




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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AS TECHNOCRATIC UTOPIA

Jens Steffek

International Organization as Technocratic Utopia

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Introduction

This book is about the evolution of the idea that international relations should be managed by experts, bureaucrats, and lawyers, rather than by politicians or diplomats. This technocratic approach has been a persistent theme in writings about International Relations (IR), both academic and policy-oriented, since the late 19th century. As I will argue in this book, it forms a tradition of international thought that we should call technocratic internationalism, promising to transform violent and unpredictable international *politics* into rational, orderly, and competent public *administration*. Embedded in a programmatic account of the virtues of specialized, 'functional' international organizations (IOs), technocratic internationalism was also politically influential. It had an impact on the creation of the League of Nations, the functional branches of the United Nations (UN) system and the European integration project.

My historical inquiry shows how the technocratic tradition of international thought unfolded in four phases that were closely related to domestic processes of modernization and rationalization. The pioneering phase lasted from the Congress of Vienna to the First World War. In these years, philosophers, law scholars, and early social scientists began to combine internationalism and ideals of expert governance. Between the two world wars, a utopian period followed that was marked by visions of technocratic international organizations that would have overcome the principle of territoriality. In the third phase, from the 1940s to the 1960s, technocracy became the dominant paradigm of international institution-building. That paradigm began to disintegrate from the 1970s onwards, but some core elements remain today.

This book is mainly about the past, but in important ways it prompts reflections about the present. The COVID-19 pandemic once again underscored the need for policies based on scientific advice and for international coordination. Controversies over measures against the spread of the virus brought the relationship between science and politics sharply back into focus. In many countries, the pandemic met with a right-wing populism that defies scientific expertise and multilateral agreements. Countries governed by populists, the United States, Great Britain, and Brazil prominently among them, recorded disproportional numbers of COVID-19 related deaths and saw their political leaders falling ill. The anti-intellectualism and anti-internationalism of populist leaders are intimately related, and the following quote can illustrate how.

In June 2016, Michael Gove, a leading campaigner for a British exit from the European Union (EU), asserted in a television interview that ‘people of this country have had enough of experts with organizations from acronyms [*sic*] saying that they know what is best and getting it consistently wrong.’¹ He said this in response to the interviewer citing a long list of organizations, national and international, that had estimated the considerable costs of Brexit. The interviewer, Faisal Islam, greeted the utterance with amused disbelief, and the pro-European part of the British press ridiculed Gove’s anti-expert quote for days. Yet as a seasoned spin doctor and populist, Gove knew exactly what he was saying. He targeted the legitimacy of technocratic organizations—I/Os figuring prominently among them—that claim to be competent and impartial managers of political problems. Gove insinuated that such organizations were neither particularly competent nor impartial.

In his campaign against an EU depicted as technocratic, elitist, and detached, Gove was able to draw on a reservoir of critical arguments against international governance that had built up for decades. First symptoms that IOs were experiencing a crisis of popular legitimacy had been visible in the 1990s, when social movements took to the streets against global economic multilaterals, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. In the EU, referendum results on new integration treaties seemed to suggest that citizens were much less enthusiastic about the integration project than most politicians, but also political scientists, had assumed.

Scholars have analysed this crisis of internationalism, the increasing politicization of IOs and the return of an assertive nationalism at length.² What these studies tend to overlook, however, is the solid popular support that IOs continue to enjoy. Amidst all the rhetoric of crisis and decline, EU citizens continue to show more trust in the supranational Union than in their national government or parliament.³ Despite Donald Trump’s attacks on multilateralism and IOs, American citizens still have more confidence in the UN than in their domestic government

¹ Interview with Faisal Islam of *Sky News* on 3 June 2016: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA> (at 1:05, last accessed 27 February 2020).

² Eric Posner, ‘Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash’, *University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series*, No. 606 (2017); G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of Liberal International Order?’, *International Affairs*, 94 (2018): pp. 7–23; Erik Voeten, ‘Populism and Backlashes against International Courts’, *Perspectives on Politics*, 18 (2020), pp. 407–22. For interest in (self-)legitimation practices of IOs, see Dominik Zaum, ‘International Organizations, Legitimacy, and Legitimation’, in *Legitimizing International Organizations*, edited by Dominik Zaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 3–25; Jennifer Gronau and Henning Schmidtke, ‘The Quest for Legitimacy in World Politics – International Institutions’ Legitimation Strategies’, *Review of International Studies*, 42 (2016): pp. 535–57.

³ See trends since 2004 in <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/surveyKy/2255> (question 6a; accessed 13 March 2020).

or Congress.⁴ This indicates that citizens' attitudes towards non-elected and openly unpolitical organizations, including IOs, are probably more complex than the diagnosis of a legitimization crisis suggests. There must be something about IOs, some quality that people appreciate in them, and it might be related precisely to the fact that they are in important respects different from national governments or political parties.

Survey-based social research has shown that citizens have a weakness for depoliticized, unelected and largely unaccountable organizations as long as these can plausibly claim to be catering to the public interest in an impartial fashion. They also show an aversion to open conflict and controversy, haggling and bargaining—in other words, what 'politics' is commonly believed to be about. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse called this a preference for 'stealth democracy', where decisions are made by unelected specialists, largely outside of the public's view. Stealth democracy finds support because 'people tend to believe that all political solutions driven by a concern for the general welfare (rather than special interests) are more or less acceptable, or at least not worth arguing about.'⁵ Recent research has shown that citizens value competence and a problem-solving capacity in governance beyond the state.⁶ If this is so, the unpolitical and expert-driven character of IOs may not be a problem to resolve but an asset to capitalize on. Technocracy, it seems, still has its supporters.

Technocratic internationalism

In this book, I seek to understand the technocratic strand of international thought in the context of modernization theory. Drawing on the seminal work of Max Weber, I argue that the 'organization' of international relations through bureaucratization; formalization and the turn to scientific expertise should be interpreted as part of a more encompassing process of societal *rationalization*, which first the Western industrialized countries and successively most other regions of the world embarked upon. This process of rationalization was not driven by technical necessity alone, however. It was not inevitable. Rationalization

⁴ Of US respondents, 43.2 per cent said they have 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in the UN, as opposed to 33.1 per cent for the US government and 14.8 per cent for the parliament (World Values Survey 2017–20: Results for the USA (2017), Questions 71, 73, 83; Christian W. Haerpfer et al., eds., 'World Values Survey: Round Seven—Country-Pooled Datafile' (Madrid/Vienna: JD Systems Institute & WVSA Secretariat, 2020), doi.org/10.14281/18241.1).

⁵ John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 9.

⁶ Brilé Anderson, Thomas Bernauer, and Aya Kachi, 'Does International Pooling of Authority Affect the Perceived Legitimacy of Global Governance?', *The Review of International Organizations*, 14 (2019): pp. 661–83; Lisa M. Dellmuth, Jan Aart Scholte, and Jonas Tallberg, 'Institutional Sources of Legitimacy for International Organisations: Beyond Procedure versus Performance', *Review of International Studies*, 45 (2019): pp. 627–46.

always had its champions: men and women who pursued an agenda of political and social reform, and formulated justifications to sell it. This book is concerned with the technocratic thought of these ideational entrepreneurs. Their common objective was 'to move as many political and social decisions as possible into the realm of administrative decision making where they can be refined and processed in technical terms'.⁷

To characterize this intellectual attitude, I use the term 'technocratic internationalism'. This is my heuristic tool to render a specific tradition of thinking about international relations visible, and to bring together authors and writings from different historical periods. 'Internationalism' represents a preference for international cooperation and institutions. 'Technocratic' derives from two ancient Greek words, *téchne* and *kratos*. *Téchne* denotes a practically applicable kind of knowledge, a 'how to'-knowledge that helps us make or do things. It was sometimes associated with the skills of craftsmen but also used in a much broader sense, including practically useful types of 'scientific' knowledge.⁸ *Kratos* means power or rule. But the composite word 'technocracy' as representing 'the rule of experts' did not exist in ancient Greece, and it is a 20th-century neologism. The promise of technocracy also is a particularly modern one: to rationalize politics and society through the systematic use of scientific evidence and technical expertise. Robert Putnam called technocracy a 'mentality', a set of interrelated beliefs.⁹ In a similar vein, Frank Fischer found that technocracy 'is fundamentally an intellectual ethos and world-view. In political terms, it is a "meta-phenomenon" geared more to the *shape* or *form* of government than a specific content per se'.¹⁰

In the social sciences, the debate about technocratic governance and its legitimation has focused on national institutions and policies. Few authors have analysed international institutions through that lens, and even fewer the strand of international thought that justifies them.¹¹ In this regard, one of IR's major shortcomings is its 'relentless presentism', as Andrew Hurrell once put it.¹² Even if

⁷ Frank Fischer, *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990), p. 43.

⁸ On the term *téchne*, see Richard Parry, 'Episteme and Techne', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall Edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/episteme-techne/> (last accessed 21 November 2020).

⁹ Robert D. Putnam, 'Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy', *Comparative Political Studies*, 10 (1977): pp. 383–412, at p. 388.

¹⁰ Fischer, *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise*, p. 21; emphasis in the original.

¹¹ William E. Akin, *Technocracy and the American Dream* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Frank Fischer, *Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting Policy Inquiry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Eduardo Dargent, *Democracy and Technocracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Christian Rauh, *A Responsive Technocracy? EU Politicisation and the Consumer Policies of the European Commission* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016).

¹² Andrew Hurrell, 'Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within the English School', *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001): pp. 489–94, at p. 489.

that presentism still pervades the positivist mainstream of the discipline, an increasing number of IR scholars, mostly based in Europe, Canada, and Australia, are recovering the history of international thought.¹³ Studying the history of the discipline is no longer perceived as an act of intellectual navel-gazing. It is increasingly acknowledged that

[t]he social sciences stand at the nexus of power and knowledge in the modern world. Universities and other research institutions have generated, incubated and helped to disseminate forms of knowledge, and programmes for social and political action, that have played a fundamental role in shaping the world in which we live. Global politics during the twentieth century and into our own times cannot be understood adequately without taking into account this dimension of human activity.¹⁴

While more IR scholars have become interested in history in recent years, more historians have turned to what is now usually called international or global history. Historical studies of international organizations and internationalism have proliferated.¹⁵ There is a fertile intellectual trading zone now between these two disciplines and this book is situated in it.

To write an intellectual history of technocratic thought in IR with a *longue durée* perspective is an ambitious undertaking, as so many authors and contributions may seem relevant. It is therefore crucial to spell out the limitations of the exercise. First of all, the focus here is on public IOs as technocratic utopias. My account does not cover the countless transnational professional associations of engineers, scientists, statisticians, or artists, even if they are also a typically modern phenomenon. Nor do I study transnational social movements or

¹³ Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014); David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, eds., *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Thomas R. Davies, 'Understanding Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Promise and Pitfalls of the Early "Science of Internationalism"', *European Journal of International Relations*, 23 (2017): pp. 884–905.

¹⁴ Duncan Bell, 'Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond', *International Affairs*, 85 (2009): pp. 3–22, at p. 22.

¹⁵ Particularly important for this study are Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001); Madeleine Herren-Oesch, ed., *Networking the International System: Global Histories of International Organizations* (Cham: Springer, 2014); Martin Kohlrusch and Helmuth Trischler, *Building Europe on Expertise: Innovators, Organizers, Networkers* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Maria Paula Diogo and Dirk van Laak, *Europeans Globalizing: Mapping, Exploiting, Exchanging* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, 'Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks', *Journal of Modern European History*, 6 (2008): pp. 196–217.

non-governmental organizations (NGOs). All these private transnational associations and advocacy groups were and still are influential in creating a 'world culture' permeated by formal institutions, scientific expertise, and technical standards.¹⁶ In this book, however, I concentrate on blueprints for public institutions with political authority to make rules, and hence *governing* international relations in the narrower sense of the term.

Second, this book does not claim that it can replace grand narratives about the history of international thought, such as Brian Schmidt's *Political Discourse of Anarchy*. It is confined to the technocratic variety of international theory. My historical account is also overtly and self-consciously Eurocentric.¹⁷ The institutions and mentalities of technocratic modernity first emerged in Europe and North America, and from there were exported (not least by IOs) to other regions of the world. I do not address the pathologies of the instruments and practices of technocratic modernization in the global South. The spread of norms and modes of (self-)governance, the failures of technocratic 'development' and local resistance against it, they all have been documented by anthropologists and historians more qualified to do so than I am.¹⁸ What I will document, however, are the important colonial and imperial legacies in the genesis of technocratic international thought, which often went unnoticed in the past. My account will show how notions of 'rational' colonial administration influenced early blueprints for IOs, and how colonial legacies permeated discourses of global economic planning and development.

Over the course of the 20th century, technocratic ideas appeared frequently in writings on politics and public administration, but also in academic and policy-oriented treatises on international affairs. Rationalization in this context appears as a global project. Technocratic internationalism has come in various contexts and vocabularies, and with different doctrinal labels attached. In the field of IR theory, 'functionalism' probably is the best-known term to catch the essence of

¹⁶ John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁷ An influential critique of the Western-centric tradition in writing international theory is John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Brieg Powel, 'Blinkered Learning, Blinkered Theory: How Histories in Textbooks Parochialize IR', *International Studies Review*, 22 (2020): pp. 957–82.

¹⁸ Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Tania Murray Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

this style of thinking.¹⁹ Functionalism, as I will show in Chapters 5 and 6, never was just an academic utopia but one pursued by practitioners as well.²⁰ It provided a recipe for building international institutions.

It is worth recalling in this context that before the Second World War there was hardly a distinction between academic reflection on IOs and political advocacy in their favour. A striking example is the publications by League of Nations officials. During the crisis of international organization in the 1930s and 1940s, they wrote a plethora of books and pamphlets to defend international collaboration.²¹ IOs produced, and indeed continue to reproduce, justifications for their own existence. The lasting impact of the technocratic tradition is still visible today whenever IOs present themselves as unpolitical, rules-bound, competent, and objective managers of global problems whose existence is beyond dispute, hailing 'the gradual triumph of the rational and the technocratic over the political'.²²

For a long time, the orthodox IR literature had little to say about the technocratic legitimacy of IOs and its sources, because it was not assumed that such institutions had any independent power or authority in need of legitimation. On the contrary, IOs were usually conceived as mere instruments of the states that acted 'through' them. According to that view, governments opportunistically create IOs to reduce the transaction costs of their cooperation or, in a realist reading, to smoothly exercise hegemonic power.²³ The background foil for those debates was the classic imagery of the international system as an anarchical and conflict-prone environment populated by self-interested states. That anarchy framing left little room for any non-state actor with authority in need of legitimation, leading to a prevalent image of IOs as strangely abstract mechanisms of inter-state cooperation.

¹⁹ Regarding IOs, functionalism is the name of a legal doctrine as well as a particular branch of IR theory associated mainly with it David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); see also Lucian M. Ashworth and David Long, eds., *New Perspectives on International Functionalism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). For a perspective from law, see Jan Klabbers, 'The Emergence of Functionalism in International Institutional Law: Colonial Inspirations', *European Journal of International Law*, 25 (2014): pp. 645–75.

²⁰ David Kennedy, 'The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy', *Utah Law Review*, 1994 (1994): pp. 7–103, at p. 10.

²¹ See Salvador De Madariaga, *The World's Design* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938); Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945); Frank Boudreau, 'International Civil Service: The Secretariat of the League of Nations', in *Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League*, edited by Harriet Eager Davis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp. 76–86.

²² Charles Pentland, 'Political Theories of European Integration: Between Science and Ideology', in *The European Communities in Action*, edited by Dominik Lasok and Panayotis Soldatos (Brussels: Bruylant, 1981), pp. 545–69, p. 551.

²³ For a debate on this, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42 (1998): pp. 3–32; Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 86–8.

Questions of legitimacy came back in once a new generation of scholars began to reject the notion that IOs were just handmaidens of powerful states and began to treat them as living bureaucracies.²⁴ Many of these scholars (though not all) can be characterized as social constructivists, paying much more attention to the role of ideas in international relations. They also increasingly referred to organizational sociology and Max Weber's work in particular.²⁵ In their empirical research, these scholars looked at IO secretariats, civil servants, and the dynamics of internal bureaucratic politics.²⁶ This new interest in bureaucracies and their personnel situated IOs within a wider class of social phenomena, thus linking back to an older IR literature that had already understood IOs as bureaucracies.²⁷

Genuinely new, however, was an interest in questions of organizational legitimacy, understood as 'a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor's *perception* of the institution'.²⁸ The overarching question was why, how, and under what conditions IOs would be able to influence other actors in the international system, in particular states.²⁹ The *explanandum* here was power or influence, and the framing essentially actor-centred. By recovering the phenomenon of bureaucratic legitimacy, constructivist IR scholars thus opened up a new avenue for academic research on IOs. Yet they did not walk down that road very far when they simply took it for granted that bureaucratic organizations must have some 'legal-rational' appeal that resonated with their global audience. They failed to ask how it happened that people came to believe in the virtues of global bureaucracies in the first place. This is what I do in this book.

²⁴ Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', *International Studies Quarterly*, 45 (2001): pp. 487–515; Tana Johnson, *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments Are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

²⁵ Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ian Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics', *International Organization*, 53 (1999): pp. 379–408; Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

²⁶ For an overview, see Jörn Ege and Michael W. Bauer, 'International Bureaucracies from a Public Administration and International Relations Perspective', in *Routledge Handbook of International Organization*, edited by Bob Reinalda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 135–49, at pp. 140–1; John Mathiason, *Invisible Governance: International Secretariats in Global Politics* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007).

²⁷ Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1964); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Clive Archer, *International Organization* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

²⁸ Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority', p. 381.

²⁹ Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, pp. 20–1; Hurd, *After Anarchy*, pp. 18–19; Ege and Bauer, 'International Bureaucracies', pp. 138–9.

The plan of the book

This book starts (Chapter 1) with the concept of technocratic internationalism and the ideal of rationalization to set the stage for the historical inquiry that follows. An interest in governance through expert administration directs us to Max Weber's classic account of modernization as rationalization. Rationalization is associated with the advance of explicit rules, formal procedure, technical expertise, and disciplined communication in governing modern societies. As is well-known, Weber admired the efficiency and predictability, the sheer functionality, of new forms of governance by the *Menschenmaschine*, the human machinery of bureaucracy. Weber's positive judgements of bureaucratic modernization went far beyond efficiency gains. An important aspect, but often overlooked, is the elimination of despotism (*Willkür* in German) through bureaucratization, on which Weber commented approvingly. Unlike the monarch and the tyrant, modern organizations gave reasons for their actions and were constrained by law.

Max Weber was a theorist of modernity but not an advocate of modernization. When we compare his historical-sociological and his political writings we find the tensions and ambivalences in the project of modernity. Whatever its functional advantages, Weber feared bureaucratic modernization because it eroded individual liberty and suffocated creativity through the formal regulation of all aspects of life. Bureaucratic thinking denied the necessity of political competition, conflict, and struggle over values. This criticism of de-politicization became a major theme of critical social theory in the 20th century, and I will return to it repeatedly throughout the book. Thus, Chapter 1 delivers a conceptual background foil for my historical inquiry by pointing out the nature but also the internal tensions and ambiguities of technocratic modernity. Not least, I explain the nature of my own inquiry, the construction of an intellectual tradition across various historical periods, and the selection of writings included in this book.

In Chapter 2, I begin my historical survey, and show how technocratic and internationalist strands of political thought first became intertwined. Historically, IOs as we know them today appeared in 19th-century Europe. That was a time when public administration was expanded and professionalized in all industrialized countries and their colonies. It was also the time when philosophers such as Saint-Simon, Comte, and Hegel started praising the virtues of modern public administration. Henri de Saint-Simon, whose very original work is rarely considered pertinent in IR, not only delivered an elaborate defence of technocratic government but also advocated international political integration through a European parliament of experts. He tabled this proposal at the time of the Congress of Vienna, where, incidentally, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine was founded, which is usually considered the first modern IO.

Later in the 19th century, a number of French-speaking theorists, mainly lawyers and 'scientific pacifists', called for technical organizations to manage international affairs, taking the telecommunications sector as a blueprint. An equally important but largely forgotten root of technocratic modernity was colonial administration. An author in whose life and work this connection is particularly visible is the American political scientist Paul S. Reinsch, one of the first academic scholars of IOs. Reinsch was a student of colonial administration before venturing into the field of IR, taking stock of the 19th-century 'international public unions' and their activities. In Reinsch's work, we see the contours of a new normative vision of international expert administration, a veritable technocratic utopia, emerge from his empirical studies. These studies emphasized the promise of bringing expertise and reason to international governance of technical tasks, for the benefit of citizens.

These writings were pioneer contributions to an emergent field of 'international organization studies, with a new generation of scholar-professionals taking over after the First World War. Two chapters of this book are devoted to the ideas that accompanied the first great move to international institutions. In many ways, the inter-war years were the heyday of technocratic utopias with an international dimension. I roughly divide these utopias by ideological affiliation. Chapter 3 focuses on the liberal context and the Anglophone world. I show how plans for technocratic IOs were influenced by real-world experiments with international (or rather inter-allied) administration during the Great War. A second source of inspiration was the rise of the functional theory of the state and its critique of territorial sovereignty, which by analogy facilitated the perception that IOs could take over entire political tasks from states. This figure of thought is prominent in works of a left-liberal group of British authors, represented here by Leonard Woolf, G. D. H. Cole, and David Mitrany.

Yet within the same ideological family there were also more pragmatic and, in some ways, conservative visions of transnational administration. I discuss the ideas of the British diplomat and League official, James Arthur Salter, and of Pittman B. Potter, arguably the most important American IO scholar of the inter-war generation. Both favoured the de-politicization of international governance and put a premium on the rationality of experts. Especially Salter idealized the international civil service and the work of independent expert bodies. These authors, however, did not want IOs to undermine the sovereignty of the nation-state. They rather envisaged close inter-administrative alliances among independent countries.

In Chapter 4, I turn to instances of technocratic internationalism that emerged from a non-liberal context. I focus on the writings of Francis Delaisi, a French syndicalist, and Giuseppe De Michelis, a high-ranking Italian diplomat of the fascist era. In the 1930s, both presented schemes for steering the global economy

through international expert organizations. De Michelis suggested transferring corporativism, the socio-economic doctrine of Italian fascism, to a global level. The coordinating role of the state would have been taken over by an extraordinarily powerful IO able to allocate resources across borders. Delaisi devised a scheme of transnational public works to revitalize the European economy after the Great Depression, widely known at the time as the 'Delaisi-plan'. Such non-liberal varieties of technocratic internationalism emphasized the need for scientific planning but also strong public authority in implementing international cooperation.

Ideals of a planned economy continued to influence visions of international order during the Second World War, which I discuss in Chapter 5. E. H. Carr's proposals for a 'European Planning Authority' and a 'Bank of Europe' took up themes from the non-liberal varieties of inter-war internationalism. Strangely, Carr just a few years earlier had attacked all sorts of world order utopias and advocated a power-political 'realism'. Stranger still is the case of Hans J. Morgenthau, whose *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* ranks among the most anti-technocratic pamphlets ever written in the discipline of IR, and yet Morgenthau became an admirer of David Mitrany's wartime *Working Peace System*, the manifesto of technocratic internationalism par excellence, and warmly suggested it as a blueprint for international organization in the face of the Cold War tensions. This extraordinary episode needs to be seen in the context of a robust consensus on the feasibility and desirability of expert governance in the 1940s. As I will show, technocratic beliefs were also widespread in Franklin D. Roosevelt's US administration that projected the American 'New Deal' and its independent expert agencies to the international level.

With the end of the Second World War came another great move towards the formation of international institutions, globally and in Europe. Most of these were designed along functional lines, with limited and rather technical tasks. Chapter 6 is devoted to this heyday of the technocratic IO, in the 1950s and 1960s. It analyses, respectively, the contributions of IO practitioners and IO scholars, now two increasingly divided branches of the field of IO. I look at IO officials who used the technocratic 'recipe' for building and strengthening their organizations. An important figure was C. Wilfred Jenks, an international lawyer and long-term International Labour Organization (ILO) civil servant who established a 'welfarist' perspective with technical IOs devoted to the well-being of individuals. Along the way, he adapted technocratic internationalism to the new language of development and human rights. The Indian diplomat B. R. Sen, who in 1956 took over leadership of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) felt that he had a mission to keep 'political' influences out of FAO's work and to liaise with external experts and NGOs instead. In the European Economic Community (EEC), Walter Hallstein, as the first (1958) president of its Commission, worked

to strengthen this technocratic body by building up a professional supranational civil service. Hallstein's vision of an expert bureaucracy was not grounded in grand theorizing; instead it was eminently practical.

In academic IR, by contrast, programmatic advocacy for international organizations gave way to more analytical and comparative perspectives. Political scientists, most notably Ernst B. Haas and his collaborators, attempted to convert wartime functionalism into an empirical-analytical theory of international integration, edging away from the prescriptive stance of Mitrany's writings. The technocratic-utopian legacy now became enshrined in the teleological character of the 'neo-functionalist' theorizing that made some enthusiastic assumptions about the rationality and popular appeal of governance by functional IOs.

Chapter 7 examines the increasingly critical attitude towards technocratic international organization that gained the upper hand in the 1970s and in many ways echoed criticism of domestic bureaucracies. New ideas of public management, inspired by private sector practices, eroded traditional ideals of hierarchical administration. In the field of IR, doubts mounted as to whether technocratic IOs were the appropriate tools for tackling the imposing global challenges. The early work of Thomas G. Weiss, to this day an eminent scholar of the UN system, emblematically represents the increasing awareness of the limits and pitfalls of technocratic organization.

As I also show in this chapter, such criticism of the bureaucratic form did not imply that scholars and practitioners abandoned the project of rationalizing international relations, nor did they turn away from experts or expertise. I give two examples to illustrate this. The first is provided by the literature on global environmental problems, increasingly felt in these years, which became a new field for applying visions of expert-driven, de-politicized governance in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, proponents of a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO) envisaged global administrative bodies that would manage and redistribute the globe's resources. The international administration of the deep seabed, a proposal that I discuss, shows the technocratic character of the NIEO idea when put into practice. An international authority of technical experts was foreseen here as guardian of this global public interest, managing seabed mining to make sure that developing countries received a fair share of the resources.

Results and conclusions

In the Conclusion, I summarize and analyse the findings of the historical survey. I distinguish varieties of technocratic internationalism, chronologically but also analytically. It emerges that technocratic internationalism was not a coherent, pyramidal body of political thought, in which seminal contributions pile on top of each other to reach ever new heights of sophistication. Rather, it appears as a sequence of variations over some constant themes, a loose tradition of thought

marked by recurrent descriptions of the *problématique* connected to certain types of institutional proposals.

Analytically, we can see that technocratic internationalism was constructed around a stylized distinction between politics and administration, which proved to be relatively stable over time. This stylized distinction can be understood as a Weberian ideal type, accentuating the features of these two modes of governance. This ideal-typical contrast can be described as follows. While politicians are driven by ideology, personal ambition and material interests, experts have a professional inclination towards problem-solving. Accordingly, politicians interact through bargaining and horse-trading, whereas experts follow a logic of reason-giving and persuasion. Politicians seek rent for their constituency, or even for themselves, whereas experts are interested in efficient problem-solving and measurable progress. In an international setting, politicians are chiefly oriented towards national interests and accountable to national constituencies. Experts working in or with IOs, in contrast, are oriented to a global public good and remain accountable mainly to their peers.

The argument in favour of experts being better able to deliver effective solutions for transnational problems is grounded in a number of sometimes tacit assumptions. The first and maybe most fundamental assumption is that politics is by necessity less rational than expert administration. Politicians supposedly work with a focus on the interests articulated by their constituencies, lobbies, and parties. Administrative experts' 'global point of view', in contrast, is the result of a thought experiment that can be performed individually or in conversation with peers. In that experiment, experts deduce whether a matter is of global public interest from the assumed (rather than articulated) interests of citizens.

As mentioned above, these are ideal-typical descriptions, and of course authors focus on different aspects: some highlight the merits of formal bureaucratic structures; others, the public use of scientific expertise; still others, deliberation among experts. What unites them is the hope that power politics and opportunistic rent-seeking of states will give way to rule-based decision-making, based on scientific evidence, and catering to the public interests of a transnational community.

The historical evidence also shows that praise for expert administration has not been associated with any distinct political ideology. Modern instruments for rationalizing government have been used in liberal market economies as well as in socialist state planning and fascist totalitarianism. That the same technocratic tools could equally be used for creating international administrative structures was obvious to internationalists of otherwise very different political affiliations. The modernization-theoretical framing may also help us understand a seeming paradox in current academic thinking and public commentary about IOs: that these organizations can appear powerless and yet too powerful at the same time.

IOs seem conspicuously powerless when they are unable to guarantee state compliance with internationally agreed norms. We can call this the 'realist' line of criticism formulated by figures such as E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and John

Herz during the crisis of international organization in the 1940s. Realists contend that bureaucratic modernization (quite like collective security) is prone to failure under conditions of international anarchy, and that it would be naïve to think that IOs could simply suspend the eternal laws of power politics. Importantly, many realist critics of international organization did not dispute the desirability of modernizing international relations in principle, but rather the feasibility of such a project under conditions of anarchy.

This is quite different from the position of critics who regard IOs as being too powerful. They charge IOs with undermining domestic democracy and self-determination. Compared to the well-established realist critique, this second line of criticism is relatively recent in relation to IOs. However, as a criticism of bureaucracy or 'big government' it has a considerably long history in domestic political discourse and social theory. In fact, Max Weber anticipated it a hundred years ago when he complained that bureaucratic government endangered individual creativity, spontaneity, and self-determination, and prevented political change.

In my conclusions, I suggest that current resistance to IOs and calls for the re-nationalization of political competences needs to be seen in this context, and understood as a backlash against the impositions of modernity and the oppressive side of rationalization and formalization. Such disenchantment with bureaucratic modernity has long been seen in many industrialized countries and in recent decades it has spread to include IOs. Thus, a broad modernization-theoretical perspective can shed light on this growing scepticism and on the current legitimacy crisis with regards to public, technocratic IO as an institutional form. It is not just manifest 'pathologies of IOs' that have brought about this disenchantment but also the very successes of the universal rationalization project.

To conclude this Introduction, let me summarize the three contributions I wish to make with this book. The first is to deliver a comprehensive intellectual history of technocratic internationalism, covering two centuries and diverse ideological contexts. Second, I hope to show that systematic engagement with the technocratic legacy can contribute to a better understanding of current challenges to international governance. Progressive calls for transnational democracy and public accountability of IOs, but also populist campaigns for a re-nationalization of politics, can be understood as critical counter-movements to the project of technocratic governance. Criticism of transnational technocracy has had its domestic precedents and equivalents. Realizing these parallels will contextualize current debates over IOs more broadly in social and political theory. Finally, awareness of these connections and parallels can help us overcome the disciplinary isolation of IR and foster dialogue with the neighbouring disciplines of public administration, sociology, history, and law.

1

Technocratic internationalism

This chapter is dedicated to the guiding concept of the book and its grounding in social theory. As sociologist Karl Mannheim observed, '[t]he fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration.'¹ This book takes Mannheim's insight to the transnational level and carves out a distinctly modern mode of international thought that has idealized the rule of experts and administrators across borders. The six history-focused chapters that form the bulk of this book will document various sources and trajectories of this type of international thought. 'Technocratic internationalism' is the term used to assemble the contributions under one conceptual roof.

In the first part of the chapter, I clarify the status of such an analytical concept as common denominator in a study that focuses on common themes in literatures from very diverse intellectual ambits. I will also define in this chapter what exactly I mean by technocratic internationalism, why this term has been chosen, and why, in my view, it makes sense to explore the intellectual history of International Relations (IR) with the help of this concept. In the last part of the chapter, I will address two methodological challenges that are typically affecting *longue durée* studies of political ideas: the *ex post* construction of an intellectual tradition and the selection of authors and writings that are allotted to it.

The notion of 'technocratic internationalism' is, first of all, a heuristic tool. I use it in this book to render a certain tradition of thinking about international relations visible, simply by giving it a name and suggesting that writings from different historical periods have enough traits in common to form such a tradition. Technocratic internationalism is a concept introduced *ex post* for analytical purposes. None of the authors that I study in subsequent chapters of this book identified with such a tradition. At the same time, I cannot claim to have invented the concept. In recent years, historians used the term technocratic internationalism when inquiring into the role of technology and expertise in international cooperation and regional integration. Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot argued that 'from the mid-nineteenth century onwards experts began to add a new layer to the existing political and economic order—a set of ideas, practices,

¹ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1954), p. 105.

and institutions which formed the patterns of technocratic internationalism.² Historiography brought to light persons and institutions that planned connecting countries through motorways, railways, and electricity networks. In this context, technocratic internationalism was used to capture the 'background ideology' that animated such projects.³

These historical studies are mainly focused on Europe and, even more specifically, on the technologies used to unite the continent. I agree that all those lofty visions and concrete plans, often suggested by engineers, are well-described as a form of technocratic internationalism and represented an important part of the internationalist movement. Importantly, this literature draws attention to how networks, both material and inter-personal, came to characterize modernity. In this book, I use technocratic internationalism in a slightly different fashion, however. My conception is at the same time narrower and broader than the one suggested by Kaiser, Lagendijk, and Schot. It is narrower in that, for me, internationalism is a programmatic intellectual attitude that comes in various historical forms.⁴ Institutions and networks are studied only to the extent required for the contextualization of ideas.

My conceptualization is broader than one centring on engineering and infrastructure in that it gives more weight to the aspect of *kratein* in technocratic. Technocracy implies that people with certain competences and expertise, the *téchne*, should come to rule a society. The arguably purest and most radical formulation of this idea was tabled in the early 1930s by *Technocracy Inc.*, a short-lived American utopian movement. The revolutionary plan of its eccentric founder, Howard Scott, was to abolish politics and capitalism completely and to hand the management of American society to experts, who would rule the country through the distribution of energy units.⁵ Technocratic internationalism is a considerably less radical concept. It refers to a programmatic intellectual attitude that combines two elements of reform: cooperation across borders and expert rule. The latter aspect distinguishes it from other types of visionary

² Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot, *Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 25.

³ Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, 'Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years. Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks', *Journal of Modern European History*, 6 (2008): pp. 196–217, at p. 198; Martin Schiefelbusch and Hans-Liudger Dienel, eds., *Linking Networks: The Formation of Common Standards and Visions for Infrastructure Development* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Martin Kohlrausch and Helmuth Trischler, *Building Europe on Expertise: Innovators, Organizers, Networkers* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Frank Schipper, *Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008).

⁴ For the concept of internationalism, see Warren F. Kuehl, 'Concepts of Internationalism in History', *Peace & Change*, 11 (1986): pp. 1–10.

⁵ For contemporary statements, see Howard Scott et al., *Introduction to Technocracy* (New York: John Day, 1933); Harold Loeb, *Life in a Technocracy. What It Might Be Like* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996 [1933]); Stuart Chase, *Technocracy: An Interpretation* (New York: John Day, 1933). For a contextualization, see William E. Akin, *Technocracy and the American Dream* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

internationalism, such as collective security schemes, a global revolution of the working class, world state utopias, or continental federations. I will argue in Chapter 2 that technocratic internationalism emerged during the 'long nineteenth century', when transnational expert rule became perceived to be both feasible and desirable.

To grasp the appeal of de-politicized expert governance at an international level, we need to explore the intellectual foundations of modernity, its link to the 'Enlightenment project', and its inherent promise of rationalization. In the next section of this chapter, I explore technocratic internationalism with the help of modernization theory in general, and with Max Weber's account of the *Fachbürokratie* in particular. Such a grounding in classical social theory can help us understand a key promise of technocratic internationalism, which is the rationalization of international relations. Max Weber's 'concept of the march of technical rationality in the world, the rise of a bureaucratic elite, and the relationship between bureaucracy and ideology exemplified all the principal elements of the technocratic image'.⁶ While pre-modern societies also knew forms of public administration, the *Fachbürokratie* is marked by a particular combination of practically applicable expertise, a formalization of procedures, and a hierarchical form of internal organization. It is a key feature of the modern age.⁷ Accordingly, any attempt to understand the appeal of technocratic governance should start from there.

Modernization as rationalization

If in the social sciences there are not only master questions but also master concepts, modernity and modernization are certainly among them. Modernization is usually imagined as a unique structural transformation that ushered in an era in which literally everything became new and distinct.⁸ Despite the centrality of 'modernity' and 'modernization' on the research agenda of the social sciences, these terms are notoriously fuzzy. In the 16th century, when the word 'modern' first appeared in English, its meaning was straightforward.⁹ There was little doubt if a person or thing was truly modern, because modern just meant pertaining to the present. In everyday language, the word modern has largely kept that original meaning of something up to date, or fashionable.

⁶ John G. Gunnell, 'The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy', *Technology and Culture*, 23 (1982): pp. 392–416, at p. 395.

⁷ Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 234.

⁸ On the cult of the new beginning, see Nikolas Kompridis, 'The Idea of a New Beginning: A Romantic Source of Normativity and Freedom', in *Philosophical Romanticism*, edited by Nikolas Kompridis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 32–59.

⁹ On first appearance of term modern, see <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modern>

As so often, in the social sciences and humanities things are more complicated. For a considerable number of today's scholars, 'modern' does not pertain to the present but to the past. They contend that we have left the age of modernity and ventured into a 'post-modern' period. In their view, a gulf now separates us from the modern era, even if it seems hard to spot when exactly that gulf opened.¹⁰ Other social theorists reject the idea of post-modernity and argue that we are still living in the modern age, which may be internally divided into periods, such as 'early modernity', 'high modernity', 'late modernity'; or a first and second age of modernity.¹¹ Still others contend that by now 'multiple modernities' exist parallel to each other in different parts of the world.¹² And there are those who claim, provocatively, that we have never, in fact, been modern.¹³

To deepen the definitional quagmire further, 'modern' can refer to many different objects. It may refer to technology and architecture; to specific modes of doing art and science; to certain constellations of social classes; to modes of industrial production; to ways of organizing politics and society; and, not least, to certain types of philosophical, historical, and moral reasoning.¹⁴ To some, modernity is (or was) an objective state of the real world; to others chiefly a subjective experience; and to still others an unfinished intellectual journey almost synonymous with that of the Enlightenment.¹⁵ It may seem daring to claim in the midst of such a conceptual muddle that the notion of modernity can still be something like a clue to understanding social and political phenomena. However, I am convinced that the twin terms of modernity and modernization can still have some analytical purchase, provided they are used in a restricted and well-defined sense.

The first step in establishing a workable notion of 'modernity' is to specify and limit the field of inquiry and the period covered. I use the term modernity here in

¹⁰ The term post-modern was introduced by several authors, see for instance: Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (London: Watts, 1964); and most consequential was Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

¹¹ Periods of modernity are distinguished in Peter Osborne, 'Modernity Is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological, Category', *New Left Review*, 192 (1992): pp. 65–84. Giddens introduced the idea of a radicalizing and globalizing modernity, see Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). For a first and second age of modernity, see Ulrich Beck, 'The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity', *British Journal of Sociology*, 51 (2000): pp. 79–105.

¹² Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities', *Daedalus*, 129 (2000): pp. 1–29.

¹³ Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

¹⁴ A broad take on this can be found in Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Peter Conrad, *Modern Times, Modern Places: Life & Art in the 20th Century* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1998); William R. Everdell, *The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-Century Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

¹⁵ This helpful distinction was introduced by Osborne, 'Modernity', p. 66. For a typology of uses of modernity in the social sciences, see also Bernard Yack, *The Fetishism of Modernities: Epochal Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Social and Political Thought* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1997).

relation to specific ways of organizing government and public administration. For the purposes of this study, I will put aside all other manifestations of modernity, especially those in the arts. Accordingly, I will not distinguish between attitudes that are 'modern' and 'modernist'.¹⁶ Neither will I engage with problems in the philosophy of science concerning the nature and limits of scientific knowledge. As for the historical period covered by the concept of modernity, the main processes of societal and political modernization are commonly supposed to have taken place between the 16th and the 20th century. This great transition from 'traditional' forms of communal life to an individualist, secular, industrial society based on a complex division of labour has fascinated generations of social scientists. 'One can even take it to be the founding assumption of sociology that there was a rupture with earlier modes of social organisation by which societies were put on an entirely different footing'.¹⁷ Sociology, anthropology, and also economics—when it was still a historically informed discipline—thrived by studying this rupture, comparing pre-modern and modern societies.¹⁸ Such diachronic comparisons were not just exercises in gathering data and constructing historical trajectories but also fundamental for theory-building in the respective disciplines.

Interestingly, the pre-modern/modern dichotomy and the diachronic comparisons that were so central in the development of other social sciences never made much headway in IR. The discipline's central analytical frames and scholarly debates do not revolve around the distinction of a pre-modern and a modern period. This unusual situation needs explanation. One reason probably is that international relations as an empirical phenomenon is usually regarded per se as a manifestation of modernity. The 'modern' system of territorial states as the subject of the study of inter-national relations emerged in the 16th and 17th century, and is said to mark the beginning of inter-national relations in today's sense. Sovereignty, the constitutive norm of our present international society, dates back to the same period. The 'most distinct feature of modernity in international politics came to be: a particular form of territoriality—disjoint, fixed, and mutually exclusive—as the basis for organizing political life'.¹⁹ The Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648 are conventionally regarded as the foundational moment of the modern international system, even if this historical account is not uncontested.²⁰ Inter-national relations, it is widely believed, simply did not exist before that date.

¹⁶ On the distinction between modernity and modernism, see Nicholas Onuf, *The Mighty Frame: Epochal Change and the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 40–1.

¹⁷ Peter Wagner, *A History and Theory of the Social Sciences* (London: Sage, 2001), p. 160.

¹⁸ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon, 2001 [1944]).

¹⁹ John G. Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 47 (1993): pp. 139–74, at p. 168.

²⁰ Critical accounts are Andreas Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth', *International Organization*, 55 (2001): pp. 251–87; Benno Teschke, *The Myth of*

If this story about the modernity of territorial organization is accurate, the modern era in international politics has endured now for almost 400 years. It has a relatively clear beginning and also a prospective endpoint. Modern international relations will disappear when territoriality and sovereignty are laid to rest as principles of political organization. The story about the 'Westphalian system' also suggests that none of the landmark changes that have occurred since 1648, such as secularization, the industrial revolution, or the rise of democracy, fundamentally altered the character of that modern inter-state system. The Westphalian myth thus not only reassured IR specialists that they were studying a modern phenomenon but also effectively eliminated the pre-modern/modern dichotomy from their agenda. Few IR scholars showed an interest in the political world 'before the state', or systematically looked at the transition from medieval Europe to the Westphalian system.²¹

What is more, IR as an academic specialism emerged only in the early 20th century and hence is a relatively young (and in that sense an uncontroversially modern) discipline. Although historians and political advisors addressed relations among self-governing entities long before, there was little systematic 'theorizing' about such relations in today's sense of the term.²² The emergence of IR as a distinct scholarly discipline also required conscious detachment from history, law, and philosophy, and the birth of a separate academic discourse, which only the spatial fragmentation of the world into autonomous political units made intelligible.²³ Theories of IR hence 'may be read as a characteristic discourse of the modern state and as a constitutive practice'.²⁴

One may object, arguing that IR has some peculiarities that seem to contradict its (self-)description as distinctly modern. First, its arguably most influential and persistent strand of theorizing, the 'realist' tradition, has a cyclical conception of

1648: *Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003). Stephen D. Krasner, 'Compromising Westphalia', *International Security*, 20 (1995/6): pp. 115–51.

²¹ Important exceptions are Richard N. Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Andreas Osiander, *Before the State: Systemic Political Change in the West from the Greeks to the French Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); J. L. Holzgrefe, 'The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory', *Review of International Studies*, 15 (1989): pp. 11–26; Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

²² On early modern international thought before the late 19th century, see chapters 2 and 3 in Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought. From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014) and Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

²³ For a historical account of IR as a separate discourse, see Brian Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). The historical detachment of IR from other strands of political theory is a prominent theme in Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

²⁴ Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 6.

history.²⁵ Twentieth-century realists did not deny that some important shift between pre-modern and modern society took place in the 'Westphalian moment', but they have effectively downplayed the extent to which that shift mattered. For realists, the basic rules of power politics are remarkably persistent and unaffected by epochal transformations. This alleged 'striking sameness of international life through the millennia' enabled realists to claim that there could be some timeless wisdom about it.²⁶ In such a perspective, the transformation of Europe's middle ages into the 'modern' inter-state system that by now spans the globe did not fundamentally affect the regularities of political behaviour.²⁷

Such emphasis on continuities in the subject matter under study and the theoretical apparatus needed to deal with it contrasts sharply with the keen sense of a pre-modern/modern rupture that pervades other social-scientific disciplines. Historical sociology emphasizes that feudal societies were organized by social rules and individual motives that differed fundamentally from the rules and motives that govern a modern, egalitarian, market-based society.²⁸ And the implication then is that a different theoretical and conceptual apparatus is needed to make sense of human behaviour in these two types of society. Most IR realists deviate from this view, contending that, since the dawn of history, political leaders have been exposed to the same challenges and that, therefore, an ancient historian such as Thucydides could have understood the mechanisms of power politics in quite the same way we understand them today.²⁹

Equally unusual for a modern social science is that, in line with their cyclical conception of history, 20th-century realists rejected the possibility of progress. If anything, faith in progress, in bettering the human condition, was the key feature of the 'modern' social sciences of the 20th century, including political science. The rise in IR of realist imaginaries of cyclical developments, the inevitable return

²⁵ See Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?', *International Relations*, 2 (1960): pp. 35–48; Michael Mastanduno, 'A Realist View: Three Images of the Coming World Order', in *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, edited by T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19–40.

²⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 68. See also John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19 (1995): pp. 5–49.

More historically oriented readings of realism have challenged the possibility of timeless wisdom, see Michael C. Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 2–4.

²⁷ On this, see Markus Fischer, 'Feudal Europe, 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices', *International Organization*, 46 (1992): pp. 426–66; and the reply by Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'Medieval Tales: Neorealist "Science" and the Abuse of History', *International Organization*, 47 (1993): pp. 479–91.

²⁸ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*.

