bringing a hugely diverse audience into the conversation, albeit virtually! Special effort was made to encourage young people not only to join the discussions but to actively participate, including in the role of Youth Panellist.

The success of the first series inspired the same partnership to create a second series, 'Global Heritage Perspectives', examining how the experiences of recent years have encouraged cultural organisations across the globe to adapt and transform. Global Heritage Perspectives explored innovative approaches to cultural heritage management and stewardship; to understand and reflect on how responses to crises have been shaped over the last year. In this series we discover novel strategies that respond to crises at scale and explore the degree to which cultural heritage can be a route to addressing environmental, economic, and social issues around the world. We hope to produce further 'Culture in Crisis' conversations.

Heritage at War

In 2023 the V&A's Culture in Crisis programme hosted the Heritage at War conference to advance our understanding and highlight the importance of protecting and preserving cultural heritage in conflict-affected areas. The conference brought together experts, practitioners and policymakers from various

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fields, to discuss and raise awareness on the destruction, looting and illicit trade of cultural heritage during times of war.⁶

The destruction of cultural sites during conflict not only results in the loss of irreplaceable historical and artistic treasures, but also erodes the identity, memory and cultural diversity of communities. A multi-disciplinary approach is therefore essential to fully understand the complex issues surrounding heritage at war. The conference, which was simultaneously broadcast online, succeeded in bringing in many practitioners and experts, but did not attract as much interest from museums as we had expected. A few international museums are fully engaged and act without hesitation whenever the need arises. Others appear reluctant to participate at all or leave the engagement to individuals within their institution to act, without corporate support or sponsorship.

Following the deluge of cultural tragedy witnessed globally in the last ten years, it is increasingly difficult to sympathise with museums and cultural institutions that do little more than send delegates to conferences, and sign declarations and statements calling for an end to the destruction and loss of our cultural heritage. When cultural heritage is lost or threatened during conflict or war, museums need to do more than express disapproval – we need to act in the most effective way that we can.

Few museums will be able to act on the international stage without first overcoming barriers. Some will fear scrutiny, when they themselves have objects in their collections tainted by a colonial past or uncertain provenance. Recent years, following the impact of both the pandemic and the global recession, will make others hesitant to divert vital finances and resources away from conventional and core-services. In my opinion, museums need to do more and to act urgently. They need to find ways to overcome or mitigate through the barriers they face, rather than using them as an excuse for inaction.

For a programme such as the V&A's Culture in Crisis programme to succeed it needs the full support of its museum or institution. It doesn't need a great deal of financial support, but it does need unequivocal cultural cohesion. The programme and the museum must speak with one voice, be prepared to confront challenges and break down barriers.

The world in which we live is constantly changing, with new threats emerging and truths being discovered. The V&A's Culture in Crisis programme sees this evolving landscape as an exciting opportunity to hear new voices and case studies, and learn from affected communities. Whilst the programme is

6. See <https://cultureincrisis.org/news-and-events/conference-schedule-announced-heritage-at-war-plan-and-prepare>

by no means the best or the only way for museums to engage in heritage protection, we hope our experience over the last eight years may inspire others to follow a complimentary path.

The V&A allows the Culture in Crisis programme to have a separate brand identity, whilst at the same time being inextricably linked. The Culture in Crisis website, portal and social media are designed to be as inclusive and neutral as possible, with a design intended to remove any barriers that could be associated with nation, elitism, colonialism or commercialism. Sadly, language remains a barrier to many! A degree of autonomy over our external appearance is helpful, but in every other way we welcome and cherish the support of our colleagues across the museum. We also benefit enormously from the V&A's culture of generosity and a set of values rooted in collaboration and the advancement of cultural knowledge. In practical terms, we benefit from the V&A's: desire for transparency and open dialogue, dedication to repatriation when appropriate and lawful, commitment to 'Renewable Cultural Partnerships', curatorial interest in cultural heritage protection, and determination to admit to the past and challenge barriers that limit how we can act now.

Transparency and restitution

Increasingly, museum visitors want to know more about the objects on display. There is a clear desire to understand why the object is in the museum and how it came to be there, there is an appetite to delve deeper into the untold stories of the objects. The V&A is committed to sharing these fascinating stories in its permanent galleries, special displays and online collections database. The 'Maqdala 1868' display (2018), for example, was curated in collaboration with the Ethiopian Embassy (Hunt 2018). It showcased items looted by the British Army during the campaign against the Abyssinian ruler, Tewodros II and shed some light on a dark chapter in history by highlighting the long-term impact of heritage crimes in times of war. A not dissimilar display of Asante Goldweights (2019) featured items that were also looted by the British Army, this time from the Asante court in Kumasi in 1874. The display demonstrated, again, the long-term impact of war heritage crimes, by presenting the unvarnished history and the effort required to restore and preserve displaced cultural heritage. Whilst the V&A is committed to continuous research into its collections, transparency and openness are the keys to true success. The V&A's archival records are open to anyone interested in delving into the history of our collections. As witnessed in the case that follows, visitors with access to the objects and their histories

can often make vital connections and unlock fantastic opportunities to learn more and correct the past.