²⁹ The common understanding that Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian war laid the foundations to the realist approach to IR is challenged in more sophisticated interpretations of his work; see Richard N. Lebow, 'Thucydides the Constructivist', *American Political Science Review*, 95 (2001): pp. 547–60.

of war and inter-state conflict, can be read as a countermovement to modern conceptions of linear progress and the promises of rational social 'organization'.³⁰

If realism is, as I believe, a rather anti-modern strand of 20th-century political thought, the very concept of modernity may still have some analytical purchase in the discipline of IR. There was a time in which IR was something like a truly modern discipline: in the early 20th century, before it was colonized by advocates of realism and its normalization of power politics. Almost all protagonists of international theory in the founding years of the discipline can be regarded as modernists, progressivists, or meliorists, whatever term you prefer. 'Liberal internationalism' became the most enduring and influential manifestation of such a dedication to progress in IR.³¹ They pursued a strategy of ever-expanding control over the natural and social world, and championed techniques of purposeful social organization. In their view, the Westphalian treaties did not represent the decisive epochal shift to modernity. On the contrary, they argued that modernity was still to come in international affairs. They 'shared a perception of international politics as a domain deprived of features like progress, order and justice, as well as an ambition to reform the international domain in a way that would supply it with these characteristics'.³²

As I will show in this book, at least in the first half of the 20th century, many IR practitioners still subscribed to a classical notion of modernity marked by a firm belief in the possibility of progress. They shared it with academic social scientists who strove for a more rational organization and planning of the national economy, domestic political institutions, and urban spaces. The framing of international thought in terms of modernity thus can help us contextualize it within the history of social and political thought more generally. Too few IR scholars have done this systematically so far.³³

I therefore suggest that it may be rewarding to approach IR scholarship of the 20th century through the lens of modernization theory more generally, and with a focus on 'bureaucracy' in particular.³⁴ The connection between international

³⁰ For realist skepticism, see especially Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), ch. 1; and Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944). On the intellectual attitudes of classical realism, see also Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', *International Organization*, 38 (1987): pp. 225–86; Richard N. Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). I will deal with this realist critique of 'organization' in more detail in Chapter 5.

³¹ Beate Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

³² Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 7.

³³ A remarkable exception is Jo-Anne Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World* (London: Pluto, 2001).

³⁴ When used at all in a systematic fashion in international relations, modernization is more commonly associated with functional differentiation (see Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert, 'Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory', *European Journal of International*

organization and bureaucracy seems intuitive because international organizations (IOs) emerged at a time when public administration had expanded and professionalized at a national level in many countries.³⁵ The first attempts at a bureaucratic organization of international relations paralleled the domestic bureaucratization of the Western state. And it is plausible to assume that the aim behind this bureaucratizing move, the more rational ‘organization’ of social and economic relations at home and abroad, thrived on analogies between the two ambits.³⁶ In other words, I seek to contextualize international theory within broader trends of social and political thought. I am interested in a particular variety of progressivism that focused on the possibility of international organization as a more rational, more efficacious, more efficient, and more orderly type of governance. This particular account of modernization as ‘rationalization’ is inextricably linked with the comparative historiography and sociology of Max Weber to which I will turn in the next section.

Max Weber on rationalization

The connection between modernity and rationalization through organization pervades the work of Max Weber, one of the earliest theorists (and critics) of expert bureaucracy. Max Weber’s scholarly work is complex and fragmented, and defies easy interpretation. It is probably futile to search for a single overarching question that inspired these writings, but among the central concerns guiding his research over many years, modernization features prominently. The famous ‘Prefatory Remarks’ prepared for the 1920 edition of *The Protestant Ethics*, one of the last pieces that Weber wrote before his untimely death, succinctly outlines this long-term research question.³⁷ Why did industrial capitalism, great advances in science and technology, and the modern nation-state arise in the Occident and not elsewhere? Weber was well-versed in global history, and knew the enormous cultural achievements of ancient China, India, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Islamic world. Why had those societies not embarked on a journey towards

Relations, 16 (2010): pp. 315–37); or generically with the Enlightenment (as in Richard Devetak, ‘The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 24 (1995): pp. 27–51).

³⁵ Pierre Rosanvallon, *Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), ch. 4.

³⁶ On domestic analogies, see Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in *Diplomatic Investigations*, edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wright (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); and especially Hidemi Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

³⁷ Benjamin Nelson, ‘Max Weber’s “Author’s Introduction” (1920): A Master Clue to His Main Aims’, *Sociological Inquiry*, 44 (1974): pp. 269–78; Max Weber, ‘“Prefatory Remarks” to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion’, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, edited and translated by Stephen Kalberg (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 2001).

industrial modernity? The answer that Weber provides is complex, but the 'characteristic features of modern Western rationalism' are crucial.³⁸

The presumed uniqueness of Western rationalism is also at the core of the established interpretation of Max Weber as a theorist of modernity, to which I largely subscribe.³⁹ According to this reading, modernization is a process of rationalization that takes place simultaneously at both an individual and a structural, societal level. Weber's famous Protestant ethics thesis illustrates one important episode of the long-term historical trajectory (rather than being anything like its point of departure). According to this famous account, individuals started rationally and methodically planning and controlling their way of life, initially for religious reasons.⁴⁰ This systematic 'self-governance' by individuals later emancipated from its Christian roots. What remained was the control of impulses and desires and a way of holding oneself to account for all choices made, reviewing them with a view to achieving whatever ends one has chosen to pursue. These changes at the level of individual conduct were accompanied by changes at an institutional level, societally. Weber was interested in both levels of analysis, even if much 20th-century sociology placed the emphasis on the structural side of the transformation.⁴¹

In the course of modernization, political, social, and economic organization is increasingly based on the application of scientific knowledge, on impersonality of procedure and capillary control of individual behaviour.⁴² Although Weber argued that this type of rationalization was characteristic of the path to modernity taken in Europe and North America, he found some of its features in other epochs and cultural contexts as well.⁴³ What made the West avant-garde was a particular constellation of factors that facilitated the rationalization of all spheres of

³⁸ Weber, *Prefatory Remarks*, p. 160.

³⁹ In my reading of Weber as a theorist of bureaucratic modernity, I draw on Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962); Rogers Brubaker, *The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984); Wolfgang Schluchter, *The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Bryan S. Turner, *Max Weber: From History to Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1992).

⁴⁰ Stephen Kalberg, 'Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History', *American Journal of Sociology*, 85 (1980): pp. 1145–79, at p. 1149.

⁴¹ Against the structuralist reading of Weber as prophet of grand societal transformations, see in particular Wilhelm Hennis who emphasized Weber's interest in the individual's conduct of life: Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber's Central Question*, translated by Keith Tribe (Newbury: Threshold Press, 2000). Although I think that Hennis overstates the case when making individual conduct Weber's 'central question', he is certainly right in pointing out the importance of this level of analysis. In particular Weber's criticism of modernity can only be understood from the perspective of what it did to human beings.

⁴² Brubaker, *Limits of Rationality*, pp. 30–2.

⁴³ Guenther Roth, 'Rationalization in Max Weber's Developmental History', in *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*, edited by Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 75–91.

society.⁴⁴ A quite important role in the process of modernization is that of formalized and disciplined knowledge production. Scientific knowledge is generated through reproducible experimental procedures. The spread of this knowledge is greatly helped by new 'symbolic technologies', such as abstract and formal language.⁴⁵ The advance of rationalized forms of communication also enables practices of reason-giving and, conversely, creates the expectation that reasons be provided for all choices. The development of the ability rationally to ask questions and rationally to give answers is pivotal in Weber's account of modernization.⁴⁶

The increasing importance of rational communication and coordination of action is linked to other transformations of society in the industrial age. First of all, a general trend that permeates the public sector as well as that of industrial enterprise is formalization: written, explicit, and precise norms supplant custom, implicit conventions, and oral traditions; and decisions are documented in writing, with records being systematically kept. Especially in the public sector, formalization finds its expression in the advance of law. The administration of the law is the task of a specialized organizational apparatus in charge of norm interpretation and securing compliance. Judges, solicitors, and public prosecutors are specialized professionals who have undergone rigorous training and examination. In the public sector, salaried civil servants become prominent and are not directly accountable to political office-holders but embedded in administrative hierarchies.

The progressive formalization of social relations helps establish control, predictability of behaviour, and stable expectations.⁴⁷ Calculability and predictability, Weber argued, were increasingly required by the expansion of capitalism and the concomitant creation of markets for goods and services.⁴⁸ The rise of anonymous markets made cooperation among strangers the rule rather than the exception, rendering trust and stable expectations problematic. The modern capitalist enterprise is built around techniques of prediction, calculation, and the elimination of uncertainty. Industrial capitalism therefore profited from a legal system that functioned with almost machine-like accuracy and predictability.⁴⁹ The capitalist

⁴⁴ Weber famously traced rationalization processes also in Western forms of visual art and especially music, see his Max Weber, *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958).

⁴⁵ Nelson, 'Max Weber', p. 272.

⁴⁶ Johannes Weiss, 'Rationalität als Kommunikabilität. Überlegungen zur Rolle von Rationalitätsunterstellungen in der Soziologie', in *Max Weber und die Rationalisierung sozialen Handelns*, edited by Walter M. Sprondel and Constans Seyfarth (Stuttgart: Enke, 1981), pp. 39–58.

⁴⁷ Brubaker, *Limits of Rationality*, p. 12.

⁴⁸ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), Vol. I, p. 223.

⁴⁹ On law and capitalism in Weber, see Cary Boucock, *In the Grip of Freedom: Law and Modernity in Max Weber* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); David M. Trubek 'Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism', *Wisconsin Law Review*, 3 (1972): pp. 720–53; Richard Swedberg, *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

economy depended upon a system of public administration and jurisprudence that made its own decisions (and the reasons for them) transparent and generally known.⁵⁰ Feudal administration and pre-modern forms of jurisprudence with ample discretion given to civil servants and judges could not guarantee such predictability.⁵¹

The advance of formal law is a good example to illustrate the interplay between individual agency and social structure in the great transformation into modernity. The modern capitalist state enlisted lawyers to enforce its claim to power.⁵² But legalization also had other sponsors in society, such as the new middle classes who were most interested in the codification of the law to protect their privileges against the ruling elite. Weber cites as evidence the call of Roman plebeians, English puritans, and the 19th-century bourgeoisie for a formalization of the law.⁵³ These classes were interested in securing their own life chances (*Lebenschancen*) against despotism.⁵⁴ For the proletariat, the legal guarantee of private property and the predictability of administrative procedure were much less relevant. Proletarians appealed rather to material principles of justice when calling for new ways of economic distribution that were not yet incorporated into the formal legal order. Such 'revolutionary' demands were based on substantial ethical principles or appeals to natural law that challenged standard bureaucratic routines.⁵⁵

Parallel to the advance of law and the rise of the legal professions, a characteristic organizational form proliferates during the process of modernization: bureaucracy, both in the private and the public domain. Some speak of 'legal bureaucratization' to highlight the intimate link between the two processes.⁵⁶ H. T. Wilson argued that the bureaucratic phenomenon 'provides an "opportunity" for the sociologist to get to know rationalization relatively first hand'.⁵⁷ Weber's account of modern bureaucracy needs to be seen in the context of his sociology of rule (*Herrschaft*) and law. In his sociology of rule, the conceptual starting point is power, which in Weber's famous definition means 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out its own will despite resistance'.⁵⁸ Raw power turns into accepted authority when it is institutionalized

⁵⁰ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 1395.

⁵¹ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 1095.

⁵² This connection is discussed at some length in Andreas Anter, *Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), ch. 5.

⁵³ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 814.

⁵⁴ Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, p. 226; on the class aspect, see also David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); John O'Neill, 'The Disciplinary Society: From Weber to Foucault', *British Journal of Sociology*, 37 (1986): pp. 42–60.

⁵⁵ Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, p. 226 and II, pp. 872–4.

⁵⁶ The term is used in Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics', *International Organization*, 55 (2001): pp. 743–58, at p. 744.

⁵⁷ H. T. Wilson, *The American Ideology: Science, Technology and Organisation as Modes of Rationality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 149.

⁵⁸ Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, p. 53.

in a social relationship of voluntary deference that is maintained without the presence of threats or incentives. There must be a will to obey on the part of the ruled-over. Two factors determine the transition from power to authority: first, there must be perceptions of legitimacy, that is, the widespread belief that authority is rightfully exercised. Second, there also must be some permanent organizational structure to implement the commands of the ruler, what Weber often called *Stab*. It occupies an intermediary position, forming part of the ruling elite and of the ruled-over at the same time.

Throughout history, this administrative apparatus has taken very different forms. Ancient rulers usually had only little and largely untrained administrative staff. In many cases these administrators were not tenured, but rather they were given privileges to extract their remuneration in form of levies and taxes from the population they presided over.⁵⁹ Weber extensively cites such historical evidence to document the wide variety of organizational forms that had existed, but often only to contrast them immediately with the modern form of bureaucracy. Weber argued that, in an increasingly complex society that required ever more technical and scientific expertise, formal bureaucracies were extraordinarily efficient instruments of governance.⁶⁰ They were technically superior to pre-modern forms of administration since expertise and rule-bound conduct secured the formal rationality of decisions, as well as the predictability of administrative acts. This superior efficiency spurred the spread of the modern administration into all societal spheres, including, we may add from today's perspective, non-Western societies. Modern bureaucracies also rely on a new and specific type of 'rational-legal' legitimacy that is related, but not equal, to their technical efficiency. Obedience is not (as in traditional societies) owed to individual persons, such as lords, chiefs, or priests, but essentially to abstract rules, fixed as law and executed by the bureaucratic apparatus.⁶¹

As Weber described it, a modern bureaucratic apparatus consists of salaried professionals, hierarchically organized, and often specialized in certain areas of competence. In German, Weber called these professionals *Fachbeamte*: civil servants with certified expertise in a subject area.⁶² While administrators had existed in all cultures with a minimum of functional differentiation of social roles, the modern *Fachbeamte* embodied a new type of specialist in public service.⁶³ These civil servants had systematic training and examination in law or in other

⁵⁹ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, pp. 969–73.

⁶⁰ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 998.

⁶¹ Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, pp. 217–18.

⁶² The most extensive treatment of the *Fachbeamte* and their relation to political office-holders can be found in Max Weber, 'Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order', in *Max Weber: Political Writings*, edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 130–271.

⁶³ 'The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus

practically applicable academic disciplines, such as economics or engineering. Modern bureaucracies take decisions not on the basis of the personal interests of office-holders but on the basis of formal prescriptions.⁶⁴ Without such a legal base to act upon, a modern bureaucracy is paralysed. The faculty of rational communication is crucial for bureaucracies because ‘in principle a system of rationally debatable “reasons” stand behind every act of bureaucratic administration, namely, either subsumption under norms, or a weighing of ends and means’.⁶⁵

The virtues of rationalization cannot be reduced to mere advantages in administrative efficiency. What Weber also seemed to value was that, in modernity, reasons were given for all decisions made. This more cognitive, maybe even moral, aspect of rationalization of governance emerges most clearly in the treatment of *Willkür* in Weber’s academic and political writings. The way Weber uses this term dates back to the Enlightenment. In Germany’s most comprehensive encyclopedia of the 18th century, *Willkür* is described as a faculty of the human mind, with *spontaneitas* given as its Latin equivalent (next to other meanings of the word now obsolete).⁶⁶ *Willkür* is described as the faculty of choice, the ability of the human mind to resolve to do something or to abstain from doing it. Having it thus is a precondition of individual freedom. We find two variants of *Willkür* in Zedler’s encyclopedia: mere (*blosse*) *Willkür* is a spontaneous choice while free (*freye*) *Willkür* denotes an act of choice based on personal reflection.

In a similar vein, Immanuel Kant made an important distinction between *Willkür* and *Wille*. In Kant, ‘*Willkür*, or the power of choice, is the power of intentional causation, that is, effective desire; by contrast *Wille*, or the will, is the power of self-legislation, or giving ourselves either instrumental or non-instrumental reasons for the determination of choice’.⁶⁷ While *Wille* is informed by reasons and can be subject to justification, *Willkür* is the human ‘faculty of arbitrary choice’.⁶⁸ The distinction between *Wille* and *Willkür* remained prominent in German philosophy, with Hegel adding greatly to the pejorative connotations that *Willkür* acquired until Weber’s time (connotations which it still

compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production’ (Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 973).

⁶⁴ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 958.

⁶⁵ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 979.

⁶⁶ Johann Heinrich Zedler, ‘(Art.) Willkühr’, in *Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, Vol. 57, edited by Johann Heinrich Zedler (Leipzig: Zedler, 1748).

⁶⁷ Robert Hanna and A. W. Moore, ‘Reason, Freedom and Kant: An Exchange’, *Kantian Review*, 12 (2007): pp. 113–33, at p. 116, emphasis in the original (this particular passage was written by Hanna).

⁶⁸ In Kant, there is a distinction, similar to the one in Zedler’s encyclopaedia, between positive and negative *Willkür* but there is little use in going into the details here. The translation of *Willkür* as ‘faculty of arbitrary choice’ is suggested in Corinna Mieth and Jacob Rosenthal, ‘Freedom Must Be Presupposed as a Property of the Will of All Rational Beings: A Comment on GMS III, 447 f’, in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, edited by Christoph Horn and Dieter Schönecker (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), pp. 247–84, at p. 271, fn 13.

carries today). An act or decision springing from *Willkür* is arbitrary and capricious.⁶⁹ It cannot be justified in public because its motivation is strictly subjective; nor can anybody expect that comprehensible reasons be given for it.

In the realm of public government, decisions made by *Willkür* are manifestations of raw, unaccountable power. Government by *Willkür* is therefore despotic and (according to present Western standards) normatively illegitimate. In his academic writings, Max Weber often used the term *Willkür* to contrast modern with pre-modern forms of government, in particular in the section of *Economy and Society* that focuses on traditional rule. Weber there distinguishes different forms of traditional rule according to their degree of personalization.⁷⁰ *Willkür* is a function of personalization of government and comes in degrees; it is at its highest in what Weber called 'sultanism', an extremely personalized form of autocratic rule that was stripped of all traditional norms and conventions. In Weber's work, *Willkür* often comes with the adjective 'free' (*frei*) attached to it, to underline the unrestrained choice of the individual exerting it. Its motivations are purely personal desires. It is the elimination of *Willkür* as the despotic element in decision-making that makes the rationalization of government possible. It is apparent from his sociological writings that Weber had sympathies for such an elimination, even if he retained some romantic longing for the heroic political leader free from all formal constraints.

This brings us to one of the most intriguing ambiguities in Weber's writings, which is his personal attitude towards modernity. Max Weber was an outstanding analyst of industrial modernity but not a partisan of modernization. He not only shared some vogueish scepticism about the new 'nervous age' with many of his contemporaries,⁷¹ he also worried, very specifically, about the loss of individual and collective freedom that bureaucratization was bringing about. There is a sharp contrast in Weber's work between his academic praise for the advantages of bureaucratization and his political militancy against it.⁷² Fritz Ringer observes that '[i]t was as if he had two different perceptions of the bureaucratic phenomenon, or if that phenomenon had two different faces. One cannot help asking whether these two faces of bureaucracy were ever fully reconciled in Weber's thought, and how one is to account for the differences between them.'⁷³

Most of Weber's statements against bureaucratization can be found in pamphlets, speeches, and short essays, in which he commented on political controversies of his day. Many of these texts do not live up to the standards of

⁶⁹ Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986 [1830]), III, § 478.

⁷⁰ Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, pp. 231–2.

⁷¹ Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 164–5.

⁷² Karl Jaspers, *Max Weber. Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph* (Bremen: Storm, 1946).

⁷³ Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 220.

dispassionate academic reflection that Weber propagated elsewhere. They were often hastily written, polemical in tone, and harsh in judgement. Other statements on politics, however, are more guarded, such as the book-length treatise on the Russian revolutions and, most famously, his essay on *Politics as Vocation*.⁷⁴ There has been some controversy over the status of these political writings, and whether Weber had, next to his sociology, something like a theory of politics. Such a theory may not have been developed anywhere in a systematic fashion, but its broad contours can be reconstructed from his writings.⁷⁵ Understanding the place of politics in Weber's social theory can also help us grasp his attitude towards bureaucracy, because the ideal-typical *Beamte* (state official) is the counterpart of the ideal-typical politician.

Weber's conception of politics is appropriately described as agonistic.⁷⁶ He was convinced that politics was an arena where individual wills, material group interests, and fundamental values clashed. For him, the political process was a continuous and inevitable struggle for power.⁷⁷ Any 'political question' was in some way related to the exercise, conservation, or distribution of power in society. Accordingly, the image of the political leader in Weber's account of politics is almost an archaic one. To win the struggle over power politicians must have particular virtues: charisma, willpower, creativity, and strategic skills. Weber, who sometimes played with the idea of running for political office, idolized the figure of the *homo politicus*, the virtuous and charismatic leader. He appreciated idealism, the determination of a man to fight adamantly for his cause (women not really being foreseen in that role). In his personal life, Weber respected political activists devoted to their ideals, even if he may have argued with them fiercely over programmatic questions. Anecdotes to this effect abound: Although a self-conscious and unashamed bourgeois, Weber had much personal esteem for socialist revolutionaries and their fight against existing regimes.⁷⁸ With much zeal

⁷⁴ Max Weber, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics,' in *Max Weber: Political Writings*, edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 309–69; Max Weber, *The Russian Revolutions*, translated by Gordon C. Wells Wells and Peter R. Baehr (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

⁷⁵ See Sheldon S. Wolin, 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory,' *Political Theory*, 9 (1981): pp. 401–24. David Beetham defends the position that Weber was (also) a veritable political theorist; see Beetham, *Max Weber*.

⁷⁶ In fact, the irreconcilable plurality of values that Weber states was an important influence on Chantal Mouffe's theorizing on agonistic political conflict, see Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), p. 103; and also Peter Breiner, *Max Weber and Democratic Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), ch. 2.

⁷⁷ Weber, 'Profession and Vocation of Politics'.

⁷⁸ In 1919, for instance, Weber gave testimony before a Munich court to defend the revolutionary Ernst Toller, one of the leading figures of the short-lived soviet republic in Munich. Weber did not share Toller's political intentions but he appreciated his steadfast and idealistic character, helping him out on several occasions. On these events and their personal relationship, see Dittmar Dahlmann, 'Max Weber's Relation to Anarchism and Anarchists: The Case of Ernst Toller,' in *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*, edited by Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (Abingdon: Routledge, 1987), pp. 367–81.

he criticized, on the other hand, the German social democratic party for its compromise tactics and 'extremely petty-bourgeois demeanour'.⁷⁹

Max Weber, as is well-known, was an ardent nationalist.⁸⁰ For him, the nation was the cradle of culture and serving the nation a noble activity. Weber claimed that every politician, every party and faction had to assume responsibility for the fate of the nation and, whenever necessary, subordinate factional goals to the national interest. Weber called upon German politicians of his day to behave responsibly and to serve the great cause of their nation.⁸¹ This normative stance can be related to his analysis of the nature of international politics. Nations were embroiled in a power struggle at the international level and the mobilization of all domestic forces was required to succeed in it.⁸²

Max Weber's portrait of politics and the politician contrasts with his description of bureaucracy and the figure of the bureaucrat. Much to his regret, Weber found the bureaucratic mode of dealing with social problems and the bureaucratic mentality empirically on the rise.⁸³ He feared that the bureaucracy, that faceless apparatus, would encroach upon the political sphere and impose its inherent logic. In his political commentary, Weber was extremely critical of such tendencies. He argued, for instance, that the German political system since unification in 1871 had left far too little space for talented political entrepreneurs seeking to realize their vision. What it had fostered instead were people with the mentality of a civil servant.⁸⁴ 'If a man in a leading position is an "official" in the spirit of his performance, no matter how qualified (...), then he is as useless at the helm of a private enterprise as of a government'.⁸⁵

Thus, Weber's view of bureaucracy, of the 'human machinery', was highly ambivalent. As a social scientist committed to objective analysis of societal transformations, Weber came to conclude that the trend towards formal and legal reasoning was irresistible and irreversible. As a political commentator and activist, he hated this prospect and his outlook to the future was, accordingly, rather pessimistic. He predicted that more and more spheres of social life would become usurped by the logic of bureaucracy, due to its efficiency. From the

⁷⁹ Max Weber, Letter to Robert Michels, 8 October 1906, cited by Wolfgang Mommsen, *The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber* (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), pp. 77–8.

⁸⁰ See Richard Bellamy, 'Liberalism and Nationalism in the Thought of Max Weber', *History of European Ideas*, 14 (1992): pp. 499–507.

⁸¹ Weber, 'Parliament and Government'.

⁸² In international theory, Weber's work has been received mainly in the context of realism, see Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Tarak Barkawi, 'Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic Studies', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998): pp. 159–84; Stephen P. Turner, 'Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Max Weber', in *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, edited by Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 63–82.

⁸³ On the effects of the bureaucratized world on the individual, see Hennis, *Max Weber*.

⁸⁴ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, pp. 1427, 1448.

⁸⁵ Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, p. 1404.

technical point of view, bureaucracy was unbeatable. But there were values beyond technical efficiency.⁸⁶ In the event, the relentless advance of bureaucracy would suffocate the freedom and creativity of the individual, and this would affect the average citizen as much as the political leader.⁸⁷

Weber's stark characterization of the spheres of politics and administration as 'diametrically opposed pure types' is noteworthy and important for the study of administration in contemporary international relations.⁸⁸ On the one hand, there is the political realm of power struggle but also of creativity, innovation, and change; and, on the other, the 'continuous rule-bound conduct of official business'.⁸⁹ For Weber, the internal logic according to which the domains of politics and bureaucratic administration function can never be reconciled, only spheres of influence demarcated.

It is this contrast of politics and bureaucracy, of *Willkür* and rule-bound decision-making, that can help us hammer out, in an ideal-typical fashion, the essence of technocratic political thought. Technocratic thinking pitches an idealized, modern way of rational decision-making against a deficient, pre-modern way based on *Willkür* and chance. Technocrats claim the former mode for themselves and identify the latter mode with politicians and politics. This notion of technocratic thinking is in line with Robert Putnam's characterization of the 'technocratic mentality'. Next to the technocrats' unwavering belief in progress, Putnam marks out the idea that technics must (and can) replace politics; the hostility to political institutions and party politics, including a hostility to democracy and majority voting. Technocrats tend to believe that, good will presupposed, conflicts can be resolved unanimously and pragmatically.⁹⁰ Thus, we can conceptualize technocracy as rationalized anti-politics and that can serve as a yardstick for constructing a tradition of technocratic international thought. In the IR context, visions of transnational technocracy can be quite effectively opposed to a prominent rival, the 'Hobbesian' imaginary of IR as an eternal state of war and an agonistic struggle for power and influence that persists even when the physical violence stops.⁹¹

⁸⁶ The formulation is based on quotes reported by Marianne Weber, *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926), pp. 420–1.

⁸⁷ The idea of diametrically opposed pure types is taken from Mommsen, *Political and Social Theory of Max Weber*, p. 46.

⁸⁸ Mommsen, *Political and Social Theory of Max Weber*, p. 118.

⁸⁹ Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, p. 218.

⁹⁰ Robert D. Putnam, 'Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy', *Comparative Political Studies*, 10 (1977): pp. 383–412, at pp. 385–7. See also Jean Meynaud, *Technocracy* (New York: Free Press, 1969); Gunnell, 'The Technocratic Image', pp. 392–416; Frank Fischer, *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990).

⁹¹ The Hobbesian image of IR is one of the three types outlined in Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the power of political images, see also Yaron Ezrahi, *Imagined Democracies: Necessary Political Fictions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Max Weber himself, as should have become clear, does not belong to the technocratic tradition. His goal was to reconstruct and understand historical processes and mentalities. While true technocrats pursued the rationalization of the world through its bureaucratization, Weber wanted to rescue the political sphere. For technocrats, the rationalization was not only a process to be observed but also a 'project' to be pursued. One could say that thinking about the future in terms of projects is in and of itself a distinctly modern attitude; even modernity as a whole has sometimes been conceived as a project.⁹² That project is closely related to the ideas of enlightenment, emancipation, and constant (self-)critique. Shmuel Eisenstadt underlines the potential for rigorous self-questioning and self-correction as a key characteristic of modernity, as much as 'its ability to confront problems not even imagined in its original program'.⁹³

Carrying out the project of modernity requires human agency. Even if modernization was a grand structural transformation, it was pushed forward by individuals, social classes, or professional groups. We can find historical agency also in Weber's account of Western modernization. Social classes and groups had an interest in the spread of expert bureaucracy, with capitalist entrepreneurs and especially lawyers, or 'legal ideologists,' as Reinhard Bendix called them, being a most important example.⁹⁴ In more recent times, it seems that transnational elites in businesses, IOs (governmental or non-governmental), universities, and foundations have been carriers of a universal modernization programme often couched in terms of socio-economic 'development'.⁹⁵ Many of these modernizers were 'agents of internationalism,'⁹⁶ bringing together rationalization and internationalization. These modernizers, and their writings, will be in the focus of subsequent chapters.

⁹² Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). The goal of this project is, as Andrew Linklater put it, to create a world 'in which dialogue and consent replace domination and force'. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 8. On modernity and project-making, see Markus Krajewski, 'Über Projektemacherei. Eine Einleitung,' in *Projektmacher. Zur Produktion von Wissen in der Vorform des Scheiterns*, edited by Markus Krajewski (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2004) pp. 7–25.

⁹³ Eisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities', p. 25. Richard Devetak associates critical IR theory with this project, see Devetak, 'Project of Modernity'.

⁹⁴ Bendix, *Max Weber*, p. 434. For Weber's statements on their influence, see e.g. Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, pp. 854–5.

⁹⁵ Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger, eds., *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 32–3.

⁹⁶ I adopt that term from Jessica Reinisch, 'Introduction: Agents of Internationalism', *Contemporary European History*, 25 (2016): pp. 195–205.

Constructing a tradition of thought

Traditions of political thought are constructed in retrospect, by writers who feel committed to that type of thinking, by its adversaries, or by more detached scholarly observers. I would place myself into the last of these categories while not denying certain sympathies for the idea of rationalized government. The notion of technocratic internationalism that I have developed here serves to construct the tradition. This is done for scholarly purposes, not for the sake of political advocacy. I use the term tradition in a rather loose sense here, denoting 'a group of ideas widely shared by a number of individuals although no one idea was held by all of them.'⁹⁷ It does not require a doctrinal 'core' and orthodoxy, or a succession of teachers and students passing the torch from one generation to the next. Some exponents of the technocratic-internationalist tradition drew on previous work of the same kind while others did not, or at least not explicitly.

The analysis unfolding in this book thus uses an abstract analytical frame created retrospectively to align and link some political writings from different periods of time.⁹⁸ In Daniel Deudney's words, such '[a]cts of reading and interpreting assemble illuminating texts into various constellations by "connecting the dots" into a simple pictorial constellation.'⁹⁹ I contend that it is profitable to study manifestations of technocratic internationalism by way of diachronic comparison because the resulting picture will be more than the sum of its parts. Technocratic internationalism will emerge as a phenomenon that cuts across many of the lines that are usually drawn to organize the history of political thought, or international theory.

Specialists who work on the subject, I contend, will find it plausible that there is something like a technocratic tradition of international thought. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was discussed under a somewhat different label in IR as a 'functionalist tradition'. Most prominently, Ernst Haas listed numerous intellectual predecessors. Two good, but unpublished, PhD theses written at roughly the same time also searched for the ancestors of IR functionalism and left little doubt that there was, indeed, such an intellectual tradition.¹⁰⁰ They realized, of course, that they were allocating authors *post hoc* to a 'functionalist' tradition that only they

⁹⁷ Mark Bevir, 'On Tradition', *Humanitas*, 13 (2000): pp. 28–53, at p. 38.

⁹⁸ Duncan Bell speaks of 'expansive traditions', see Duncan Bell, 'Introduction: Under an Empty Sky—Realism and Political Theory', in *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, edited by Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 1–25, at p. 6.

⁹⁹ Daniel Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 265.

¹⁰⁰ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); Curtis W. Martin, 'The History and Theory of the Functional Approach to International Organization' (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1950); Harold E. Engle, 'A Critical Study of the Functionalist Approach to International Organization' (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1957).

could see and name. Their construction of the historical tradition was driven by the concerns, questions, and intellectual debates of their own time. The label functionalism, fashionable in their day, was imposed on many authors who never used and probably did not even know that term.

The problem affects many studies in intellectual history that cover longer periods of time. It is aggravated by the problem that some authors actively avoid certain labels and categorization even if these are perfectly familiar and appropriate. Take, for instance, Edward Bellamy's socialist utopia outlined in his novel *Looking Backward*. First published in 1888, the book conjured images of a future world in which capitalism, economic competition, private property, and even money had disappeared, social classes were levelled, and harmony reigned.¹⁰¹ Bellamy's utopian novel was hugely successful in the US and Great Britain, and it sparked a flurry of commentary, similar utopias, dystopias, and satires.¹⁰² *Looking Backward* thus was one of the finest examples of 19th-century utopian socialism—except that Bellamy stubbornly refused to call his vision socialist. He did so because he disliked the connotations of socialism, and because he knew that any utopia called socialist, whatever its intellectual merits, would be hard to sell in the US.

For the same reason that Edward Bellamy rejected the label socialism, present-day advocates of expert government shun the label technocratic.¹⁰³ The term technocratic is well-established and easily understood, but by now it has almost exclusively negative connotations.¹⁰⁴ Political terminology is contested and hardly ever value-free. Political utopias are products for sale in the market of ideas, and in that market labelling matters a lot. If you are in the political advocacy business today, you do not want your vision to be associated with technocracy. At the same time, for scholarly purposes, the term technocracy is so well-established that it is useful to work with it regardless. It nicely renders the combination of *téchne*, a practically useful and applicable type of knowledge, and the aspect of rule inherent in *kratein*.

¹⁰¹ Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward, 2000–1887*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1889).

¹⁰² Daphne Patai, ed., *Looking Backward, 1888–1888: Essays on Edward Bellamy* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).

¹⁰³ Today's advocates of expertise-based decision-making in politics would call their preferred system of government 'epistocracy', as in Jason Brennan, *Against Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), Dimitri Landa and Ryan Pevnick, 'Representative Democracy as Defensible Epistocracy', *American Political Science Review*, 114 (2020): pp. 1–13; or 'epistemic proceduralism' as in David M. Estlund, *Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), Cathrine Holst and Anders Molander, 'Epistemic Democracy and the Role of Experts', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 18 (2019): pp. 541–61.

¹⁰⁴ For the negative connotations, see the exemplary W. H. G. Armytage, *The Rise of the Technocrats: A Social History* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); in this respect it resembles the term ideology, see Manfred B. Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 1.

In Chapters 2–7, I will use this notion of technocratic internationalism as a yardstick to arrange historical proposals for international reform into a loose tradition of thought. The purposeful and conscious ‘organization’ of international relations, understood as a rationalization of procedures and decision-making, was their project, long-term and still unfinished.¹⁰⁵ I show that it has been proposed and re-proposed by scholars, politicians, and activists over the entire 20th century. My aim in bringing them together is to spell out commonalities and differences among programmatic visions of technocratic international organization from different historical periods and contexts.

I will highlight some aspects that persisted over long periods of time, but I will also give due regard to historical contingencies. Some scholars and activists elaborated more on law and formalization, others on the use of science and expertise in government, and still others on the virtues of an administrative apparatus. I will also show how interest in certain policy instruments (such as transnational public planning and public works) waxed and waned over time, along with the terms and metaphors used to describe the technocratic-internationalist project.

As conceived here, technocratic internationalism is an extremely versatile international theory. In selecting specific authors and key works for inclusion in my study, I was guided by two considerations. As a complete map of all technocratic ideas in IR was not an option, the first priority was to not miss out any important proposal that has had a lasting impact. This led me to privilege prominent technocratic utopias, widely cited in subsequent discussion, over obscure ones. This overall strategy was balanced by a second aim, which was to document, at least by way of example, important varieties of technocratic thought that has not stood the test of time. I have thus strived for a picture that gives adequate space to the contributions that proved seminal while not disregarding less successful interventions. As we will see in the chapters that follow, some technocratic internationalists worked in a ‘trading zone’ between academia and political practice.¹⁰⁶ Proximity to political circles privileged some theorists’ ideas (at least for a while), but was not a criterion for selecting them for examination in this book.

¹⁰⁵ This is what Jan Klabbers calls a ‘modernist’ conception of international organization, see Jan Klabbers, ‘Two Concepts of International Organization’, *International Organizations Law Review*, 2 (2005): pp. 277–93.

¹⁰⁶ On the concept of a trading zone, see Leonie Holthaus and Jens Steffek ‘Ideologies of International Organization: Exploring the Trading Zones between Theory and Practice’, in *Theory as Ideology: The Politics of Knowledge in International Relations*, edited by Benjamin Martill and Sebastian Schindler (London: Routledge, 2020), pp. 187–208.

2

Prophets of international technocracy

I used the previous, largely theoretical, chapter to introduce technocratic internationalism as representing a distinctive combination of expert administration and international cooperation. Turning now to history, I will show in this chapter how the latter two areas began to blend. Barry Buzan and George Lawson recently recalled that all political ideologies that have left their mark on International Relations (IR) of the 20th century originated in the 19th.¹ This is also true for technocratic internationalism. Both its main ingredients matured and eventually blended in the ‘long nineteenth century’ as defined by Eric Hobsbawm, that is, the period between the French revolution of 1789 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.² Due to technological progress, ‘during the course of the long nineteenth century it became increasingly possible, because increasingly feasible, to theorize the construction of a global polity.’³ In this founding age of the technocratic-internationalist tradition, European and American thinkers began to combine two progressive intellectual projects: expert-driven government and international cooperation.

My discussion begins with the wider intellectual background of technocratic internationalism, focusing on praise for rational public administration as it developed in political theory and philosophy. I will briefly introduce some key contributions in the next section of this chapter. Henri de Saint-Simon’s ideas about the virtues of expert government were particularly influential in the French-speaking world. In Britain, the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill was greatly amenable to the idea of technically best solutions for social problems that could be scientifically determined. German philosopher Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel had much praise for Prussia’s rationalized and efficient bureaucracy. His views on public administration became a point of reference for political philosophers and public administration reformers throughout the 19th century. I then proceed from these philosophical foundations to some real-world developments: the expansion and professionalization of public

¹ Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

² That period is covered by Hobsbawm’s famous trilogy. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital: 1848–1875* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875–1914* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987).

³ Duncan S. A. Bell, ‘Dissolving Distance: Technology, Space, and Empire in British Political Thought, 1770–1900’, *Journal of Modern History*, 77 (2005): pp. 523–562, at p. 525.

administration at a domestic level. Over the 19th century, this professionalization took place in all industrialized countries of the time, as well as in some of their colonies. It expanded to the international level in the form of the first modern international organizations (IOs), which in the 19th century were often called public unions. As first examples of administrative intergovernmentalism they ignited the imagination of technocratically inclined internationalists.

Having outlined this historical context, I present the first truly programmatic proposals for bureaucratic international governance that emerged towards the end of the 19th century. I first look at the literature in international law, where a step was made from an analysis of what public unions were to visions of a happier future where international relations would be managed by these bodies. Around the turn of the century, these internationalist visions became more systematic and explicit. My main sources for exploring this change are the writings of Russian law scholar Pierre Kazansky and the American political scientist Paul S. Reinsch. The latter is considered both founder of international organization law and one of the earliest exponents of IR as a social science. His work also offers a prime example of how colonial experiences influenced early thinking about IOs, which were imagined as expert bodies that bestowed on the world's population technically best solutions.

The philosophy and practice of public administration

Some historical accounts of technocratic thinking hark back to European antiquity, in particular to Plato and his ideal of the philosopher king.⁴ Most treatments, however, see the technocratic tradition as beginning with Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and his disciple Auguste Comte (1798–1857).⁵ It is true that, in the fourth book of his *Republic*, Plato stressed the importance of competent government and proposed selecting governors accordingly. He made a powerful analogy with a pilot steering a ship to distinguish the role of the philosopher in government.⁶ Yet, for Plato the competence of the pilot-governor was a matter of personal virtue and skill, not a question of social organization. On the other hand, social organization was the ambition of Saint-Simon's and Comte's new social science of the 19th century. Modern visions of technocracy, as conceptualized in Chapter 1, revolve around scientific organization of the

⁴ Renaissance utopias, such as Thomas More's *Utopia* or Tommaso Campanella's *Città del sole*, are also occasionally cited as predecessors of technocratic thinking because they emphasize the need for competence in government.

⁵ For influences on 18th-century thinking, and the physiocrats in particular, of Saint-Simon's theories, see W. H. G. Armytage, *The Rise of the Technocrats: A Social History* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 61–5; John G. Gunnell, 'The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy', *Technology and Culture*, 23 (1982): pp. 392–416, at p. 394.

⁶ See Benjamin Jowett's translation: <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.7.vi.html>.

governance apparatus. When competence resides in the machinery, its individual parts are significant but interchangeable. It therefore seems appropriate to let this short history of technocratic internationalism begin with the prophets of such machinery in public service.

Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon was a typical figure of a transition period, a visionary thinker enthused by emerging new possibilities.⁷ When he became better known as a publicist, around 1815, he was already in his 50s and had lived through tumultuous changes. He had fought in the war of American independence; embraced the ideas of the French revolution in spite of his aristocratic origins; was imprisoned under the reign of terror; and had seen Napoleon's army conquer most of Europe. Saint-Simon's central intellectual project was to enlist modern science for the re-organization of post-revolutionary society: the advance of industrialization would end scarcity and eliminate class conflict, he hoped, if only economy and society could be built on rational principles. To achieve this, the old ruling classes, the aristocracy and clergy, had to surrender their privileges, with scientists in public service taking their place to organize industrial production and society.⁸

Auguste Comte, his talented disciple and co-author, developed Saint-Simon's ideas about the organization of society into a new science of sociology.⁹ Neither Saint-Simon nor Comte were theorists of IR, but their political thought had implications for the organization of transboundary relations.¹⁰ As science was universal and the industrialized world becoming interdependent, it seemed to make sense to combine expert government with a cosmopolitan outlook. The new age of industry required transnational governance.¹¹ During the Congress of Vienna, Saint-Simon tabled a proposal for a re-organization of Europe to feature a European parliament composed of experts. Its two chambers were to be staffed with business people, scientists, magistrates, and administrators, because individuals with these skills would be best placed to transcend purely national points of view to envisage what was in the wider, European public interest.¹²

⁷ Frank E. Manuel, *The New World of Henri Saint-Simon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956); Henri de Saint-Simon, *The Memoirs of the Duc De Saint-Simon*, translated by Ted Morgan (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963).

⁸ Henri de Saint-Simon, 'Letters from an Inhabitant of Geneva to His Contemporaries (1803)', in *The Political Thought of Saint-Simon*, edited by Ghita Ionescu (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 65–81.

⁹ Auguste Comte, 'Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société', in *Appendice général de système de politique positive contenant tous les opuscules primitifs de l'auteur sur la philosophie sociale*, edited by Auguste Comte (Paris, 1854 [1822]), pp. 47–136.

¹⁰ F. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations. A Study in the History of Thought* (London: Sage, 1977), p. 107.

¹¹ Manuel, *New World*, 280.

¹² M. Le Comte de Saint-Simon and A. Thierry, *De la réorganisation de la société Européenne, ou de la nécessité et des moyens de rassembler les peuples d'Europe en un seul corps politique, en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale* (Paris: A. Égron, 1814), p. 53.

Nothing came of this initiative, but it does offer an example of an early attempt at connecting expert government and internationalization.

Saint-Simon's technocratic ideas gained more weight after his death in 1825. That was due not only to Comte's ongoing work but to Saint-Simonianism, a social movement inspired by Saint-Simon's last book, which had given rationalism a religious air.¹³ The Saint-Simonians combined praise for technical rationality and social organization with a wide-ranging progressive agenda of political and social reform that included emancipation of women and free love. The movement infused its devotion to science, engineering, and rationalism with a good dose of romanticism.¹⁴ Even if the Saint-Simonian movement disbanded in the 1840s, many individuals carried its ideas further, in particular French-speaking engineers and economists. Notable figures include Prosper Enfantin and Michel Chevalier who were enamoured of great infrastructure projects with a transnational dimension. In fact, Saint-Simon himself had been elated by the idea of a canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean when on visit to Central America.¹⁵ In 1833, Enfantin moved to Egypt to promote the Suez Canal project, idealistically conceived as a 'waterway for the *common good*, free of commercial or strategic aims'.¹⁶ Initially without success, Enfantin persevered with the idea and founded, in 1846, the Société d'Études de l'Isthme de Suez to further promote the project.

As a social movement, the Saint-Simonians were a predominantly French phenomenon and their ideas never gained comparable influence elsewhere. Still, they elicited some curiosity abroad. In England, John Stuart Mill (1806–73) discussed the ideas of the Saint-Simonians sympathetically and met with several members of the movement.¹⁷ Mill, as is well-known, had a predilection for utilitarian reasoning and a keen interest in social reform, inherited from Jeremy Bentham and from his father James Mill, Bentham's secretary. John Stuart Mill was not a technocrat, but he was a partisan of representative democracy and

¹³ Henri de Saint-Simon, *Nouveau christianisme—Dialogues entre un conservateur et un novateur* (Paris: Bossange Père, A. Sautelet et Cie, 1825); Pierre Musso, *Télécommunications et philosophie des réseaux. La postérité paradoxale de Saint-Simon* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998); Antoine Picon, *Les saint-simoniens, raison, imaginaire et utopie* (Paris: Belin, 2002); Armytage, *Rise of the Technocrats*, pp. 70–5; Robert B. Carlisle, 'Saint-Simonian Radicalism: A Definition and a Direction', *French Historical Studies*, 5 (1968): pp. 430–45.

¹⁴ Robert B. Carlisle, *The Proffered Crown: Saint-Simonism and the Doctrine of Hope* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Robert B. Carlisle, 'The Birth of Technocracy: Science, Society, and Saint-Simonians', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 35 (1974): pp. 445–64.

¹⁵ Arthur John Booth, *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism: A Chapter in the History of Socialism in France* (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1871), p. 6.

¹⁶ Markus Krajewski, *World Projects: Global Information before World War I* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), p. 12, emphasis in the original; Zachary Karabell, *Parting the Desert: The Creation of the Suez Canal* (New York: Vintage, 2003).

¹⁷ Pamela Pilbeam, *Saint-Simonians in Nineteenth-Century France: From Free Love to Algeria* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 82–6; J. R. Hainds, 'John Stuart Mill and the Saint Simonians', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 7 (1946): pp. 103–12.

universal political participation. At the same time, he insisted that educated opinions on political matters should count more than others. This ideal of competent government led him to suggest a system of plural votes for the educated classes, 'on the ground of greater capacity for the management of the joint interests'.¹⁸

In his theory of representative government, Mill also underscored the importance of a trained and impartial public administration.¹⁹ He did not separate bureaucracy from political process as Weber did later. Rather, Mill's civil servant can be understood as a guardian of public interests, tasked with keeping excesses of representative democracy in check.²⁰ For Britain, Mill envisaged a carefully balanced interplay of expert administration and democratic control. The situation was different in colonies such as India which, in Mill's view, were not fit for self-government.

John Stuart Mill had served in the British East India Company for many years, and he defended the idea that colonialism had a civilizing mission. In his view, territories such as India were best governed by an expert administration with disinterested expertise and local knowledge. Its competence would bring progress and economic development to the native populations.²¹ For Mill, Britain's colonial rule of India was legitimate only under the condition that it really promoted development. In colonies where representative government did not seem feasible to him, the expert guardians could rule directly. Progress in development should not only be in the interest of the local population, Mill argued, but it should also benefit the entire human race.²² As I will show below, colonial paternalism of this kind informed some early suggestions for transnational technocracies as well.

When looking for competent and progressive administration in the mid-19th century, few contemporaries would miss out the example of Prussia. A famous theorist of the Prussian model was Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel (1770–1831). Hegel's idealist philosophy was extraordinarily influential in the 19th century, and it was widely embraced within and beyond the German-speaking world. Compared to the radicalism of Saint-Simon and Mill, Hegel stood on the more conservative side of the political spectrum. His writings on public administration, to be found mainly in his philosophy of right, focus on a defence of constitutional monarchy as a form of state. As part of the executive, the task of the civil service

¹⁸ John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1863), p. 181; J. Joseph Miller, 'J.S. Mill on Plural Voting, Competence and Participation', *History of Political Thought*, 24 (2003): pp. 647–67.

¹⁹ Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, pp. 103–8.

²⁰ Beth E. Warner, 'John Stuart Mill's Theory of Bureaucracy within Representative Government: Balancing Competence and Participation', *Public Administration Review*, 61 (2001): pp. 403–13, at p. 410.

²¹ Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, pp. 357–61.

²² Duncan Bell, 'John Stuart Mill on Colonies', *Political Theory*, 38 (2010): pp. 34–64, at p. 43.

was 'the maintenance of the state's universal interest, and of legality' against the particular interests of citizens and corporations.²³

To perform this task, the civil servant had to be specifically trained and selected on proven ability. Yet for Hegel there was more to a public administrator than just technical training. To instil in civil servants 'a dispassionate, upright and polite demeanour', their education should be a 'spiritual counterpoise to the mechanical and semi-mechanical activity involved in acquiring the so-called "sciences" of matters connected with administration'.²⁴ Hegel was also aware of the danger of a self-empowered bureaucracy that cultivated its own particular interest over that of the public interest of the state. 'What the service of the state really requires', he claimed,

is that officials shall forgo the selfish and capricious satisfaction of their subjective ends; by this very sacrifice, they acquire the right to find their satisfaction in, but only in, the dutiful discharge of their public functions. In this fact, so far as public business is concerned, there lies the link between universal and particular interests which constitutes both the concept of the state and its inner stability.²⁵

As with Mill, Hegel's theory of bureaucracy depicts the civil servant as guardian of the public interest. Hegel's conception seems more demanding, however, as he argued that civil servants must not only defend the public interest but internalize it, making it their own. Still, in Prussia, Hegel's views on public administration were not perceived as particularly radical or visionary. What he had to say about the place and function of the civil service in the state was deemed common sense. As Karl Marx sarcastically remarked, Hegel's theory of the state and its apparatus was more a description of Prussian realities taken from the self-perception of its civil servants than a proper philosophical treatise.²⁶ Regardless, Hegel's views on public administration were influential beyond Germany. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, a famous advocate of professional public service in the United States (US), was greatly influenced by Hegel's thought.²⁷

²³ G. W. F. Hegel, *Outline of the Philosophy of Right*, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), § 289.

²⁴ Hegel, *Outline of the Philosophy of Right*, § 296.

²⁵ Hegel, *Outline of the Philosophy of Right*, § 294.

²⁶ Karl Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State (§§261–313)', in *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin, 1975), pp. 57–198, at pp. 105–6.

²⁷ Simon P. Newman, 'The Hegelian Roots of Woodrow Wilson's Progressivism', *American Presbyterians*, 64 (1986): pp. 191–201; Fritz Sager and Christian Rosser, 'Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy', *Public Administration Review*, 69 (2009): pp. 1136–1147, at p. 1138; David Steigerwald, *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Ronald J. Pestritto, *Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 14–18.

The example of Hegel's Prussia also points to the interplay between the intellectual project of public administration and the real professionalization of the civil service. Over the course of the 19th century, this professionalization took place in industrialized countries and some of their colonies. It did not follow a universal model but different national formats cannot be fully explored here.²⁸ Patricia Ingraham argues that in the 19th century,

[c]ivil service systems, or merit systems, were equated with 'good' government. They represented fair and equitable examinations, qualified public servants, and a commitment to the higher ideals of the state. Politics, on the other hand, had come to represent what was wrong with government. The early reformers believed deeply that if civil service systems were to function properly, the influence of politics and politicians would have to be completely removed from them.²⁹

In practice, the processes of civil service reform were often protracted. A landmark moment in Britain was the publication of the Northcote Trevylian report of 1854 on the organization of the civil service, which suggested a clear hierarchy of grades with promotions being based on merit. It argued that recruitment into the civil service should take place by open examination, organized by an independent board. Interestingly, such reforms were introduced in India before they were implemented in the UK.³⁰ Britain's civil service only fully accepted these reform ideas after 1900.

Civil service reform was accompanied by a proliferation of theorizing in the newly emerging field of public administration advocating an expansion of the state and its activities. A notable figure was the German lawyer Robert von Mohl, who saw professional public administration and independent administrative jurisdiction as central elements in the rule of law. Von Mohl suggested a proliferation of administrative activity and law in countless arenas, from public health to education, agriculture, trade and industry, and fighting poverty.³¹ Expert public administration, he argued, would take care of the well-being of citizens in an all-encompassing way. Another progressive German mind was that of Lorenz

²⁸ See instead: Bernard S. Silberman, *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States and Great Britain* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

²⁹ Patricia W. Ingraham, *The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in American Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 25.

³⁰ Barry O'Toole, *The Ideal of Public Service: Reflections on the Higher Civil Service in Britain* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 48; Thomas Osborne, 'Bureaucracy as a Vocation: Governmentality and Administration in Nineteenth-Century Britain', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 7 (1994), pp. 289–313.

³¹ Robert von Mohl, *Die Polizei-Wissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates*, 2 vols. (Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1832–3).

von Stein, author of the famous *Verwaltungslehre*, a massive text that, in seven volumes, covered countless fields and aspects of public administration.³²

Von Stein was, as we will see below, also among the pioneers of an international administrative law. Arguably, his interest was not incidental but had to do with the territorial fragmentation characteristic of Germany at this time.³³ In spite of Prussia's political and military prominence, Germany was not a nation-state before 1871. It had been held together by transnational institutions, since 1834, represented by the *Deutscher Zollverein*, the German Customs Union. The *Zollverein* was a regional intergovernmental organization of sovereign territories under Prussian leadership that not only liberalized cross-border trade but also pursued standardization and regulatory alignment.³⁴ Especially in the minds of German scholars, it became a blueprint for international unions and a European federation.

In the industrializing world of the 19th century, the expansion of the state and the professionalization of its administration also created a new figure in public service, the technical expert. 'His task became to identify and implement policies for stimulating industrialization and to explore, monitor, and find solutions for the problems it caused.'³⁵ Many of these challenges, as Saint-Simon had already underlined, were not confined to the territory of one state. It was, therefore, only natural that the national experts responsible for reform of the state also became central figures in the international conferences that proliferated in the second half of the 19th century.³⁶ This vibrant conference diplomacy evolved into a new type of administrative organization with cross-border reach: the international public union.

The rise of international public unions

After Napoleon's final defeat, the Congress of Vienna gathered in 1814 and 1815 to restore political order in Europe. Building on an existing bilateral treaty between France and the Holy Roman Empire of 1804, the Congress

³² Lorenz von Stein, *Die Verwaltungslehre*, 7 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1865–8); Michael Stolleis, *Public Law in Germany: A Historical Introduction from the 16th to the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), ch. 8; David F. Lindenfeld, *The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 67–89, 115–17.

³³ Douglas Howland, 'An Alternative Mode of International Order: The International Administrative Union in the Nineteenth Century', *Review of International Studies*, 41 (2015): pp. 161–83, at p. 165.

³⁴ Among lawyers, the precise legal status of the *Zollverein* was debated, see Toni Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly, *The German Economy During the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Berghahn, 2014).

³⁵ Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot, *Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 24.

³⁶ Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 63.

institutionalized the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine to guarantee free navigation for all vessels and to regulate traffic on the river.³⁷ Even if progress in cooperation was initially sluggish, the Central Commission became the blueprint for a similar body for the Danube, founded in 1856. It marked the beginning of a move towards the formation of international institutions in the second half of the 19th century, which accelerated in its last two decades.³⁸ For the year 1914, which marks the end of this foundational period, Bob Reinalda counts some fifty intergovernmental organizations with a permanent administrative machinery.³⁹

These organizations were commonly called international public unions, or administrative unions, equipped with—usually tiny—headquarters, the so-called international bureaus. Jean Claveirole defined the public unions as ‘associations diplomatically formed by a number of free and equal states, but open to all other states, with a view to realizing common goals through concerted action, joint regulation and organization.’⁴⁰ The mandates of these organizations were clearly specified and usually limited to one issue. That is why they are often characterized as ‘functional organizations’, as compared to permanent diplomatic platforms where any issue can be addressed.⁴¹ Two pioneer organizations that inspired subsequent foundations as well as academic reflection were the International Telegraph Union (ITU), founded in 1865, and the General Postal Union (later called the Universal Postal Union; UPU) of 1874. Many public unions were active in the field of technical standardization, such as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875) or the International Union of Railway Freight Transportation (1890). The International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) defended technological innovations against plagiarism while the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) did the same for cultural goods.

Like today’s IOs, the public unions had a dual structure. The intergovernmental conferences that formally directed and supervised their work were held by diplomatic representatives. After a brief ceremonial part of the proceedings, the

³⁷ Guido Thiemeier and Isabel Tölle, ‘Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? Die Beispiele der Zentralkommission für die Rheinschifffahrt und des Octroi-Vertrages 1804–51’, *Journal of European Integration History*, 17 (2011): pp. 177–96.

³⁸ On the Danube, see Francis B. Sayre, *Experiments in International Administration* (New York: Harper, 1919), pp. 39–47. The move towards the formation of institutions is a phrase coined by David Kennedy, who, however, sees the first great move happening only after the First World War; see David Kennedy, ‘The Move to Institutions’, *Cardozo Law Review*, 8 (1987): pp. 841–988.

³⁹ Bob Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 91–2.

⁴⁰ Jean Claveirole, *L’internationale et l’organisation internationale administrative* (Saint-Étienne: A. Waton, 1910), p. 106; my translation.

⁴¹ Lisa Martin and Beth A. Simmons, ‘International Organizations and Institutions’, in *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 326–51, at p. 329.

real work at these conferences was carried out by expert committees, formed by specialists from national public administrations.⁴² These experts developed a considerable group spirit. Their aim was to find efficient solutions to particular problems which could then be adopted after reaching a reasoned consensus. Their technical mindset and trust in the power of argument was at loggerheads with existing traditions of inter-state diplomacy, so that relations between experts and diplomats in the public unions were often strained.

Experts perceived diplomats as people who had no interest in or knowledge of technical issues. They believed that diplomats played political games that produced irrelevant political noise. At base, diplomats were petty nationalists who only sought advantages for the state they represented, with no recognition of other states and their legitimate interests.⁴³

The diplomat, in contrast, was perceived to be

much better equipped than the 'expert' to hammer a broad proposal into an acceptable form. He was also as a rule more acutely aware of the limits of the possible and he operated to keep the expert, hypnotised by efficiency to the degree that he was sometimes oblivious of the national interest, within reasonable bounds.⁴⁴

Despite some obvious continuities, in several respects the 19th-century public unions differed considerably from today's IOs. First of all, it would be a misconception to view them as associations of sovereign states. In the 19th century, the public unions had a much more variegated membership that included colonies and semi-sovereign territories.⁴⁵ For instance, in 1895 almost one-half of ITU members were not fully sovereign.⁴⁶ British India had joined the ITU before Great Britain. The reason was that the telegraph infrastructure in India was managed publicly while in Britain it was largely in the hands of private companies. After Great Britain nationalized its infrastructure and joined the ITU, the British Empire for a while could muster thirteen formally independent votes.⁴⁷ Similarly, UPU membership encompassed quite a striking variety of entities. Serbia, Egypt, and Bulgaria were part of the Ottoman Empire but they were UPU members

⁴² F. S. L. Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe, 1815–1914* (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1963).

⁴³ Kaiser and Schot, *Writing the Rules for Europe*, p. 42.

⁴⁴ Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe*, p. 22.

⁴⁵ Denys P. Myers, 'Representation in Public International Organs', *American Journal of International Law*, 8 (1914), pp. 81–108.

⁴⁶ Ellen J. Ravndal, 'Colonies, Semi-Sovereigns, and Great Powers: IGO Membership Debates and the Transition of the International System', *Review of International Studies*, 46 (2020), pp. 278–98, at p. 286.

⁴⁷ Howland, 'An Alternative Mode of International Order', p. 170.

because they had independent postal services. To reflect this diversity, the UPU decided not to speak of states [*états*] but of countries [*pays*] when referring to its constituent members.⁴⁸

In determining membership of public unions, the consideration of who was *de facto* managing an issue clearly trumped formal sovereignty. At the same time, the public unions did not abandon the principle of territoriality altogether. Private companies active in the respective fields of international regulation were only accepted as observers. Unsurprisingly, the multiple representation of colonial empires through their territorial units caused diplomatic tensions in the unions that were only fully resolved in the age of de-colonization.⁴⁹ The key concern was that the metropolises in reality controlled the votes of their dependent territories, thus unfairly inflating their influence.

Despite the universal mission of the public unions, many bureaus were technically just an annex of existing national bureaucracies. The secretariat of the UPU in Berne, for instance, was a part of the Swiss postal administration and housed in its building.⁵⁰ Most international bureaus had just a handful of employees recruited from the civil service of member states, but high-level positions were by convention filled by host country nationals.⁵¹ The prospect of gaining some additional clout in international politics ‘through the backdoor’ made it attractive for some small European states, such as Switzerland and Belgium, to specialize in hosting international bureaus.⁵²

Why did the international public union proliferate as an organizational form in the 19th century? The standard explanation, and a powerful one at that, is that the intertwined dynamics of industrialization, technological innovations, and increasing international trade triggered their formation.⁵³ Economically, the industrialized world of the 19th century grew tremendously, even if there were some deep crises. Together with revolutions in transport and communication technologies, from railways and steamships to the advent of the telegraph, increasing economic exchange rendered the world ever more interconnected.⁵⁴ This is not an *ex post* rationalization by historians and political economists.

⁴⁸ Howland, ‘An Alternative Mode of International Order’, p. 169.

⁴⁹ On the conflict, see Myers, ‘Representation’, pp. 84–5; on its eventual resolution through de-colonialization, see Ravndal, ‘Colonies, Semi-Sovereigns, and Great Powers’, pp. 295–6.

⁵⁰ Sayre, *Experiments in International Administration*, p. 22; Claveirole, *L'internationalisme*, pp. 199–201.

⁵¹ Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe*, p. 34.

⁵² Madeleine Herren, *Hintertüren zur Macht. Internationalismus und modernisierungsorientierte Außenpolitik in Belgien, der Schweiz und den USA 1865–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000); Daniel Laqua, *The Age of Internationalism and Belgium, 1880–1930: Peace, Progress and Prestige* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).

⁵³ On the link between industrialization and the foundation of IOs, see Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change*, p. 48.

⁵⁴ Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 710–43.

Contemporaries also perceived this increasing global interdependence and the need for a means of managing it.⁵⁵ It was widely understood that infrastructures of exchange had to be strengthened and new technology standardized to unleash their full potential and smooth transactions.

This dominant narrative of transnational problems creating a corresponding need for solutions, which public unions then delivered, proved to be durable. It established a compelling connection between the material interdependencies of a globalizing world and the need for management by expert bodies. In later years, this line of argument, which became popular in both IR and international law, became known as 'functionalism'.⁵⁶ It was, and still is, a textbook explanation of what IOs are and why we need them. In the field of IR, the idea of international cooperation being driven by demand and problem pressure became canonical, and especially prominent in the regime theory of the 1970s and 1980s.⁵⁷ Jan Klabbers argues that 'lawyers and others working in or with international organizations have all been speaking the language of functionalism without realizing it'.⁵⁸ Since it is so much taken for granted, he calls the functionalist account an 'ideology'.⁵⁹

As Klabbers reminds us there are some good reasons not to simply endorse the functionalist account but rather to historicize it critically. There are not only problems prompting a search for solutions but also institutional solutions prompting a search for new problems to tackle. The proliferation of international river regimes is a case in point. Outside Europe, such river regimes were usually implemented for other motives than 'problem pressure' and certainly not through free and reasoned consensus. A reluctant China, for example, was bullied into the Huangpu River Commission by the great powers that wished to open the Chinese hinterland to external trade.⁶⁰ The Huangpu was not even an international river,

⁵⁵ Frederic Seebohm, *On International Reform* (London: Longmans, Green and co., 1871), pp. 5–6.

⁵⁶ For the consolidation of this account, see Alfred H. Fried, *Das internationale Leben der Gegenwart* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908), pp. 14–15; Andrea Rapisardi-Mirabelli, 'Théorie générale des Unions Internationales', *Receuil des Cours*, 7 (1925): pp. 341–94, at pp. 348–9; Michel Virally, 'La notion de fonction dans la théorie de l'organisation internationale', in *Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau. La communauté internationale* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1974), pp. 277–300.

⁵⁷ Robert O. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes', *International Organization*, 36 (1982): pp. 141–71; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42 (1998): pp. 3–32.

⁵⁸ Jan Klabbers, 'The Emergence of Functionalism in International Institutional Law: Colonial Inspirations', *European Journal of International Law*, 25 (2014): pp. 645–75, at p. 651. Philippe Schmitter had previously made a similar point in the 1970s, see Philippe C. Schmitter, 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration', *International Organization*, 24 (1970): pp. 836–68.

⁵⁹ Jan Klabbers, 'Notes on the Ideology of International Organizations Law: The International Organization for Migration, State-Making, and the Market for Migration', *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 32 (2019): pp. 383–400.

⁶⁰ Sayre, *Experiments in International Administration*, pp. 88–91. The Huangpu, a tributary of the mighty Yangtze River, is a relatively short river that runs through Shanghai. Better connections to the Yangtze River were of commercial interest to the international trading posts located in Shanghai.

like the Rhine or the Danube in Europe, and the Chinese alone were supposed to pay for regulating its course. As for Africa, the foundation of the International Congo River Commission at the Berlin conference of 1884/5 was mainly an attempt to accommodate competing territorial claims of the colonial powers.⁶¹ That Commission formally had far-reaching competences but never became operational, and the envisaged internationalization of the Congo River never materialized.⁶²

Moreover, some public unions were not concerned with trans-border issues at all but strengthened the domestic governance capacities of their member states. The International Penitentiary Commission was created in 1872 to collect statistics on prisons and make suggestions for prison reform. The availability of the institutional format may have made it attractive for governments to use it for other purposes. The functionalist storyline of transnational problems prompting a search for a corresponding institution should therefore be treated as a legitimization narrative proposed by the advocates of international cooperation rather than as a causal explanation.⁶³

As the initiatives often originated from civil society, governmental forms of international cooperation in the 19th century existed alongside non-governmental ones.⁶⁴ The Red Cross movement found followers in many countries, and the same is true for international advocacy for the abolition of slavery and sex-trafficking. Many professions, in particular scientists, organized themselves into international associations, while governments did their part in establishing non-governmental contacts and cooperation. They organized international fairs and exhibitions to showcase new industrial products. These events not only created iconic symbols of progress, such as the Crystal Palace in London (1851) or the Eiffel Tower in Paris (1889), but also gathering places for all kinds of cosmopolitans and internationalists.⁶⁵

This non-governmental, 'scientific internationalism' spawned what Markus Krajewski called 'world projects'. Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine, two Belgian peace activists embarked on such a mission when they started cataloguing the

⁶¹ Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 121–3.

⁶² See *General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa*, 26 February 1885, Arts. 17–20. Today, there is a remote successor organization, the International Commission of the Congo Basin (CICOS).

⁶³ On this function, see Osborne, 'Bureaucracy as vocation', p. 290; Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*. Vol. 1: *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 23.

⁶⁴ The *Annuaire de la vie internationale*, first published in 1905, documented these efforts; see also John Culbert Faries, 'The Rise of Internationalism' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1915); Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., *Constructing World Culture. International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

⁶⁵ John R. Davis, *The Great Exhibition* (New York: Sutton, 1999), pp. 174–7.

knowledge of the world, creating the Universal Decimal Classification of publications and a kind of paper-based search engine, the Universal Bibliographic Repertory, consisting of index cards with information on various subjects.⁶⁶ They also founded the Union of International Associations, which to this day represents non-governmental organizations and associations active across borders. Such initiatives produced another, societal layer of international cooperation. It was largely congenial to public initiatives and at times converted into an inter-governmental institution at some point.

There also was, in the same period, a major fascination with works of science fiction depicting peaceful futures in which expert governance played a key role. In Britain, H. G. Wells rose to fame with his *Anticipations* (1901), in which he predicted how science and technology would transform Western society for the better. Progress would be driven by 'a really functional social body of engineering, managing men, scientifically trained, and having common ideals and interests'.⁶⁷ This new class would transcend the chaos of a fragmented world and push us towards a 'New Republic' of global dimensions. In the subsequent science-fiction novel *A Modern Utopia* (1905) Wells had an ascetic expert elite, the 'Samurai', manage an imaginary planet.⁶⁸

The internationalist lawyers

The advent and initial successes of the public unions influenced how scholars thought and spoke about international organization and its prospects. Some historiographies attribute the first programmatic proposals for IOs of the technical, functional kind to a French engineer of Saint-Simonian ideas, Émile Saigey. Writing under the pseudonym of Edgar Saveney, in 1872 he analysed the ITU and its conference diplomacy in two lengthy essays.⁶⁹ Extrapolating from this specific case, Saigey called for more international public unions to work on the joint interests of all states.⁷⁰ He did not go beyond the rather generic claim that having more public unions would be a good idea, however.

The real academic debate about public unions, and their possible importance and prospects, emerged in the field of international law in the 1880s and 1890s,

⁶⁶ Krajewski, *World Projects*, pp. x–xi.; Thomas R. Davies, 'Understanding Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Promise and Pitfalls of the Early "Science of Internationalism"', *European Journal of International Relations*, 23 (2016): pp. 884–905.

⁶⁷ H. G. Wells, *Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress Upon Human Life and Thought* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1901), p. 143.

⁶⁸ H. G. Wells, *A Modern Utopia* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905), pp. 259–62.

⁶⁹ Edgar Saveney, 'La télégraphie internationale. Les anciens traités et la conférence de Paris', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1872, pp. 359–84; Edgar Saveney, 'La télégraphie internationale. Les conférences de Vienne et de Rome', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 1872, pp. 551–83.

⁷⁰ Saveney, 'Les conférences', p. 558.

and was conducted mainly in French.⁷¹ It is connected to the new discipline of international administrative law, a subfield pioneered by the Baltic-Russian Fedor [de] Martens and the German Lorenz von Stein who was based in Vienna.⁷² The directors and civil servants of international public unions, who often had legal training, began to contribute to these academic debates as well. Especially French-speaking lawyers roamed this 'trading zone' between academia and praxis that persisted well into the 20th century, publishing academic treatises on the institutions they worked for.⁷³ Among them was Léon Poinard, who directed the secretariat of the intellectual property convention in Berne; Gustave Moynier who chaired the international committee of the Red Cross in Geneva; and Édouard Descamps who chaired the Institute Internationale de la Bibliographie in Brussels.⁷⁴ Descamps also founded, together with fellow Belgian internationalist Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Institut de Droit International, which became a veritable hub for internationalist thinking and publications.

It is unsurprising that many works from this veritable cottage industry applauded the foundation of public unions and predicted their growing importance in the future.⁷⁵ In their commentary, the internationalist lawyers also welcomed the extension of the rule of law to the field of IR and gauged the prospects for a global version of statehood that it might lead to. The new variety of internationalist spirit that pervaded the debates of the late 19th century occasionally has been called 'administrative internationalism.'⁷⁶ The following

⁷¹ Witold Zaleski, *Zur Geschichte und Lehre der internationalen Gemeinschaft* (Dorpat: Heinrich Laakmann, 1866); Louis Renault, *Études sur les rapports internationaux. La poste et le télégraphe* (Paris: L. Larose, 1877); Gustave Moynier, *Les bureaux internationaux des unions universelles* (Geneva: A. Cherbuliez, 1892); Léon Poinard, *Étude de droit international conventionnel* (Paris: Cotillon, 1896).

⁷² Frédéric de Martens, *Traité de droit international*, translated by Alfred Léo, Vol. II (Paris: Maresq Ainé, 1886); Lorenz von Stein, 'Einige Bemerkungen über das internationale Verwaltungsrecht', [*Schmollers*] *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich*, 6 (1882), pp. 395–442.

⁷³ Madeleine Herren, 'Governmental Internationalism and the Beginning of a New World Order in the Late Nineteenth Century', in *The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War*, edited by Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 121–44, at pp. 128–9. On the trading zone between theory and practice in IR, see Leonie Holthaus and Jens Steffek, 'Ideologies of International Organization: Exploring the Trading Zones between Theory and Practice', in *Theory as Ideology: The Politics of Knowledge in International Relations*, edited by Benjamin Martill and Sebastian Schindler (London: Routledge, 2020), pp. 187–208.

⁷⁴ Poinard, *Étude de droit*; Léon Poinard, *Le droit international au XX siècle. Ses progrès et ses tendances* (Paris: Bureaux de la Science Sociale, 1907); Édouard Descamps, *Les offices internationaux et leur avenir* (Brussels: F. Hayez, 1894); Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, 'Les principes philosophiques du droit international', *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée*, 18 (1886): pp. 49–82.

⁷⁵ Rolin-Jaequemyns, 'Les principes philosophiques', p. 81; Georg Jellinek, *Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen* (Vienna: A. Holder, 1882), pp. 165–6; Descamps, *Les offices internationaux*, p. 53; Louis Renault, 'Les unions internationales. Leurs avantages et leurs inconvénients', *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 28 (1896): pp. 14–26, at p. 24; Moynier, *Les bureaux*, pp. 148–54.

⁷⁶ Douglas Howland, 'Telegraph Technology and Administrative Internationalism in the Nineteenth Century', in *The Global Politics of Science and Technology*, Vol. 1, edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich (Berlin: Springer, 2014), pp. 183–99.

quote from Gustave Moynier can illustrate this type of programmatic writing (my translation):

Fundamentally, all international Bureaus have the same aim, which is the reconciliation of peoples. Each of them is engaged in removing one of the obstacles that stand in the way. Even if they are isolated, they collaborate towards a common goal. Therefore, it is in the logic of things that if they multiply, as is to be expected, to accomplish all the reforms on which the triumph of their common aspirations depends, the day will come when one will harmonize their efforts to speed up their victory.⁷⁷

The cumbersome phrasing of the last sentence is not due to the complexities of French syntax. What Moynier tried to convey here in diplomatically convoluted fashion was the prospect of international public unions turning into something bigger and more powerful. The ever-denser web of international institutions entangling states in cooperative endeavours would shift to a different level of organization, which Moynier did not want to designate clearly. On the previous page he had reassured his readers that he was not advocating something lofty like a world state, as some federalists did.⁷⁸ Central coordination of functional unions, however, would certainly have required some public international organization with considerable competencies. Technically speaking, the public unions and their bureaus had rather narrow aims set out in their constitution. The reconciliation of peoples was a mission that Moynier (and many others) read into them.

As a distinctive world order utopia, international administration found most of its contours in the works of Pjotr [Pierre] Kazansky, a Russian international lawyer based at the University of Odessa. Kazansky wrote a series of treatises in Russian on public unions but also two French-language articles that found broader international circulation, in which he presented a theory of international administrative law, animated by an ardent internationalism.⁷⁹ These two pieces are particularly interesting for the purposes of this book because it is here that we can witness the emergence of an elaborate, normative vision of international organization of a technocratic character. Kazansky's point of departure was the classic globalization narrative about a shrinking and interdependent world. 'Each inhabitant of a civilized state', he argued,

⁷⁷ Moynier, *Les bureaux*, pp. 148–9.

⁷⁸ Members of the peace movement in fact had formulated such visions. A 'general world government' to complement the evolution of world society was advocated by Benjamin F. Trueblood, *The Federation of the World* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1899), pp. 127–8. A 'world organism' with all the branches of the state in place was imagined by Raymond L. Bridgman, *World Organization* (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1907), pp. 140–1.

⁷⁹ Kazansky, Pierre, 'Les premiers éléments de l'organisation universelle', *Revue de Droit International et de Législation compare*, 29 (1897): pp. 238–47; Pierre Kazansky, 'Théorie de l'administration internationale', *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 9 (1902): pp. 353–67.

takes part, in one way or the other, in international social life. Also, when taken together, the international social interests have for each of us a far greater value than political or state interests. [...] One could say that the development of contemporary international life is in some way the development of international social interests.⁸⁰

In a cosmopolitan fashion, Kazansky considered transnational civic associations in the economic, scientific, or humanitarian field a sort of 'international self-government'.⁸¹ He still saw the need, however, for institutions to be based on treaties among states, because transnational societal interests needed strong patrons to protect them. Kazansky considered the foundation of international public unions to be a move to organization on a greater scale. 'Organization' meant to become able to act collectively and to pursue a common interest: public administration bound this collective endeavour to legal rules. Although Kazansky argued that international bureaus should complement national public administrations, it was obvious that international administrative law would pose restrictions to national administrative sovereignty.⁸² He argued that these organizations would be incipient parts of a larger political order that would develop beyond the state, a view he shared with Lorenz von Stein.⁸³

Kazansky was not shy about professing to a 'dream' for the future: the 'decentralized, administrative organization of humanity'. That vision was inspired by the motto *In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas* ('in necessary things unity, in uncertain things liberty, in all things charity'), a Latin phrase often used in the advocacy of religious freedom.⁸⁴ Kazansky deployed this vision against ideas of a world state that would eliminate the sovereignty of existing states altogether. Administrative cooperation showed a middle way: joint work on common interest based on the rule of law, while preserving the independence of nations. This would lead to a better understanding and solidarity among nations and, in the long term, to universal peace.⁸⁵ Administrative internationalism thus laid out an avenue of international reform compatible with the existing state-based order. This was also the strategy proposed by the American political scientists Paul S. Reinsch who is occasionally cited, with good reason, as one of the founders of the discipline of IR in the US.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ Kazansky, 'Théorie de l'administration', p. 357, my translation.

⁸¹ Kazansky, 'Théorie de l'administration', p. 355.

⁸² Kazansky, 'Théorie de l'administration', pp. 362–4.

⁸³ Kazansky, 'Les premiers éléments'; von Stein, 'Einige Bemerkungen', p. 419.

⁸⁴ Kazansky, 'Les premiers éléments', p. 247; my translations.

⁸⁵ Kazansky, 'Les premiers éléments', p. 239; 'Théorie de l'administration', p. 367.

⁸⁶ William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), p. 47. In-depth treatments are Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 70–5, 118–19; Brian C. Schmidt, 'Paul S. Reinsch and the Study of Imperialism and Internationalism', in *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of*

Paul Reinsch and the legacies of colonialism

Paul Reinsch (1869–1923) was among the first professors in the political science department at the University of Wisconsin and involved in the foundation of the American Political Science Association in 1903. Next to his academic activities, Reinsch also served as US diplomat in China and, later, as advisor to the Chinese government.⁸⁷ Originally, Reinsch had studied law and was well-versed in the international legal debates of his day. In many of his writings on international affairs, however, the doctrinal questions that typically interest jurists do not feature much. Reinsch ventured into the emerging field of international organization from the perspective of colonial government. In 1900, he published a book entitled *World Politics*, which was a critical study of imperialism and its consequences. Its main argument unfolded through a discussion of the great power scramble for the opening and potential partition of China, a territory that he considered to be ‘the stepping stone to world control.’⁸⁸ In 1902 and 1905, two massive comparative studies of colonial rule followed which focused on the governing institutions and, respectively, policies and administrative practices in Europe’s colonies.⁸⁹

In *World Politics*, Reinsch’s analytical view of the international system was one of competing empires struggling for colonial expansion. His main political concern was how the US should position itself in such a world. Paramount was the colonial question, as the US had just joined the ranks of the colonial empires through the acquisition of the Philippines at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898.⁹⁰ The identity shift from former colony to colonizer, the denial of self-government to the locals, and counterinsurgency warfare on the islands—all these issues were hotly contested in the American public. Yet, the new possibilities for designing colonial government in the Philippines intrigued America’s political scientists and public administration experts.⁹¹

International Relations, edited by David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 43–69; Klabbers, ‘Emergence of Functionalism’; Jan Klabbers, ‘Re-Thinking Functionalism: Paul S. Reinsch and the Making of International Institutional Law’ (Manuscript, University of Helsinki, 2010).

⁸⁷ On Reinsch’s life, see Noel H. Pugh, *Paul S. Reinsch: Open-Door Diplomat in Action* (Millwood: KTO Press, 1979).

⁸⁸ Paul S. Reinsch, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as Influenced by the Oriental Situation* (New York: Macmillan, 1900), p. 245; see also Schmidt, ‘Paul S. Reinsch’, pp. 52–5.

⁸⁹ Reinsch, *World Politics*; Paul S. Reinsch, *Colonial Government: An Introduction to the Study of Colonial Institutions* (New York: Macmillan, 1902); Paul S. Reinsch, *Colonial Administration* (New York: Macmillan, 1905).

⁹⁰ On US colonialism, see Daniel Immerwahr, *How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019). Alaska was an earlier colonial acquisition but became part of the metropole subsequently.

⁹¹ Stuart C. Miller, ‘Benevolent Association’: *The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Alasdair S. Roberts, ‘Bearing the White Man’s Burden: American Empire and the Origin of Public Administration’, *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, 3 (2020): pp. 185–96.

For Reinsch, colonization was 'the systematic influence exerted upon a lower grade of civilization by a higher'.⁹² In line with the conventions of his time he imagined a clear hierarchy of civilizations and also ascribed innate qualities to different races, with sub-Saharan Africans in many ways at the bottom of the ladder.⁹³ Reinsch defined the colonization of the global South as 'a serious and sad duty that the white race is performing'. Colonization was a serious duty because it created the resources that the world's entire population needed for its socio-economic progress. It was a sad duty because colonial rule was all too often not to the benefit of the local populations and imposed on them against their will. In spite of the racist vocabulary, Reinsch had great sympathy for the plight of colonized populations, and denounced the cruelties and excesses of colonial rule.⁹⁴ It was a type of 'melancholic colonialism', as Duncan Bell characterized John Stuart Mill's ideas.⁹⁵

Reinsch's attitude towards the colonies may be described as the benevolent paternalism of a progressive liberal. Native populations lacked the rationality, the technical skills and the discipline to achieve progress by their own means.⁹⁶ Still, Reinsch saw potential for development in all races and societies, provided the right policies and administrative structures were in place. He warned, however, that a simple imposition of Western practices and institutions of government might not work. To function properly, new institutions needed to resonate with local traditions. There was one universal, though, and that was economic growth—the basis for all further development. Reinsch concluded that '[t]o foster the cohesion and self-realization of native societies, while at the same time providing the economic basis for a higher form of organization—that should be the substructure of an enlightened colonial policy'.⁹⁷ That was his recipe also for dealing with China, which, Reinsch suggested, 'can best be saved by the tactful interference of foreign powers pushing her along the path of progress by the establishment of new industries and new methods of education'.⁹⁸

Even if the colonial enterprise was beneficial to humankind, in his view, Reinsch warned against the ruthless imperialism of the late 19th century. Headless races for territorial aggrandizement threatened orderly progress and sparked conflict, even war, among the great powers. The US, Reinsch argued, should abstain from such folly and pursue open-door policies instead.⁹⁹ Imperialism also

⁹² Reinsch, *Colonial Government*, p. 88.

⁹³ Reinsch, *Colonial Administration*, pp. 58–61, 384–6.

⁹⁴ Reinsch, *Colonial Government*, pp. 89–90; see also Schmidt, 'Paul S. Reinsch', pp. 63–4.

⁹⁵ Reinsch, *World Politics*, pp. 43, 254–5; the notion of 'melancholic colonialism' is developed in Bell, 'John Stuart Mill on colonies', p. 37.

⁹⁶ Reinsch, *Colonial Government*, pp. 224–7, 231–3; Reinsch, *Colonial Administration*, pp. 3–4, 35.

⁹⁷ Reinsch, *Colonial Administration*, p. 29.

⁹⁸ Reinsch, *World Politics*, pp. 107–8; fostering the modernization of China was among Reinsch's priorities as US diplomat in the country, see Pugach, *Paul S. Reinsch*, p. 138.

⁹⁹ Reinsch, *World Politics*, p. 242; Reinsch, *Colonial Government*, pp. 75–6.

threatened domestic democracy since foreign policy and national interest commanded national unity and levelled party differences.¹⁰⁰ In principle, however, Reinsch thought that competition among states was conducive to progress because it was 'the intense rivalry of peoples which brings out their strongest characteristics'.¹⁰¹ Not least, such competition would also safeguard the global balance of power as assurance against despotism of one country.

What transpires from Reinsch's colonial treatises is a universalist perspective on the issue of development for the benefit of humankind that sits comfortably with his liberal preference for free trade and a market economy. Economic growth would lay the foundations for rational, accountable government, equipped with a professional civil service, based on tested competence and meritocratic principles.¹⁰² In their rigorously comparative design, his two colonial treatises can be read as a search for best practice in government and administration, which, in the case of *Colonial Administration*, is divided by functional issue area. The continuities between Reinsch's thinking on colonial administration and on international organization become apparent when we compare these treatises with his work on international organizations.

Reinsch's major publications on international functional organizations are two substantial articles and a slim monograph, and in the latter of which much of the material from the articles was re-arranged.¹⁰³ In the introduction to the book, Reinsch characterized his theoretical perspective as a 'new internationalism', which he argued to be empirically grounded and practical. He tried to immediately dispel suspicions of utopianism, even ridiculing proposals for transnational federations or a world state. 'The world state above, he wrote, 'the rational individual below, and between them nothing but an exalted enthusiasm to uphold so vast a structure'.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, Reinsch saw a clear practical case for the international organization of an increasingly interdependent world, where events in one territory would inevitably affect all the others. The 'new internationalism' was theoretically grounded in the liberal tradition of thought that Reinsch traced back to Grotius, Locke, and other 'believers in a rationalist policy'.¹⁰⁵ He contrasted this liberal rationalism with the cynical 'Machiavellism' of the doctrine of reason of state, and 'the blind and passionate forces of the will'.¹⁰⁶

The task of international cooperation, in Reinsch's view, was to tackle the dangers arising from interdependence, but also to the secure welfare of citizens

¹⁰⁰ Reinsch, *World Politics*, pp. 335–6.

¹⁰¹ Reinsch, *World Politics*, p. 24.

¹⁰² Reinsch, *Colonial Government*, pp. 309–10, 326–7.

¹⁰³ Paul S. Reinsch, 'International Unions and Their Administration', *American Journal of International Law*, 1 (1907): pp. 579–623; Paul S. Reinsch, 'International Administrative Law and National Sovereignty', *American Journal of International Law*, 3 (1909): pp. 1–45; Paul S. Reinsch, *Public International Unions: Their Work and Organization. A Study in International Administrative Law* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1911).

¹⁰⁴ Reinsch, *Public International Unions*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ Reinsch, *Public International Unions*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁶ Reinsch, *World Politics*, p. 8, see also p. 15.

through contact with other nations. 'Relying merely upon the capacities and resources contained within its national territory, it [the state] can not offer to those dependent upon it the protection and the advantages which as citizens of the modern world they have a right to demand'.¹⁰⁷ This resembles his line of argument when defending colonialism, where native populations are 'to be endowed with the multiform blessings of civilization'.¹⁰⁸

In the international public unions, the cosmopolitan ideal of global institutions working for the common good of humankind had become operational and practical. Reinsch pointed out that these unions had appeared more or less spontaneously since the 19th century, without any global plan or orchestration, a quasi-natural response to functional needs.¹⁰⁹ In his survey of more than thirty unions with bureaus existing in his day, he detected all the classic functions of government: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, in an embryonic state. His emphasis, however, was on the complexity of the technical tasks of international governance requiring expert advisors and expert diplomats.

These experts often ran into conflicts with more traditionally minded diplomats who treated all questions according to the pursuit of national interest, prestige, and considerations of power. Traditional diplomacy, in this context, was among the retarding elements inhibiting the growth of international administration. The main resource of the public unions was epistemic in nature, to be found in the 'reason and practicalness of the ideas suggested, which may ultimately bring about unanimity among all the nations concerned'.¹¹⁰ Reinsch expected that international administration would lead to a certain harmonization of public administration and to a 'uniformity of law'.¹¹¹ That would happen not so much through imposing standards, but by mutual learning and the spread of best practices. 'Civilized nations, being desirous to arrange their affairs in the most scientific and effective fashion, feel the need of making use of experience and knowledge wherever it may be found'.¹¹²

Reinsch, quite obviously, had faith in the possibility of experts determining universally best solutions to technical questions. International organizations were dispensers of factual knowledge, but also of administrative routines and practices, that national administration would otherwise not have access to. On the other hand, Reinsch did not expect the state (or the nation) to become redundant due to political and administrative internationalization, nor did he want them to disappear. After all, states were crucial actors in creating much-needed international administrative capacities. Reinsch rather imagined a

¹⁰⁷ Reinsch, 'International Administrative Law', p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ Reinsch, *Colonial Administration*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Reinsch, *Public International Unions*, pp. 4–5.

¹¹⁰ Reinsch, 'International Administrative Law', p. 29.

¹¹¹ Reinsch, 'International Administrative Law', p. 44.

¹¹² Reinsch, 'International Unions', p. 581.

harmonious interplay between the international and the national level of public administration.

The effect which international organization has exercised upon the methods and processes of national administration has been salutary. In the international conventions and congresses, methods are compared, criticisms and suggestions are made, and the best experience of the world is centralized; all of which may be turned to advantage by progressive national administrations.¹¹³

Beyond such functional advantages, cooperative endeavours would also lead to mutual understanding and, eventually, to peace. War between nations, Reinsch concluded, would become less and less likely as the web of cooperative relations grew larger.¹¹⁴

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have revisited the 19th-century origins of technocratic internationalism. I have shown how technocratic internationalism began as a combination of two existing intellectual currents, which idealized, respectively, expert government and international cooperation. Domestic- and international-level factors spurred on this new, emerging synthesis. At a domestic level, the rise of technocratic ideas sprang from an increasing fascination with the possibilities of science, new technologies, and, not least, social organization. Visionary social theorists of the 19th century, such as Saint-Simon, tried to show how an industrial society could be managed by specialists in the public service. Others, such as Hegel and Mill, were less sanguine about a direct rule of experts, but suggested the professionalization of bureaucracies within more complex systems of national government.

The philosophers' praise for expertise coincided with real-world expansion and the professionalization of public administration in many industrialized countries as well as some of their colonies. This professionalization of public administration gave rise to a new figure in public life: Max Weber's *Fachbeamte*, with the specifically trained expert in the public service. The *Fachbeamte* made their appearance at an international level when the first generation of IOs, the international public unions, began to work on tasks of technical standardization and regulation. In contemporary idealizations, the international civil servants were 'bridging national and international forms of government with an ideal

¹¹³ Reinsch, 'International Administrative Law', p. 16.

¹¹⁴ Reinsch, 'International Administrative Law', p. 18.

combination of personal virtue, specialist knowledge, and fidelity to the law.¹¹⁵ These international civil servants became carriers of a new administrative-internationalist spirit and many of them contributed to academic scholarship and political activism. As I have shown in this chapter, scholar-practitioners (in particular, international lawyers) shaped technocratic internationalism as a distinctive style of international thought. Writing between 1880 and 1914, they vowed to put an end to the ‘age of disorganization’, with its chaos caused by a doctrine of independent territories being imagined as sovereign.¹¹⁶

As for factors at an international level, the rise of international public unions is often seen as a functional response to the mounting global interdependencies of the 19th century. New technologies of transport and communication not only boosted the mobility of merchandise and persons, which profited from transnational regulation and standardization, but technological advances also made the idea of government on a large territorial scale seem increasingly feasible. What characterized technocratic-internationalist ideas of governance was a shift of perspective to the individual point of view. Technology and scientific progress laid the foundations for the global emancipation of human beings from material scarcity and hard labour. Seen from this perspective, IOs became guardians of individual interests and needs, making up for limited state capacity. International administration provided goods and services that citizens deserved, a welfarist perspective that we will encounter again in Chapter 3.

The emergent perception of a borderless community of individuals came with the idea of a community interest (a public interest beyond the state) that oriented the work of the international civil servant. Accordingly, the role of these experts was often formulated in opposition to traditional international politics where diplomats skilfully defended their national interest. Diplomats were not only bound by instructions but by their cognitive limitations, being unable to perceive what was best for the international community as a whole. Only unbiased experts could do this. Thus, praise for international expert governance often came with a critique of old conceptions of inter-state diplomacy and negotiation.