In 2022 the V&A agreed a 'Renewable Cultural Partnership' with the Istanbul Archaeology Museum, in respect of the 3rd century AD head of Eros from the Sidamara sarcophagus (V&A 2022). Partnerships such as this ensure that objects in the V&A's care can be admired outside of London and in the right circumstances returned to their country of origin. The detached Head of Eros was donated to the V&A in 1933 by the daughter of Major General Sir Charles Wilson RE the British military consul general of Anatolia, Turkey (1879–1882). During his term of office, he discovered an important Roman sarcophagus near the ancient settlement of Sidamara. At some point the head of Eros became detached from the sarcophagus and returned to England. Importantly, the possessor clearly expressed a desire for the head to be reunited with the sarcophagus, which by 1900 had found its way to the Istanbul Archaeology Museum. In 1933 a visitor noticed the striking resemblance between the Head of Eros and the Sidamara Sarcophagus in Istanbul. This discovery prompted the V&A to create a plaster cast of the Head which it sent to the Istanbul Archaeology Museum for comparison. Once the match was confirmed, the Director of the Istanbul Archaeology Museum proposed that the V&A transfer the original head to their institution. It's unclear why the transfer did not occur until reinitiated in 2010. From then on, conservation teams from both museums collaborated to conserve and return the Head of Eros, and safely reunite it with the figure carved on the sarcophagus in June 2022.⁷

The collection of valuable of objets d'art collected by Arthur and Rosalinde Gilbert in the 1960s is also on display at the V&A and is famous for European and British masterpieces including gold and silver, gold boxes, painted enamels and mosaics. An extensive research project undertaken by the Gilbert Trust for the Arts unearthed the troubled past of a 4,250-year-old gold ewer within the collection which had been purchased innocently by the Gilberts from a dealer strongly suspected of being involved in the illicit trade of looted and stolen antiquities. The Turkish Ministry of Culture confirmed that the ewer had been illegally excavated and exported. Whilst the object was on display at the V&A, it is owned by a private Trust and, as such, unbound by legislation that could have prevented the return although the Trust quickly returned the object to the Museum of Anatolian Civilisations in Ankara where it has been on display since October 2021. The act of returning the ewer created a void within the collection but a chance encounter with artist metalsmith Adi Toch

7. See <https://www.vam.ac.uk/info/restitution-and-repatriation>

sparked a new dialogue centred on creation rather than loss. She was commissioned to create a new piece to reflect upon movement and restitution and to add her own artistic creativity to the conversation. Toch designed and produced a gold funnel by meticulously recreating the exact 21.7 carat gold alloy of the original ewer. The funnel is known as 'Place to Place' and is symbolic of the ewers' journey home (Eddie 2021). The highly polished interior of the funnel invites visitors to peer inside, confront their own reflections and consider their own journeys and experiences. The display of 'Place to Place' at the V&A is a permanent reminder of the wrongs of the past whilst simultaneously providing a lesson in mutually successful repatriation and a beacon of hope for the future.

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Culture in Crisis

The right of access to, and enjoyment of, cultural heritage is enshrined in human rights norms and the devastating effects of armed conflict on cultural heritage are well documented, with the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage having been an integral part of warfare throughout history. Culture now, once again, finds itself on war's frontline. Marking the 70th anniversary of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and in the current context of devastating conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan, among others, *Heritage at War – Plan and Prepare* brings together military, academic and heritage practitioners' voices from across the Euro-Atlantic, North Africa and the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific to explore how lessons learned from past experiences of conflict can inform approaches to the safeguarding of cultural heritage today. Emerging from and building upon an international conference held at the V&A Museum in February 2023, the book addresses how the military, the heritage sector and other stakeholders in Human Security can, and must, collaborate to give primacy to people and protect tangible and intangible cultural heritage under attack. The volume's case studies highlight interdisciplinary efforts to protect heritage in conflict zones, drawing out guidance for those working in the Heritage Sector in these contexts, with specific relevance to those engaged in cultural heritage protection and those working in related interdisciplinary fields. Reviewing the historic relationship between heritage and armed conflict, and offering lessons for present-day practitioners, *Heritage at War* shows how, in different contexts, heritage can be a catalyst and target of conflict, an obstacle to stabilisation, and yet also a potential vector of peace-building and the return to normality.

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