With its individualism and sense of a global public good, technocratic internationalism has affinities with philosophical cosmopolitanism. Yet we should be careful not to overstate these cosmopolitan traits. Politically, the early technocratic internationalism was neither radical nor revolutionary. Trained international lawyers, such as Kazansky and Reinsch, sought to reconcile their quest for more cross-border cooperation with the doctrine of state sovereignty. This confirms Glenda Sluga’s observation that in the early 20th century, the more

¹¹⁵ Guy Fiti Sinclair, *To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 19.

¹¹⁶ Walther Schücking, *Die Organisation der Welt* (Leipzig: Kröner, 1909), p. 39; my translation.

radical forms of internationalism were eliminated.¹¹⁷ Pacifist Alfred Fried tried to interpret the mounting tension between a desire for national sovereignty and that for international cooperation as a dialectical development where the final, inevitable synthesis would be some form of international government.¹¹⁸

Despite all appeals to cosmopolitanism and universalism, the technocratic thought of the late 19th and early 20th century was imbued with colonial overtones. I have shown an example of this in discussing the case of Paul Reinsch. In Reinsch's work, there are clear analogies between the imposed development of the colonies and the project of IOs driven by experts. The common denominator here is a paternalism of international experts who are positioned as knowing the best interests of local populations and being best placed to act accordingly.¹¹⁹ Not least, the early technocratic internationalism was consciously anti-political. As the aims of international governance were noble and uncontroversial it was safe to leave the governing to experts. In the mindset of a technocratic internationalist, 'the idea of international organizations not serving the common good is unthinkable.'¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 18.

¹¹⁸ Fried, *Das internationale Leben*, pp. 16–17.

¹¹⁹ On paternalism in international aid and development, see Michael N. Barnett, ed., *Paternalism beyond Borders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

¹²⁰ Klabbers, 'Emergence of Functionalism', p. 647.

Experts without borders

After slow and scattered beginnings in the 19th and early 20th century, technocratic internationalism began to thrive from the First World War well into the 1930s. As Jo-Anne Pemberton observed, ‘in the inter-war period, centred on the cults of technocracy and internationalism, futurophilia shone most brightly in the public discourse’.¹ This period is the focus of this chapter and Chapter 4. Intellectually, the interwar years were extraordinarily fertile. New strands of social and political theory were discussed with great excitement, from futurism to fascism and the first version of ‘neoliberalism’.² Anti-colonial movements gained momentum, along with the women’s movement and civil rights activism. And, indeed, political ideas that for a long time had been considered utopian were suddenly put into practice, with the Soviet Union and more short-lived bolshevist regimes in Europe seeking to realize a dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the field of International Relations (IR), the newly founded League of Nations greatly inspired theorists of international organization. Under Woodrow Wilson’s leadership, the dream of a global organization to secure peace seemed to become a reality at last. ‘Thinking globally’ was the order of the day.³ In international theory, blueprints abounded for a world state, federation, or commonwealth, for a European union or a union of the Anglophone countries. Quite prominent was the idea of collective security and an international rule of law, ideally bolstered by a global army or police force. Pacifists, in contrast, sought to achieve perpetual peace through education and international conciliation, working towards changing people’s minds and hearts.⁴

¹ Jo-Anne Pemberton, ‘New Worlds for Old: The League of Nations in the Age of Electricity’, *Review of International Studies*, 28 (2002): pp. 311–36, at p. 312.

² See contributions to this in Hagen Schulz-Forberg, ed., *Zero Hours: Conceptual Insecurities and New Beginnings in the Interwar Period* (Brussels: P. I. E. Peter Lang, 2013).

³ See overviews in Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014), ch. 6; Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), chs 5 and 6; David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., *Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Jo-Anne Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World* (London: Pluto Press, 2001).

⁴ John Eugene Harley, *International Understanding: Agencies Educating for a New World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931); Peter Brock and Thomas B. Socknat, eds., *Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain 1914–1945: The Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980).

The interwar years also produced an enormous variety of technocratic ideas about international organization, and I dedicate two chapters to this remarkable period. The present chapter explores examples of technocratic internationalism from the English-speaking world, some utopian and some more pragmatic. Generally speaking, these proposals were influenced by the liberal-internationalist tradition, but their more utopian manifestations had affinities with heterodox (non-Marxist) socialism. In Chapter 4, I will introduce varieties of technocratic internationalism that were developed outside the English-speaking world and the liberal tradition, even being consciously pitched against it. My aim is to show that, in the interwar years, technocratic internationalism was an intellectual trend that cut across countries and political divides.

Today, the Anglophone variety of technocratic internationalism is often called 'functionalism'. That label was invented in retrospect. There was no strand of international theory known by that name in the 1920s and 1930s, even if political and sociological reasoning in terms of 'function' was common. What we find are proposals for the expert administration of international affairs connected to a variety of institutional forms. Existing studies of IR functionalism tend to portray it as liberal internationalism with a Fabian-socialist bend and a focus on welfare.⁵ This description is accurate for many authors but, as we will see, it somewhat downplays the diversity of technocratic approaches that existed even within the English-speaking world. I suggest that some early functionalists can be characterized as pragmatists seeking to respond to an increasingly complex and interdependent world, but content with an international order based on states, which they proposed to modernize by means of expert administration and advice. Other functionalists were more radical in that they sought to undermine the existing order of sovereign states. As Leonie Holthaus has shown, this utopian left-wing functionalism was symptomatic of a widely perceived crisis of representative democracy and capitalism.⁶ 'Left-wing' here is my generic term to cover left-liberal as well as reform-socialist ideas. These utopian functionalists had ambitions of social reform that went far beyond the efficient organization of international relations.

This chapter consists of four sections. In the first section, I introduce some historical context to set the stage for interwar internationalism. Wartime executive cooperation among the Western allies became a point of reference for internationalism of the state-based, top-down type. To illustrate this, I discuss, in the second section, the work of the British League official James Arthur Salter and

⁵ Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Cornelia Navari, 'David Mitrany and International Functionalism', in *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed*, edited by David Long and Peter Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 214–46.

⁶ Leonie Holthaus, *Pluralist Democracy in International Relations: The Thought of L.T. Hobhouse, G.D.H. Cole, and David Mitrany* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

of H. R. G. Greaves, a government scholar at the London School of Economics (LSE). Both envisaged the economic and technical branches of the League as a continuation of the wartime 'executives' among the Western allies. I then turn to Pitman B. Potter, the most influential American scholar of international organization in the interwar years. Potter linked his vision of international expert administration to otherwise Wilsonian ideals about an international rule of law and the primacy of security.

The third section is devoted to the more utopian kinds of interwar functionalism that were inspired by non-Marxist socialist thought. My account focuses on the contributions of Leonard Woolf and G. D. H. Cole who applied ideas of functional representation and government to the domestic and international levels alike, giving much more room to non-state actors. In the final section of the chapter, I turn to David Mitrany, often regarded as the 'founding father' of the functionalist approach to international organization. I caution that Mitrany was certainly a very original and systematic thinker, but when 'inventing' functionalism he drew heavily on the work of other authors discussed in this chapter. Rather than being a founding father, I argue, Mitrany was a catalyst who combined the pragmatic and utopian elements of technocratic internationalism into a new synthesis that, as I will show in Chapter 5, became very popular in the 1940s.

Organizing the world

Three historical developments left a major imprint on the formulation of technocratic internationalism of the interwar period: the First World War and its consequences, the Great Depression, and the expansion of the welfare state in the Western industrialized countries. The First World War was also the first industrial war. It saw the use of tanks, machine-guns, airplanes, submarines, and poison gas. Recent advances in engineering and chemistry were used for appalling purposes and turned battlefields in the heart of Europe into lunar landscapes. The brutal routines of trench warfare made a mockery of traditional fantasies of warrior heroism: many soldiers came home crippled, disfigured, or shell-shocked, there for all to see.

Internationalists had warned against this disaster. Norman Angell's *Great Illusion*, first published in 1910, sold an estimated two million copies before the First World War and thus became one of the most widely read texts on IR ever.⁷

⁷ Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage* (New York: G.B. Putnam's Sons, 1910). An excellent introduction to the work is Torbjørn L. Knutsen, 'A Pillar of Air? Norman Angell and *The Great Illusion*', in *Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation*, edited by Henrik Bliddal, Casper Sylvest, and Peter Wilson (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 13–23.

Its message was that under conditions of industrial modernity and economic interdependence, warfare no longer paid, not even for the victorious parties. The great illusion that Angell meant was that most politicians thought otherwise. Their outlook was out of tune with economic and social realities.⁸ If there is one single line of thought that permeated virtually all types of early 20th-century internationalism, this is it: that the existing understanding of the modern world and its interdependencies lagged far behind social and economic realities. That Angell's book on the dire need to renew the political outlook has often been associated with a naïve belief that warfare had become impossible under modern conditions is an irony of history, but attributable to the shortcomings of the text itself.⁹

The Great War ushered in a flurry of strategies for peace and proposals for international institutions of a new kind. 'It should be definitely understood that the type of man who has filled our Foreign Office and our Embassies', wrote J. A. Hobson, 'however "expert" he may have been in the diplomacy of the past, is the reverse of "expert" for the new needs of peace and international government'.¹⁰ Expert governance became a realistic prospect when the peace settlement gave rise to the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Many interwar discussions on world order revolved around these new institutions, especially the League with its broad and ambitious mandate. Yet the two global organizations were only the most spectacular of the innovations that the war had brought about. New forms of executive management and bureaucratic control proliferated domestically too. In order to manage shortages and logistic challenges of the war, many countries had established new administrative and executive agencies. Mitrany recalled 'how under the impact of the new kind of warfare, which had made economic resources and industrial potential a decisive factor, the belligerents had all adopted much the same ways and means for dealing with problems of supply and production and distribution under conditions of war'.¹¹ The war thus proved to be a modernizer with regards also to domestic governance and public administration.

These wartime domestic developments had international ramifications. By the year 1916, cereal supply had become a pressing problem for Britain, France, and Italy. In response, an allied 'wheat executive' was set up, which was basically an extension of an existing British domestic institution.¹² Its goal was to better

⁸ The point is powerfully reiterated in Norman Angell, *The Foundations of International Polity* (London: William Heinemann, 1914), xxiv–xxvi.

⁹ Martin Ceadel, *Living the Great Illusion. Sir Norman Angell, 1872–1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 100–1.

¹⁰ J. A. Hobson, *Towards International Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1916), p. 200.

¹¹ David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertson & Company, 1975), p. 17.

¹² Elizabeth Greenhalgh, *Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 110–13; Yann Decorzant, *La Société des Nations*

coordinate the import strategies of the Western allies. Other issue-specific executives followed. The pivotal problem, however, was maritime transport, as German submarine warfare had seriously diminished the shipping capacities of the Western allies. The response to the shortages was the creation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC), founded in December 1917 by representatives of the three European allies and the United States (US).¹³ The task of the new institution was the management of shipping capacities across national and administrative boundaries. In the Council, member states were represented by their national ministries in charge of shipping matters (not their foreign offices), and the measures decided there were to be implemented directly through the national ministries, by-passing cabinet and parliament. This construction 'practically destroyed the distinction between the advisory and the executive'.¹⁴

The day to day work of the AMTC was performed by expert civil servants drawn from the four member countries. The administrative apparatus, based in London, had a properly intergovernmental component with two quadripartite committees, but also a permanent secretariat, whose members were expected to take an impartial point of view.¹⁵ After the armistice, the AMTC was disbanded quickly, but it remained in the memory of its participants as a model experience of effective international cooperation. Two young men served on it who became influential internationalists in the years to follow: Jean Monnet of France and Salter of Britain.¹⁶ Monnet had the chance to draw on the AMTC lessons in the Second World War when he again was involved in the inter-allied coordination of supplies, and in the European integration project (see Chapter 6). Salter came to direct the Economic and Financial Section of the League and also got involved again in wartime economic organization in Britain during the Second World War.¹⁷ He published a book on his AMTC experience that became a reference point for technocratic internationalism in the interwar period.¹⁸ I will discuss his proposals for transgovernmental administrative cooperation in the next section.

Public administration also grew domestically in the interwar years. With the expansion of the welfare state, or 'service state', as it was often called, technocratic

et la naissance d'une conception de la regulation économique internationale (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 133–5; Georges-Henri Soutou, *Lor et le sang. Les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre Mondiale* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), pp. 512–17.

¹³ For the documentary record of the Council's activities in 1917/18, see AMTC, *Allied Maritime Transport Council 1918* (London, 1918).

¹⁴ James Arthur Salter, *Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1921), p. 249.

¹⁵ AMTC, *Allied Maritime Transport Council 1918*, pp. 10–11.

¹⁶ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), pp. 71–95; James Arthur Salter, *Memoirs of a Public Servant* (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), pp. 176–7.

¹⁷ On the economic and financial sections of the League, see Victor-Yves Ghébal, 'Aux origines de l'Ecosoc. L'évolution des commissions et organisations techniques de la Société des Nations', *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 18 (1972): pp. 469–511. Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹⁸ Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*.

modernity fastened its grip on Western society. More or less independent agencies, public boards, and parastatal companies proliferated in Britain and the US.¹⁹ Max Weber's prediction that state socialism would spawn an enormous bureaucratic apparatus proved prophetic. Not least, technocratic futures permeated science-fiction literature. H. G. Wells, for one, now imagined a 'great encyclopædic organization, kept constantly up to date and giving approximate estimates and directions for all the material activities of mankind'.²⁰ The American technocracy movement, which propagated a post-political and post-capitalist utopia run by engineers, experienced a short boom in the early 1930s. From today's perspective, '*Technocracy Inc.*' with its grey uniforms, fleet of grey cars, and salute may appear like a caricature of a political movement, somewhere between an Orwellian dystopia and a Charlie Chaplin satire. Yet some ideas of the technocrats were taken seriously in the US, at least for a while, in the early 1930s.²¹

The reason for such receptiveness was the Great Depression and the feverish search for new approaches to economic organization that came with it. The global economic collapse that followed Black Friday became a pressing new *problématique* for social and political theorists to debate in the 1930s. The fact that economic crisis spread like a tsunami from its epicentre on Wall Street to the remotest corners of the world made it of immediate concern to international theorists—yet another proof of global interdependence. For liberals, the interwar years were hard times. The Great War had dashed 19th-century hopes that international economic interdependence would somehow automatically lead to peace. The Great Depression dashed remaining hopes that international economic interdependence would, somehow, automatically lead to prosperity. Even liberals embarked on new thinking about politics and the economy, and, for many of them, public organization and planning became the key to the future.

Praising the expert: Salter, Greaves, Potter

Technocratic internationalism of the interwar years had two institutional precedents. The international public unions of the 19th century, which Paul

¹⁹ Guy Alchon, *The Invisible Hand of Planning: Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World* (New York: John Day, 1941).

²⁰ H. G. Wells, *The Open Conspiracy: Blue Prints for a World Revolution* (Garden City: Doran Doubleday, 1928), p. 53.

²¹ Seminal statements from the technocracy movement are Howard Scott et al., *Introduction to Technocracy* (New York: John Day, 1933); Harold Loeb, *Life in a Technocracy: What It Might Be Like* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996 [1933]). For a contemporary appraisal, see Stuart Chase, *Technocracy: An Interpretation* (New York: John Day, 1933). Historical works contextualizing the movement are William E. Akin, *Technocracy and the American Dream* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Howard P. Segal, *Technological Utopianism in American Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

Reinsch and others had studied, remained a paramount point of reference (see Chapter 2). Leonard Woolf recalled that Reinsch's book was the only useful scholarly monograph at hand when he started writing his wartime reports on international government in 1916.²² The other precedent was represented by the inter-allied executives of the war years introduced above. Salter became the most influential proponent of extending their operations into times of peace. James Arthur Salter (1881–1975, 1st Baron Salter as of 1953, often referred to simply as Arthur Salter) was a British civil servant, politician, and scholar.²³ After graduating from Oxford University he joined the civil service in 1904 and became an expert in military logistics. This led him to the AMTC, where as head of the British section, he also served, *ex officio*, as the AMTC's 'secretary', and thus presided over the entire administrative apparatus. In 1920, he was appointed head of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations Secretariat in Geneva. At the League, Salter worked on the reconstruction of various European economies, beginning with Austria, after its financial crisis of 1922.²⁴ Upon his return to Britain, Salter embarked on a second career in academia, and specialized in political economy and democratic government.²⁵ In 1934, he was appointed Gladstone professor of political theory and institutions at Oxford University, which he came to represent also in the House of Commons.

Salter's ideas on national and transnational governance converged on the need for administrative expertise. His ideal was quite evidently represented by the British civil service, even if he insisted that public administration was an 'impersonal science' and thus universal.²⁶ Salter had much faith in the technical capacities, disinterestedness, and professional ethos of civil servants. He argued that they should not just implement political decisions but act as advisors early in the policy process, before the pushing and shoving of parties and interest groups began.²⁷ Salter had a preference for expert advisory bodies deployed close to the centres of political power at a national and international level. He was aware that increasingly the role of expert advisors in the policy process undermined the

²² Leonard Woolf, *International Government* (London: Fabian Society and George Allen & Unwin, 1916). Reinsch is cited in Leonard Woolf, *Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911–1918* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), p. 187, fn. 1.

²³ For a more extensive discussion of Salter's contribution, see Leonie Holthaus and Jens Steffek, 'Experiments in International Administration: The Forgotten Functionalism of James Arthur Salter', *Review of International Studies*, 42 (2016): pp. 114–35. The only biography is Sidney Aster, *Power, Policy and Personality: The Life and Times of Lord Salter, 1881–1975* (London: CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2016). In addition, there are two autobiographical books: Salter, *Memoirs*; Arthur Salter, *Slave of the Lamp: A Public Servant's Notebook* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967).

²⁴ Arthur Salter, 'The Reconstruction of Austria', *Foreign Affairs*, 2 (1924): pp. 630–43; Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessel, 'Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of Its Economic and Financial Organisation', *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), pp. 465–92, at p. 475.

²⁵ Arthur Salter, *The Framework of an Ordered Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933); James Arthur Salter, *Recovery: The Second Effort* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1933).

²⁶ See also Salter, *Recovery*, p. 214.

²⁷ Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, pp. 257–8.

primacy of parliament, but he found this development unavoidable, as a necessary shift from dilettantism to expert rule.²⁸ Parliamentary democracy, he argued, had emerged at a time when the state performed few functions. Technical complexities, economic crises, and growing calls for social equality required states to manage the national economy, and this could not be achieved by parliamentary means.²⁹

In a similar vein, he found generalists of the foreign office unfit to cope with the technical tasks of international governance. They were trained to think in terms of national interest, and were reluctant to adopt a transnational point of view. The solution to this problem, and for Salter the true innovation of the AMTC, was a transnational standing group of experts, founded on the 'principle of direct contact between specialists.'³⁰ These specialists were *Fachbeamte* seconded from national public administrations and hence not entirely independent.

Salter projected this inter-administrative type of organization into peacetime, arguing that this expert cooperation would be adaptable to managing a huge number of issues. Accordingly, he saw the proper function of the League of Nations in the technical and economic field and not in collective security. Its task was to provide administrative machinery to promote socio-economic progress. At the time of the Paris peace negotiations, Salter suggested that the League Secretariat be organized along the transgovernmental lines of the wartime executives, but he clashed over this with Eric Drummond, future secretary general of the League, whose plan for a genuinely international civil service prevailed.³¹ Despite the defeat, Salter proposed the transgovernmental scenario again during the Second World War.³²

Not all internationalists shared Salter's enthusiasm for peacetime cooperation through transgovernmental expert bodies. Angell, an advocate of Wilsonian ideals of collective security and universal democratization, criticized the strategy of executive cooperation harshly. He wrote in 1918 about this idea to continue wartime executives:

What sort of international government is to come out of that? The government of an international bureaucracy? Possibly. A Holy Alliance of executives and

²⁸ Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, p. 260.

²⁹ James Arthur Salter, 'World Government', in *The Modern State*, edited by Mary Adams (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933), pp. 253–316, at p. 253. On international economic advisory councils, see James Arthur Salter, *World Trade and Its Future* (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 91; James Arthur Salter, *A Scheme for an Economic Advisory Organisation in India* (Delhi: Manager Government of India Press, 1931).

³⁰ Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, p. 253.

³¹ Martin David Dubin, 'Transgovernmental Processes in the League of Nations', *International Organization*, 37 (1983): pp. 469–93, at pp. 473–5.

³² James Arthur Salter, 'From Combined War Agencies to International Administration', *Public Administration Review*, 4 (1944): pp. 1–6.

established institutions? Very probably. And that might well become one of the worst tyrannies that mankind has known, slowly growing in power, unnoticed, and so uncontrolled.³³

Angell feared for the precarious balance of power that Western republicanism had established between the legislative and executive branches of the state. The transnational expert administration that Salter suggested for the sake of competent and efficient government was encroaching on that balance, becoming a veritable threat to representative democracy.

Salter's approach had a notable influence on subsequent internationalist thought, most visible in the work of Harold Richard Goring [H. R. G.] Greaves (1907–81). Greaves was a product of the LSE, and influenced in particular by the pluralist political theory of Harold Laski. He came to Geneva as a student at the Graduate Institute but returned to London where he also taught from 1930 onwards. If still remembered at all, Greaves is known mainly as a scholar of government and public administration, not of IR. His first book, however, was entitled *The League Committees and World Order* (1931), and it was one of the first scholarly treatments of the administrative structure of the League.³⁴

The work is imbued with Salter's ideas and is programmatic in tone, but it displays more of an academic, that is to say, analytical and historical, interest in international organization. Greaves, only 23 years old when he wrote *The League Committees*, had high hopes for an evolution of what he called 'organs of international disinterestedness'.³⁵ Like Angell, Salter, and basically a whole generation of internationalists, he found the political world and its established institutions out of step with the realities of economic interdependence.³⁶ The mentality of national leaders, obsessed with sovereignty, autarchy, and independence, was, he argued, hopelessly obsolete.³⁷ Greaves approached the League from a constitutional perspective, and made analogies between the international system and the state, in particular Britain. Government, and that term for him implied democracy, needed to be adapted to the increasing complexity of modern societies and the undeniable facts of international interdependence. This required a combination of expert advice, wider participation of societal interest groups, and the creation of new international institutions. For Greaves, the League was the logical

³³ Norman Angell, *The Political Conditions of Allied Success* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1918), p. 128.

³⁴ H. R. G. Greaves, *The League Committees and World Order* (London: Oxford University Press / H. Milford, 1931). Of special interest here is also H. R. G. Greaves, *The Civil Service in the Changing State* (London: G. Harrap, 1947).

³⁵ Greaves, *League Committees*, p. vii.

³⁶ Greaves here drew especially on Francis Delaisi's *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971 [1927]), which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

³⁷ Greaves, *League Committees*, pp. 202–3.

and much-needed international incarnation of a universal tendency in government, which was the turn to expert administration.

Although Drummond's concept of a truly international civil service for the Secretariat had prevailed in 1918, the economic and technical branches of the League were filled with committees of national experts. Greaves regarded these committees as legitimate heirs of wartime executive cooperation and thus found them 'built on the right principles'.³⁸ Much like Salter, Greaves hoped that through the diffusion of international ideas into national government departments, the League's expert committees would also internationalize the outlook of domestic public administration. The direct link with national executives explained how the committees became influential, even if their formal powers were merely advisory. As within the wartime executives, expert administrators fed the new solutions to transnational problems directly into their national ministries. 'In their collective capacity', Greaves argued, 'these committees formulate expert recommendations and conventions which are in fact international legislation'.³⁹

When staffing international committees, the challenge was to select persons of high expertise who also had close ties with their national governments, so that ministers would listen to them. A delicate balance needed to be struck between dedication to the common cause and accountability to national governments.⁴⁰ Only this way was the transmission function assured. Greaves suggested that national ministers should also get together more frequently, so as to develop an international *esprit de corps*.⁴¹ Greaves was not a radical transgovernmentalist, however. He also called for functional consultation and representation of non-state actors, even if probably this was less a matter of principle and more a perceived necessity. Although the League was founded on the assumption that international relations occurred between states, to function effectively it had to include society's 'chief interests' in its remit.⁴² Greaves therefore approved of reform proposals to make the League's governance in the field of economic affairs more inclusive, suggesting tripartite structures of the kind that the ILO experimented with.⁴³ His caveat was that, unlike in ILO, such tripartite bodies should have only advisory functions.

Greaves in the end maintained a traditional conception of government, which is also reflected in his later writings, arguing that the responsibility for choices should always remain with elected politicians. A professional civil service, on the other hand, he believed was crucial for accomplishing the manifold tasks of what

³⁸ Greaves, *League Committees*, p. 6.

³⁹ Greaves, *League Committees*, pp. 10–12, 26–8, at p. 12.

⁴⁰ Greaves, *League Committees*, pp. 41–3.

⁴¹ Greaves, *League Committees*, pp. 61, 109.

⁴² Greaves, *League Committees*, p. 58, 253–4.

⁴³ Greaves, *League Committees*, p. 59; Michele D'Alessandro, 'Global Economic Governance and the Private Sector: The League of Nations' Experiment in the 1920s', in *The Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration: Power, Institutions, and Global Markets, 1850–1930*, edited by Christof Dejung and Niels P. Petersson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 249–70.

had become a service state. The expertise of civil servants was indispensable, as was their objective, disinterested perspective. Greaves felt that Britain had led the way in this regard, its civil service being 'one of the principal contributions made by England to political science and the art of government'.⁴⁴ The civil service was an imperfect but benign force, he felt, and could be trusted to produce outputs in the public interest.

To summarize, for Salter and Greaves the future of international and domestic government was intertwined. Both domains required professionalization to drive out the dilettantism of the generalists. A firm belief in the ethos, expertise, and disinterestedness of civil servants made Greaves much less worried about the democratic consequences of technocratic transnationalization, the growth of an executive-administrative nexus that increasingly blurred the lines between executive, legislative, and advisory functions. Their ideals of transgovernmental expert administration clearly grew out of the tradition of the British civil service, and their blueprint for a functional, technocratic League was pitched against Wilsonian visions of collective security. The American Pitman B. Potter (1892–1981), by contrast, combined a pragmatic defence of transnational expert bureaucracy with Wilsonian liberalism and its emphasis on an international rule of law.

Potter served as professor at the University of Wisconsin before moving on to the newly established hub of internationalism, the Graduate Institute in Geneva, where he stayed from 1932 to 1941. Potter was a prolific writer and a leading American expert on international organization between the wars. His magnum opus is *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization*, a hybrid between a textbook and a programmatic statement, first published in 1922 and regularly updated until the 1950s. There is disagreement in the literature as to how Potter ought to be labelled. Ernst Haas placed him with the ancestors of the functional approach, while others classified him as an early realist.⁴⁵ I am not really troubled by this problem of labelling, for, as I will show in Chapter 5, the classical-realist outlook of Carr and Morgenthau was compatible with functionalist figures of thought. My concern here is with technocratic internationalism as an intellectual attitude, and Potter seems to have endorsed it to quite some degree.

Like Salter and Greaves, Potter developed his proposals for international organization from a deeply felt dissatisfaction with traditional diplomacy. Diplomats and foreign offices, he argued, dealt with issues of transnational importance only when disputes arose between states.⁴⁶ Potter argued that this was

⁴⁴ Greaves, *Civil Service*, p. 218.

⁴⁵ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 8.

⁴⁶ Pitman B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (New York: Century, 1922), pp. 269–70.

too late. International organizations (IOs) of the technical-administrative kind, which Potter normally called bureaus, were required to work on these issues continually. Their foundation followed functional considerations. 'The bureaus have, in the past, been created to meet certain needs and have been given duties according to the need in each case, and a form calculated to support the functions assigned to these organizations.'⁴⁷ Potter, it should be stressed, did not believe that there was a fundamental difference between political and technical issues. He found that all political questions had technical aspects, and all technical questions political implications.⁴⁸ It was not the subject matter that made the difference but the method of tackling it. 'It is the distinction between the volitional and the scientific attitude and action upon any given matter.'⁴⁹ Political will and subjective preferences were the basis of a decision in the former case, objective knowledge in the latter.

Potter clearly preferred the scientific over the political, or 'volitional', method, and that renders him, in my view, a technocratic internationalist. 'If once a Convention can be concluded and a subject referred to a bureau and kept there', he wrote, 'there is some prospect that it will be dealt with on its merits and not by reference to what are often fictitious and artificial "national policies"'.⁵⁰ Potter was a political realist, however, when he acknowledged the enduring prevalence of the state in international affairs.⁵¹ Which subjects were treated 'scientifically' by international bureaus was a question of political will, as states retained the prerogative of deciding this. That mainly non-contentious issues were delegated to IOs was due to a lack of political resolve, not a direct consequence of the characteristics of the issues themselves. For Potter, states were irrational in their reluctance to transfer more issues to IOs. It was, he felt, in a rather short-sighted fashion that politicians defended their freedom to unilaterally seek advantages through bilateral diplomatic bargaining.

This bargaining, however, prevented outcomes conducive to the global common good, because non-pertinent considerations of power and prestige prevailed. The call for treating issues 'on their merits' is a theme that runs through Potter's work and is even more prominent here than in Salter's or Greaves' work. Potter shares their confidence that international relations can be rationalized and global welfare gains obtained by means of international organization. In a later edition of his *Introduction*, Potter came to draw a sharp dividing line between the realm of international politics, as traditionally conceived, and the new world of

⁴⁷ Potter, *Introduction*, p. 275.

⁴⁸ Potter, *Introduction*, p. 283.

⁴⁹ Pitman B. Potter, 'Note on the Distinction between Political and Technical Questions', *Political Science Quarterly*, 50 (1935): pp. 264–71, at p. 268.

⁵⁰ Potter, *Introduction*, p. 283.

⁵¹ Pitman B. Potter, *This World of Nations. Foundations, Institutions, Practices* (New York: Macmillan, 1929).

international organization that for him was, essentially, the combination of an international rule of law and international administration.

More and more matters of international rivalry are being given treatment in some more mature and formal manner. Institutions and forms of procedure in international cooperation are engulfing one after another of the great topics of international politics and reducing the importance of one after another area of international conflict. One item after another in the foreign policy programs of various nations is being transferred to the agenda of an international conference or the list of functions of an international commission. International politics tend to become obsolete, as international law and organized international cooperation become broader, deeper, and more effective.⁵²

The overarching concern in Potter's work, however, is not with welfare or efficiency but with peace. In this, and in his emphasis on the rule of law, he was a Wilsonian liberal. For Potter, functional international organization contributes to stability only in a very indirect way, by tackling potential economic and social causes of international conflict.⁵³ The direct road to peace, by contrast, was conference diplomacy, international arbitration, and fair treaties. Potter did not see the state, or national governments, on the retreat, or as being marginalized by international interdependence. The state was there to stay, and, provided it learned to behave more rationally, Potter did not object to that. He thus sought to insert technocracy into a more encompassing framework of international governance, centring on problems of security and conflict resolution. For Potter, 'low politics' and 'high politics' approaches to international security were not mutually exclusive but complementary. His ultimate vision was a global federation of states brought about through an ever-denser network of functional cooperation, collective security, and advances in law.⁵⁴

Left-wing functionalism and its critique of the state

The international cooperation that Salter, Greaves, and Potter envisaged was premised on the enduring existence and political centrality of states. It was liberal internationalism with a technocratic bend, and its proposals for functional international cooperation unfolded in a top-down fashion. This intergovernmental

⁵² Pitman B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization*, 5th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 55.

⁵³ Pitman B. Potter and Roscoe L. West, *International Civics: The Community of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 186.

⁵⁴ Pitman B. Potter, 'The Study of International Federation', *The American Journal of International Law*, 47 (1953): pp. 480–2.

approach did not call into question the existing state-based world order, and it did not have strong underpinnings in political or social theory. This is what distinguishes the pragmatic praise of international expert administration from the politically more engaged kind of functionalism that embedded its call for transnational cooperation into quite far-reaching proposals for social reform and democratization from the bottom up. I will now turn to this more utopian variety of functional reasoning.

The ideas informing this type of international thought, in particular British left-liberalism and Fabianism, are well-documented in the literature.⁵⁵ Fabianism was a strand of reform-socialist thought with technocratic and paternalistic tendencies, marked by trust in the state and in the virtues of experts.⁵⁶ Fabianism inspired a number of British international theorists of the early 20th century, among them the Bloomsbury intellectual and former colonial officer Leonard Woolf (1880–1969), who was married to the writer Virginia Woolf. Leonard Woolf is often considered the leading Fabian thinker on IR in the interwar years. During the First World War, the Fabian Society commissioned a study on the prevention of war, which Woolf was asked to write. He in the end delivered two reports. The first dealt mainly with international dispute settlement and conference diplomacy, illustrated with examples from the 19th-century concert system; the second, with international cooperation in functional fields. Peter Wilson argues that Woolf's reports, published in 1916 as a single volume entitled *International Government*, had a major influence on the further development of functionalism.⁵⁷ One important feature in this respect is Woolf's regard for non-state actors in transnational governance.

'Social groups', as Woolf usually called them, are present in the pages of *International Government* in two different roles. First, Woolf claimed that, in the 19th century, private transnational organizations were already performing governmental functions. He could make this claim thanks to his very broad definition of government as the 'organized regulation of relations within a community'.⁵⁸ At an international level, the term government implied the presence of an 'organ', some permanent administrative structure, whether it be

⁵⁵ Lucian M. Ashworth, 'The Poverty of Paradigms: Subcultures, Trading Zones and the Case of Liberal Socialism in Interwar International Relations', *International Relations*, 26 (2012): pp. 35–59; Jeannie Morefield, 'Hegelian Organicism, British New Liberalism and the Return of the Family State', *History of Political Thought*, 23 (2002): pp. 141–70; Michael Freeden, *Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought, 1914–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

⁵⁶ David Long, 'Paternalism and the Internationalization of Imperialism: J.A. Hobson on the International Government of the "Lower Races"', in *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*, edited by David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2005), pp. 71–91.

⁵⁷ Peter Wilson, *The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth-Century Idealism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 58–60. Wilson refers especially to how this work influenced Mitrany, even if Mitrany himself failed to acknowledge that influence.

⁵⁸ Woolf, *International Government*, p. 311, see also pp. 164–8.

public or private, and the regulation of transboundary relations 'by agreement'. The organized violence of warfare represented the opposite of government thus conceived.⁵⁹ Such an agreement may be concluded between states but also between societal actors. Woolf gave many examples of agreement in the private sphere, from the setting of industry standards to the formation of transnational cartels.

Second, non-governmental organizations increasingly interacted with the public domain through consultative arrangements. In Britain, Woolf argued, the executive was routinely liaising with all types of civic associations, industries, and trade unions. Parliament disapproved of this practice, as Woolf mentions, but he nonetheless appreciated it. 'It is essential', he argued, 'if the organization of government is to work fairly and smoothly, that it shall provide for the due representation of group interests'.⁶⁰ Extrapolating from the British example, Woolf suggested the expansion of this to a regular consultation of private associations at the international level of government.⁶¹ His favourite example of a close public-private collaboration that even went beyond mere consultations was L'Association Internationale pour la Lutte contre le Chômage, which had public and private bodies as members—a sort of public-private partnership *avant la lettre*.⁶²

Woolf's *International Government* clearly went beyond conventional notions of expert administration when it envisaged such close cooperation between (inter-) governmental institutions and organized civil society. His major conceptual innovation, however, was to conceive of international government as offering 'regulation'. This conceptual as well as terminological shift made it possible to imagine international government as an activity that could be performed by either public or private actors equipped with the relevant data and expertise. It marks the transition from a territorial to a functional conception of governance (as we would say today). Later defences of the European Union as a technocratic regulatory agency are based on a strikingly similar understanding of supranational government as regulatory.⁶³

Woolf's re-framing of government as providing regulation of social relations must be understood with a view to the pluralist theory of the state that gained popularity in the early 20th century. G. D. H. Cole, John Neville Figgis, and Harold Laski are most often associated with this strand of political thought.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Woolf, *International Government*, pp. 141–2. Peter Wilson discusses some ambiguities inherent in Woolf's use of the term 'international government'; see Wilson, *International Theory*, pp. 65–7.

⁶⁰ Woolf, *International Government*, p. 353.

⁶¹ Woolf, *International Government*, pp. 170–3, 352–4.

⁶² Woolf, *International Government*, pp. 356–9.

⁶³ Giandomenico Majone, 'Europe's "Democratic Deficit": The Question of Standards', *European Law Journal*, 4 (1998): pp. 5–28.

⁶⁴ For British pluralism, see Paul Q. Hirst, ed., *The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis, and H.J. Laski* (London: Routledge, 1989); Jens Bartelson, *The Critique of the*

These English pluralists refuted the theory of unlimited state sovereignty and had a functional conception of the state that invited visions of new, bottom-up approaches to organizing political life, since many of the state's functions could also be taken over by societal organizations. Pluralist thinking also encouraged a societal approach to international organization, and some contemporary British authors went further in this direction than Woolf had, most notably Cole.

George Douglas Howard Cole (1889–1959) was an Oxford scholar, political activist, and theorist of socialism. Like the other English pluralists, Cole was only an occasional international theorist but nonetheless he delivered original proposals for international cooperation when he proposed ideas for economic democracy at an international level. Cole always pursued an unorthodox kind of socialism, steering clear of revolutionary Marxism and domesticated social democracy.⁶⁵ He felt particularly drawn to the democratic theory of Rousseau, but he absorbed a wide and eclectic range of ideas from 19th-century utopian socialism and syndicalism.⁶⁶ The young Cole was a radical anti-centralist and anti-statist. He argued against sovereignty, against representative government, against capitalism and, not least, against the state. 'The omniscient state, with its omniscient Parliament, is [...] utterly unsuitable to any really democratic community, and must be destroyed or painlessly extinguished as it had destroyed or extinguished its rivals in the sphere of communal organization.'⁶⁷ He associated the state and its bureaucracy with the power of the ruling classes, whose privileges it defended.

Cole's alternative was a polycentric pattern of industrial and political organization, realizing social justice and democracy at the grassroots. This brought him to a seminal re-statement of guild socialism, a branch of utopian

State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 3. An important influence was the French public lawyer Léon Duguit who stipulated that public law in the industrial age was no longer based on sovereign command but on 'organization', see Léon Duguit, *Law in the Modern State* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919), p. 48. Duguit's functional approach to public law influenced international theory in France, mainly through the work of the international lawyer Georges Scelle, see Georges Scelle, 'La doctrine de Léon Duguit et les fondements du droit des gens', *Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique*, 1–2 (1932): pp. 83–119; Georges Scelle, 'Le concept de Société Internationale. Ses conséquences en technique juridique', *Revue de Droit International*, 15 (1935): pp. 7–35; Georges Scelle, *Précis du droit des gens* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984 [1932/4]). Duguit also had an impact on the British scene, mainly through Harold Laski who, together with his wife Frida, translated Duguit's magnum opus into English and prepared a long introduction full of glowing praise.

⁶⁵ David Long, 'International Functionalism and the Politics of Forgetting', *International Journal*, 48 (1993): pp. 356–79, p. 362; C. Deslisle Burns, Bertrand Russell, and G. D. H. Cole, 'Symposium: The Nature of the State in View of Its External Relations', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series*, 16 (1915/16): pp. 290–325.

⁶⁶ In his early work, he called upon British socialists to seek direct trade union action, rather than working through established institutions, see G. D. H. Cole, *The World of Labour: A Discussion of the Present and Future of Trade Unionism* (London: G. Bell, 1913).

⁶⁷ G. D. H. Cole, *Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic Democracy* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1921), p. 23.

socialism still associated with his name today.⁶⁸ Professional associations, the guilds, were to organize society bottom-up, not only industrial production and the crafts, but also health, education, and culture. Consumers were also to be organized along functional lines, with even railway season-ticket holders and telephone users forming small associations of their own.⁶⁹

This emergent network of associations would then replace the old hierarchical state bureaucracy. Cole realized, however, that guilds and consumer associations still required some central institutions to tackle problems that affected more than one of them. Within one functional domain, like agriculture, transport, or education, the 'coordination' between producers and consumers would be the task of sectoral councils. Problems that transcended the functional domain would be taken care of by the 'commune', a local territorial organization. Cole's commune would have an impressive number of tasks: to distribute resources, fix taxes and prices, and provide the minor police-like enforcement that might still be needed in a harmonious socialist society.⁷⁰

Cole envisaged guild socialism not only for national reform but also for international affairs. The respective proposals, however, remain sketchy. In his *Social Theory* he briefly outlined the contours of transnational functional governance. 'International functional organization would undertake, in the wider sphere, the work undertaken in the narrower sphere by national functional organization', he wrote, 'and the central coordinating body would reproduce internationally the federal structure of the national coordinating bodies.'⁷¹ This bottom-up, societal, and truly stateless approach to international organization is Cole's original contribution to international theory, even if he did not develop it much further. Cole was seconded by L. T. Hobhouse, a renowned philosopher and sociologist at LSE, who also advocated the idea that the functional spheres of society should become self-governing, ruled by those participating in their performance. Hobhouse promoted the idea of a World League in which states and 'international functions' would be represented side by side.⁷²

⁶⁸ G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1920); G. D. H. Cole, *Chaos and Order in Industry* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1920).

⁶⁹ The curious example of the season-ticket holders is in Cole, *Guild Socialism*, p. 81.

⁷⁰ Cole, *Social Theory*, p. 140.

⁷¹ Cole, *Social Theory*, p. 143. In the last chapter of *Guild Socialism*, Cole canvassed an international order of free, independent and (ideally) guild socialist societies, see Cole, *Guild Socialism*, pp. 189–90.

⁷² L. T. Hobhouse, *Elements of Social Justice* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922), pp. 238–42. On Hobhouse's international thought, see Leonie Holthaus, 'L.T. Hobhouse and the Transformation of Liberal Internationalism', *Review of International Studies*, 40 (2014): pp. 705–27; David Weinstein, 'Consequentialist Cosmopolitanism', in *Victorian Visions of Global Order*, edited by Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 267–90; Duncan Bell, 'Democracy and Empire: J. A. Hobson, Leonard Hobhouse, and the Crisis of Liberalism', in *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier*, edited by Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 181–206.

What enthusiasts of Cole's bottom-up transnationalism tend to overlook, however, is that transnational guilds were not his last word on the subject of IR.⁷³ Affected by the rise of fascism and the Great Depression he transferred his interests to public planning, which was so much *en vogue* in the 1930s and not least among Fabians (see also Chapter 4).⁷⁴ Extrapolating once again from the national level, Cole suggested economic planning was also necessary on an international level, in particular with regards to trade relations.⁷⁵ However, this would necessitate a top-down management by the state apparatus, not a bottom-up organization of society, which Cole openly conceded.⁷⁶ It was not Mitrany's pragmatism of the 1940s that buried the emancipatory project of the left-wing functionalists, as David Long once suggested,⁷⁷ rather, it was Cole himself who took care of this.

Mitrany's synthesis of pragmatism and utopia

The most systematic thinker on functional international organization was beyond doubt David Mitrany (1888–1975). Although there is, regrettably, no book-length portrait of his life and work, Mitrany is still so well-known that a brief biographical sketch should suffice. Mitrany was born and raised in Romania. As his professional future looked to be limited by his Jewish origins, he migrated first to Germany and then to Britain, taking up studies at the LSE in 1912. After a career as a political journalist and scholar, which in the 1930s took him to the US, in 1943 he joined the multinational company Unilever as an advisor on international affairs. Influenced in particular by Hobhouse and the socialist Graham Wallas, Mitrany was initially more attracted to social policy than to international affairs.⁷⁸ He was also drawn to the ideas of other theorists linked to the Labour Party and the Fabian Society, in particular Woolf, Cole, and Laski.⁷⁹ Indeed, his writings feature the same combination of interest in social reform at home and re-organization of politics abroad that characterized other internationalists of the British left. He studied the impoverished peasant populations of the Balkans and kept working on the subject of rural poverty until the 1950s.⁸⁰

⁷³ This point is strongly made by Holthaus, *Pluralist Democracy*, Ch. 3.

⁷⁴ G. D. H. Cole, *Principles of Economic Planning* (London: Macmillan, 1935).

⁷⁵ G. D. H. Cole, 'Planning International Trade', *Foreign Affairs*, 12 (1934): pp. 231–43.

⁷⁶ G. D. H. Cole, 'Plan for Living', in *Plan for Britain: A Collection of Essays Prepared for the Fabian Society*, edited by G.D.H. Cole et al. (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1943), pp. 1–33, at p. 20.

⁷⁷ Long, 'International Functionalism', p. 379.

⁷⁸ Lucian M. Ashworth, 'David Mitrany and South-East Europe: The Balkan Key to World Peace', *Historical Review*, 2 (2005): pp. 203–24, at p. 208.

⁷⁹ Navari, 'David Mitrany'.

⁸⁰ David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania: The War and Agrarian Reform (1917–21)* (London/Oxford: H. Milford / Oxford University Press, 1930); David Mitrany, *Marx against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1951).

Mitrany's approach to international organization is distinctive because it so decidedly and unambiguously sides with technocratic international governance and against Wilsonian schemes of collective security.⁸¹ This sets him clearly apart from Woolf, for instance, whose *International Government* held a place for functional cooperation but equally for arbitration and conference diplomacy. Mitrany's first major academic statement on international affairs was his 1933 book *The Progress of International Government*, whose title probably alluded to Woolf's wartime reports. Based on a series of lectures delivered at Yale University it was the first book-length exposition of what came to be called 'IR functionalism'.⁸²

Mitrany started out on a familiar note, arguing that interdependence required overcoming the territorial fragmentation of the political world. He gave that narrative a new twist, however, when couching it in terms of retarded modernization at the international level.⁸³ State sovereignty in the Westphalian order not only led to war but also stood in the way of socio-economic progress, globally conceived.⁸⁴ Traditional international politics had a bias towards maintaining the *status quo*, he argued, so that opportunities for transnational modernization through cooperation were often missed.

Mitrany went even further beyond the conventional interdependence narrative when he added to it a cosmopolitan perspective on the problem of equality.⁸⁵ His conception of equality is two-pronged. It entails formal inter-state equality as well as material equality among individuals. IOs, accordingly, had two complementary tasks: first, to create state equality before the law; and, second, to offer fair material living conditions for individuals.⁸⁶ Relating to the first point, *Progress of International Government* calls for legalization, for international courts and arbitration, a feature that largely disappeared from his later writings. The justification for this type of international government by law relates back to the equality theme. International law, administered by international executive bodies, was, he believed, necessary to end the arbitrary conduct of great powers and create real equality among big and small states.⁸⁷

Mitrany, however, did not elaborate much on the legalization theme, certainly much less than Woolf had done in 1916 and many prominent British internationalists, such as Alfred Zimmern, continued to do in the 1930s. He was much more interested in the use of IOs to perform practical work targeting material living conditions, to be improved by international cooperation in the

⁸¹ David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (London/Oxford: H. Milford / Oxford University Press, 1925).

⁸² David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1933).

⁸³ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 20.

⁸⁴ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 33.

⁸⁵ I elaborate on Mitrany's normative political theory at more length in Jens Steffek, 'The Cosmopolitanism of David Mitrany: Equality, Devolution, and Functional Democracy Beyond the State', *International Relations*, 29 (2015): pp. 23–44.

⁸⁶ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 103.

⁸⁷ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 65.

field of economic development, health, education, etc. Mitrany hence is a textbook theorist of what we can call 'welfare internationalism'.⁸⁸ Welfare internationalism is marked by methodological individualism, where international relations is approached from the perspective of the individual, and not states or governments. This methodological individualism is visible also in Mitrany's views on the state and its sovereignty, where the influence of the pluralists is discernible. Mitrany attacked the traditional conception of sovereignty at quite some length and posited instead that 'the State is for the people and not the people for the State'.⁸⁹

The needs of human beings were fulfilled through the functions of social institutions, and for Mitrany there was no reason to assume that the state should be privileged in performing such functions. Mitrany's functionalism, at least in its early version of the 1930s, was definitely anti-statist in character. The state and the nation formed a particularly unholy alliance, because he saw nationalism as the ultimate cause of most political evils and that it had to be overcome by all necessary means.⁹⁰ IOs, in his view, then, should not only be interdependence managers or welfare agencies with transnational reach, a secondary purpose should also be the undermining of state sovereignty, the diffusion of political power, and the creation of new social bonds across borders.⁹¹

It needs to be noted, however, that there was a certain ambiguity in Mitrany's attitude towards the state, which Per Hammarlund pointed out clearly.⁹² Mitrany observed that the state was taking on more and more tasks related to meeting the needs of its citizens, and hence becoming a 'service State', a trend he applauded. In industrial Europe and North America, the state in fact did expand rapidly between the wars.⁹³ This seems difficult to square with Mitrany's prediction of an imminent decline of the nation-state. Mitrany not only declared the state dangerous due to the excessive concentration of power in national government, but also he predicted that increasing international interdependence soon would make it obsolete.

Mitrany's fame for being an eminent theorist of IR functionalism owes to the elaborate and also radicalized vision of a global system of technocratic government that he devised. He advocated a polycentric form of governance beyond the state, a complex map of organizations with different functions, membership, and geographical reach. This was a real alternative to the strongly centralized

⁸⁸ Jens Steffek and Leonie Holthaus, 'The Social-Democratic Roots of Global Governance: Welfare Internationalism from the 19th Century to the United Nations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 28 (2018): pp. 106–29; Hidemi Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 191.

⁸⁹ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 99.

⁹⁰ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 118.

⁹¹ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 79.

⁹² Per A. Hammarlund, *Liberal Internationalism and the Decline of the State. The Thought of Richard Cobden, David Mitrany, and Kenichi Ohmae* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 100.

⁹³ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 97.

organization seen in the League of Nations. The political function of each organization would determine its geographical scope, its potential membership and institutional structure. 'The nature of each function tells of itself the scope and powers needed for its effective performance'.⁹⁴ Mitrany really seemed to believe in 'technical self-determination', which implies that the organizational form directly and unambiguously followed its function. Unlike Potter who had rejected the idea that one could really de-politicize technical tasks, Mitrany maintained that purely technical international government was a realistic possibility.⁹⁵ Equally distinctive in Mitrany's international theory is his aversion to the world state or any other central political structure resembling it. Already in *Progress of International Government* he argued against a reproduction of state-like structures on a supra-national scale, and in essence any type of territorially defined re-organization of politics. This later brought him into opposition with the federal approach to European integration, as we will see in Chapter 5.

To summarize, of all the technocratic internationalists, David Mitrany today is the only one considered a classic author in IR. His vision of technocratic international organization was the most elaborate defence of de-politicized expert rule at an international level up to that point. Interestingly, Mitrany's work of the 1930s does not confirm today's textbook wisdom that the overriding concern of IR functionalism is to overcome war through functional cooperation. In the *Progress of International Government* this was only a secondary theme. Only in his *Working Peace System* of the 1940s did Mitrany make this connection central.⁹⁶ In my view, the Mitrany of the 1930s was an intellectual catalyst who helped combine pragmatic and largely a-theoretical thought about technocratic IOs with functional social theory. Even if Mitrany had always insisted that he was a practical thinker and not an ideologue, he smuggled a good deal of pluralist political theory into his functional vision of governance. His staunch anti-nationalism and his insistence that the state needed to be overcome as form of social organization testify to the influence of Hobhouse, Cole, and Laski. Mitrany merged these elements into a coherent vision of technocratic international government that could stand alone and not just in conjunction with other elements, such as arbitration and collective security. That his, on the face of it, pragmatic and hands-on theory of de-politicized expert governance was hard to pin down in the conventional terms of political ideology may account for its success in the Cold War years. This argument will be developed in Chapter 5.

⁹⁴ David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organization', *International Affairs*, 24 (1948): pp. 350–63, at p. 358.

⁹⁵ Mitrany, *Progress*, p. 122.

⁹⁶ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how three major historical developments left an imprint on the technocratic internationalism of the interwar period. At an international level, the First World War gave rise to new forms of allied international collaboration that informed the new international order built around the League of Nations. At a domestic level, the state apparatus expanded, at least in the industrialized countries, and acquired new tasks in welfare provision. In the early 1930s, the Great Depression bridged the international and domestic divide as the international economic crisis prompted new government activism and the rise of national expert bodies. The ILO and the functional branches of the League in Geneva became international gathering grounds for the new class of experts in the public service.

The growing importance of experts and expertise was reflected in new varieties of technocratic internationalism. In this chapter, I have introduced two strands of thinking from the English-speaking world that in retrospect became associated with 'functionalism'. One strand was more top-down, as well as conservative, in its call for transgovernmental administrative cooperation with narrowly circumscribed tasks, modelled on the wartime executives of the Western allies. In Britain, Salter and Greaves suggested transgovernmental expert bodies as an alternative to collective security schemes but also to more independent, supranational bureaucracies. They accepted the preeminent role of states in international affairs and put a premium on administrative cooperation among them, framed and organized by IOs but implemented directly through national ministries. In the US, Potter did not subscribe to the transgovernmental ideal but still envisaged a good dose of expert cooperation within a more comprehensive Wilsonian framework of international organization. Remarkable in Potter's account is the emphasis that he put on a shift from the 'volitional' (i.e. political) mode of diplomatic negotiation to a scientific discourse of problem-solving. Despite this aversion to politics, Potter's vision of international organization was still premised on the continuing presence and centrality of states.

In a second step, I contrasted such ideas of international expert administration with the more utopian strand of functionalist thought represented, *inter alia*, by Woolf and Cole. Their vision of transnational cooperation was permeated by a critique of the capitalist state and must be read with a view to their proposals for socio-economic reform. In my reading of Woolf's *International Government*, I pointed to a conceptual shift from government as territorial control to government as providing regulation. This move enabled Woolf to interpret private forms of transboundary cooperation as a form of sectoral transnational government. Cole importantly hinted at the possibility of extending domestic forms of bottom-up societal organization along functional lines to the transnational level.

There is an emancipatory and utopian theme in this type of international thought that conventional accounts of administrative expert cooperation lack.

One may wonder, of course, if Cole and Woolf are accurately described as technocratic internationalists in the sense used in this book. After all, Cole reassured his readers that the complex patchwork of organizations that governed a guild socialist society would not lead to total 'bureaucratization'. But that was largely a rhetorical move in that Cole reserved the term 'bureaucracy' for the existing state apparatus. He was happy to concede that all functional associations in practice were performing 'administrative' work.⁹⁷ What distinguished this from standard visions of public administration was that citizens were foreseen to be directly involved in the workings of these bodies. Note, however, that the citizens involved in the associative tissue had access to it because of their particular knowledge about what was being discussed there. Participation in government hinged on the condition that the citizen had some sort of relevant expertise. This expertise was not necessarily certified by academic exams or diplomas but could consist in the practical knowledge of the craftsman, farmer, or coal miner.⁹⁸ Functional government, it seems, has a tendency towards technocracy that even a radical bottom-up conception cannot fully escape.

Moreover, Cole presumed that conflicts arising in a well-ordered guild socialist society would be settled by the use of deliberation and reason rather than classical political tools such as majority voting. I think it is not unfair to argue that Engel's idea that a socialist society could be administered rather than governed, because all fundamental conflicts had disappeared, is shining through here. While certainly not textbook advocates of expert bureaucracy like Salter or Mitrany, both Cole and Woolf had strong affinities with the underlying project of a rationalized society in which coordination replaced coercion, and reasoning the power struggle. And it should not be forgotten that Cole, like most exponents of the British left, converted to much more top-down visions of national and international planning in the 1930s.

In spite of their remarkable differences, the authors discussed in this chapter share a focus on functionally designed IOs; the eminent importance of administrations and expertise; and trust in the rationalizing potentials of deliberation and planning. On the ideal typical 'checklist' of technocratic internationalism presented in Chapter 1, Cole and Woolf score mainly on the modernist side. They believed in the possibilities of human agency to change the world for the better through appropriate social organization. Especially Cole's

⁹⁷ Cole, *Social Theory*, p. 73.

⁹⁸ The point is made also by Hobhouse, *Elements*, p. 237; and by David Mitrany, 'A Political Theory for the New Society', in *Functionalism. Theory and Praxis*, edited by A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (London: London University Press, 1975), pp. 9–25.

bottom-up vision, however, lacked a faith in expert public administration of the Weberian kind, which is still discernible in the writings of Salter, Greaves, and to some extent Mitrany. Interestingly, only for Potter was the legal form of international government really central, although Woolf and Mitrany had some things to say about arbitration.

I have argued in the beginning that this was a chapter on the liberal tradition of international thought, and it is legitimate to question whether Cole and Woolf were really part of that liberal tradition, given the socialist influences on their work. What, in my view, testifies to their liberalism is their response to the totalitarian challenges of the 1930s. Facing Hitler and Mussolini they came to defend the liberal model of a state based on individual autonomy, parliamentary democracy, checks, and balances. Chapter 4 shows how technocratic ideas unfolded in non-liberal contexts. As examples, I will cite Italian fascism and the French and Belgian 'planisme', an authoritarian offspring of the socialist tradition.

4

Transnational planning

This chapter is dedicated to non-liberal varieties of technocratic internationalism. In Chapter 3, I introduced authors who founded the ‘functionalist’ tradition of international theory in Great Britain and in the United States (US). These authors can be characterized as political liberals, even if some of them had strong social-democratic inclinations. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that all strands of technocratic internationalism were liberal. This would reinforce the still common belief that liberalism and internationalism were something like two sides of the same coin.¹ As I will show in this chapter, the interwar years were marked by a particular ‘international style’ in political and legal thought, which transcended the national boundaries, language communities, and ideological camps that we have come to perceive as being neatly distinct.² While that international style in political theorizing was thriving more in the English-speaking world than elsewhere, we need to acknowledge the genuinely transnational nature of the phenomenon.

In this chapter, I will focus on two largely forgotten authors who can represent technocratic internationalism in the fascist and socialist context. The treatment of their writings will be more extensive than that of the authors in the previous chapters. The reason, quite simply, is that these writers stand outside the well-known corpus of literature and wrote from a context presumably unfamiliar to an International Relations (IR) audience. I first consider the international theory of Giuseppe De Michelis, a Geneva-based Italian diplomat who developed a fascist approach to international cooperation. What he proposed in the early 1930s was a system of global economic governance coordinated by a powerful international organization (IO). Projecting Italian corporativism to the international level, De

¹ For this alleged connection, see Michael Banks, ‘The Evolution of International Relations Theory’, in *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations*, edited by Michael Banks (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), pp. 3–21, at p. 6; Michael W. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986): pp. 1151–69; Tim Dunne, ‘Liberalism’, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 186–201.

² The notion of an ‘international style’ in political and legal thought is taken from David Kennedy, ‘The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy’, *Utah Law Review*, 1 (1994): pp. 7–103. Originally, the expression ‘international style’ referred to modernism in architecture, see Henry R. Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, *The International Style: Architecture since 1922* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1932). On non-liberal forms of internationalism, see also Ana Antic, Johanna Contiero, and Dora Vargha, ‘Conclusion: Beyond Liberal Internationalism’, *Contemporary European History*, 25 (2016): pp. 359–71, at pp. 365–6.

Michelis envisaged a global scheme to allocate capital, labour, and raw materials, with a united 'Eurafrica' as avant-garde. De Michelis never was a key figure of Mussolini's regime nor did he represent the 'mainstream' of Italian fascist thought. However, his theory shows how utopias of international organization combined rather effortlessly with core elements of fascist political theory.

In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the work of Francis Delaisi, a French political economist and journalist of the same generation. He was the author of the so-called 'Delaisi plan', a scheme of transnational public works intended to unite the European continent. The idea behind this plan, presented in 1931, was to bring together the 'two Europes' that he found to co-exist on the same continent: the industrial core in the North-West on the one hand and the far less developed areas in Eastern and Southern Europe on the other. Politically, Delaisi was a syndicalist who late in his life came to sympathize with the Nazis and the way they re-organized the German economy. Accused of collaboration with the enemy, Delaisi became *persona non grata* in post-war France and soon fell into oblivion.

Delaisi's programmatic work on European integration via joint infrastructures shows interesting parallels with the approach taken by De Michelis. Both approaches revolve around a strong public power ordering the economy and society, but conceived transnationally, not within national boundaries. Their emphasis is on the needs for planning and state intervention in the economy. This is the intellectual framework in which their version of technocratic internationalism and a de-politicized rule of experts unfolds. In the last section of the chapter, I elaborate on the parallels with some of the liberal designs for international organization discussed in previous chapters. I contend that world order proposals of the 1930s must be seen in the context of transnational enthusiasm for rationalization, understood as public planning based on evidence and scientific expertise.

Italian fascism and its ideology

To contextualize the international theory of Giuseppe De Michelis, a brief introduction to Italian fascism is necessary.³ Italian fascism was a political movement that emerged at the end of the First World War and rapidly rose to power. Its leader, Benito Mussolini, governed Italy for two decades, from 1922 to the collapse of his regime in 1943.⁴ From the very beginning, the ideology of

³ This section summarizes an argument presented at greater length in Jens Steffek, 'Fascist Internationalism', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 44 (2015): pp. 3–22.

⁴ A. James Gregor, *Interpretations of Fascism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Alberto de Bernardi, *Una dittatura moderna. Il fascismo come problema storico* (Milan: Mondadori,

Italian fascism was characterized by remarkable flexibility, and it never became a particularly coherent system of political thought. This is not to say that it was completely erratic or without intellectual appeal.⁵ However, Italian fascism to a great extent thrived on a critique of other ideologies, manifest in its anti-liberalism, anti-parliamentarism, and anti-bolshevism.⁶ It also grappled with internal contradictions. While being highly critical of modern individualism it also promoted technological progress and socio-economic modernization.

The ideology of fascism had many different roots. Leading exponents of the movement, Mussolini among them, had a socialist past, and a legacy of Sorelian syndicalism informed in particular their socio-economic theorizing.⁷ At the same time, Italian fascists glorified the national community, in which the individual was to dissolve. Mussolini famously insisted that there was to be *tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla contro lo Stato* ('everything within the state, nothing outside of the state, nothing against the state').⁸ The oscillations of fascist ideology were also related to Mussolini's personality. For most of his compatriots the proclamations of the *duce* remained the ultimate reference point in deciding what Italian fascism actually was. Yet Mussolini proved to be opportunistic and adjusted his political rhetoric to new circumstances. The compromises he made with the Catholic Church and the Nazis testify to this flexibility.

Although Italian fascism was in many respects a nationalistic and particularistic ideology it harboured a number of theorists who elaborated on its universal implications.⁹ Giuseppe Bottai, Ugo Spirito, and Arnaldo Volpicelli were among the more well-known universalists. They represent a modernizing strand within Italy's fascist movement that Paolo Ungari called 'rationalizing fascism' (*fascismo razionalizzatore*), as opposed to the rivalling 'adventurous fascism' (*fascismo avventuriero*).¹⁰ Only the diplomat Giuseppe De Michelis, however, developed a veritable fascist theory of international organization.

2006); Roberto Vivarelli, *Storia delle origini del fascismo. L'Italia dalla grande guerra alla marcia su Roma* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012).

⁵ For Italian fascism as a 'serious' political theory, see especially A. James Gregor, *Mussolini's Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁶ Emilio Gentile, *Le origini dell'ideologia fascista*, 2nd ed. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), p. 495.

⁷ David D. Roberts, *The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979); Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁸ Benito Mussolini, 'Discorso pronunciato ai cittadini milanesi il 28 ottobre 1925', in *Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini*, vol. 21, edited by E. and D. Susmel (Florence: La Fenice, 1951–63), p. 325.

⁹ Niccolò Pinto, 'Universalità del fascismo. Internazionale corporativa', *Critica Fascista*, 13 (1935): pp. 299–303; Beate Scholz, 'Italienischer Faschismus als "Export"-Artikel (1927–1935). Ideologische und organisatorische Ansätze zur Verbreitung des Faschismus im Ausland' (Unpublished PhD-dissertation, University of Trier, 2001), pp. 95–6.

¹⁰ Paolo Ungari, 'Ideologie giuridiche e strategie istituzionali del fascismo', in *Il problema storico del fascismo*, edited by Mario Abrate (Florence: Vallecchi, 1970), pp. 61–79, at p. 77.

Giuseppe De Michelis was born on 6 April 1872 in Pistoia, Tuscany.¹¹ He studied medicine at the University of Lausanne and worked for a couple of years at the University of Geneva. In 1904, he joined the Swiss branch of the Italian Commissariato Generale dell'Emigrazione (CGE), a body set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protect the interests of Italian migrants abroad. De Michelis embarked on a remarkable career in the CGE and by 1919 was appointed as commissioner general. In this function, he negotiated a number of international agreements with European and extra-European countries to which Italians had migrated. As of 1920, De Michelis also represented the Italian government in the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Giuseppe De Michelis never was a central figure of the fascist regime but he served it in a number of prominent functions until the mid-1930s. He remained in office as commissioner general of the CGE after the fascist seizure of power and became a party member in February 1926.¹² Until 1936, he led the Italian delegation to the International Labour Conference and for a short period also represented Italy in the Assembly of the League of Nations (1930/1). Much of his daily diplomatic work was more technical than political, however. Over the 1920s, he represented Italy at a good number of international conferences and commissions in his fields of expertise: labour and migration. As of 1925, he also directed the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, the precursor of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. In 1929, De Michelis was appointed senator. After Mussolini's regime had collapsed in 1943 and allied troops occupied Italy, he was cited before the 'High Court of Justice for Sanctions against Fascism', but absolved. After the war, he briefly served as first president of the newly founded Italian state airline, Alitalia (1946–8). He died in Rome in 1951.

Next to his diplomatic and political engagements, De Michelis was a prolific author of scholarly studies and pamphlets, mostly published by the institutions he was affiliated with. His early writings tackled questions of labour and migration, but in the 1930s he turned to more general problems of international relations

¹¹ Biographical information taken from Maria Rosaria Ostuni, 'De Michelis, Giuseppe', *Dizionario biografico degli italiani* (Rome: Treccani, 1990), vol. 38 (http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giuseppe-de-michelis_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/); Anonymous, ed., *Chi è? Dizionario degli italiani d'oggi* (Rome: Formigini, 1936); Anonymous, ed., *Chi è? Dizionario degli italiani d'oggi* (Rome: Filippo Scarano, 1940). Senato della Repubblica, *Scheda del senatore del Regno d'Italia Giuseppe De Michelis*, fondo: segreteria del regno, serie: fascicoli personali dei Senatori del regno (<http://notes9.senato.it/Web/senregno.NSF/a04d83b9abb14b3ec125711400382f82/093a48df8779bd434125646f005b0247?OpenDocument>).

¹² Already in 1924, he had received 'honorary membership' of the Geneva branch of the fascist movement, see Senato della Repubblica, *Scheda*, p. 14. On the CGE see Philip V. Cannistraro and Gianfausto Rosoli, *Emigrazione, chiesa e fascismo. Lo scioglimento dell'Opera Bonomelli (1922–28)* (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 1979), pp. 28–9, 39–40.

and political economy.¹³ It was in this phase of his life that De Michelis published a book-length proposal for the global application of Italy's corporatist model, *La corporazione nel mondo*, which we focus on here.¹⁴ There is not much academic literature to date on the life and work of Giuseppe De Michelis. Historians have been interested chiefly in his extensive work on migration and labour issues.¹⁵ His proposals for global corporatism and European integration received less attention, and mainly in the context of studies with a different thematic focus.¹⁶

Fascist internationalism

La corporazione nel mondo was published in Italian in 1934, with a French and English translation soon following.¹⁷ Like other works in economics and political science of the 1930s, *World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines*, as it was called in English, took the Great Depression as its point of departure. De Michelis presented the book as a proposal for overcoming the crisis by 'establishing a form of organized economy on the international plane'.¹⁸ His interest in global corporatism, however, was not triggered directly by the Great Depression. He had already tabled ideas for international economic 'triangulation', as he preferred to call it, in the 1920s.¹⁹

De Michelis believed in a managed economy. The terms he used to denote public intervention into economic life varied: coordination, regulation, rationalization, triangulation. Triangulation did not refer to tripartite structures of governance (as in the ILO) but to the coordinated use of three basic factors of

¹³ Giuseppe De Michelis, *La disoccupazione operaia. Una migliore distribuzione della popolazione, della terra e dei capitali* (Rome: Carlo Colombo, 1931); Giuseppe De Michelis, 'A World Programme of Organic Economic Reconstruction', *International Labour Review*, 24 (1931): pp. 495–505; Giuseppe De Michelis, 'Direttive e prospettive dell'organizzazione internazionale del lavoro', *Gerarchia*, 11 (1932): pp. 375–81; Giuseppe De Michelis, *Politica internazionale del lavoro* (Rome: Carlo Colombo, 1938).

¹⁴ Giuseppe De Michelis, *La corporazione nel mondo* (Milan: Bompiani, 1934).

¹⁵ Renata Allio, *L'Organizzazione internazionale del lavoro e il sindacalismo fascista* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973); Cannistraro and Rosoli, *Emigrazione*; Stefano Gallo, 'Governare la mobilità. Il servizio statale delle migrazioni nell'Italia fascista' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pisa, 2008); Maria Rosaria Ostuni, 'Il fondo archivistico del Commissariato Generale dell'Emigrazione', *Studi Emigrazione*, 51 (1978): pp. 411–40.

¹⁶ Elisabeth Tamedly, *Socialism and International Economic Order* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton, 1969); Traute Rafalski, *Italienischer Faschismus in der Weltwirtschaftskrise (1925–1936)* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984); Scholz, 'Italienischer Faschismus'; Maria-Rosa Marrero, 'Notes sur la Société des Nations, les dictatures et la notion de corporativisme (1922–1939)', in *Korporativismus in den südeuropäischen Diktaturen*, edited by Aldo Mazzacane, Alessandro Somma, and Michael Stolleis (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2005), pp. 399–412; Daniela Liebscher, *Freude und Arbeit. Zur internationalen Freizeit- und Sozialpolitik des faschistischen Italien und des NS-Regimes* (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2009).

¹⁷ Giuseppe De Michelis, *World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935); Giuseppe De Michelis, *La corporation dans le monde* (Paris: Éditions Denoël et Steele, 1935).

¹⁸ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 236.

¹⁹ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 13.

production: 'labour, nature and capital'.²⁰ 'Nature' here refers to arable land and forests as well as mineral resources. If the coordination of these three factors failed, an economy faced what he called 'maladjustments'. Countering such maladjustments was a political, public task. The massive distortions brought about by the First World War and the Great Depression could not be tackled by one state alone, he argued. They required international cooperation to address the uneven distribution of labour, natural resources, and capital across the globe.²¹

The need for intervention was also grounded in a theory of market failure. The free market, in which liberal economists had placed high hopes, ceased to function as a mechanism of allocation in the 20th century, when public and private monopolies hampered coordination via the price mechanism.²² Fully in line with dominant fascist doctrine, De Michelis also criticized free market capitalism for the social inequality it produced, and for spawning a 'plutocracy' of bankers and industrialists. Communism, on the other hand, adopted a too extreme remedy when handing over all means of production to the working class.²³ Private property and individual economic initiative guaranteed the productivity of human labour and the accumulation of savings. The protection of private property, however, was neither tantamount to a capitalist form of production, nor a human right. 'The collective interest [...] is what determines the substance and form of property. Private property is the institution which at this moment in the history of modern progressive industrial societies can best subserve the general economic interest'.²⁴

This intermediate position between a market economy and interventionism was fascist orthodoxy. It enabled fascists to claim that Italy's corporativism was an alternative way of organizing the economy, even if it remained nebulous for many years what corporativism actually meant in practice.²⁵ According to De Michelis, the principal aim of the fascist economy was 'to preserve and to enlarge the purchasing power of the consuming population'.²⁶ Since consumers were more difficult to organize than employers and workers, the tutelage of consumer interests was a task of the state. Conflicts over wages, on the other hand, were to be addressed by the 'self-discipline' of the classes involved, rather than by strikes and lock-outs. If the parties failed to reach agreement, the interests of workers and employers were harmonized by 'the consciously exercised authority of the State which in this act transcends the corporative system itself and rises to the

²⁰ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 26.

²¹ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 28.

²² De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, pp. 233–5.

²³ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, pp. 29, 207.

²⁴ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 208.

²⁵ On corporativism, see Gianpasquale Santomassimo, *La terza via fascista. Il mito del corporativismo* (Rome: Carocci, 2006); Irene Stolzi, *L'ordine corporativo. Poteri organizzati e organizzazione del potere nella riflessione giuridica dell'Italia fascista* (Milan: Giuffrè, 2007); Alessio Gagliardi, *Il corporativismo fascista* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2010).

²⁶ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 210.

totalitarian care of the interests of the community'.²⁷ This almost metaphysical moment, when the state reconciles antagonistic group interests, is the obscure core of Italian corporativist doctrine.

Giuseppe De Michelis took corporativism to the global level. He made his case for a transnational attempt at 'triangulation' with reference to a wealth of statistical data. A particular problem was the massive concentration of the world's population in some areas of Europe and Asia while other inhabitable lands remain almost void of human activity. International political intervention was required to re-distribute populations, so as to make more efficient use of natural resources and provide work for the unemployed masses. A main hindrance in this respect was the lack of mobility in the labour force. De Michelis, now on his home turf, documented how international migration flows had been interrupted by the First World War, and had never recovered. This trend affected temporary labour migration as well as permanent re-settlement.²⁸ He therefore argued for international agreements and organizations to facilitate labour mobility. Raw materials were also unevenly distributed across the globe, and the fact that they were subject to national jurisdiction led to misallocation and shortages. Countries were abusing their control over scarce resources as a political lever. De Michelis therefore suggested that national sovereignty over natural resources should be limited and free access guaranteed. That proposal, even if made in universalist terms, would have clearly benefitted Italy, notoriously short of resources.

The First World War and the subsequent political turmoil had also hindered foreign direct investment. In particular Africa, De Michelis argued, suffered from a lack of foreign capital to develop its productive capacities and to serve as a market for goods produced in the industrialized world. Again, at the root of this misallocation were economic nationalism and protectionism. As a remedy, De Michelis suggested international cooperation to facilitate access to credit for small enterprises and farmers.²⁹

As a first practical step, such cooperation was supposed to start between the colonies and the centres of industrial production in Europe. To that end, existing colonial empires needed to be dismantled. Treating colonies as an annex of the mother country and not opening them to exchange relations with others (including neighbouring colonies) diminished both the welfare of the colonies and that of the colonial powers. This called for a 'more methodical and orderly revival of that colonising activity'.³⁰ De Michelis suggested transferring unemployed European workers to the colonies, in particular to Africa. He approvingly referred to similar ideas of the German economist and long-time

²⁷ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 30.

²⁹ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 158.

²⁸ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 46.

³⁰ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 143.

president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, who had also foreseen settler colonies as an outlet for European surplus population.³¹

Scientific, statistical, and administrative tasks related to colonial development were an ideal field of operation for international agencies. De Michelis thus came to promote technocratic cooperation in the field of agriculture and colonial administration, inspired by the mandate system of the League.³² He took care to distinguish this internationalized neo-colonialism from established colonial practices that led to the displacement and expropriation of native populations, and to forced labour.³³ Unlike established colonial powers such as Britain or France, fascist Italy was intent on developing, rather than exploiting, territories of the global South. To that end, humanitarian concern for native populations was merged with technocratic optimism. One could, De Michelis suggested, scientifically determine the number of foreign settlers in colonization projects without putting the sustainability of the native communities and their agriculture at risk.³⁴

The project of international cooperation along corporative lines was to unfold gradually, starting in Europe and Africa. De Michelis argued that 'a well-constructed and well-equipped European union—or better, as we shall see, Eurafrican union—will be the best example and preparation for the future forms of world economic and political collaboration.'³⁵ The Eurafrican union was a neo-colonial idea so widely discussed during the interwar years that De Michelis did not bother introducing it in detail to his readers. There were different versions of this concept, but the core always was the joint socio-economic development of the African continent through concerted efforts of European powers.³⁶

To re-start the economy in Europe, De Michelis also envisaged public works with a transnational dimension. These projects should integrate the continent through a new transport infrastructure and at the same time tackle mass unemployment. In this context, he approvingly cited proposals made by John Maynard Keynes. An international investment fund could further facilitate such tasks but De Michelis did not stipulate the need for new organizations. The League's Commission of Enquiry for European Union could take over the task of coordinating the work and include—in a corporativist spirit—representatives of national economic councils.³⁷

³¹ Hjalmar Schacht, *Das Ende der Reparationen* (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1931), pp. 229–32.

³² De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 150.

³³ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 177.

³⁴ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, pp. 71–2.

³⁵ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 166.

³⁶ De Michelis credited the prominent internationalist Coudenhove-Kalergi with the idea, see Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Afrika', *Panuropa*, 5 (1929); see also Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

³⁷ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, pp. 202–4.

A European union, De Michelis argued, should (and could only) be built around a common market, while 'the legal framework of the greater European society should not precede but spring out of the economic formation'.³⁸ This integration of Europe, or Eurafica, was only the beginning, however. Gradually, the project would include more and more parts of the world. De Michelis's true aspiration was 'world corporativism', to be developed by global institutions. The League of Nations, the ILO, and the International Institute of Agriculture (over which De Michelis presided) were the candidates for realizing this project.³⁹ It was not quite clear which institution was supposed to take the lead. The 1934 book remains rather vague, but an earlier version of his proposal had put the League clearly at the top of the list.⁴⁰ De Michelis was aware that global corporativism would infringe upon national sovereignty, a principle otherwise so dear to Italian fascists. He openly approved of this tendency, and found the League and other IOs already making some progress towards it.⁴¹

To summarize, what De Michelis developed in *La corporazione nel mondo* was a quite extravagant melange of internationalism, neo-colonialism, and corporativism. In the Italian press, the book received mixed reviews. Bottai's *Critica Fascista* found De Michelis's approach to international economic governance 'intimately Mussolinian', thus putting it explicitly into fascist orthodoxy.⁴² This positive appraisal was echoed in a number of articles on the colonial question that referred to the book or to De Michelis's ideas more generally.⁴³

Others were more hostile. Giulio Colamarino, a journalist and theorist of fascism, argued that the concept of corporativism remained so closely tied to the context of the state that its global application was unconceivable.⁴⁴ Only a strong state could discipline societal forces and become the 'motor' of corporatist development. In the absence of a central and powerful institution at the international level, how could a corporatist arrangement unfold? Economic cooperation and international law, he argued, were unlikely to become functional equivalents of the strong nation-state. Colamarino concluded that De Michelis had abandoned the ideological premises of the fascist project.

The contradictory assessments of the reviewers reflect the ambiguities of Italian fascism. In the eyes of the nationalist wing of the movement it was all but impossible to reconcile fascism with international organization. The modernizers,

³⁸ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 206.

³⁹ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 216.

⁴⁰ De Michelis, 'World Programme', pp. 504–5.

⁴¹ De Michelis, *World Reorganisation*, p. 213.

⁴² Alberto Donini, 'La corporazione nel mondo' *Critica Fascista*, 12 (1934): pp. 338–40, at p. 340.

⁴³ Gennaro Mondaini, 'Colonie e corporativismo'. *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 11/12 (1934): pp. 919–36, 993–1005; Eberto Casagrandi, 'L'Africa salverà l'Europa?', *Rivista di Studi Coloniali*, 3/4/6 (1943): pp. 205–14, 284–93, 468–77.

⁴⁴ Giulio Colamarino, 'La corporazione nel mondo', *Nuovi Problemi di Politica, Storia ed Economia*, 5 (1934): pp. 662–5.

by contrast, placed their emphasis on socio-economic progress and technocratic institutions that worked for the benefit of the people.⁴⁵ This was in principle compatible with international solutions. They also advocated fascism and its corporatist 'third way' for universal application. This made them keen on international recognition of the fascist ideology and its practical achievements. Linking up to that strand of the ideological spectrum, De Michelis made fascism compatible with the 'Geneva spirit'.⁴⁶ He knew that world order proposals with an accent on expertise and planning would be well-received in Geneva, especially at the ILO.

De Michelis thus navigated between ideologies that we have come to view as utterly incompatible. He found common ground mainly in techniques of governance, like planning and coordination of economic factors of production, which were widely endorsed across ideological divides. In the next section, I will introduce Francis Delaisi's advocacy for transnational public works as another illustration of the nexus between technocracy, internationalism, and non-liberal political thought.

Francis Delaisi: From syndicalism to internationalism

François Almire [Francis] Delaisi (1873–1947) was born into a modest family in the French province of Mayenne.⁴⁷ The young man was an exceptionally gifted student. He attended grammar school, and studied history and geography at the University of Rennes with the help of a scholarship. In these years, he joined anti-militarist and anarchist circles; and during the Dreyfus affair (1894–1906) he sided with the *dreyfusards*, the militant public defendants of Alfred Dreyfus. When his scholarship was revoked in 1898, presumably due to his political activism, Delaisi moved to Paris. While trying to finish a degree in history he turned to journalism and worked for radical left-wing periodicals, such as *Les Temps Nouveaux* and *La Guerre Sociale*. He became a member of the militant trade union Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and was appointed one of the editors of its political journal, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*. At the same time, he joined the intellectual circles and frequented the salons of Paris in which, it seems, he became friendly with exponents of the right-wing Action Française, a

⁴⁵ Ungari, 'Ideologie giuridiche', pp. 71–2.

⁴⁶ In his written defence before the High Court of Justice sanctioning exponents of the fascist regime, De Michelis explained that he had exploited the 'phraseology in fashion', see Alta Corte di Giustizia, 'Esposto a Difesa del Senatore Giuseppe De Michelis', in Senato della Repubblica, *Scheda*, p. 106; my translation, emphasis in the original.

⁴⁷ Biographical information is taken from Lorenzo Morselli, 'Francis Delaisi et l'Europe' (Unpublished MA thesis, Université de Paris I, 2001); A. Perrier, 'Delaisi (Francis)', in *Dictionnaire de biographie française*, vol. 10, edited by Roman D'Amat and R. Limouzin-Lamothe (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1965), pp. 653–5.

monarchist and anti-democratic movement.⁴⁸ While little is known about these contemporary sympathies for the extreme left and the extreme right, the common denominator might have been Delaisi's contempt for parliamentary democracy. Delaisi was convinced at the time that political change in favour of the working class could only be achieved outside the formal institutions of the French political system.⁴⁹

Next to domestic political affairs and socialist theory, Delaisi's publications from these early years already covered matters of international relations and political economy.⁵⁰ Although not principally opposed to political violence, Delaisi was known as a pacifist and defender of French neutrality before the First World War. In 1911, he warned that France could become enmeshed in a war arising from Anglo-German rivalry. Delaisi developed that argument in a pamphlet, originally a long journal article, entitled *La guerre qui vient* ('The war to come').⁵¹ With this, as it turned out, prophetic title, the piece gained him a reputation as a clear-sighted political analyst, and it was translated into other languages during the war.⁵²

The thrust of the booklet is worth discussing at some length because it shows how Delaisi analysed international politics. France, he argued, had ceased to compete with Great Britain in the global economy while Germany, a latecomer to industrialization, was succeeding in that role. The steep rise in success of German industry, its increasing military expenses, and its colonial ambitions inevitably created tensions with Britain.⁵³ In particular, the capitalists of England pushed their government 'to hold a reckoning with this unexpected rival'.⁵⁴ The essentially economic nature of the conflict had repercussions on the tactics in the war that Delaisi anticipated. Britain, he predicted, would try to cut off Germany's vital supply and export routes by blocking its ports on the North Sea coast.⁵⁵ However, equally important for German industry were the ports of Rotterdam and, especially, Antwerp. Neutral Belgium would thus become almost inevitably a theatre of the coming war.⁵⁶

⁴⁸ Morselli, 'Francis Delaisi', pp. 17–18.

⁴⁹ Francis Delaisi, *La démocratie et les financiers* (Paris: Guerre sociale, 1910), pp. 195–205.

⁵⁰ Morselli provides the most complete list of Delaisi's publications, see Morselli, 'Francis Delaisi', pp. 161–6.

⁵¹ Francis Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient* (Paris: Guerre sociale, 1911).

⁵² Francis Delaisi, *Der kommende Krieg* (Berlin: Mittler, 1915). Several translations appeared in English, such as Francis Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient / The Inevitable War* (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, 1915) (a bilingual version); Francis Delaisi, *A Prophecy Fulfilled: The Present War Predicted in 1911* (Omaha, NB: Swartz, 1916).

⁵³ Francis Delaisi, *La force allemande* (Paris: Pages libres, 1905).

⁵⁴ Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient / The Inevitable War*, p. 31.

⁵⁵ On the same strategy in the Second World War, see Francis Delaisi, *La révolution européenne* (Paris: Edition de la Toison d'Or, 1942), p. 8.

⁵⁶ Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient / The Inevitable War*, pp. 51–5.

The French attitude was pivotal in Delaisi's war scenario. 'Germany lacks capital', he wrote, 'and requires our money. England, not having compulsory military service, needs our army'.⁵⁷ France was hence in the position to prevent the coming war, simply by refusing to ally itself with any of the two. Delaisi called upon his fellow citizens to remain neutral and to not let themselves be deceived by chauvinist propaganda. However, he warned that French foreign policy was beyond the control of public opinion and parliament; and even beyond the control of the executive. For in reality, he argued, a 'small band of capitalists' had captured French politics and the mainstream press.⁵⁸ He conjectures that French capitalists had their private interests in waging war against Germany, citing commercial rivalries in Morocco and Turkey along with the interest of French banks in profits from domestic war loans.⁵⁹

What Delaisi formulated in *La guerre qui vient* was an economic theory of the causes of war under conditions of industrial modernity, where motives had shifted from territorial aggrandizement to the conquest of markets.⁶⁰ Even if war was still formally waged by monarchs or elected politicians, the driving force behind it were industrialists and bankers. Fooled by propaganda and nationalist sentiment the public failed to realize that modern wars were fought for essentially economic motives. Delaisi's analysis thus belongs to a family of left-wing theories about the economic causes of war that stipulated a connection between international conflict and the advance of capitalism.⁶¹

Delaisi's research on IR and political economy intensified after the First World War and inspired his proposals for international cooperation and planning. In 1920, he published *Le pétrole*, a study he had begun before the war.⁶² Unlike most of his earlier writings, this book did not adopt a distinctive working-class perspective, nor did it feature tirades against bankers and industrialists. Rather, Delaisi surveyed the development of the oil industry and the British-American rivalry from the point of view of French national interest, arguing that it would be wise to maintain a good balance of international allies.⁶³

Over the 1920s, Delaisi became increasingly interested in the management of the French economy, and he organized tripartite conferences that brought workers, employers, and consumers together. This new interest in corporatist arrangements also extended to the newly founded ILO in Geneva. He visited this

⁵⁷ Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient / The Inevitable War*, p. 13.

⁵⁸ Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient / The Inevitable War*, p. 98.

⁵⁹ Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient / The Inevitable War*, p. 97.

⁶⁰ Francis Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971 [1927]), p. 334.

⁶¹ H. N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace*, 10th ed. (London: Bell, 1918), pp. 36–7; J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: Nisbet, 1902).

⁶² Francis Delaisi, *Le pétrole. La politique de la production* (Paris: Payot, 1921).

⁶³ Francis Delaisi, *Oil: Its Influence on Politics* (London: Labour Publishing Company and George Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 79.

'extremely ingenious and original organization'⁶⁴ and its French founding director Albert Thomas, already his 'good friend',⁶⁵ in 1921. Between the wars, Delaisi turned into a vociferous advocate of international cooperation and European integration. He joined the French League of Nations Society and several pro-European organizations, among them the Pan-European Union of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Delaisi was among the speakers at the Union's first Congress in 1926 and became secretary general of its French branch.⁶⁶ He also supported the attempts at international conciliation by Aristide Briand, a social democrat who served eleven (mostly short) terms as prime minister of France between 1909 and 1929. Among Briand's initiatives was a famous memorandum on European integration along federal lines, presented to the League of Nations in 1930.⁶⁷

The irrationality of politics

The theoretical foundations of Delaisi's internationalism can be found in *Les contradictions du monde moderne* ('Contradictions of the modern world'), a massive book published in 1925 and soon translated into English, where it was called *Political Myths and Economic Realities*.⁶⁸ The title of the English edition goes straight to the heart of the matter. Delaisi made a categorical distinction between the rational world of economics and the irrational world of politics, somewhat resembling the Marxist distinction of base and superstructure. Economics pertained to the material world of demand, supply, and transactions. Politics, by contrast, was the province of myths. Political myths were irrational but nevertheless had a clear-cut societal function: they fostered solidarity among individuals, made collective action possible, and legitimated public authority.⁶⁹ The myth, he explained, 'can only create obedience by consent if accepted spontaneously by the minds of the people. It must have the air not of a useful fiction, but of a truth'.⁷⁰

In the course of history, a number of mythical truths had followed upon each other, from the polytheism of ancient Greece to the 'Marxist myth of the class

⁶⁴ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 400.

⁶⁵ Francis Delaisi, 'Un plan quinquennal de travaux publics dans le Sud-Est Européen', in *L'Europe centrale et la crise*, edited by Francis Delaisi et al. (Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 1933), pp. 591–618, at p. 616.

⁶⁶ Morselli, 'Francis Delaisi', p. 51.

⁶⁷ Aristide Briand, *Mémoire sur l'organisation d'un régime d'union fédérale européenne* (Paris, 1 May 1930) (<http://www.wdl.org/en/item/11583/view/1/1/>); see also Cornelia Navari, 'Origins of the Briand Plan', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 3 (1992): pp. 74–104.

⁶⁸ Francis Delaisi, *Les contradictions du monde moderne* (Paris: Payot, 1925).

⁶⁹ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 15. ⁷⁰ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 41; emphasis in the original.

war'.⁷¹ Delaisi identified a certain pattern in that historical sequence. In moments of transition, the economic development of a society often outgrew the institutional structures supported by the old myth. The industrial revolution, spurred by unprecedented technological progress, ushered in such a transition period. 'Big industry with the help of modern machinery, by compelling each country to specialize, and by aiming everywhere at the greatest output combined with the lowest cost, has succeeded in accomplishing the economic unity of the planet in less than a century'.⁷² Colonialism extended economic interdependence to the most remote areas of the globe. The result was what he called a 'Geon', a global organism with an imagined vascular and nervous system.⁷³

The globalizing markets inevitably came into conflict with the political institutions of the nation-state, still based on the nationalist myth of the French revolution. Political institutions were out of pace with economic realities. The key 'contradiction of the modern world' was the blatant mismatch between the globalized economy and political institutions based on the myth of national sovereignty. That mismatch led to chaos and war through a fateful collusion of economic competition and national rivalry, which came in the guise of economic nationalism and imperialism. Economic competition per se was not the danger but rather the fusion of politics and economics.⁷⁴ The mismatch also created intellectual inconsistency.

As a holder of capital, everybody invests his money wherever it is likely to bring in the best return, even though it be in an enemy country. But as a citizen, he will think of his own country first, demand protective measures or reprisals against rival nations and thus annul the profits of his own investments. *Homo politicus* thinks as a nationalist; *homo economicus* acts as an internationalist.⁷⁵

The challenge was to first expose and then overcome the contradictions inherent in this schizophrenic mentality. From 'the polytheism of sovereignties' the world had to arrive at the 'economic monotheism' of interdependence.⁷⁶ The difficulty, however, was in finding a new political myth to support post-national political institutions. Delaisi observed some attempts at creating it, such as the doctrine of free trade or Woodrow Wilson's slogan of 'making the world safe for democracy'.⁷⁷ Delaisi refrained from suggesting a new, internationalist myth

⁷¹ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 51.

⁷² Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 129.

⁷³ Delaisi (in *Political Myths*, p. 138) attributes the neologism to Hélian Jaworski, *Le géon ou la terre vivante* (Paris: Gallimard, 1928).

⁷⁴ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 335.

⁷⁵ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 366; emphasis in the original.

⁷⁶ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 416.

⁷⁷ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, pp. 262, 319.

himself. '[I]t need not be expected,' he argued, 'that it will emerge ready made from the brain of some sociologist or genius.'⁷⁸

Nonetheless, he laid out his own vision of transnational cooperation, based on the following reasoning: 'If the view be accepted [...] that the fundamental cause of the malady of Europe lies in the fusion of the economic and political factors, the remedy will be found in their separation.'⁷⁹ To achieve this separation Delaisi returned to syndicalism, suggesting the professional association as a basis for developing a transnational political outlook and transnational social solidarity. 'From this point of view, the syndical conception possesses a wonderful educational potency. Its starting point lies in man's most vital interest, his profession, by which his existence and that of his family are secured.'⁸⁰ With the help of transnational professional associations, the rational economic sphere would eventually be able to self-organize.⁸¹ If economic interdependence ever was to triumph over the various imperialisms and nationalisms, it needed a structure of transnational professional institutions to support it.

This type of transnational self-organization became the task of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Delaisi feared, however, that industrialists—if left alone—were likely to form a transnational oligarchy that would conclude agreements at the expense of workers and consumers. Delaisi saw the ILO as an institutional counterweight to this possibility, with its social policy agenda and its tripartite governance structure.⁸² As a third element, the League of Nations should have functioned as a forum for states to settle their disputes. Delaisi's institutional formula for international reconstruction and world peace hence read 'I.C.C.+I.L.O.+L.N.'⁸³

Uniting Europe with infrastructures

The end state of the international integration process that Delaisi envisaged was a 'United States of the World,' a federation conceived along the same lines as the United States of America. The laboratory for experimenting with integration was to be Europe.⁸⁴ Delaisi gave the rationale for European integration an interesting twist by accentuating the fact that the European continent was not only politically but also economically divided. This argument about Europe's economic geography was developed in *Les deux Europes*, published in 1929.⁸⁵ Delaisi stipulated that the European continent should be divided into an industrial Europe and an agricultural Europe—in his words, between *l'Europe du cheval-vapeur* ('horse

⁷⁸ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 440.

⁷⁹ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 373; emphasis in the original.

⁸⁰ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 412.

⁸² Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 402.

⁸⁴ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 415.

⁸¹ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 414.

⁸³ Delaisi, *Political Myths*, p. 406.

⁸⁵ Francis Delaisi, *Les deux Europes* (Paris: Payot, 1929).

power Europe, or Europe A') and *l'Europe du cheval de trait* ('work horse Europe, or Europe B').⁸⁶ Europe A, the industrial heartland, was circumscribed by a line that ran from Stockholm in the North, via Danzig and Budapest in the East, Florence and Barcelona in the South back North again via Bilbao and the Atlantic to Scotland.⁸⁷ Europe A was already integrated economically and had transnational infrastructures. Regardless of any remaining national differences, its populations had adopted a very similar lifestyle. Technology, scientific research, higher education, democratic modes of governance, all this remained 'in the narrow circle we have drawn between Dantzic and Barcelona, Glasgow and Milan.'⁸⁸

In the periphery, Europe B remained poor, fragmented, and culturally diverse. In search of new markets, industries and banks from Europe A had tried to venture into Europe B but were frustrated by political uncertainties and feudal mentalities. Europe A had therefore turned away from Europe B and conquered new markets overseas.⁸⁹ Likewise, Europe B had also expanded into colonial territories, not via trade and investment, but through emigration. In settler colonies, a 'Europe d'outremer' emerged, equipped with technology and capital from Europe A and workers from Europe B.⁹⁰ The strategy of colonial expansion had reached its limits, however. All attractive territories had been conquered; conflicts with indigenous populations had become more intense; and the envisaged modernization of many tropical areas lagged far behind expectations.

In Delaisi's view, it was time for industrial Europe to return to Europe B.

240 million Europeans only demand to work, to produce, to buy the stocks that burden us. For a century we have transported at huge cost millions of men over the seas, with enormous equipment and capital. Here the men are on site. They wait for nothing else than for equipment and credits.⁹¹

This is where the 'Dealisi-plan' of 1931 sets in, meant as a practical suggestion for bringing the two Europes closer together. Bolstered by a lot of statistical data and calculations, it was first presented in the French journal *Plan* and swiftly translated into English.⁹²

Delaisi's scheme centered on those areas of central and Eastern Europe that lay between the industrial core of the continent in the West and the rapidly

⁸⁶ Delaisi's thesis was challenged by geographers who pointed out that French agriculture in many regions of the country was far from industrialized, see Yannick Muet, *Les géographes et l'Europe. L'idée européenne dans la pensée géopolitique française de 1919 à 1939* (Geneva: Publications euryopa, 1996), p. 46, n. 65.

⁸⁷ Delaisi, *Les deux Europes*, pp. 25–6.

⁸⁸ Delaisi, *Les deux Europes*, pp. 50–1; my translation.

⁸⁹ Delaisi, *Les deux Europes*, p. 58.

⁹⁰ Delaisi, *Les deux Europes*, p. 81.

⁹¹ Delaisi, *Les deux Europes*, p. 205; my translation.

⁹² Francis Delaisi, 'Proposal of a European Economic Plan', *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 8 (1932): pp. 23–41.

industrializing Soviet Union in the East. Some sixty million people inhabited these 'marches', as Delaisi called them with reference to Charlemagne, predominantly peasants with little formal education and a traditional lifestyle.⁹³ Delaisi suggested boosting their purchasing power by raising revenues from their agriculture, which was not profitable due to the lack of infrastructure needed to transport, store, process, and export the produce. In particular, roads and highways were missing in the rural areas of the East.⁹⁴ Delaisi suggested major investments into transport infrastructures; storage, and processing facilities; and credits for farmers. New navigable canals were also to be constructed. He estimated that 1 million kilometres of new roads were required to elevate Eastern Europe to the level of France, in terms of road density.⁹⁵ Five years would be sufficient to build 400,000 kilometres, he argued, at a cost of 45 billion French francs.

Such public projects required central planning. 'Special offices' at a national level in each participating state were to be set up, staffed by political representatives at a central and local level, with experts in road-building and business representatives able to assess the traffic needs of the rural areas in question.⁹⁶ Managers of railway and water transport companies should also be present in these 'offices' so as to achieve a harmonious orchestration of the different means of transport and avoid unnecessary competition. To raise the credit necessary for such large-scale investment, Delaisi suggested autonomous national agencies to attract foreign private capital, supported by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as a trustee. Credit for farmers, notoriously in short supply in rural Eastern Europe, would have to be raised by a system of local agricultural banks.

In all this, the role of existing nation-states was marginal. Delaisi predicted that it would humiliate the nations to see international institutions, such as the BIS, in the driver's seat of these developments. But faced with the effects of the global economic crisis, states would eventually come to accept their own disempowerment.⁹⁷ Delaisi's aversion to the nation-state may be traced back to early syndicalist influences but must also be seen in the light of the Great Depression. In the crisis, states had turned economic policy into a weapon.⁹⁸ As Delaisi argued in his 1933 book *La bataille de l'or* ('the battle of gold'), the only remedy to the instrumentalization of economics by the state was to create a

⁹³ Delaisi, 'Un plan quinquennal', pp. 595–6, 612.

⁹⁴ Frank Schipper, *Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008), pp. 94–7. On infrastructures and the League, see also Frank Schipper, Vincent Legendijk, and Irene Anastasiadou, 'New Connections for an Old Continent: Rail, Road and Electricity in the League of Nations Organisation for Communications and Transit', in *Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe*, edited by Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 113–43.

⁹⁵ Delaisi, 'Proposal', p. 26.

⁹⁶ Delaisi, 'Proposal', p. 29.

⁹⁷ Delaisi, 'Un plan quinquennal', p. 610.

⁹⁸ Francis Delaisi, *La bataille de l'or* (Paris: Payot, 1933), pp. 126–7.

powerful international bank in charge of stabilizing exchange rates and thus the global economy.⁹⁹ His proposals for European economic integration also entailed a joint external tariff and monetary union, but all this was embedded in a larger project of global economic governance.¹⁰⁰ The Delaisi plan also found support in IOs. Albert Thomas at ILO enthusiastically supported the idea and its implementation became an objective of the newly founded Institut d'économie européenne in Bruxelles.¹⁰¹

In the 1930s, Delaisi became increasingly interested in technologies of planning and the organization of a guided economy, the *économie dirigée*.¹⁰² Heightening international tensions prompted Delaisi to publish a new edition of *La guerre qui vient* in 1934. Now under the title of *La guerre qui revient* ('The returning war') he warned against a new arms race.¹⁰³ He was active in anti-fascist circles and among the founding members of the Comité de Vigilance des Intellectuels Antifascistes. When mounting worries about a possible German attack divided the French left, Delaisi stuck to his pacifism. He sided with the 'conciliateurs' seeking appeasement, and joined the Comité Syndical d'Action Contre la Guerre in 1938. Not even the German invasion of France in 1940 changed Delaisi's mind, and he began, like other exponents of the pacifist left, to collaborate with the occupiers.

During the years of the occupation, Delaisi continued publishing pro-European articles and gave public talks on the subject, but his united Europe now was a continental one under German rule, without Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). His last major work, *La Révolution européenne* ('The European revolution'), praised the managed economy of Nazi Germany. Delaisi found that the Germans had successfully overcome the speculation and instability that he associated with Anglo-Saxon free market capitalism and which, in his perception, had ruined the world economy of the interwar years.¹⁰⁴ He also began to promote the idea of a currency regime based on working hours, the *mark-travail* ('labour mark'). He suggested this currency regime for a borderless European economic space, created through German leadership.

⁹⁹ Delaisi, *La bataille*, pp. 162–3.

¹⁰⁰ This global dimension has been neglected by those historians who concentrated on Delaisi's role as an advocate of European integration; Jean-Luc Chabot, *Aux origines intellectuelles de l'Union européenne. L'idée d'Europe unie de 1919 à 1939* (Saint-Martin-d'Hères: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2005); Carol Bergami, 'L'Europe est ailleurs! Technique Européenne et politique nationale chez Francis Delaisi et Jean Monnet', in *Les deux Europes. Actes du IIIe colloque international RICHIE*, edited by Michele Affinito et al. (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2009), pp. 119–32.

¹⁰¹ Morselli, 'Francis Delaisi', pp. 102–7; Schipper, *Driving Europe*, p. 95; Geneviève Duchenne, *Esquisses d'une Europe nouvelle. L'europhisme dans la Belgique de l'entre-deux-guerres (1919–1939)* (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2008).

¹⁰² Jacques Amoyal, 'Les origines socialistes et syndicalistes de la planification en France', *Le Mouvement Social*, 87 (1974): pp. 137–69.

¹⁰³ Francis Delaisi, *La guerre qui revient* (Paris: L'homme réel, 1934).

¹⁰⁴ Delaisi, *La révolution européenne*, p. 113.

In *La Révolution européenne*, all his previous calls for a neat separation of politics and economics gave way to a vision of an authoritarian economic regime under state control.¹⁰⁵ Completely disregarding the totalitarian and imperialist character of the Nazi regime, Delaisi concentrated on its economic doctrine in which he perceived a sort of imperfect socialism.¹⁰⁶ He even contended that the successes of the Nazi economy had been the real cause of the Second World War: the defendants of free market capitalism were trying to smash the rivalling German model.¹⁰⁷ Not surprisingly, *La Révolution européenne* gained Delaisi a reputation as a Nazi economist. After the liberation of France he was banned from publishing and persecuted for his collaboration with the occupants. He died on 20 July 1947 while a process against him was pending before the Court of Appeal.

Experts, the managed economy, and the public interest

Francis Delaisi's political thought oscillated greatly over time, from revolutionary anarchism to a defence of Hitler's totalitarian state. That intellectual trajectory may seem somewhat less capricious if we consider that a major influence on Delaisi was the syndicalism of Georges Sorel (1847–1922).¹⁰⁸ To simplify matters slightly, Sorel had attempted a synthesis of Marxism and the anarchism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. From Marx, he adopted the notion of class struggle but he did not reject private property. The struggle of the working class was to take place within a market-based economy, where syndicates formed a counter-elite to the bourgeois establishment. Sorel's own political affinities also shifted considerably. He militated for several left-wing parties, until he broke with socialism, sympathized with the right-wing Action Française only to then support the bolshevist revolution a few years later. As already mentioned, Sorel's syndicalism inspired, among others, Italian fascists. Mussolini's cult of direct action is of Sorelian heritage.¹⁰⁹

Most importantly, Sorel rejected liberalism and parliamentary democracy. This strain of influence is rather obvious in Delaisi's work, marked by rampant anti-parliamentarism and a general hostility towards politicians and party politics, grounded in a suspicion against the will of politicians to serve the general

¹⁰⁵ Delaisi, *La révolution européenne*, pp. 124–5. ¹⁰⁶ Morselli, 'Francis Delaisi', p. 137.

¹⁰⁷ Delaisi, *La révolution européenne*, pp. 257–8; see also Chabot, *Aux origines*, p. 209.

¹⁰⁸ Jaap De Wilde, *Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), pp. 118–19.

¹⁰⁹ Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 93–4; Luigi Ganapini, 'Revolutionärer und faschistischer Syndikalismus in Italien (1920–1945)', *Jahrbuch für Forschungen zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, 1 (2007): pp. 72–7; Roberts, *The Syndicalist Tradition*.

interest.¹¹⁰ Delaisi wrote, and here it may be appropriate to quote the French original, [*s*]ous tous les régimes à toutes les époques, la politique a été l'art de mettre l'intérêt général au service d'intérêts particuliers ('[u]nder all regimes and in all epochs, politics has been the art of having the general interest serve particular interests').¹¹¹ The contrast between what is good for everyone and what is good only for powerful factions is a cross-cutting theme in Delaisi's writings from *La guerre qui vient* to *La révolution européenne*.¹¹²

The challenge was to break the predominance of private interests and to devise political institutions that catered to the public interest. Delaisi's admiration of the Nazi economists in *La révolution européenne* was based on such reasoning: the Nazis wrenched control of their national economy from capitalists and installed a regime that served the working class (whether this is historically accurate is dubious, of course). In Delaisi's view, experts—when free from instrumentalization by political factions—were able to discern what was in the public interest and act upon this. For the same reasons, expert administration was a feature of the international organizations he called for, in particular international banks. Experts, he proposed, would serve the transnational public interest because they were not corrupted by national egotisms.¹¹³

Delaisi's writing also needs to be seen in the context of the *planisme* of the 1930s. As an approach to economic governance, *planisme* merged elements of heterodox socialism and rationalization theory.¹¹⁴ Its most prominent exponent was Henri de Man (1885–1953), a Belgian socialist who also collaborated extensively with the Nazis.¹¹⁵ French and Belgian 'planistes' diagnosed a crisis of overproduction in the industrialized world that could only be resolved through public intervention and planning, and boosting of the purchasing power of the masses.¹¹⁶ In his European plan of 1931, Delaisi transferred this strategy to the transnational level.

Even if Delaisi's version of *planisme* was a distinct phenomenon of the French-speaking left, a belief in the necessity of economic planning was widespread in the early 1930s.¹¹⁷ Not only economists and social scientists promoted it, but also engineers. Among the supporters of the Delaisi plan was Dannie Heineman

¹¹⁰ Francis Delaisi, 'What the Ordinary Frenchman Thinks', *The New Republic* (September 26, 1923), p. 122.

¹¹¹ Delaisi, *La bataille*, p. 167.

¹¹² Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient*, p. 98; Delaisi, *La révolution européenne*, pp. 125–6; see also Bergami, 'L'Europe est ailleurs', pp. 121, 125.

¹¹³ Delaisi, *La bataille*, pp. 94–5, 125–6.

¹¹⁴ Jules Moch, *Socialisme et rationalisation* (Brussels: L'Églantine, 1927).

¹¹⁵ Henri De Man, *Réflexions sur l'économie dirigée* (Brussels: L'Églantine, 1932); Hendrik de Man, *Die sozialistische Idee* (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1933); Mieke Claeys van Haegendoren, 'La pratique du planisme en Belgique', *Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales*, 12 (1974): pp. 131–42.

¹¹⁶ Amoyal, 'Les origines', pp. 145–6.

¹¹⁷ Mary L. Fledderus, ed., *The Necessity for Planned Adjustment of Productive Capacity and Standards of Living* (The Hague: International Industrial Relations Institute, 1932).

(1872–1962), a Belgian-American businessman and electrical engineer by training. As a pro-European and supporter of Coudenhove-Kalergi, Heineman had already contributed a flattering preface to *Les deux Europes*, and Delaisi also acknowledged Heineman's influence on his plan for European integration.¹¹⁸ Heineman was thrilled by the idea of a technology-driven unification of a continent.¹¹⁹ The friendship between a syndicalist and a businessman was based not only on their internationalism and pro-European outlook, but also on a shared 'Saint-Simonian' technocratic ideal of governance.¹²⁰

On an international level, advocates of planning and transnational public works gathered in Geneva. At the ILO, Albert Thomas forged corporatist arrangements between industry and trade unions, and adopted the idea of European public works to unite the continent.¹²¹ Incidentally, he also brought Francis Delaisi and Giuseppe De Michelis into contact. Having studied the Delaisi plan, Thomas on 28 October 1931 wrote a letter to Delaisi, suggesting that he should get in touch with De Michelis to discuss problems of agricultural development and in particular the question of credit.¹²² The anecdote shows to what extent the ILO under Thomas was a breeding ground for technocratic internationalism and networks of experts committed to scientific management and economic modernization.¹²³

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have focused on non-liberal varieties of technocratic internationalism which developed outside the English-speaking world. They were driven by projections of domestic institutions onto an international level. I have introduced the work of Giuseppe De Michelis, who worked to ground a theory of international cooperation in the ideology of Italian fascism; and the French syndicalist Francis Delaisi. The plan was to illustrate by way of example how effortlessly technocratic internationalism could be adapted to various ideological

¹¹⁸ Dannie Heineman, *Skizze eines neuen Europa* (Cologne: Gilde-Verlag, 1931); Delaisi, 'Proposal', p. 25.

¹¹⁹ Delaisi, *Les deux Europes*, p. 18.

¹²⁰ Morselli, 'Francis Delaisi', p. 64; Chabot, *Aux origines*, pp. 124–5. In the early 1920s, Delaisi in fact had collaborated with neo-Saint-Simonian circles in France, see Bergami, 'L'Europe est ailleurs', pp. 121–2.

¹²¹ Denis Guérin, *Albert Thomas au BIT, 1920–1932. De l'internationalisme à l'Europe* (Geneva: euryopa, 1996); B. W. Schaper, *Albert Thomas: trente ans de réformisme social* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), pp. 327–8.

¹²² The letter is cited in Guérin, *Albert Thomas*, p. 75, n. 54.

¹²³ Thomas Cayet, *Rationaliser le travail, organiser la production. Le Bureau international du Travail et la modernisation économique durant l'entre-deux-guerres* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010).

contexts, and how permeable the boundaries between the various ideological camps were in the 1920s and 1930s.

Both De Michelis and Delaisi start with a diagnosis of a widening gulf between the economic reality of international interdependence and the political reality of separate nation-states. As explored in Chapter 3, the interdependence argument was widely shared by British and American internationalists as well.¹²⁴ Across nations and ideological divides there was a sense of traditional politics being out of step with industrial modernity, and a sense of urgency in ushering in a new era of economic management. Disenchantment with parliamentary democracy was another common theme of interwar internationalism. Mitrany and Salter, as we saw in Chapter 3, also thought that parliamentary democracy was a relic of the pre-interdependence age. Even Coudenhove-Kalergi, who pursued the project of a European political party, found in 1932 that '[t]he parliamentary form of democracy will have to give way to other forms of it'.¹²⁵ The anti-parliamentary (and sometimes truly anti-democratic) tendencies of interwar internationalism are indicators of what Kenneth Bertrams called the 'techno-corporatist bargain': 'Especially effective during the interwar period in industrially-based and technology-oriented countries, it combined the attributes of social engineering derived from the application of technology to the social sciences, the denunciation of nineteenth-century laissez-faire economic liberalism and the contestation of the parliamentary regime as the backbone of liberal democracies'.¹²⁶

Techno-corporatism thus conceived was not directly tied to any specific political system or ideology. *Planisme* merged syndicalism and technocracy: Italy's corporatist 'third way' of private property and totalitarian control. Public planning also was en vogue among liberal political thinkers. Mitrany's 'New Deal' analogies and Salter's passion for economic advisory councils at whatever level of government were previously mentioned in Chapter 3.¹²⁷ Planning was the order of the day in socio-economic thinking in the interwar years, and it was a truly transnational trend. Techno-corporatism thus held the promise of transcending ideological divides and become a new basis for international cooperation. The

¹²⁴ See also De Wilde, *Saved from Oblivion*, pp. 210–11.

¹²⁵ Letter from Coudenhove-Kalergi to Leopold Klausner, 22 July 1932, cited in Katiana Orluc, 'A Last Stronghold against Fascism and National Socialism? The Pan-European Debate over the Creation of a European Party in 1932', *Journal of European Integration History*, 8 (2002): pp. 23–43, at p. 30.

¹²⁶ Kenneth Bertrams, 'Planning and the "Techno-Corporatist Bargain" in Western Europe and the United States, 1914–44: Diffusion and Confusion of Economic Models', in *Expert Cultures in Central Eastern Europe: The Internationalization of Knowledge and the Transformation of Nation States since World War I*, edited by Martin Kohlrausch et al. (Osnabrück: fibre, 2010), pp. 43–61, at p. 44. Bertram draws on the idea of a 'technocratic bargain' formulated by Guy Alchon, *The Invisible Hand of Planning. Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 5–6.

¹²⁷ For Salter's analogies, see Leonie Holthaus and Jens Steffek, 'Experiments in International Administration: The Forgotten Functionalism of James Arthur Salter', *Review of International Studies*, 42 (2016): pp. 114–35.

corporatist world order suggested by De Michelis is an excellent example to show how such a techno-corporatist design was projected from a domestic onto an international stage.

World order proposals of the interwar years must hence be seen in the context of transnational enthusiasm for the possibilities of rationalization, of purposeful public planning based on evidence and scientific knowledge. Jo-Anne Pemberton drew out the intimate connections between world order proposals and the cult of modernization in the interwar years most clearly: '[A]mong all world improvers it was a sustaining myth that social or economic frictions could be overcome through the application of intelligence by bodies of experts.'¹²⁸ This zeitgeist found its institutional home in international bodies such as the International Institute of Scientific Management (founded in Geneva in 1926) while material infrastructures such as motorways, railways, and electricity networks came to be seen as potential unifiers of entire continents.¹²⁹ Modernity in social and political theory was also associated with a distinct type of metaphor. Images of machinery became *en vogue* in describing societal institutions, in order to underline their precision and predictability, but also the overall functional design and harmonious interplay of the parts.¹³⁰ Social scientists came to think of themselves as societal engineers while engineers, such as Dannie Heineman, became political internationalists.

My analysis of De Michelis's and Delaisi's international theory has also highlighted how transnational planning found an important justification in relation to public interest. Technocratic institutions at the international level were consistently opposed to the struggle among factions, and the rationality of expert administration contrasted with the irrationality of politics (war being the greatest irrationality of them all). Arguments centring on public interest or the common good thus paved the way for a delegation of tasks to functional agencies, central banks, etc. Again, Chapter 3 showed how liberal authors followed the same argumentation strategy.

Despite all the striking similarities between the varieties of technocratic internationalism there is something specific about those that emanated from non-liberal contexts, and this is the status of public power. The absolute supremacy of the state was a constitutive element of Italian fascism. Images of a powerful state also characterized the Belgian-French *planisme* of Delaisi and de

¹²⁸ Jo-Anne Pemberton, 'New Worlds for Old: The League of Nations in the Age of Electricity', *Review of International Studies*, 28 (2002): pp. 311–36, at pp. 315–16.

¹²⁹ Pemberton, 'New Worlds', pp. 318–21; Irene Anastasiadou, *Constructing Iron Europe: Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015); Vincent Legendijk, '"To Consolidate Peace"? The International Electro-Technical Community and the Grid for the United States of Europe', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47 (2011): pp. 402–26; Schipper, *Driving Europe*.

¹³⁰ John M. Jordan, *Machine-Age Ideology: Social Engineering and American Liberalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

Man. Interestingly, the international theory of Delaisi and De Michelis also disregarded the control of public power by the individuals affected by it. In De Michelis's economic world order, international technocrats would have reshuffled populations and raw materials as economic efficiency required it. Delaisi's planners would have elected for European infrastructures to be built in a similar top-down fashion. It was not their concern how such choices could be authorized; how planners and technocrats could be controlled; or how affected citizens could have a say in it all.

5

A global New Deal

In this chapter, I show how technocratic internationalism survived the crisis of world order utopias in the 1940s and had considerable influence on the negotiation of post-war institutions. Against a backdrop of ideological tensions and inter-block confrontation, the pragmatic and apparently ‘un-ideological’ character of governance by expert administration proved attractive. In the first section of this chapter, I provide historical context by taking issue with the critique of modern rationalism in the war and post-war years. In the field of international thought, this critique came in the guise of a ‘realist’ backlash against the ‘idealism’ or ‘utopianism’ of the interwar period. Two celebrated but controversial books, E. H. Carr’s *Twenty Years’ Crisis* and Hans J. Morgenthau’s *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, held overblown faith in the possibilities of international organization being responsible for the disasters of the 1930s and 1940s.

In the second section, I document the prominence of technocratic internationalist ideas during the Second World War. I first return to Mitrany’s functional approach as it was re-proposed in his *Working Peace System*, a political pamphlet published in 1943. That wartime version of ‘functionalism’ became the reference point for subsequent generations of scholarship even if it targeted an audience of policy-makers with an immediate task of reconstruction. I then show how much popularity these ideas of technocratic governance enjoyed in political and academic circles during the war years. Technocratic thinking also became politically influential when American policy-makers projected the New Deal and its institutions to the international plane in the foundation of the United Nations (UN) system.

From the perspective of international theory, an interesting observation is the co-existence of realist and technocratic figures of thought. In this chapter, I show this with reference to the work of Morgenthau and Carr. Morgenthau came to advocate international cooperation in the field of low politics, but also multilateral control over nuclear technology. In doing so, he drew directly on Mitrany’s functionalism. E. H. Carr, the eminent British critic of all things utopian, suggested a European planning authority and a bank of Europe for uniting the continent. Carr often faithfully echoed Mitrany’s style of reasoning but in terms of substance his programmatic ideas owe more to the non-liberal varieties of technocratic internationalism introduced in Chapter 4.

The rising tide against utopia

By the 1940s, the atrocities of totalitarian regimes and a murderous war had thrown the intellectual project of modernity into crisis. Instead of emancipation from hard work and material want, modern technologies had brought humankind death and destruction on an unprecedented scale. Fascists, Nazis, and Soviets had adopted advanced forms of social organization to build up repressive political regimes. In the hands of the Nazis, a merciless bureaucratic machine executed the Holocaust of the European Jews. This made Weber's prophecies about bureaucracy's efficiency appear in a new and frightening light.¹ Modern techniques of social organization, or so it appeared to many contemporaries, had paved the way for a return of barbarism.²

In the field of social and political theory, émigré scholars from the European continent spearheaded a critical attack on modernity from their overseas destinations. Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Leo Strauss attacked established progressivist narratives. In the backlash against the optimism of the Enlightenment, internationalism also came under fire.³ German émigré scholars, such as Hans J. Morgenthau, John [Hans Hermann] Herz, and Georg Schwarzenberger became the protagonists of a 'realist' turn in international theory. The ground, however, was already fertile for this by the time they arrived. Disillusionment had already pervaded the young academic field of International Relations (IR) in the mid-1930s, as fears of a new world war began to appear.⁴

It has been argued that early American realism represented a nostalgic longing for an old world of inter-state diplomacy.⁵ Yet a truly reactionary attitude, in the sense of a will to return to the pre-1914 world, was not very common. It is most visible, perhaps, in the work of Edwin Borchard (1884–1951), who in the 1930s still yearned for the 'rational times' before the First World War.⁶ Borchard, an international lawyer and advocate of United States (US) being neutral, was one of the fiercest critics of the League and collective security in the country. A self-declared realist, he argued that international treaties reflected historically specific

¹ German émigré scholars helped exporting Weber's ideas to the US, see Peter Breiner, 'Translating Max Weber: Exile Attempts to Forge a New Political Science', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 3 (2004): pp. 133–49.

² See Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 78–80; Hans Kohn, *World Order in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942); Eugen Kogon, *The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System Behind Them* (New York: Berkley, 1950).

³ Corine Pelluchon, *Leo Strauss and the Crisis of Rationalism: Another Reason, Another Enlightenment* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014).

⁴ For this fear, see for instance Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Europe between Wars?* (New York: Macmillan, 1934).

⁵ Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot, 'How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and Decisionmaking in Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism', *International Security*, 40 (2015): pp. 87–118, at pp. 88–9.

⁶ Edwin Borchard, 'Sanctions versus Neutrality', *The Hungarian Quarterly*, 1 (1936): pp. 254–70, at p. 265.

constellations of state power and needed to be adapted whenever circumstances changed. A system of collective security was bound to fail, because it enshrined the status quo of the time of its creation and committed states to uphold it. It was futile and dangerous to try and transform international politics into law. Borchard, in the midst of the Second World War, still advocated a return to the great power concert of the 19th century.⁷

Few American realists, however, drew such radical conclusions from their criticism of the League. Much more widespread was a 'tragic' realism that sprang from disillusionment with the slow pace of progress in international organization. Frederick Schuman, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau certainly belong to this group of tragic realists. Frederick Schuman (1904–81) held a chair in history at Williams College but was a product of the strenuous Chicago School of political science. Under the tutelage of Charles E. Merriam, the Chicago School in the 1920s and 1930s propagated a progressivist 'scientific' study of politics.⁸ Faithful to that approach, Schuman suggested power as the fundamental category of a scientific analysis of politics (at whatever level). For IR this meant concentrating on states, their interests, and material resources. Schuman presented his ideas in a massive textbook called *International Politics*, first published in 1933. The book became standard reading in American political science departments and was superseded only in the 1950s by Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*.⁹ With its emphasis on power, it is usually regarded as one of the first realist statements, but it hardly qualifies as an anti-progressivist manifesto.

Schuman historicized power politics as a peculiar form of interaction that he called 'Machiavellian' and which he identified with the Western state system.¹⁰ That Machiavellian phase could be overcome, however, by purposeful international organization and related changes in state behaviour. In words that could easily have been Potter's (see Chapter 4), Schuman recognized the rationality of international administrative bodies, where 'social intelligence is applied to the fulfilment of human needs. An anarchic and individualistic system of relationships in which each State pursues its own interests, with resulting inconvenience and loss to all, is replaced by organization and planning through which all cooperate to serve the common interest'.¹¹ Schuman cautioned, however,

⁷ Edwin Borchard, 'The Place of Law and Courts in International Relations', *American Journal of International Law*, 37 (1943): pp. 46–57, at p. 56.

⁸ Michael T. Heaney and John Mark Hansen, 'Building the Chicago School', *American Political Science Review*, 100 (2006): pp. 589–96.

⁹ Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933). On the succession of textbooks, see Oliver Jütersonke, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 10.

¹⁰ Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System*, 2nd ed. (New York: Mac Graw-Hill, 1937), pp. 36–7.

¹¹ Schuman, *International Politics*, 2nd ed., p. 191.

that this method of international organization, which would have replaced politics by administration, was only applicable to problems of low political salience and not when vital interests of state were at stake.

Yet even those situations were amenable to new modes of negotiation that were more rational than traditional power politics. Schuman shared Borchard's view that accommodating change was a challenge to any international organization in the security field. Unlike Borchard, he found that the League provided the necessary infrastructure for 'orderly procedures involving mutual concessions and compromises'.¹² The problem was not the League but Fascist aggression that violated international law and repudiated the ideal of peace itself. Schuman's only hope was a grand alliance, including the US and the Soviet Union, to form against Japan, Italy, and Germany in order to force these states to honour their international obligations. American neutrality was not the way forward, but united action against the villains. Consider the following statement from the 1937 edition of *International Politics*, where Schuman discussed the situation after the Manchurian and Abyssinian crisis.

In the mid-twentieth century, disputes have tended to become violent clashes of rival wills-to-power. [...] This failure is not a failure of the League nor a result of innate weaknesses in the Geneva machinery. It is a failure of the members of the Western State System to live up to the expectations upon which the League was established and upon which all orderly government must be founded. [...] Though science and business have made the world society an intimate neighbourhood which grows constantly smaller and more interdependent, the family of the nation-states is all too evidently not a community after all. It is rather a dark jungle of primitive lusts and hungers where sovereign beasts rend one another with tooth and claw and savage cannibals seek to ensnare and devour their fellows. Geneva's failure is a failure to transform animals into men. [...] Machiavelli has triumphed over Dante.¹³

Schuman concluded with the gloomy prediction that a second world war was imminent. The disillusioned tone of Schuman's *International Politics* is similar to the one adopted by many 'idealists', from Angell to Woolf, during those years. Schuman remained committed to progress and, even if the League had failed, he felt that a return to old balance of power politics was not the solution. 'In any event the politics of power, having destroyed its creators, will end by destroying itself. The competitive pursuit of prestige and empire by the nation-states will come to an end before the close of the century.'¹⁴

¹² Schuman, *International Politics*, 2nd ed., p. 640.

¹³ Schuman, *International Politics*, 2nd ed., pp. 681–3.

¹⁴ Schuman, *International Politics*, 2nd ed., pp. 743–6, quote at pp. 745–6.

The tragic perspective on international affairs was emphasized even more by Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), the arguably most influential American realist of the 1930s.¹⁵ In his writings, however, it received a more pronounced anti-utopian twist. Niebuhr was a theologian with socialist inclinations who addressed the dilemmas of politics from a Christian perspective. The book that made him famous was *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, a scathing criticism of what he saw as an excessive faith in the possibilities of a rational, scientific organization of societies.¹⁶ Niebuhr here took on all modern political utopias in one sweeping move, no matter if they had been borne of liberalism, Marxism, or religious ‘sentimentalism’.

Niebuhr grounded this analysis anthropologically. Human beings were torn between the community interest and their private passions and desires. They knew what the former required and were able to act accordingly but were inevitably drawn to the latter. By their very nature, human beings were neither saints nor devils but had the potential to act morally and to resist their selfish impulses. Social groups, including states, lacked this ability to transcend their self-interest. They inevitably strove for power. The fundamental flaw of political utopias was to conclude from the individual ability to act morally that collectives could do the same. From this, Niebuhr also drew lessons on the nature of international politics and the limits of international organization.¹⁷ In designing the League, he argued that its founders had overrated the willingness of states to abide by common rules and ignored established wisdom about the grim realities of power politics. His formulation of the tragic condition of humankind is worth quoting at length:

The task of building a world community is man’s final necessity and possibility, but also his final impossibility. It is a necessity and possibility because history is a process which extends the freedom of man over natural process to the point where universality is reached. It is an impossibility because man is, despite his increasing freedom, a finite creature, wedded to time and place and incapable of building any structure of culture or civilization which does not have its foundations in a particular and dated locus.¹⁸

¹⁵ On tragedy, see Richard N. Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Toni Erskine and Richard N. Lebow, eds., *Tragedy and International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

¹⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1932).

¹⁷ Essays on the theme are collected in Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940). For his analysis of Germany and the dangers of appeasement, see in particular ‘Germany and the Western World’ (pp. 49–64); ‘Peace and the liberal illusion’ (pp. 83–93), and ‘Synthetic barbarism’ (pp. 117–30), all in Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics*.

¹⁸ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944), p. 187.

Niebuhr was able to make theological sense of this dilemma. He posited that all moral strife by necessity must end in frustration but, simultaneously, also in fulfilment. For anyone without Niebuhr's Christian faith, however, the prospect of joint frustration and fulfilment was hardly satisfactory; in particular for IR scholars who wanted to give policy advice. What exactly Niebuhr's diagnosis implied for foreign policy or international organization remained nebulous. Nevertheless, or maybe precisely because of this, Niebuhr's influence on wartime and post-war realist scholarship was enormous.¹⁹ He set the resigned, pessimistic tone; substituted utopias of linear progress with thinking in terms of eternal dilemmas; and justified the differentiation between morals and politics. Niebuhr's work seemed the perfect antidote to interwar euphoria about world improvement. It was cited also by Hans J. Morgenthau whose formulation of tragic realism proved seminal.

Morgenthau, Carr, and the ambivalences of modernity

Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–80) was born into a Jewish family in the Bavarian town of Coburg. He studied law and completed a doctoral dissertation at the University of Frankfurt on the justiciability of international disputes.²⁰ Shortly before the Nazis seized power in Germany, Morgenthau moved to Geneva and via Madrid migrated to the US in 1937. Morgenthau turned to political science only in exile, not least for the lack of other options.²¹ The political realism of Morgenthau, Herz, and other Jewish émigrés is sometimes attributed to their experience with the rise of totalitarianism in Weimar Germany.²² It would be misleading, however, to overstate this link with the realism of the émigrés. Already during his formative years in the Weimar republic, Morgenthau (quite like Herz and Schwarzenberger) had been exposed to a specific type of legal thought. Moving away from the legal positivism of the Wilhelmine period,

¹⁹ Torbjorn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 241; Hans J. Morgenthau, 'The Influence of Reinhold Niebuhr on American Life and Thought', in *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Prophetic Voice in Our Time*, edited by Harold R. Landon (Greenwich, CT: Seabury Press, 1962), pp. 97–109; Kenneth W. Thompson, 'Beyond National Interest: Evaluation of Reinhold Niebuhr's Theory of International Politics', *The Review of Politics*, 17 (1955): pp. 167–88.

²⁰ The dissertation was published as Hans J. Morgenthau, *Die Internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen* (Leipzig: Noske, 1929). See also Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001).

²¹ This is emphasized in Jüterssonke, *Morgenthau*, pp. 124–5.

²² John H. Herz, *Vom Überleben: Wie ein Weltbild entstand. Autobiographie* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1984), p. 106. On the fate of émigré scholars, see Richard N. Lebow, 'German Jews and American Realism', *Constellations*, 18 (2011): pp. 545–66; and contributions to Felix Rösch, ed., *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations: A European Discipline in America?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

German legal thinking became sensitive to the societal determinants and consequences of the law, and its political character.²³

In his 1929 doctoral dissertation, Morgenthau studied the relations of law and politics in IR. He defended a distinction between inter-state disputes, which could be expressed in legal terms and subjected to adjudication, and what he called 'tensions' (*Spannungen*). Tensions arose when there was a mismatch between the international legal order and the real power relations among states.²⁴ That situation called for redress, which was not possible via adjudication but only through a reversal of the international legal order.²⁵ In *La notion du 'politique'*, a book based on his dissertation and written during his exile in Geneva, Morgenthau echoed Weber in saying that 'politics' was concerned with the maintenance, increase, or demonstration of power.²⁶ A Weberian-realist conception of politics thus marked Morgenthau's writings long before he arrived in the US.²⁷

Morgenthau did not turn to political realism only when faced with the war and the Holocaust, but witnessing these tragedies unfold seems to have fostered a general disenchantment with modernity, which is absent from his pre-war writings.²⁸ A monument to this disenchantment is *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, a polemic that Morgenthau published in 1946. It was the first monograph he had written in English and marked his breakthrough in American intellectual circles, even if it later remained somewhat in the shadow of *Politics among Nations* and the more programmatic *In Defense of the National Interest*.²⁹ The main thrust of the book is to formulate a harsh attack on ideas of international organization and a global rule of law, and the words with which Morgenthau chose to open *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* deserve quotation: 'Two moods determine the attitude of our civilization to the social world: confidence in the power of reason, as represented by modern science, to solve the problems of our age and despair at the ever renewed failure of scientific reason to solve them.'³⁰

²³ Jütersonke, *Morgenthau*, p. 44.

²⁴ Morgenthau, *Internationale Rechtspflege*, pp. 70–80.

²⁵ See also Martti Koskenniemi, 'Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau and the Image of Law in International Relations', in *The Role of Law in International Politics*, edited by Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 17–34, at p. 20.

²⁶ Hans Morgenthau [Morgenthau], *La notion du 'politique' et la théorie des différends internationaux* (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1933), pp. 42–44, 61. On Morgenthau's debt to Weber see also Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau*, p. 130.

²⁷ Morgenthau [Morgenthau], *La notion du 'politique'*, p. 43.

²⁸ Lebow, *Tragic Vision*, pp. 220–2. In 1940, Morgenthau still wrote about 'the laws which govern the social relations of men' and left no doubt that he believed that social sciences had the ability to find them: Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law', *American Journal of International Law*, 34 (1940): pp. 260–84, at p. 284. His views changed, however, in the following years. See Hans J. Morgenthau, 'The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning', *Ethics*, 54 (1944): pp. 174–85.

²⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948); Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951).

³⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 1.

It does not seem far-fetched to argue that the 'attitude of our civilization' was Morgenthau's own. Totalitarianism and the holocaust loom large over the pages where Morgenthau goes on to say that the appearance of fascism 'ought to have convinced us that the age of reason, of progress, and of peace, as we understood it from the teachings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had become a reminiscence of the past'.³¹ In the 20th century, he said that 'modern man' had fallen from grace. Industrial modernity had atomized society, leaving individuals with a feeling of powerlessness, and it was this that had made fascism possible.³²

Scientific Man vs. Power Politics is a polemic that lumps together many authors and strands of political thought—too many, as critical reviewers pointed out.³³ Morgenthau associated these ideals with the project of the Enlightenment, the belief in scientific progress and the eventual triumph of reason. Their mischievous promise was that expanding rational control over the social world could fix the problems of power politics, violence, and war. Although liberal internationalism Wilsonian style was undoubtedly Morgenthau's main target, he found all modern political ideologies guilty of that misperception.³⁴ They had tried to transform the business of politics into jurisprudence and scientific management.³⁵ Morgenthau also dissected the construction of technocratic internationalism when he argued that '[t]he very field of politics thus becomes a kind of atavistic residue from a prerational period. Since politics is arbitrariness and chance, just as science is order and regularity, science fits perfectly into this picture of the social world'.³⁶

For Morgenthau, the architects of international organizations (IOs) had fallen for the illusion that the human lust for power could be tamed by rational insight and the scientific design of social institutions. Morgenthau thus in the 1940s explicitly rejected the idea that the instruments of technocratic modernism could be applied to international affairs: the expansion of formal organization, law, and technocratic bodies. Like the other realists, he advocated intergovernmental diplomacy instead.³⁷ He returned, however, to the promises of rationalism under the impression of the follies of nuclear deterrence, as I will show below. First,

³¹ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, p. 6.

³² Michael C. Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 122.

³³ See Jerome N. Frank, 'Book Review: Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics by Hans J. Morgenthau', *University of Chicago Law Review*, 15 (1947/8): pp. 462–78; for the reception of the book, see also William E. Scheuerman, 'Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man vs. Power Politics', *Constellations*, 14 (2007): pp. 506–30.

³⁴ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, p. 4.

³⁵ In a 1929 essay, Carl Schmitt had attacked the idea that science and technological development could overcome political conflict and strife in very similar terms, see Carl Schmitt, 'The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations', trans. John P. Mc-Cormick and Matthias Konzett, *Telos*, 96 (1993): pp. 119–30.

³⁶ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, p. 28.

³⁷ See Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Diplomacy', *Yale Law Journal*, 55 (1946): pp. 1067–80.

I will introduce Morgenthau's British counterpart as debunker of all things utopian, E. H. Carr.

Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) was an English historian and diplomat who had witnessed the birth of the League as member of the British delegation to the Paris peace conference. At that time, Carr was still a liberal supporter of international organization.³⁸ His worldview changed markedly over the interwar period, and by the 1930s he had become a heterodox socialist who sympathized with the Soviet Union but also with the German fight against the Versailles settlement. In 1936, Carr left the British foreign office and was appointed to a chair in IR at Aberystwyth.³⁹ From this academic position he launched an attack on 'the utopian approach' to international politics.⁴⁰

Carr's celebrated contribution to IR is the *Twenty Years' Crisis*, a book-length polemic which became so famous in international theory that it hardly needs introduction. While Niebuhr and Morgenthau targeted the pretences of a scientific approach to international relations and world peace in general, Carr's enemy was liberal internationalism.⁴¹ As he focused on the liberal legacy, Carr's attack on world order utopias did not go to the heart of technocratic modernity in the same way as Morgenthau's *Scientific Man*. Liberal internationalism was a particular ideology whose time had passed, he argued, but, still, Carr continued to believe in progress. By associating utopianism with liberalism, Carr left himself a back door open to continue elaborating his own world order proposals. I will turn to their substance in the last section of this chapter but before I need to outline a contextual irony. The realist revolt against world order utopias took place in parallel with the arguably greatest political effort at international organization in history. While realist scholars warned against misguided trust in IOs, American and British politicians already plotted a new international order, roughly along the lines of the ill-fated League. As I will show in the next section, this was one of the finest hours of technocratic internationalism in the theory and practice of IR.

'Earthbound, concrete and wholly practical': Functionalism's finest hour

The idea that cooperation in fields of low political salience could be the way forward had been among the lessons drawn from the demise of the League of

³⁸ Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H.Carr, 1892–1982* (London: Verso, 1999), pp. 57–8.

³⁹ On the troubled relationship of Carr and Davies, see Brian Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic', *International Relations*, 16 (2002): pp. 77–96.

⁴⁰ Haslam, *Vices of Integrity*, p. 70.

⁴¹ Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 79–80.

Nations. In the summer of 1939, shortly before war broke out, the League issued a reflection on possible futures of the organization, the so-called Bruce report, which was formally adopted in December 1939. Taking its name from the Australian statesman Stanley Bruce who was in charge of its drafting, the report suggested that the League should concentrate on its 'economic and social activities'.⁴² The report claimed that these were the fields in which the League had made a major impact in promoting global welfare and managing problems of interdependence. Indeed, the interdependence narrative that pervaded academic writing on international organization of the early 20th century is very prominent in the report. At quite some length the document then summarizes the successes of expert collaboration under the League and the fact that it also included non-members of the organization.⁴³

The Bruce report was written for national politicians and made an effort to reassure them that international cooperation was not about disempowering governments but rendering them more efficient. When cooperating in the League, governments helped each other by sharing expertise and experience, an argument put forward by Paul Reinsch (see Chapter 2). 'It is by international discussion, and by the association in the work of independent experts that governments can best safeguard themselves against the danger of being pressed by one sectional interest or another to assist it at the expense of the general well-being'.⁴⁴ What we see here is an interesting variation on the common good theme often used in justifications of international technocracy. It is not a transnational or global common good that is protected by IOs against the selfishness of factions, but rather a national one.

The central policy proposal of the Bruce report was an organizational reshuffling of the League. All its economic and social activities should be combined under a new 'Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions', which in the event became the Economic and Social Council of the UN.⁴⁵ The

⁴² The report was published as League of Nations, ed., *The Development of International Cooperation in Social and Economic Affairs: Report of the Special Committee* (Geneva: Special Supplement to the Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, 1939); Victor-Yves Ghébal, *La Réforme Bruce, 1939–1940* (Geneva: Centre européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 1970), pp. 9–27; and Martin D. Dubin, 'Toward the Bruce Report: The Economic and Social Programs of the League of Nations in the Avenol Era', in *The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium, Geneva 6–9 November 1980*, edited by United Nations (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), pp. 42–72. On Bruce and his influence on post-war planning, see David Lee, *Stanley Melbourne Bruce: Australian Internationalist* (London: Continuum, 2010).

⁴³ On the social and economic activities of the League, see Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁴⁴ League of Nations, *Development of International Cooperation*, pp. 8–9.

⁴⁵ J. Simon Rofo, 'Prewar and Wartime Postwar Planning: Antecedents to the UN Moment in San Francisco 1945', in *Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations*, edited by Dan Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 17–35, at pp. 25–7; Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 17; F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).

Central Committee was to be staffed, by way of initial experimentation, by twenty-four governmental delegates and up to eight independent experts 'co-opted on the ground of their special competence and authority'.⁴⁶ The architects of the UN discarded this idea of mixed membership but the idea of a 'Central Committee' for its functional, expertise-based branches was indeed adopted.

In the early 1940s, the question was not whether a successor to the League should be founded, but what exactly it would look like.⁴⁷ That the new organization would have to take on at least *inter alia* functional, managerial tasks was taken for granted. The negotiation process that led to the foundation of the UN was driven mainly by the Roosevelt administration in the US. 'As planning moved from London to Washington', Mark Mazower writes, comparing peace preparations in the First and Second World War, 'a generation accustomed to thinking in classic Oxbridge common-room style about the eternal wisdom of ancient Athens was superseded by a new cohort of policymakers more comfortable with discussions of comparative legal systems, farm economics, or business cycles'.⁴⁸ This attitude greatly favoured the technocratic approach to international organization. As for farming, Roosevelt's Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, a staunch internationalist, had advocated international cooperation in that field.⁴⁹ Secretary of State Cordell Hull believed in the need for IOs to manage an interdependent world, and so did many of his aides.⁵⁰ Arthur Sweetser, a former League official with an interest in functional cooperation, advised on questions of institutional design.⁵¹

Among the less visible figures who consolidated the internationalist thrust of American foreign policy was Raymond Fosdick.⁵² Woodrow Wilson had envisaged him as under-secretary of the League in 1919, but the plan faltered over quarrels in the US Senate.⁵³ After some years practicing law in New York City,

⁴⁶ League of Nations, *Development of International Cooperation*, p. 20.

⁴⁷ An inside view on the wartime debate is provided by Arthur Sweetser, 'The Framework of Peace', in *Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League of Nations*, edited by Harriet Eager Davis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp. 1–25.

⁴⁸ Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 199; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World. America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007).

⁴⁹ Henry A. Wallace, *The Century of the Common Man* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943).

⁵⁰ Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 208–9; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1643. Notable among the internationalist advisors is Leo Pasvolosky, a special assistant to Hull who had represented the US in meetings of the League on economic issues, see John Burley and Stephen Browne, 'The United Nations and Development: From the Origins to Recent Challenges', in *Wartime Origins and the United Nations*, edited by Dan Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 139–59, pp. 141–2.

⁵¹ Arthur Sweetser, 'The Non-Political Achievements of the League', *Foreign Affairs*, 19 (1940): pp. 179–92.

⁵² Mazower, *Governing the World*, p. 148.

⁵³ On the missed opportunity of the League, see Raymond B. Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 209–11; David Steigerwald, *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

Fosdick joined the Rockefeller foundation and served as its president from 1936 to 1948. Rockefeller greatly sponsored the social and scientific activities of the League as well as internationalist scholarship.⁵⁴ Together with Sweetser, Fosdick arranged for a re-location of the League's specialists in economics and statistics from Geneva to Princeton in 1940.

A pressing challenge to be tackled by the allies during the war years were humanitarian emergencies. Already in 1943, they had created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization (UNRRA) to that end. It was a short-lived institution but nevertheless it represented a new type of IO, dedicated to directly assisting human beings in distress.⁵⁵ Contemporary observers and historians alike discerned the impact of Roosevelt's domestic New Deal here, its welfare orientation, its emphasis on planning, and its specialist and technocratic style of governance.⁵⁶ It is probably no exaggeration to say that the political ground in the US was never before or after so fertile for technocratic ideas to be applied to international affairs as it was in the New Deal era.

The New Deal also made a great impression on David Mitrany who had studied it first hand in the 1930s.⁵⁷ He was impressed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a scheme of great public works, because it disregarded political borders, focusing instead on a natural area: the basin of the Tennessee River and its tributaries. The remit of the new public agency was to follow the course of a river, thus it was to be directed by nature. As outlined in Chapter 3, Mitrany was fond of the idea that political institutions should follow such objectively given natural structures rather than the arbitrary borders of states.

Upon his return to Britain in 1939, Mitrany re-proposed his functionalism for international organization in the war years. The 'Pragmatic Forties', as he called them in one paper, were susceptible to his ideas.⁵⁸ During the Second World War, Mitrany joined the Foreign Research and Press Service, a thinktank that the Royal

⁵⁴ Katharina Rietzler, 'Experts for Peace: Structures and Motives of Philanthropic Internationalism in the Interwar Period', in *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars*, edited by Daniel Laqua (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 45–66.

⁵⁵ Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 110–12; Jessica Reinisch, 'Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA', *Past & Present*, 210 (2011): pp. 258–89, at p. 273.

⁵⁶ Mazower, *Governing the World*, p. 199; Gilbert Murray, *From the League to U.N.* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948). On internationalism of the 1940s, see for example Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), ch. 3; Anne-Marie Burley, 'Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State', in *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Practice of an Institutional Form*, edited by John G. Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 125–56.

⁵⁷ David Mitrany, *American Interpretations: Four Political Essays* (London: Contact, 1946); David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), pp. 21–2.

⁵⁸ David Mitrany, *The Pragmatic Forties, or The 'Principle of Practicalism'* (London: Chatham House, undated).

Institute of International Affairs ran for the British Foreign Office.⁵⁹ The *Working Peace System* (henceforth WPS), Mitrany's most famous text, originated as a policy paper. Its target audience was politicians and intellectuals discussing possible post-war peace settlements, not only in Britain but also in the US.⁶⁰ As explained in Chapter 3, Mitrany had always been sceptical of global systems of collective security, mostly due to the problem of sanctioning offenders of the international legal order. In that sense, Mitrany was a political realist who advertised his own approach as 'earthbound, concrete and wholly practical'.⁶¹ His ostentatious pragmatism and awareness of practical difficulties in implementing international agreements also appealed to practitioners. In the autumn of 1943, Mitrany accepted an offer by the multinational company Unilever to work as an advisor on social and political questions in their London headquarters, a post he kept until his retirement in 1960. While Mitrany's regional expertise in Central and South-Eastern Europe certainly was an asset, his theoretical views on international cooperation reportedly were of interest to Unilever as well.⁶²

In WPS, Mitrany re-proposed the functional type of international organization, as being 'organized along the lines of specific ends and needs'.⁶³ His blueprint for international organization was still in the format laid out in the Dodge lectures delivered in 1932, and the evident failure of the League in matters of collective security seemed to confirm the point. With regards to competing visions of international order, Mitrany in WPS attacked first of all federalism. 'All the functional arrangements proved their worth, both in war and reconstruction', he wrote in a foreword to the 1966 edition of the pamphlet, 'all the federal and such political schemes proved pitifully barren'.⁶⁴

Back in the 1930s, Mitrany had not been shy to propose grand schemes of international organization. In the *Progress of International Government*, he sketched a global constitution with a 'universal League' and secondary regional

⁵⁹ On Mitrany in the war years, see Or Rosenboim, 'From the Private to the Public and Back Again: The International Thought of David Mitrany, 1940–1949', *Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences Po*, no. 2 (September 2013).

⁶⁰ Lucian M. Ashworth, 'A New Politics for a Global Age: David Mitrany's A Working Peace System', in *Classics in International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation*, edited by Henrik Bliddal, Casper Sylvest, and Peter Wilson (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 59–68. On Mitrany catering to American policy-makers, see Ian Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945–1975* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), p. 111.

⁶¹ Cited in Sir Frederick Pedler, 'Mitrany in Unilever', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 5 (1976): pp. 196–9, at p. 198; see also Lucian M. Ashworth, 'David Mitrany on the International Anarchy: A Lost Work of Classical Realism?', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 13 (2017): pp. 311–24.

⁶² Pedler, 'Mitrany in Unilever', p. 196, highlights how his area expertise was a factor in facilitating the somewhat unlikely appointment. Rosenboim cites Mitrany's correspondence with Unilever's Vice Chairman Paul Rykens who took a great interest in his functionalist views and pushed for his appointment as advisor; Rosenboim, 'From the Private to the Public', p. 7; David Mitrany, 'New Horizons for Management', *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, 5 (1976): pp. 190–5.

⁶³ Mitrany, *Working Peace System*, 1943 ed., p. 20.

⁶⁴ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), p. 20.

bodies with consultative and legislative competences, which would have dealt with regional problems and conflicts.⁶⁵ Mitrany framed such ideas in terms of devolution but one could consider them an instance of federal international organization. It probably had been read that way, for Mitrany took great care to stress the difference between his project and the European federation proposed by Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi.⁶⁶ Mitrany's main argument against transnational federations was that they were built on outdate models of the territorial state. The political integration of continents would simply lift political strife and disputes to a higher level so that, in the end, transnational federations would only reproduce the conflictual logic of territorial fragmentation.⁶⁷

As Lucian Ashworth points out, there is a pessimism in Mitrany's wartime proposals that resembles the tone of realist writings of the same years.⁶⁸ Mitrany in fact cited Niebuhr approvingly, and Niebuhr also seems to have held Mitrany's work in high esteem.⁶⁹ Mitrany defended the functional approach not because it was an ideal form of government, but because it was the most likely to succeed. The functional cooperative schemes that Mitrany proposed in his wartime writings defy any categorical distinction between intergovernmental and world-societal processes. The envisaged cooperation across borders was to directly address and include corporate non-governmental actors and citizens.⁷⁰ Mitrany remained by and large faithful to this approach until his death in 1975.⁷¹

The WPS was well-received; US Vice-President Henry Wallace wrote to Mitrany to ask for a copy.⁷² Contemporary observers found functionalism reflected in the rapid proliferation of technical and socio-economic organizations in the ambit of the UN system after 1945.⁷³ Subsequently, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with its powerful executive was also associated with his ideas. Critics of WPS argued that Mitrany's approach to international organization neglected the problem of power. The socialist C. A. Rowland, for one, found Mitrany's analogy with the TVA mistaken. Roosevelt's TVA scheme, he argued, worked because it was backed by a federal government and its enforcement capacities. It was unclear how an international

⁶⁵ David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1933), pp. 107–10.

⁶⁶ Mitrany, *Progress*, pp. 116–17.

⁶⁷ Mitrany, *Working Peace System*, 1943 ed., p. 12.

⁶⁸ Ashworth, 'A New Politics', p. 64.

⁶⁹ Mitrany, *Working Peace System*, 1966 ed., p. 29; Ashworth, *History of International Thought*, pp. 259–60.

⁷⁰ David Mitrany, 'The International NGOs: Experiment in Representation', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 April 1954.

⁷¹ David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective', *International Affairs*, 47 (1971): pp. 532–43.

⁷² This is reported in Ray M. Douglas, *The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939–1951* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 95, n. 57.

⁷³ Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 357.

body of the same kind could function where states remained free to retreat from it any time they wanted. In addition, there were very few checks on the international agencies that Mitrany proposed. It was naïve, Rowland argued, to assume that a public corporation would automatically work in the public interest and not pursue its own agenda.⁷⁴ What is interesting about this critique is that Rowland depicts international organization simultaneously as powerless vis-à-vis states and dangerously powerful vis-à-vis citizens. I will come back to this seemingly paradoxical assessment in the final chapter.

Mitrany's WPS certainly was a landmark publication, but there were far more technocratic world order proposals on offer in the 1940s. The American law scholar Harrop Freeman, for one, drew parallels between public administration at the subnational, national, and international level, pointing out the universal nature of the phenomenon of public administration and the particular body of law regulating it. International agencies, he argued, had developed methods for solving international problems and concepts of law familiar to domestic lawyers.⁷⁵ Freeman, much like Mitrany, was drawn to pragmatism. 'An architect's drawing of a house may be a beautiful thing, but it is the beam-by-beam building of the carpenter which makes the structure a reality.'⁷⁶

Another technocratic voice in wartime debates were former practitioners of international organization who had worked the machinery of the League. Ex-League officials, such as John Boyd Orr, Frank Boudreau, and Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer continued praising the virtues of international expert administration. Boudreau was an American specialist in the field of public health who directed the Milbank Memorial Fund after the war. He called for an internationalization of health policies and promoted the idea of an international expert civil service.⁷⁷ Ranshofen-Wertheimer was an Austrian diplomat who started working for the League in 1931 and due to his being of half-Jewish descent was unable to return home after the Nazis' annexation of Austria. He went to the US and, after a brief academic interlude at American University, became a policy advisor and subsequently a UN official. In two massive volumes, he provided an

⁷⁴ C. A. Rowland, 'The Functional Escape from Politics', *Socialist Commentary*, 9 (1944): pp. 176–80, at p. 178.

⁷⁵ Harrop A. Freeman, 'International Administrative Law: A Functional Approach to Peace', *Yale Law Journal*, 57 (1948): pp. 976–93, at p. 986. See also Harrop A. Freeman and Theodore Paullin, *Road to Peace: A Study in International Functional Organization* (Ithaca, NY: Pacifist Research Bureau, 1947).

⁷⁶ Freeman, 'International Administrative Law', p. 986.

⁷⁷ Boudreau focused mainly on his field of expertise, advocating strongly for the internationalization of health policies, see Frank G. Boudreau, 'Health Work of the League of Nations', *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 15 (1937): pp. 103–20; Frank G. Boudreau, *Our Nation's Health: An International Problem* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940); Frank G. Boudreau, 'International Civil Service: The Secretariat of the League of Nations', in *Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League*, edited by Harriet Eager Davis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp. 76–86.

insider view of the League and made a plea for a renewed effort at international organization.⁷⁸ Ranshofen-Wertheimer hailed the efficiency of the functional branches of the organization but cautioned that functional cooperation alone would not secure world peace.⁷⁹

Orr, the first director general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), emphasized the view that human welfare was the basis of any future peace. The point in having an organization like the FAO, he said, was 'that it affords a means of bringing Governments together for a definite, understandable, concrete scheme and gives them something on which they can begin to co-operate; and, once they begin to co-operate in one field, it will be easier to extend co-operation to other fields.'⁸⁰ Another potential selling point of technocratic internationalism in times of hot and cold wars was its non-ideological appearance, grounded in its emphasis on scientific data and facts. When Orr was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1949 he delivered a lecture in which he reassured his audience that

[c]oncrete plans of development need not conflict with any political ideology. They have the further advantage that they can be discussed in well-defined terms, like tons of wheat or standards of timber on which there can be no misunderstanding, such as occurs when politicians talk in ill-defined abstract terms like democracy or socialism or capitalism, which can be used to mean almost anything.⁸¹

As former practitioners, the former League officials were well-placed to promote the functional type of IO, pointing out that it was working experience that academics naturally lacked. Next to their heartfelt internationalist convictions they had a robust self-interest in doing so.

Affinities between functionalism and realism

Most textbook accounts of IR realism fail to mention that many of its early proponents dreamt of a world state. Hans J. Morgenthau, who had not given up

⁷⁸ Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945); Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *Victory Is Not Enough: The Strategy for a Lasting Peace* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1945).

⁷⁹ Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *Victory Is Not Enough*, p. 307.

⁸⁰ John Boyd Orr and G. D. H. Cole, *Welfare and Peace* (London: National Peace Council, 1945), p. 7 (passage written by Orr). See also Leonard Woolf, ed., *When the Hostilities Cease: Papers on Relief and Reconstruction Prepared for the Fabian Society* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1943), pp. 43–60.

⁸¹ Lord Boyd Orr, 'Nobel Lecture', *Les Prix Nobel en 1949* (Norwegian Nobel Institute), 12 December 1949, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1949/orr-lecture.html (accessed 4 November 2020).

completely on utopian thinking, was among them.⁸² His world state utopia was cautiously couched in Niebuhrian tragic terms of simultaneous necessity and impossibility. A world state was necessary to transcend the system of sovereign nation-states. This was the only way out of the Hobbesian condition of anarchy and the danger of nuclear war. Even if highly desirable such a solution remained very unlikely as states were not willing to give up their sovereignty. 'Humanity desperately needed to move beyond the Westphalian system, yet fundamental political mechanisms militated against doing so.'⁸³

Morgenthau also praised Mitrany's functional approach to international organization. In the second edition of *Politics among Nations*, he honoured him with a quote that covered more than half a page. Morgenthau explicitly subscribed to the idea that functional IOs would

create by the very fact of their existence and performance a community of interests, valuations and actions. Ultimately, if such international agencies were numerous enough and served the most important wants of most peoples on earth, the loyalties to these institutions and to the international community of which they were the agencies would supersede the loyalties to the separate national societies and their institutions.⁸⁴

Morgenthau cited specialized UN agencies and the nascent ECSC as real-world examples to illustrate the theoretical approach. If successful, the ECSC would undermine the sovereignty of its member states without their realizing it. The success of functional organizations, however, crucially depended upon their institutional design and personnel, and the extent to which 'technicians' were able to do their work protected from political influence. Morgenthau characteristically injected a good dose of realism into the discussion when he argued that the room for manoeuvre of an IO was limited by the political balance of power between its member states and in the global political environment.⁸⁵

In fact, Morgenthau enlisted functionalism for his own utopian project of a world state. Functional organizations would help prepare the ground by building 'world community'. However, states and their power considerations would still formulate the conditions under which functional international organization could work. The functional erosion of sovereign statehood would thus unfold within a framework set by sovereign states. Why states would ever allow that

⁸² James P. Speer II, 'Hans Morgenthau and the World State', *World Politics*, 20 (1968): pp. 207–27; Campbell Craig, 'Hans Morgenthau and the World State Revisited', in *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations*, edited by Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 195–215.

⁸³ Scheuerman, 'Was Morgenthau a Realist?', p. 524.

⁸⁴ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 493.

⁸⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 498–9.

erosion to happen remains a conundrum, however, given Morgenthau's views on power and foreign policy.

Puzzling is also Morgenthau's association of functionalism with the control of nuclear weapons. The nuclear stalemate that came close to the brink of the Cold War years had undermined Morgenthau's confidence in the advisability of confrontational strategies.⁸⁶ He therefore came to advocate supranational control of nuclear weapons by an international agency as the 'indispensable precondition of survival'.⁸⁷ In his flattering introduction to the 1966 edition of Mitrany's WPS, Morgenthau associated the international control of nuclear technology quite clearly with functionalism.⁸⁸ This appears to be a remarkably odd adaptation of Mitrany's ideas. Nuclear weapons represented a technological risk and as such could have been managed by an international authority. At the same time, they remained the most politicized of issues imaginable in the East-West conflict. The suggestion that such weapons could be put under supranational control flies in the face of the functionalist axiom that cooperation must start with the least controversial issues. What Morgenthau liked about Mitrany's functionalism, it seems, was the pragmatic step by step approach to international cooperation that acknowledged the practical difficulties of building international organization in a world of sovereign states. At the same time Morgenthau ignored (or may have chosen to ignore) some fundamental theoretical assumptions on which Mitrany had built his functionalist edifice.

It is apparent from Mitrany's own preface to the 1966 edition of WPS that the common ground he shared with Morgenthau included their revulsion for nationalism. Both considered nationalism obsolete in times of global interdependence, and the advent of nuclear weapons had made nationalist follies more dangerous than ever. Despite his devastating criticism of Western rationalism in *Scientific Man*, Morgenthau believed in the possibility of a 'rational theory' of politics and in a rational foreign policy. Not least, both Morgenthau and Mitrany acknowledged the practical importance of starting and maintaining a process of international cooperation. While Mitrany had originally looked more closely at the interests of individuals, Morgenthau and other realists opened the functionalist approach to include the interests of states. David Long rightly says that Mitrany's WPS 'sanitized' the functional approach and omitted much of the utopian and emancipatory content from interwar years.⁸⁹ Mitrany, it seems, had made his peace with the state.

⁸⁶ Craig, 'Hans Morgenthau', pp. 211–12.

⁸⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1960), pp. 167–77, at p. 177.

⁸⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Introduction', to Mitrany, *Working Peace System*, 1966 ed., pp. 7–11, at p. 11; Morgenthau apparently arranged for the publication of this 1966 edition of the *Working Peace System*, which had become unavailable in the US; see Ashworth, 'A New Politics', p. 59.

⁸⁹ David Long, 'International Functionalism and the Politics of Forgetting', *International Journal*, 48 (1993): pp. 355–79, at p. 376.

The peculiar liaison between functionalist and realist figures of thought is also visible in Carr's wartime writings. While Carr did believe in the possibility of progress he 'did not believe in the Enlightenment notion of an eternally ascendant humanity'.⁹⁰ In Carr's view, the pathways of progress were tortuous, as the torch was passed from one leading state to another. Carr saw the former leader, Britain, in decline, immobilized by an ossified liberal creed and unable to realize that economic conditions had changed. The torch now was now in the hands of those who had understood the new necessities better: the Bolsheviks, the Italian fascists, and the Nazis. This is not to suggest that Carr condoned the brutalities of totalitarian rule. In socio-economic matters, however, he believed that these regimes had found a timely answer in planning and organizing their economies. This distinguishes Carr's functionalist sympathies from Morgenthau's, who retained his liberal reservations against a planned economy.⁹¹

Carr's vision of a planned future is laid out in the two books he published during the Second World War, the *Conditions of Peace* and *Nationalism and After*.⁹² These wartime books can be read as sequels to the *Twenty Years' Crisis* whose publication had made quite an impact on British and American intellectuals.⁹³ Carr's realist manifesto had received positive reviews in the press, but fellow academics criticized it heavily for inconsistencies in logic, ill-defined terminology, and moral nihilism. Not least, critics complained that what was implied in Carr's realist approach for the future of international order remained opaque. Carr tried to rectify these issues in his follow-up publications.⁹⁴

In the *Conditions of Peace* and *Nationalism and After*, he presented ideas that testify to his technocratic inclinations.⁹⁵ Carr remained rather vague on the architecture of international security, hinting at the necessity for 'standing international forces made up of different national units'.⁹⁶ While this idea might at first have sounded radical, Carr then added so many qualifications regarding the primacy of great powers that he seemed to distrust his own scheme. His proposals were more confident in tone when it came to welfare issues. Global policies to further social justice were within reach, he argued in *Nationalism and*

⁹⁰ Daniel Kenealy and Konstantinos Kostagiannis, 'Realist Visions of European Union: E.H. Carr and Integration', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 41 (2013): pp. 221–46, at p. 232.

⁹¹ Morgenthau, 'The Limitations of Science', pp. 174–85.

⁹² E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1942). Carr had already anticipated the need for such a programmatic vision in the 1939 edition of the *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 87.

⁹³ Fox and Fox report that 'the book enjoyed at least as great a vogue in the United States as in England'; William T. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, 'The Teaching of International Relations in the United States', *World Politics*, 13 (1961): pp. 339–59, at p. 344.

⁹⁴ Peter Wilson, 'Carr and His Early Critics: Responses to the Twenty Years' Crisis, 1939–46', in *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal*, edited by Michael Cox (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 165–97.

⁹⁵ See also F. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought* (London: Sage, 1977), p. 99.

⁹⁶ E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), p. 54.

After, even if disparities in living conditions complicated the matter. The greatest potential for international integration was in 'ambitious international plans to assure full employment throughout the world'.⁹⁷ These statements did not go far beyond an outline of general principles, however, as Carr said little about the institutions that such policies would require.

In that respect, the *Conditions of Peace*, where Carr turned to European integration, is slightly more instructive. The proposals are premised on his idea that there was a secular trend towards larger units of political, economic, and military organization and that any post-war order would need to take this into consideration.⁹⁸ For Carr, the age of the nation-state was over, as the future world would be divided into regional spaces.⁹⁹ As for Europe, Carr cautioned first that it would be a mistake to terminate wartime cooperation among the Western allies, as had happened after the First World War.¹⁰⁰ He referred here to James Arthur Salter's idea that allied supply schemes could become a nucleus of cooperation in peacetime. The distribution of humanitarian aid and post-war reconstruction, Carr argued, should be handed to transnational functional agencies, so as to swiftly improve the living conditions of Europe's citizens.

The work of these specialized agencies would be coordinated by a European planning authority, which, Carr thought, could combine elements of Hitler's 'New Order' and Western wartime cooperation. Carr firmly believed in the need for organizing and planning the modern economy. In this respect, the Nazis had gone quite far. The European planning authority was to perform planning at a continental scale and, by stages, come to control production, trade, and finance. Unlike Hitler's continental order, which was tailored to Germany's advantage, the new system would need to benefit all countries and social classes. The key to enduring peace, for Carr, was in raising the standards of living of all Europeans. A transnational bank of Europe was to complete the institutional set-up that Carr envisaged. This institution would be tasked with providing funds for investment and trade, settling financial claims resulting from the war, and managing a European system of currencies. Again, this was not much more than a rough sketch of a future institutional landscape, and Carr said little about the functioning of the new agencies.

As in *Nationalism and After*, the chapter on the new Europe in the *Conditions of Peace* is almost void of references. Mitrany is never named, but some phrases could have been his. 'The essence of international cooperation,' Carr writes here, 'is to find some immediate and concrete task which people think it worth while cooperating about, even at some sacrifice to themselves.'¹⁰¹ Peter Wilson and William Scheuerman therefore argue that Carr must have been significantly

⁹⁷ Carr, *Nationalism and After*, p. 69.

⁹⁹ Carr, *Nationalism and After*, pp. 52–3.

¹⁰¹ Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, p. 258.

⁹⁸ Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 211.

¹⁰⁰ Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, p. 249.

influenced by Mitrany whom he met regularly at Chatham House during the war years.¹⁰² The parallels in their vocabulary are striking indeed. In substance, however, Carr's project was for a European federation, a geographically bounded club with stable membership. Equally, a centralized planning authority with a wide range of competences in different policy fields does not qualify as a typical Mitranean idea. And, not least, Mitrany quibbled with the state-led economic planning that Carr so ardently supported.¹⁰³

In a way, Carr's proposals for European integration seem less inspired by Mitrany than by non-liberal types of technocratic internationalism. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the specific combination of European economic planning with transnational public works, infrastructure development, and a European-level investment bank was suggested by Francis Delaisi—who also professed sympathies for the 'New Order' of the Nazis, along with other *planistes*, in particular Henri de Man. There is, to be sure, no reference in the *Conditions of Peace* that could document such a connection, apart from a mention of Georges Sorel, who inspired so much non-liberal thought on planned economies; and of Lawrence Dennis, an odd figure who advocated an American version of fascism.¹⁰⁴ Dennis shared Carr's belief that Anglo-American liberalism was obsolete and a Nazi-style, managed economy was the way forward, and it is quite plausible that Carr might have taken inspiration from those quarters.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how the start of a new world order under American leadership during and shortly after the Second World War was imbued with technocratic ideas. In the foundation of the UN and its functional agencies, the Roosevelt administration projected its domestic experiences with the technocratic agencies of the New Deal onto an international level. This episode testifies, once again, to the power of domestic templates in inspiring the design of international institutions. I have also explored in this chapter how a new, functionalist-realist synthesis became the mainstream of academic thinking about international organization in the war years. As a pragmatic and un-ideological strategy of taking small steps, technocratic internationalism was popular among theorists and practitioners of IR alike. In fact, many authors who wrote about IOs at that

¹⁰² Peter Wilson, *E. H. Carr: The Revolutionist's Realist* (London: LSE, 2000); William E. Scheuerman, *The Realist Case for Global Reform* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), pp. 79–80; Leonie Holthaus, *Pluralist Democracy in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), ch. 5.

¹⁰³ Andrew Williams, *Failed Imagination? New World Orders of the Twentieth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 125.

¹⁰⁴ For his views on international order, see Lawrence Dennis, *The Coming American Fascism* (New York: AMS Press, 1972[1936]), Ch. 13.

time had practical experience as international civil servants, so that the links between international theory and practice were closer than they are today.

In the new guise of IR functionalism, popularized by David Mitrany's *Working Peace System*, the technocratic approach emerged from the international crises of the 1930s and 1940s almost unscathed. Indeed, it proved more robust than other types of progressivist international thinking in surviving the demise of the League and the polemical attacks of self-declared IR realists. Mitrany's re-statement of functionalism as an un-ideological hands-on approach to international cooperation was certainly not vulnerable to charges of utopianism. Commenting on these developments, Inis Claude considered the UN 'a full-fledged experiment in the application of functional theory' and highlighted the extraordinary versatility of the functionalist doctrine.¹⁰⁵ Even if that might be overstating the case a bit, functional cooperation certainly proved there were ways around the ideological minefields of the Cold War, as the promises of modernization and rationalization appealed to both the East and the West.

Claude's *Swords into Plowshares*, a standard textbook on international organization of the 1950s, in many ways represents the new functionalist-realist synthesis that emerged after the war.¹⁰⁶ The academic study of international organization in the post-war era became more attuned to problems of great power conflict, thus absorbing realist ways of reasoning. A disillusioned pragmatism now reigned in the long shadow of an oppressive nuclear stalemate. On the other hand, post-war realists nurtured their own world order utopias, ranging from Morgenthau's and Schuman's defence of a world state to Schwarzenberger's federalism and Carr's planning authority for Europe. The question of what should be done after the war was so pressing that early realists, after firing some shots at utopianism, liberalism, and the Enlightenment, quietly returned to the business that almost every IR scholar of their generation was in: the endless production of blueprints for international order. Even the unforgiving Edwin Borchard conceded in 1944 that if there was an approach to international organization that held some promise, it had to 'confine attention to those economic problems, like food, oil and other raw materials, transport, communications, trade barriers, currency stabilization, credits, and loans and investments, which lie close to the national lifeline'.¹⁰⁷

With regards to the doctrinal development of technocratic internationalism, the domesticated functionalism of Mitrany's *Working Peace System* continued to

¹⁰⁵ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, at p. 357, see also pp. 351–2.

¹⁰⁶ Claude's own book 'became widely recognized as a work that managed to blend hope and skepticism and to combine normative and empirical analysis in a manner that bridged several international organization perspectives and defied easy labeling as idealist or realist'; J. Martin Rochester, 'The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study', *International Organization*, 40 (1986): p. 785.

¹⁰⁷ Edwin Borchard, 'Flaws in Post-War Peace Plans', *American Journal of International Law*, 38 (1944): pp. 284–9, at p. 289.

bear many resemblances to his interwar ideas. The progress of international government was still within reach even if the road towards it had turned out to be rocky. The conceptual opposition of politics and administration as representing the realms of the irrational and the rational, respectively, is still visible in his war-time work. Disinterested expertise assembled in the international administrative bodies remained their main legitimation resource. As shown in this chapter, Mitranean-style functionalism had some political influence during the war years, but its success came at a price. The strange transformation of Mitrany's functionalism in the hands of realists can illustrate this. Integrated into a state-based framework for thinking about IR, functionalism became a mere strategy, potentially a clever one, but hardly an end in itself. Mitrany's state-sceptical cosmopolitanism of the interwar period all but disappeared. In Chapter 6, I will show how a functionalism that had made its peace with the state continued to leave its mark on international theory, but also on the ideas of IO practitioners, in the 1950s and 1960s.

Working the machinery

Chapter 5 explored how much popularity technocratic utopias enjoyed in the 1940s, when they were increasingly referred to as offering a functional or functionalist approach to world order. That success story continued well into the 1950s and 1960s, the focus of this chapter. As Inis Claude put it, functionalism was not only ‘a recipe to be studied but also a pudding to be tasted’.¹ In these two decades, the technocratic recipe was widely followed in practice and found new fields of application in development and regional integration. A new generation of international organizations (IOs) was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War to address the socio-economic issues that the Bruce report had recommended for international action in 1939. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1945) of the United Nations (UN), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1945) and the World Health Organization (WHO, 1948) joined the International Labour Organization (ILO) as global organizations devoted to human well-being. New bodies were added to this emerging family in subsequent years, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP, 1965) and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 1966).

With the creation of these specialized organizations, global governance took a markedly technocratic but also welfarist turn. The new functional members of the UN family were set up by governments but committed to the welfare of individuals.² In this explicit orientation towards human lives they differed from the technical standard setting IOs that had been active since the 19th century. The newly independent countries of the global South welcomed this trend. The increasingly welfarist orientation of IOs is reflected also at the level of theory-building, where development became a leading paradigm. Discourses on development constituted a new intellectual trading zone between theoretical analysis and practical application of expert knowledge. The concept of development was congenial to functionalism since ‘[t]he promise of development

¹ Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 365.

² For technocratic drift, see Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 352; for the turn to welfare tasks, see Emmanuelle Jouannet, *The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 257–8; Jens Steffek and Leonie Holthaus, ‘The Social-Democratic Roots of Global Governance: Welfare Internationalism from the 19th Century to the United Nations’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 28 (2018): pp. 106–29.

itself is linked to the technocratic belief in technical solutions.’³ Development not only gave technocratic IOs a new mission and justification, through their ‘technical assistance’ programmes, these IOs also diffused ideals and practices of expert governance globally.⁴

The rise of the development paradigm is just one facet of the great faith in technology and progress that pervaded capitalist and socialist societies alike during the 1950s and 1960s. It also inspired the new regional IOs in Western Europe, which set out to integrate the continent that had been devastated by war, through reconstruction, modernization, and economic growth. Functionalism became a textbook doctrine of European integration, rivalling federalism with its suggestion of quick political union. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951, was a prime example of a technocratic IO. Its High Authority, the predecessor of today’s European Commission, was arguably the most powerful technocratic organ that ever existed beyond the boundaries of the state.

In this chapter, I trace the transformations of technocratic internationalism during the 1950s and 1960s in three steps. I begin with the evolution of functionalism as a theoretical approach to technocratic international organization and, increasingly, regional integration. The professionalization of the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s and the new focus on method eroded its academic appeal. Scholars began to perceive Mitrany’s ideas as ‘reformist ideology’ rather than as representing a serious theory of international organization. To remedy these defects, American political scientist Ernst Haas re-formulated it as ‘neo-functionalism’. Although ostensibly this was an empirical-analytical approach avoiding open normative commitments, it nonetheless retained the ideal of rationalized governance.

In the second section, I explore the emergent nexus between welfarism and functional international organization. I start with the development paradigm that combined good moral grounds for international action with prospects of a bright future for all humankind. By way of example, I will look at the work of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal who were among the intellectual architects of the Swedish welfare state and the early UN. They projected domestic social-democratic ideals of the welfare state and the respective technologies of ‘social engineering’ onto a global arena.

³ Daniel Speich Chassé, ‘Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System’, in *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990*, edited by Marc Frey et al. (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke 2014), pp. 23–45, at p. 26.

⁴ Balakrishnan Rajagopal, *International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 52; David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Michael Adas, *Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003).

In the third section, I focus on IO officials who worked the technocratic machinery in practice. I begin with the Indian diplomat B. R. Sen, who in 1957 became the second director general of the FAO and was one of the first individuals from the global South to occupy such a role. Sen defended the de-politicized nature of the FAO's work and sought to keep member state influence at bay, forging alliances with non-governmental actors instead. The often symbiotic relationship between intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field of development can be seen in its earliest stages here. I then turn to C. Wilfred Jenks, a high-ranking ILO official and eminent international lawyer who liberated international law (and the ILO) from its European roots, and formulated a 'common law of mankind' that justified multilateral aid efforts and technical assistance.

In a last step, I return to the European continent and the first president of the European Economic Community's (EEC's) Commission, Walter Hallstein, a former law professor, who sought to build a professional supranational expert administration whose political leverage would reside in its expertise. Quite like academic functionalists, Hallstein argued that European integration was driven mainly by *Sachlogik*, the inherent logic of things. At the same time, he clearly perceived the democratic deficit of a European integration project that concentrated powers, including the right to initiate legislation, in a technocratic body.

The evolution of functionalism

Since the first publication of the *Working Peace System* in 1943, David Mitrany's work had become the standard reference for functional, or functionalist, reasoning in the field of international affairs. Although Mitrany maintained that he had developed his approach by drawing lessons from practical experience,⁵ younger scholars began to construct a tradition of international thought in which his work could be placed. Curtis W. Martin at Harvard (1950) and Harold E. Engle at Columbia (1957) wrote PhD dissertations on International Relations (IR) functionalism in which they sought to identify Mitrany's predecessors.⁶ Martin and Engle thus established a canon of functionalist IR theory that included many authors also discussed in this book, among them Saveney, Reinsch, Woolf, Cole,

⁵ David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science / Martin Robertson & Company, 1975), p. 3.

⁶ Curtis W. Martin, 'The History and Theory of the Functional Approach to International Organization' (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1950); Harold E. Engle, 'A Critical Study of the Functional Approach to International Organization' (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1957).

and Potter. Although their dissertations were never published, others began citing the canon of functionalists that they had put together.⁷

This canon was of course an artefact constructed 'from the scattered and fragmentary comments from a large number of writers on the subject of international administrative organizations and the problem of world order'.⁸ None of the writers except Mitrany had used the term 'function' (let alone 'functionalism') in a systematic fashion. Functionalism thus became a post-hoc label for a variety of proposals that elaborated in one way or the other on international governance through de-politicized expert organizations. Presumably, the invention of a functionalist tradition in the 1950s also sprang from a desire of proponents of the emergent academic discipline of IR to bring order and intellectual pedigree to its theoretical positions.⁹

Mitrany himself also delivered several re-statements of his functional theory, and a new edition of the *Working Peace System* in 1966, but he never substantially revised his argument.¹⁰ What changed much more was the academic context in which Mitrany's ideas were read. Especially in North America, political science professionalized tremendously over the 1950s and 1960s as theory-building, data collection, and problems of method became major preoccupations.¹¹ A pioneer of the new science was Karl W. Deutsch (1912–92), an immigrant from Prague. In particular, Deutsch sought to develop the scientific study of political community beyond national borders. It is no exaggeration to say that his 'sociocausal paradigm' set the agenda and the very terms of subsequent debates over international cooperation.¹²

⁷ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), ch.1, fn. 9; James P. Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. x, fn. 4.

⁸ Engle, 'Critical Study', p. 40.

⁹ Laurence W. Martin and Arnold Wolfers (eds.), *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956); William T. R. Fox, 'Interwar International Relations: The American Experience', *World Politics*, 2 (1949): pp. 67–79; Stanley H. Hoffmann, 'International Relations: The Long Road to Theory', *World Politics*, 11 (1959): pp. 346–77. J. David Singer, 'Theorizing About Theory in International Politics', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 4 (1960): pp. 431–42.

¹⁰ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective', *International Affairs*, 47 (1971): pp. 532–43; David Mitrany, 'A Political Theory for the New Society', in *Functionalism. Theory and Practice*, edited by A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (London: London University Press, 1975), pp. 9–25.

¹¹ On the 'second great debate', see Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), *New Approaches to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968); on the scientific study of European integration, see Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question: Theories of European Integration* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), pp. 15–23.

¹² The agenda is set in Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954); see also William E. Fisher, 'An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration', *International Organization*, 23 (1969): pp. 254–90. Ernst Haas acknowledged that Deutsch had 'raised all the major questions' that one should ask about regional integration, see Ernst B. Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', *International Organization*, 24 (1970): pp. 607–46, at p. 607, fn. 1; see also Ernst B. Haas, 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', *International Organization*, 15 (1961): pp. 366–92.

Deutsch also visited, in 1953/4, the Center for Research on World Political Institutions at Princeton University, a hub of world order thinking at the time, where he picked up some basic concepts and research questions.¹³ Fundamental was the idea of transnational community, most notably in the form of a 'security-community', in which the use of force for political ends disappeared. Communities emerged, within and across states, through a process called 'integration'. Integration, as Deutsch conceived it, implied change of individual attitudes and beliefs as their political activities and personal loyalty shifted to new centres of power.¹⁴ Neither Deutsch nor the Princeton centre held the copyright for the term 'international integration', of course. The term had already been in use in the interwar years to denote intensifying linkages across nations, in particular economic ones. By the late 1940s the word integration 'had taken the place of all previously used synonyms in practically all languages in which such matters are talked about'.¹⁵

Deutsch's twin concepts of community and integration have affinities with the society-based forms of transnational cooperation that some functionalists elaborated. Indeed, functionalism suggested pathways to community-building via ever denser webs of task-oriented collaboration. Unlike Mitrany, however, Deutsch and other new social scientists searched for empirical evidence to detect and measure integration.¹⁶ Although he had done fieldwork on the Tennessee Valley Authority, Mitrany did not re-formulate functionalism as an empirical-analytical theory. The further development of the approach, along the scientific lines that Deutsch suggested thus passed on to a new generation of scholars. Most influential among them was Ernst B. Haas (1924–2003), founder of a new academic school that self-identified as *neo-functionalism*.¹⁷

Ernst Haas was of German-Jewish descent and had arrived in the United States (US) as a teenager in 1938. He graduated from Columbia University and in 1951 moved to the University of California at Berkeley, where he remained for the rest of his career. Two monumental monographs made his reputation as one of the most important students of international organization. In 1958, Haas published

¹³ Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus* (Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1952), pp. 9–13. The result of Deutsch's work with the Center was Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹⁴ Deutsch defined integration as 'the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions and practices', see Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, p. 33.

¹⁵ Fritz Machlup, *A History of Thought on Economic Integration* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 12; Werner S. Landecker, 'Types of Integration and Their Measurement', *American Journal of Sociology*, 56 (1951): pp. 332–40.

¹⁶ On functionalism and integration, see Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, p. 56.

¹⁷ David Mitrany, *American Interpretations: Four Political Essays* (London: Contact, 1946).

The Uniting of Europe, a detailed empirical study of the ECSC years that made Deutsch's twin problems of community and integration its focus. The meticulously researched book became the standard account of the early integration process and its key actors. Still more theory-driven and broader in ambition was its successor, *Beyond the Nation-state*. Its subtitle, *Functionalism and International Organization*, summarizes the endeavour.¹⁸ Others undertook similar studies designed to 'test' Mitrany's approach but none could rival Haas's in terms of academic influence.¹⁹

Haas placed himself in the functionalist tradition of IR but claimed to put it on solid empirical feet. His critique of traditional functionalism, which in *Beyond the Nation-state* he spelled with a capital F for distinction, was friendly but devastating. It was friendly because Haas remained sympathetic to Mitrany's 'low-politics' approach to international organization. At the same time, his critical appraisal was more devastating (at least for academic purposes) than realist attacks on world order utopias. As we saw in Chapter 5, many realists took Mitrany's functional approach seriously. Haas, in contrast, derided it as 'reformist ideology', a 'vague and shifting syndrome of common attitudes and propositions'.²⁰

Only the empirical study of actors and interests, Haas argued, would be able to explain the process of integration and gauge its prospects. His inquiry in *The Uniting of Europe* was structured accordingly. He harshly criticized the functionalists' belief in the almost automatic proliferation of international institutions: 'Tasks do not take care of themselves; form does not automatically follow function; institutional goals do not flow naturally from obvious welfare commitments of the clients.'²¹ Mitrany's functionalism, Haas contended, did not offer a theory of change beyond some rather generic hints at learning.²² Haas also doubted if loyalties would change out of gratitude to international welfare providers—an important point because a shift in citizens' loyalty was Deutsch's touchstone of successful international integration.²³ Haas also criticized Mitrany's distinction between politics and expert administration by showing how technical and political considerations were intertwined in international affairs. Experts often justified positions determined by their foreign offices in their own technical jargon.²⁴

¹⁸ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*.

¹⁹ Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics*; Engle, 'Critical Study'.

²⁰ Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, p. 29. On functionalism as ideology, see also R. J. Vincent, 'The Functions of Functionalism in International Relations', *Yearbook of International Affairs*, 27 (1973): pp. 332–44; Roger Tooze, 'The Progress of International Functionalism', *British Journal of International Studies*, 3 (1977): pp. 210–17.

²¹ Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, p. 101.

²² Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, pp. 12–13.

²³ Haas, *Uniting of Europe*, pp. 15–16.

²⁴ Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, pp. 17–19. See also Claude, *Swords into Ploughshares*, pp. 353–4; Harrison, *Europe in Question*, pp. 32–4; much of this criticism is rejected by David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Working for Peace: The Functional Approach, Functionalism and Beyond', in

This alone presented a formidable challenge to the technocratic ideas of the interwar period but Haas's criticism of functionalism was even more fundamental. Haas argued that with their emphasis on expert governance, functionalists only endorsed half the insights of 19th-century liberalism. What they had adopted from the liberal tradition was a preference for societal self-organization over state action, trust in experts, and utilitarian reasoning. What they had missed, and supplanted with utopias of automatic progress, was the liberal theory of interest politics. Drawing on it, Haas found it safer to assume that individuals and social groups were motivated by self-interest rather than by rational insight. 'Cooperation among groups is thus the result of convergences of separate perceptions of interest and not a spontaneous surrender to the myth of the common good.'²⁵

According to Haas, the functionalists had done a good job in spotting policy fields where integration was most likely to occur. They had got it wrong, however, when they assumed that rational solutions to problems of interdependence would be self-enforcing. By injecting agency and interests, Haas attempted to remedy functionalism's most apparent deficit, the lack in theory of political change.²⁶ He reconciled the old functionalist focus on economic interdependence and welfare issues with a theory of change. Along the way Haas quite effectively debunked the justificatory narrative on benevolent technocrats who recognize the common good of the international community and implement the correct solutions. 'There is no common good other than that perceived through the interest-tinted lenses worn by the international actors. But international interest politics causes the tinting to fall into converging patterns, and Functionalism sensitizes us to spotting the tasks responsible for the pattern.'²⁷

The formulation deserves attention. The tasks of governance (or the 'problem structure', as it was later called) remain the hidden drivers for international cooperation. Its success, however, ultimately depends on the actions of organizational elites and external interest groups.²⁸ Accordingly, the landscape of IOs cannot be sculpted at will. It inevitably mirrors the constellation of political forces and interests in a specific historical moment. These dynamics are at the core of Haas's neo-functionalist theory of integration, or rather 'pre-theory' as he

New Perspectives on International Functionalism, edited by Lucian M. Ashworth and David Long (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 1–26, at pp. 12–13.

²⁵ Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, p. 34.

²⁶ Haas criticized sociological structural functionalism and systems theory for similar reasons. Both were immensely popular at the time but, in Haas's judgement, 'far too rigidly teleological in their mania for stability, equilibrium, and self-maintenance'; Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, p. 65.

²⁷ Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, p. 35.

²⁸ Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 110. On the tension between structural and actor-centred elements in Haas's theory, see also Leon Gordenker and Paul R. Saunders, 'Organisation Theory and International Organisation', in *International Organisation: A Conceptual Approach*, edited by Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (London: Frances Pinter, 1978), pp. 84–107, at pp. 90–1.

modestly preferred to call it. Varieties of this (neo-)functionalism dominated political science debates over international organization in the late 1950s and 1960s.²⁹ The dominant question was to what extent functionalist theories, and now most prominently Haas's, could explain causally the integration process in Europe and elsewhere.

In this book, however, I am less interested in causal explanations, whatever their merits, and more interested in legitimization narratives. In this regard, it seems that neo-functionalists abandoned Mitrany's teleological reasoning, his cosmopolitanism, and his ideal of political devolution. The new analytical theory of international integration declared such normative aspirations irrelevant.³⁰ However, Haas's dissociation from the normative foundations of functionalism was much more ambiguous than the first hundred pages of *Beyond the Nation-state* might suggest. Also for Haas, the ultimate reason for studying international integration was normative, even if the resulting theory appeared to be strictly explanatory. International integration represented a form of peaceful, voluntary cooperation among states and thus was highly desirable. This justified the work of the social scientists in the 'living laboratory' of international politics.³¹ As Haas wrote in an essay on European integration: 'The advent of supranationality symbolizes the victory of economics over politics, over that familiar ethnocentric nationalism which used to subordinate butter to guns, reason to passion, statistical bargaining to excited demands.'³²

I do not think we do Haas wrong if we read this as a normative statement, suggesting that he shared the political goals of functionalism with a capital F. What differed was his role as social scientist in the endeavour. For Haas, only systematization, empirical hypothesis-testing, aggregation of evidence, and critical discussion would lead to reasoned policy advice.³³ The neo-functionalists thus replaced the emotional appeal of Mitrany's 'language of poetry' with dispassionate scientific analysis—but essentially it was in the service of the same political end, a reign of rationality and scientific reason beyond the nation-state.³⁴

²⁹ For critical debate, see Sewell, *Functionalism*; Pentland, *International Theory*; John H. Eastby, *Functionalism and Interdependence* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985); Victor-Yves Ghebali, 'The League of Nations and Functionalism', in *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations*, edited by A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (London: University of London Press, 1975), pp. 141–61; A. J. R. Groom, 'Functionalism and World Society', in *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations*, edited by Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom (London: University of London Press, 1975), pp. 93–111; Mark F. Imber, 'Re-Reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty', *Review of International Studies*, 10 (1984): pp. 103–23; Robert I. McLaren, 'Mitranyan Functionalism: Possible or Impossible?', *Review of International Studies*, 11 (1985): pp. 139–52; Long and Ashworth, 'Working for Peace'.

³⁰ Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, pp. 35–6.

³¹ Haas, 'Study of Regional Integration', p. 608.

³² Ernst B. Haas, 'Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe', in *A New Europe?*, edited by Stephen R. Graubard (London: Oldbourne Press, 1964), pp. 62–88, at p. 71.

³³ The 'cosmology' of Ernst Haas is laid out in the Introduction by Peter M. Haas et al. to the post-humous 2008 edition of *Beyond the Nation-state* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 1964), pp. 1–20, at p. 8.

³⁴ Mitrany's style as poetry is a characterization by Engle, p. 41.

Thus, academic neo-functionalism continued the normative-programmatic tradition of technocratic internationalism but wrapped it in layers of technical jargon. Charles Pentland summarized the shift well:

Whereas the older functionalists stated an unabashed preference for administration over politics, the neofunctionalists create [...] a blend of the two, but a blend in which there remains an administrative flavor to the 'politics'. In short, the neofunctionalists have largely retained the rationalism of their intellectual forebears. At bottom they are, like the functionalists, good Weberians, seeing integration as a gradual increase in stability and rationality through the growth of a bureaucratic polity.³⁵

Despite the continuities, the empirical-analytical turn of political science certainly dispelled the 'original urgent concern to develop alternatives to the present international system'.³⁶ Hypothetical alternatives to the status quo could not be studied in the 'living laboratory' of real-world integration processes. Unwittingly, perhaps, the language of interest-driven politics also eroded important justifications of transnational expert rule: that human needs were beyond dispute and the public good objectively discernible; that technical government without intrusions of politics was possible; that experts were committed to public interest more than to their own. Haas's engagement with the political science and public administration literature of his time cast doubt on the viability of old technocratic utopias. At the same time, he continued to believe in the rich benefits of scientific reason. I will come back to this in Chapter 7 when discussing theories of international regimes, to which Haas also contributed.

Through their extensive empirical work, the neo-functionalists also realized that fragments of classical functionalism had become the 'organizational ideology' of existing IOs. Haas referred to that variety of functionalist thought as 'official functionalism'. As the organizational ideology of IOs now was an empirically relevant variable, neo-functionalism had to reckon in yet another way with its predecessor. Even terminological innovations of neo-functionalism, such as the 'spill-over effect', were picked up by practitioners in IOs. 'Some of us', Philippe Schmitter once reported, 'have had the rather unnerving experience of hearing our special jargon spouted back at us by those whom we are studying'.³⁷

Maybe Mitrany was too dismissive when he said about neo-functionalism in one of his last writings that 'there is no evidence that it has had any effect on

³⁵ Pentland, *International Theory*, p. 111.

³⁶ Thomas G. Weiss, *International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 16–17.

³⁷ Philippe C. Schmitter, 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration', *International Organization*, 24 (1970): pp. 836–68, at p. 838; see also Vincent, 'Functions', pp. 336–7.

actual practitioners and policy'.³⁸ The social-scientific turn of American IR certainly led to a bifurcation between scholarly and practical-political discourses. At the same time, practitioners still used arguments from the technocratic tradition of international thought for their own purposes. In the 1960s, there still was a lively trading zone between the academic study of IOs and the discourses of IO practitioners. In the next section, I will explore this nexus between technocratic theory and practice, beginning with the concept of development.

Development as a mission

Compared to the interwar years, two fundamental changes had occurred in the international landscape of the 1950s. One was the East-West conflict and the Cold War between the two blocks. The bipolar constellation and the threat of nuclear escalation profoundly affected thinking about international security. The second epochal change was the process of de-colonization that led to the proliferation of numerous newly independent states. Despite their differences, countries emerging from Europe's crumbling colonial empires had one common concern and aspiration: socio-economic development.³⁹ While the emergent theory and practice of nuclear deterrence was not congenial to technocratic utopias (unless as proof of the irrationality of power politics), socio-economic development fitted perfectly.

In the context of macroeconomics, the term development had rarely been used in the English-speaking world before the 20th century. Karl Marx had prominently talked about *Entwicklung* ('development') but liberal economists preferred terms such as progress, industrialization, and modernization. In the sense of purposefully developing territories, the word was occasionally used in British colonies, especially in Australia.⁴⁰ In 1922, Sun Ya-tsen tabled some famous proposals for the economic development of China through international action, laying emphasis on infrastructure.⁴¹ Around the same time, the 'underdeveloped' territories of the Empire also became an issue in interwar Britain, and a number of studies were published at the London School of Economics about how to develop them actively.⁴² Much of that literature associated development strongly

³⁸ David Mitran, 'A Political Theory for the New Society', at p. 26.

³⁹ Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Have Changed the World, 1945–1965* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006).

⁴⁰ H. W. Arndt, 'Economic Development: A Semantic History', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 29 (1981): pp. 457–66.

⁴¹ Sun Ya-tsen, *The International Development of China* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922).

⁴² L. C. A. Knowles, *The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1924); Vera Anstey, *The Economic Development of India* (London: Longmans, Green, 1929); R. H. Tawney, *Land and Labour in China* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932). Joseph

with the exploitation of natural resources. It also assumed that the process of development would have to be externally assisted, requiring not just financial investments but also some sort of knowledge-based intervention.

American economist Eugene Staley was among the first scholars to be widely recognized as a specialist in these matters. In 1939, he had already suggested a 'world development plan'.⁴³ During the war, he wrote a report for the ILO on universal 'freedom from want', a goal also enshrined in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Staley's conception of development included

a combination of methods by which the capacity of a people to produce (and hence to consume) may be increased. It means introduction of better techniques; installing more and better capital equipment; raising the general level of education and the particular skills of labour and management; and expanding internal and external commerce in a manner to take better advantage of opportunities for specialisation.⁴⁴

International institutions were essential for achieving this, and Staley suggested an international development authority with a 'multilateral, supra-national character' in the framework of the UN system. This authority was there to manage but also to de-politicize the process and 'to prevent developmental investments from being used by individual States as tools in the game of power politics and balance of power'.⁴⁵

Economic planning appears here as a largely technical activity that was best left to specialists, even if governments needed to implement the measures eventually. This view was widely shared, along with great optimism about the prospects of development plans, in the first generation of international development economists.⁴⁶ It was also characteristic of the post-war decades that leading development specialists, such as Arthur Lewis, Paul Rodenstein-Rodan, and Walt Rostow, switched between academic and practical engagements, advising governments and IOs. Global political conditions were also conducive to

Schumpeter's work on development was translated into English only in the 1930s, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934).

⁴³ Eugene Staley, *World Economy in Transition* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939), p. 68; Eugene Staley, *World Economic Development: Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries*, 2nd ed. (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1945); Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Harper, 1954). See also W. Benson, 'The Economic Advancement of Underdeveloped Areas', in *The Economic Basis of Peace*, edited by Evan F. M. Durbin (London: National Peace Council, 1942), pp. 10–16; Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, 'The International Development of Economically Backward Areas', *International Affairs*, 20 (1944): pp. 157–65.

⁴⁴ Staley, *World Economic Development*, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Staley, *World Economic Development*, pp. 98, 100.

⁴⁶ Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., *Pioneers in Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). Some very early and heterodox thinkers are included in K. S. Jomo, ed., *The Pioneers of Development Economics* (London: Zed Books, 2005).

development thinking when the US placed its bet on global economic growth and rapid reconstruction of European countries.⁴⁷

American attitudes were informed by domestic attempts to manage the economy, prominently characterized by the technocratic and interventionist New Deal. Accordingly, 'American opinion generally viewed the transition to a society of abundance as a problem of engineering, not of politics'.⁴⁸ President Harry S. Truman added to the prominence of the term development when he referred to it extensively in his 1949 inaugural address. He said that, through the UN, the world should embark on a 'bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas'.⁴⁹

There is no space here to explore the details of the early development approaches, or the debates within the emerging guild of specialists. What matters is the further technocratization of IOs and the global proliferation of development plans, national economic councils, planning boards, etc. IOs, notably the UN and its regional economic commissions, promoted these institutions vigorously. In 1951, a group of UN experts recommended that every underdeveloped country's government should 'establish a central economic unit with the functions of surveying the economy, making development programmes, advising on the measures necessary for carrying out such programmes, and reporting on them periodically'.⁵⁰ In these years, the figure of the international development consultant emerged, roaming the global South to advise newly independent nations. While in universities economic development was becoming a subject in its own right, the provision of technical assistance and foreign aid turned into a new profession.⁵¹

There are important parallels between the technocratic approach to developing the global South and the expansion of the welfare state in the North. They concern theoretical concepts as well as blueprints for institutions. An excellent example to demonstrate this connection is the academic work and political engagement of two Swedish social reformers, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. Contrary

⁴⁷ Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956); Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

⁴⁸ Charles S. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II', *International Organization*, 32 (1977): pp. 607–33, at p. 615.

⁴⁹ Address delivered on 20 January 1949, at the Capitol in Washington, DC, see Harry S. Truman Library & Museum (https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm).

⁵⁰ United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, ed., *Measures for the Economic Development of under-Developed Nations: Report by a Group of Experts Appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 1951), p. 93.

⁵¹ Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever, *The Common Aid Effort* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), p. 351.

to the expectations (or, rather, hopes) of David Mitrany, who had predicted the decline of the nation-state, the rise of IOs in the 20th century coincided with a marked increase in its powers. It transformed into a welfare state that seized new competences and extended its apparatus.⁵² Sweden was a trailblazer of that development, producing what Esping-Anderson classified as the 'social-democratic' variety of the welfare state.⁵³

Alva and Gunnar Myrdal were among the architects of this Swedish welfare state. An extraordinary couple in many ways, they not only shared a reform-socialist worldview and published academic treatises together, they also tried to live an exemplary private life, within a new type of emancipated partnership.⁵⁴ As public intellectuals and leading spirits of Sweden's social-democratic party, they moved back and forth between academic and political activities for more than five decades. Their careers in Sweden were dotted with international appointments in the ambit of the UN.

Alva Myrdal (1902–86) had a broad academic education in the social sciences and philosophy. As an academic researcher, she became particularly interested in questions of social policy, education, and demography. A pioneer in many male-dominated domains, Alva Myrdal fought for equal opportunities for women in Sweden but also globally. Her most influential scholarly book, published with Austrian-British sociologist Viola Klein, was a study on the possibilities for women to combine professional work and family life, and what the state could do to facilitate this.⁵⁵ Alva Myrdal was also among the first women to secure important posts in IOs. From 1948 to 1950, she headed the UN department for social issues at the New York headquarters; and, from 1950 to 1956, the social science section of UNESCO in Paris. Afterwards, she served her country in many public roles, as a member of parliament, diplomat, and minister. Alva Myrdal represented Sweden in many international disarmament negotiations, and, for her longstanding activism in that field, she received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982.⁵⁶

⁵² On the dimensions of the 20th-century state, see Michael Zürn and Stephan Leibfried, 'Reconfiguring the National Constellation', *European Review*, 13 (2005): pp. 1–36; on the golden age of the post-war world Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994); on the parallel growth of IOs and modern statehood, see Guy Fiti Sinclair, 'State Formation, Liberal Reform, and the Growth of International Organizations', *European Journal of International Law*, 26 (2015): pp. 445–69; Guy Fiti Sinclair, *To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁵³ Gösta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

⁵⁴ For studies of the couple, see Thomas Etzemüller, *Alva and Gunnar Myrdal: Social Engineering in the Modern World* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014); Yvonne Hirdman, *Alva Myrdal: The Passionate Mind* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

⁵⁵ Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein, *Women's Two Roles: Home and Work* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956); see also Hedvig Ekerwald, 'Alva Myrdal: Making the Private Public', *Acta Sociologica*, 43 (2000): pp. 343–52.

⁵⁶ Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977); Peter Wallensteen, 'Rationality, Alternative Security,

Alva's husband, Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987), was an economist of international fame, interested in the interdependence of economic and political phenomena. He attacked neoclassical variants of economic theory and pointed out the need for public interventions to counter disequilibria that markets were unable to eliminate.⁵⁷ Together with his liberal rival, Friedrich von Hayek, he received the Nobel Prize in 1974 for their contributions to institutional economics. Gunnar Myrdal also ranks among the pioneers of development economics, where he underlined the importance of public institutions in the development process. Like his wife he also held important offices beyond academia. At the end of the Second World War, he was Swedish minister of trade and, from 1947 to 1957, founding director of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in Geneva.⁵⁸

In the biographies of the Myrdals, academic theorizing and political practice intersect in an exemplary fashion, as do the Swedish welfare state model and international governance. The Myrdals merged welfare state theory and internationalism into a form of welfare internationalism. Their general approach is outlined in a book they jointly published in 1934, called *Kris i Befolkningsfrågan* ('Crisis in the population question'), which sparked heated debate in Sweden.⁵⁹ They started from an observation of the declining fertility rates in Sweden, perceived as a threat to the country's future. To counter this trend, the Myrdals proposed social reforms that could persuade, in particular, middle-class families to have more children. Measures extended from free medical care to financial subsidies for families, and much emphasis was put on better and affordable housing. The Myrdals also questioned the traditional patriarchal model of the Swedish family, arguing that women should have the opportunity to pursue a professional career. To make this possible, children were to attend public childcare institutions.

The Myrdals were keen to put these ideas into practice and soon got opportunities to do so, when Alva Myrdal became director of the National Educational Seminar, which she co-founded in 1936. 'Social engineering' was the term used for their interventionist strategy, and in Sweden this did not carry any negative connotations. It implied a strong activist state whose experts would

and the People: Alva Myrdal's Approach to International Disarmament', in *Alva Myrdal in International Affairs*, edited by Peter Wallensteen (Uppsala: Uppsala Publishing House, 2003), pp. 11–21.

⁵⁷ James Angresano, *The Political Economy of Gunnar Myrdal: An Institutional Basis for the Transformation Problem* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997); William Barber, *Gunnar Myrdal: An Intellectual Biography* (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁵⁸ On A. Myrdal at the UNECE, see Daniel Stinsky, *International Cooperation in Cold War Europe: The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1947–64* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).

⁵⁹ Alva Myrdal and Gunnar Myrdal, *Kris I Befolkningsfrågan* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1934); there is no English translation, but see Alva Myrdal, *Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1945); on the debate, see Allan C. Carlson, *The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp. 114–22.

identify the needs of the population, and take care of them. As one biographer of Gunnar Myrdal put it, he 'would combine an interest in social welfare with a belief that experts had a key role to play in shaping public policy and in stabilizing parliamentary democracy'.⁶⁰ The remit of expert involvement was far-reaching. Alva Myrdal, for instance, found that professional, public, sex education was badly needed. 'The educational part of such a readjusted modern family policy would then be to prepare youth for sexual, affective, and parental partnership'.⁶¹

This model of an interventionist welfare state influenced the international work of the Myrdals. Gunnar Myrdal realized this when looking back at his time at the UNECE he once recalled,

when in these years I came to approach the problem of the great poverty in the really underdeveloped countries outside Europe it was natural for me, with my background in Swedish political life, to look upon their economic underdevelopment as a problem of international distributional inequality. We should strive towards creating more of a 'welfare world,' just as I had been active in helping Sweden come closer to the ideal of a welfare state.⁶²

Gunnar Myrdal was an economist with a mission. He insisted that all economic theorizing was driven by values, even if classical and neoclassical economists usually denied this.⁶³ He routinely disclosed his own premises, which, in the 1950s, he cited as the 'desirability of political democracy and of equality of opportunity'.⁶⁴ This transpires, for instance, from his work on the domestic determinants of inequality in Asian societies that he studied in the 1960s, when Alva was Swedish ambassador to India. Yet even if there were domestic reasons for persistent poverty and injustice, Gunnar Myrdal still called for efforts of the developed countries to reduce the widening gap between living standards in the North and the South.⁶⁵

Gunnar Myrdal was an advocate of public economic planning, which he found especially urgent in underdeveloped countries. Where resources were scarce, those that existed needed to be deployed with utmost efficiency. A national

⁶⁰ Walter A. Jackson, *Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938–1987* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 49.

⁶¹ Alva Myrdal, *Nation and Family*, p. 176.

⁶² Gunnar Myrdal, 'International Inequality and Foreign Aid in Retrospect', in *Pioneers in Development*, edited by Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 151–65, at p. 152.

⁶³ Gunnar Myrdal, *The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).

⁶⁴ Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions* (London: Duckworth, 1957), p. vii.

⁶⁵ Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, 3 vols. (New York: Pantheon, 1968); Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline* (New York: Pantheon, 1970).

development plan was indispensable as 'a strategy for state interference, aimed at maximising the general economic advance of a country, given the sacrifices the people can safely be expected to accept'.⁶⁶ He conceded that public planning, even if it was 'advanced applied social science', could not simply transfer experiences from the developed world to the South. Therefore, international interventions had, first of all, to create local capacities for planning and research.⁶⁷

Alva Myrdal shared his view that training and capacity-building would lead to a capacity to self-help in the South. As ambassador to India, she supported local projects and mobilized funding for them, with a special regard for the situation of women.⁶⁸ Feminism, socio-economic development, and transnational expert action appeared perfectly compatible.

From [Alva] Myrdal's perspective, the Swedish precedent had shown that giving women as well as men a greater stake in the improvement of quality of life had, in the course of half a century, led that country out of its feudal past into a more democratic and modern future. She was inclined to see the potential of the UN's Technical Assistance program in places such as the Near East in similar terms.⁶⁹

The functionalist recipe applied

The case of the Myrdals can illustrate how welfarism informed technocratic visions of international organization in the trading zone between academia and political practice. In this last section, I move even closer to the practitioners' perspective and show how leaders of IOs applied the recipes of technocratic internationalism. Social and political theory is, as Robert Cox famously put it, 'always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'.⁷⁰ A great case to discuss in relation to this in the 1950s is the leadership of the FAO. John Boyd Orr, the FAO's first secretary general (1945–8), had already heeded the functionalists' advice to create an operational organization that could respond directly to the needs of people all over the world—an organization which, in its functional domain of food supply, would not just study but also change the world. To that end, Orr planned a 'world food board' as an independent agency or branch of FAO, that could have, *inter*

⁶⁶ G. Myrdal, *Economic Theory*, p. 86.

⁶⁷ G. Myrdal, *Economic Theory*, pp. 98–9.

⁶⁸ Sondra R. Herman, 'Solidarity Abroad: Alva Myrdal's Campaign for the Developing Nations', in *Alva Myrdal in International Affairs*, edited by Peter Wallensteen (Uppsala: Uppsala Publishing House, 2003), pp. 23–41.

⁶⁹ Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 112.

⁷⁰ Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10 (1981): pp. 126–55, at p. 128.

alia, the power to stabilize agricultural commodity prices and hold emergency food stocks.⁷¹

Orr's ambitious blueprints for the FAO as an operational agency were frustrated in the 1940s but realized later under the leadership of Binay Ranjan [B. R.] Sen (1898–1993). From 1956 onwards, Sen transformed the FAO into a development agency, staging the 'Freedom from Hunger' campaign in the early 1960s, and pushing through the foundation of the World Food Programme. Sen saw the FAO's mission as best served by letting specialists do their job and keeping politics out.⁷² As he had been responsible for the food supply of India during the war, Sen knew about the disruptive role of political interference. 'Having gone through the various manifestations of the problem of food in India', he wrote in his memoir, 'I came to FAO convinced that it should be protected, at all costs, against incursion from politics not consistent with its basic role.'⁷³

Technocratic ideas about governance by experts equipped with national and international food supply plans combined in the FAO with the ambition of IO leaders to carve out more space for autonomous action. To that end, Sen formed new alliances with various types of non-governmental actors.⁷⁴ He enlisted celebrities to serve on a 'Special Assembly on Man's Right to Freedom from Hunger' and the World Food Congress of 1963 to put the issue on the agenda.⁷⁵ He also made the FAO a pioneer in outreach to NGOs. These partners were not only instrumental because of their expertise in foreign aid and political campaigning, Sen also requested, indeed, he demanded, that they mobilize additional funds for his 'Freedom from Hunger Campaign'.⁷⁶ Such cross-sectoral

⁷¹ 'FAO Proposals for a World Food Board', prepared for submission to the second session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2 September 1948 (http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/library/docs/613_2__42_OR7.pdf); Lord John Boyd Orr, *The White Man's Dilemma: Food and the Future* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), pp. 90–5; Lord John Boyd Orr, *As I Recall* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1966), pp. 171–8, 191–5; D. John Shaw, *World Food Security: A History since 1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 24–5.

⁷² Ruth Jachertz, "'To Keep Food out of Politics': The UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1945–1965", in *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990*, edited by Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 75–100; Tana Johnson, *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments Are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 152–4; Staples, *Birth of Development*, pp. 106–8.

⁷³ B. R. Sen, *Towards a Newer World* (Dublin: Tycooly International, 1982), p. 134.

⁷⁴ Nora McKeon, *The United Nations and Civil Society: Legitimizing Global Governance. Whose Voice?* (London: Zed Books, 2009), pp. 18–20; Tana Johnson, 'Cooperation, Co-Optation, Competition, Conflict: International Bureaucracies and Non-Governmental Organizations in an Interdependent World', *Review of International Political Economy*, 23 (2016): pp. 737–67, at pp. 749–50.

⁷⁵ Charles Weitz, 'Freedom from Hunger Campaign: Involving Civil Society before It Became Fashionable', in *Whose World Is It Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations and the Multilateral Future*, edited by John W. Foster and Anita Anand (Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 1999), pp. 73–90.

⁷⁶ B. R. Sen, 'Letter to NGOs', 5 June 1962, cited in Matthew Bunch, 'The Freedom from Hunger Campaign: Inventing the International Development Movement', n.d., at p. 21, <https://freedomfrom-hungerproject.weebly.com/the-freedom-from-hunger-campaign.html> (accessed 19 March 2019).

alliances became characteristic for many functional IOs within the UN system and beyond, as partnerships promised to enhance both technical expertise and implementation capacities of international governance.⁷⁷ They constitute an important opening up of Weber's *Fachbürokratie* that would now liaise, formally or informally, with external specialists, resulting in a more networked and less hierarchical form of governance.

As a career diplomat, Sen was more of a manager and political entrepreneur than a theorist inclined to abstraction. However, even in the period after the Second World War, we still find persons at the helm of IOs who were prone to theoretical advancement. A man who combined managerial and intellectual ambitions in an exemplary fashion was C. Wilfred Jenks (1909–73), a long-term civil servant at the ILO and its director general from 1970 to 1973.⁷⁸ Jenks was a law scholar who had joined the ILO in 1931, still under its charismatic founding director, Albert Thomas, who tirelessly sought to enlarge the organization's competences and venture into new fields of technical assistance. The ILO also became a hub for international theorizing under Thomas's leadership (see Chapter 4). It was the intellectual breeding ground for the welfare internationalism that became so popular after the Second World War.⁷⁹

Jenks climbed the ILO's internal hierarchies quickly. Together with Director General Edward Phelan, in the 1940s, he planned to turn the ILO into a 'master agency' for all social and economic activities of the UN system. The 1944 declaration of Philadelphia, which Jenks co-authored, claimed for the ILO full responsibility for all socio-economic matters of global concern. The attempt failed, however, as that coordinating role was eventually allotted to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN.⁸⁰ UN activism in the field of technical assistance posed new challenges for the ILO whose corporatism was tailored to the negotiation of labour issues between the social partners—a typical constellation of the industrialized world. Much of the labour-related regulation that the ILO set was peripheral to agrarian economies of the global South.

Jenks responded by re-branding the ILO as a sort of development agency. That strategy was backed up with doctrinal work in international law, where Jenks sought to accommodate the concerns of the global South and regain a moral high

⁷⁷ Jens Steffek, 'Explaining Cooperation between IGOs and NGOs: Push Factors, Pull Factors, and the Policy Cycle', *Review of International Studies*, 39 (2013): pp. 993–1013.

⁷⁸ On Jenks' doctrinal work at the ILO, see Robert W. Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony', *International Organization*, 31 (1977): pp. 385–424; and Robert W. Cox, *Universal Foreigner: The Individual and the World* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2013), pp. 223–4.

⁷⁹ Sinclair, *To Reform the World*, ch. 1; Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Druox, eds., *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Steffek and Holthaus, 'Social-Democratic Roots', pp. 115–17.

⁸⁰ For the enlarged agenda, see International Labour Organisation 1944, art. II d; Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state*, p. 155.

ground.⁸¹ In 1958, he presented what was to become his most influential book, *The Common Law of Mankind*. In this monograph, Jenks sketched the contours of a new kind of international law for a welfare world, in which IOs would not only take care of keeping the peace but also of the well-being of individuals, accepting 'a common responsibility for the common welfare'.⁸² Jenks argued that material inequalities within countries were superseded by inequalities between countries. The task of a global welfare law was to tackle such injustices, mainly by contributing to the process of socio-economic development.⁸³ Jenks thus established 'a characteristically "social" view of law [...] as organic, vital and responsive to the progressive needs of society'.⁸⁴

Jenks's efforts need to be seen in the context of a discipline confronted with increasing global interdependence and post-colonial realities.⁸⁵ Some colleagues were suggesting similar ideas of a truly global law that would transcend the parochial interests of the industrialized world as well as the dominance of the sovereign state. Philip Jessup suggested that international law be built around the fact of the mutual dependence of nations instead of postulating their independence.⁸⁶ Wolfgang Friedmann advocated an 'international law of cooperation' to complement the conventional 'international law of coexistence'.⁸⁷ Parallels between the domestic welfare state and the international arena were frequently made. The Dutch international lawyer Bert Röling argued that for countries of the global South, 'the state cannot but strive to be a welfare state, and in the same way the community of nations, the world-community, should be a "welfare-community"'.⁸⁸

Alongside the rise of the development paradigm in economic and political thought, international law was also becoming increasingly welfarist in the 1950s and 1960s.⁸⁹ In Jenks's case at least, this was not a purely theoretical or doctrinal statement but came with a pledge to do something about poverty and underdevelopment. Jenks had an understanding of international law 'as a method

⁸¹ C. Wilfred Jenks, *The Common Law of Mankind* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958); C. Wilfred Jenks, *Law, Freedom and Welfare* (London: Steven & Sons, 1963), p. 45.

⁸² Jenks, *Common Law*, pp. 140, 246–8.

⁸³ C. Wilfred Jenks, 'Realism and Magnanimity in the Law of Nations', *American Journal of International Law*, 66 (1972): pp. 314–23, at pp. 316–17.

⁸⁴ Guy Fiti Sinclair, 'The Common Law of Mankind: C. Wilfred Jenks' Constitutional Vision' (New York: NYU School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/16, 2016) at p. 12.

⁸⁵ Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, pp. 32–3.

⁸⁶ Philip C. Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 37–8.

⁸⁷ Wolfgang Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

⁸⁸ Bernard Victor Aloysius Röling, *International Law in an Expanded World* (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1960), at p. 50.

⁸⁹ In calling this orientation welfarist, I follow Jouannet, *Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations*; see also Eric Posner, 'Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash' (Chicago: University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, No. 606, 2017).

of intervention in the problems of the world.’⁹⁰ The new tasks of technical and development assistance transformed IOs into welfare agencies. ‘The discharge of operational functions in this broad sense,’ Jenks wrote, ‘gives international organisations opportunities of securing direct results which compare favourably with the uncertainties and delays involved in the older technique of attempting to influence opinion, policy, legislation and national administrative action.’⁹¹ The welfarist orientation of international law thus dovetailed with the quest for political and financial autonomy of global IOs.

A discussion of technocratic internationalism in the 1950s and 1960s would not be complete without a look at the European integration project. In this last section of the chapter, I therefore turn to the international thought of Walter Hallstein (1901–82), founding president of the Commission of the European Communities. Hallstein was a German law professor, diplomat, and politician. Considered a brilliant mind, Rostock University awarded Hallstein a professorship in international private law when he was only 29 years old. After the war, Hallstein served as president of the University of Frankfurt, which he had joined in 1941, but he moved on to politics soon after. As of 1950, he was West Germany’s highest ranking civil servant in the field of foreign relations, first heading a division in Konrad Adenauer’s chancellery and, from 1951, as state secretary in the foreign office of the Federal Republic (Adenauer acted as foreign minister until 1955).

Walter Hallstein ranks among the most influential figures in early European integration history. In 1950, he negotiated the ECSC Treaty with his French counterpart Jean Monnet. As of 1958, he was an entrepreneurial founding president of the EEC Commission, which was already tabling ambitious proposals, such as monetary union, under his presidency.⁹² A stand-off with French President Charles de Gaulle over the expansion of majority voting in the EEC led to the empty chair crisis of 1965 and, as it turned out, to Hallstein’s resignation at the end of 1967. The conflict was not only about voting issues and agricultural policy, De Gaulle countered Hallstein’s strategy of incrementally strengthening the powers of the EEC, and in particular the Commission, vis-à-vis member states. In de Gaulle’s eyes, this Commission was *quelque aréopage technocratique, apatride, et irresponsable* (‘some technocratic and unaccountable Areopagus without a fatherland’).⁹³

⁹⁰ Jean D’Aspremont, ‘Jenks’ Ethic of Responsibility for the Disillusioned International Lawyer’ (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016–20, 2016), at p. 13.

⁹¹ C. Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Impact of International Organisations on Public and Private International Law’, *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, 37 (1951): pp. 23–60, at p. 42.

⁹² Hans Groeben, ‘Walter Hallstein as President of the Commission’, in *Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?*, edited by Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), pp. 95–108.

⁹³ Charles de Gaulle at a press conference at the Palais de l’Élysée, Paris, 9 September 1965, reprinted in *Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages*. Vol. IV. *Pour l’effort (1962–1965)* (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 379.

Hallstein was a prolific writer, and this activity intensified after his retirement. Regarding his general approach to European integration, Hallstein defies easy labelling as federalist or functionalist. His overall vision of Europe was ambitious, a *Bundesstaat* ('federal state') in the making. On the other hand, Hallstein is often characterized as a functionalist. That assessment refers to his method of integration rather than the desired end-state. When Hallstein took office in Brussels in 1958, he tried to apply functionalist approaches because they promised to bolster the Commission's power, which was of the soft sort, rooted in expertise. For that reason, Hallstein sought to build a professional European civil service.

If all of the Commission's proposals to date [1965]—with a single unimportant exception—have been approved by the Council, there is no doubt that this is largely due to the Commission's success in putting forward the best possible solutions from the technical angle. In order to achieve this, the Commission does not simply rely on the expert knowledge of its officials in drafting its proposals; it tries to ascertain and take into account the views of independent consultants, the business circles concerned and government departments. Experts from the member Governments are brought into preliminary discussions at an early stage.⁹⁴

Thus, quite like Sen, Hallstein tried to base his organization on the internal expertise of a *Fachbürokratie*, but placed within a wider network of specialists. Hallstein believed in transnational expert administration in a way that other key figures of European integration did not, and that includes Jean Monnet, the president of the ECSC. Monnet certainly was a partisan of public planning of a rather pragmatic and entrepreneurial kind.⁹⁵ It is true that he 'rejected a political career for himself because from his viewpoint politicians spent their energy seeking power rather than facing problems'.⁹⁶ On the other hand, Monnet was not a technocrat either. He took care to dissociate himself from the French bureaucratic tradition, because bureaucracy to him was a conservative force that defended the status quo. His own working method was energetic, chaotic, and 'intentionally disorganized'.⁹⁷ In comparison, Hallstein had more faith in the virtues of expert bureaucracy.

Like Jenks, Hallstein never was just a manager. Even as president of the Commission, he followed scholarly debates and referred to them. When

⁹⁴ Walter Hallstein, 'The EEC Commission: A New Factor in International Life', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 14 (1965): pp. 727–41, at p. 731.

⁹⁵ On Monnet as a planner, see Marie-Laure Djelic, 'Genèse et fondements du plan Monnet. L'inspiration américaine', *Revue Française d'Études Américaines*, 68 (1996): pp. 77–86.

⁹⁶ Richard F. Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 219.

⁹⁷ Jonathan White, *Politics of Last Resort: Governing by Emergency in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 40.

discussing the dynamics of European integration he referred to the theorems and terminology of 'American Political Science'.⁹⁸ I outlined above how Ernst Haas attempted to reconcile the image of an integration process that was mainly driven by technological and economic interdependence with political agency. Hallstein saw a similar constellation of forces at play. The European integration project had diluted the boundaries between the economic and the political to a point where the two had become almost indistinguishable. At the same time the integration process was not proceeding automatically. 'The essence of politics,' Hallstein wrote, 'is choice. I do not want, therefore, to give the impression that because the logic of integration is compelling and inexorable, its consequences can be put into practice without making a political choice and a number of difficult political decisions.'⁹⁹ Pentland's conclusion thus seems warranted that '[a] Hallstein and a Haas, each in his different style, expressed the same kind of assumptions and analyses'.¹⁰⁰

Hallstein also found that two fundamental forces were at play in the European integration process. One, the 'objective' force was inherent in the economic or technical necessity that determined 'what ought to happen'. His German word for it was *Sachlogik*, the inherent logic of things. The other force was the contingent conditions (*das Willkürliche*) of political opportunity. These conditions determined whether what *Sachlogik* demanded could be achieved in practice or not.¹⁰¹ It is quite obvious that Hallstein had a preference for rational solutions and would have loved to see *Sachlogik* determine the European integration process.¹⁰² Consider the following statement:

The European Community has no symbol, no flag, no anthem, no parades and no sovereign. It has no means of integration which appeal to the senses, to the eye or the ear. This benefits the style of our Community, the style of plain, hard, undramatic work which still earns us the reputation of being technicians, even technocrats. Our activity is founded on reason rather than on emotion, our strength is our readiness to recognize facts rather than myths, our struggles are discussions, not the unloosing of passion.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Walter Hallstein, 'Die echten Probleme der europäischen Integration' (Kieler Vorträge gehalten im Institut für Weltwirtschaft der Universität Kiel, Neue Folge 37, 1965), p. 5.

⁹⁹ Walter Hallstein, *United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 58.

¹⁰⁰ Charles Pentland, 'Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration', in *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations*, edited by Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom (London: University of London Press, 1975), pp. 9–24, at p. 19. For essentially the same assessment, see Wolfgang Wessels, 'Walter Hallstein's Contribution to Integration Theory: Outdated or Underestimated?', in *Walter Hallstein—the Forgotten European?*, edited by Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), pp. 220–54.

¹⁰¹ Hallstein, *Die echten Probleme*, p. 19.

¹⁰² Walter Hallstein, *Europe in the Making* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p. 22.

¹⁰³ Walter Hallstein, 'Address at the Celebration in the European Parliament of the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Rome', Summary for the Press (1962), at p. 1.

On the other hand, Hallstein knew the limits of a technocratic strategy of integration that did not appeal to citizens' emotions and offered them little to identify with. Moreover, Hallstein also perceived the normative challenges of a Community built around a single market and its administration. In many of his articles and speeches, Hallstein underlined the need for a directly elected European parliament as a counterweight to the expert administration.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored how technocratic thought dominated both theory and practice of international organization in the 1950s and 1960s. My analysis has revealed, once again, the constant interplay between the domestic and the international level. Domestically, the welfare state expanded in many Western countries during the post-war years, a tendency conducive to technocratic forms of governance in the national arena. These domestic trends were projected onto the international arena when visionaries suggested an imminent transition from welfare state to 'welfare world' through international organization. Introducing the work of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, who were active in Sweden and at the UN, I have been able to explore how political entrepreneurs promoted welfare state thinking on both levels.

The rising welfare orientation of IOs was in many ways congenial to the established technocratic-internationalist doctrine. Yet the advent of developmentalism and North-South conflict also transformed the traditional image of functional IOs as technical standard setters and clearinghouses of data. It added an operational layer of 'project-making', of direct intervention into the economies and societies of states, guided by a new class of international engineers, economists, public health specialists, etc. The League of Nations, to be sure, already had some initiatives of the kind, but the functional organizations of the UN system took project-orientation to an entirely new level.

This new mission promised more power and autonomy for IOs, and I have shown in this chapter how IO leaders took the opportunity to strengthen their organizations, securing new tasks in offering technical assistance to the 'developing countries' of the South. The international experts also brought technocratic institutions and practices, such as economic planning, to these countries. On the other hand, the new image of IOs as welfare providers also raised expectations of quick and tangible results. As we will see in Chapter 7, this

¹⁰⁴ Hallstein, *Die echten Probleme*, p. 10; Walter Hallstein, *Der unvollendete Bundesstaat. Europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse* (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1969), pp. 66–70; Walter Hallstein, *International Course on European Integration* (Europa Institute, Amsterdam, 1970), p. 3.

backfired when critics increasingly questioned the efficiency of the technocratic organizational form.

I have also shown in this chapter how technocratic internationalism came to embrace NGOs. Expertise for development, along with implementation capacity, was found in cross-sectoral networks of governance that reached out to private actors. As partners in development, NGOs were enlisted to enhance the quite limited operational capacities of IOs and to overcome the political reluctance of some governments. Forging these new alliances transcended Weber's conception of a cloistered and largely self-sufficient *Fachbürokratie* in the public realm. Rather, these administrative bodies were now teaming up with societal elites and private organizations that shared their goals. Architects of European integration who tried to unite the continent through the creation and regulation of markets with the help of business and civil society also followed a strategy of synergy between public and private action.

The 1950s and 1960s also offer an excellent example to demonstrate the links between technocratic theory and political practice. In these decades, the functionalists' recipe was tried on a large scale and expectations in many quarters were high. Regional integration in Europe is a case in point. A new scientific functionalism, developed mainly in the US, not only pretended to explain the European integration process and predict its future. This neo-functionalism, which accommodated political interests and political agency to a greater extent than Mitrany's version, was also inspiring practitioners, such as Walter Hallstein in the European Commission. The neo-functionalists still assumed that integration was driven by great, anonymous forces or an 'inherent logic of things' in the background. At the same time, they expected political leaders to steer, accelerate, or slow that process. .

The popularity of technocratic governance schemes in Europe and at the UN after the Second World War is evidence that technocratic internationalism had an impact on the course of international politics in the real world. International organization had definitely left its utopian stage. This implied, on the other hand, that technocratic internationalism and the IOs it had brought about could not live on promises alone any longer. Expert bureaucracies now had to prove their alleged qualities empirically, and blunders in the real world would have repercussions on doctrine. Chapter 7 zooms in on the crisis of technocratic internationalism in the decades that followed.

Disenchantment and renewal

Chapter 6 documented how technocratic approaches dominated the theory and practice of international organization over the 1950s and 1960s. In this chapter, I will show how the intellectual tide turned against technocratic internationalism in the 1970s and 1980s, and heavily so. ‘Technical-rational action has brought progress,’ stated critical International Relations (IR) theorist Richard Ashley in 1980, ‘progress toward destruction of all it has built.’¹ Dividing intellectual history by decades is, of course, a rather blunt way of organizing such a narrative. Yet the early 1970s really marked a shift in the history of technocratic internationalism (and technocratic political thought in general) as old certainties crumbled in Western societies, and crisis became the standard diagnosis when talking about international relations and the world economy.

That crisis had many facets. In North America and Western Europe, university students were in open revolt against the establishment. They pursued a broad agenda for change. Targets included the capitalist economic order; the absurd realpolitik of nuclear arms races; the brutal proxy war in Vietnam; the discrimination of women and sexual minorities; and institutionalized racism and apartheid. At the same time, there was growing sensibility for the adverse ecological consequences of industrial modernity and consumerism, a new understanding that environmental historian Patrick Kupper once called the ‘1970s diagnosis’.² Under the impact of depleting resources and environmental disasters, the almost consensual political strategy of the post-war decades to create ever more material wealth for everyone began to lose appeal.

Major changes were also underway in the international economy. The long post-war boom floundered with the 1973 oil price shock. That shock was provoked by concerted action of the oil-exporting countries within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and widely interpreted as a harbinger of a global power shift. It hit American and West European economies that were already struggling with increasing competition from Asia, as heavy industries followed labour-intensive sectors, such as textiles, to the Far East. In the more advanced economies, the shift to what Daniel Bell in a visionary

¹ Richard K. Ashley, *The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique* (London: F. Pinter, 1980), p. 214.

² Patrick Kupper, ‘Die “1970er Diagnose”. Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zu einem Wendepunkt der Umweltgeschichte,’ *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 43 (2003): pp. 325–48.

book dubbed a 'post-industrial society' was imminent.³ The shock also hit the global South, where de-colonization was almost complete, but the promise of quick economic development and industrialization was proving illusory. In the early 1970s, famine raged in West Africa and the Sahel zone.

In the field of international organization, the post-war order of the Western hemisphere began to disintegrate.⁴ The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates collapsed in 1971 when the US suspended the dollar's convertibility into gold. One of the reasons for this was excessive military spending to finance the war in Vietnam, which the US had proved unable to win, despite its superpower status. In 1973, military blunders and mounting domestic resistance forced the US government into a truce with communist North Vietnam. Western industrialized countries also struggled to placate the demands of the Group of 77 (G77), the increasingly assertive pressure group of the South that advocated a re-balancing of international economic relations. A general feeling of American decline and lack of hegemonic leadership abounded, paired with an acute awareness of an ever-closer global interdependence. With an apparent failure to manage that interdependence, the future itself became widely perceived as uncertain and problematic. In response, many social scientists and economists converted to the new academic specialism of 'future studies'.⁵ In the field of IR, this took the form of a 'World Order Models Project'. Under the leadership of Saul Mendlovitz and Richard Falk, a transnational team of scholars went searching for 'feasible utopias'.⁶

Having sketched a picture of that overall feeling of multiple crises and uncertainties, I will now show how such changes affected international thought in general and theorizing international organizations in particular. In the first section of this chapter, I will show how a backlash against bureaucracy as an organizational form affected international organizations (IOs). Thomas G. Weiss's criticism of United Nations (UN) bureaucracy serves as a key work to illustrate the shifting perception. I then proceed to discuss the return of the state and intergovernmentalism in international theory. It was ushered in by a double diagnosis of urgent need for the management of global interdependence and sluggish political responses. This new type of liberal-internationalist literature,

³ Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (London: Heinemann, 1974).

⁴ For an excellent overview of these trends, see Robert W. Cox, 'The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980s', *International Journal*, 35 (1980): pp. 370–95.

⁵ Jenny Andersson, 'The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World', *The American Historical Review*, 117 (2012): pp. 1411–30; Russell L. Ackoff, *Redesigning the Future: A Systems Approach to Societal Problems* (New York: John Wiley, 1974); Louis René Beres and Harry R. Targ, eds., *Planning Alternative World Futures: Values, Methods, and Models* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

⁶ Richard A. Falk, *(Re-)Imagining Humane Global Governance* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p. 183; Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Robert C. Johansen, 'The Contribution of the World Order Models Project', *Alternatives*, 19 (1994): pp. 155–62.

influenced by economic thinking and rational choice theory, put the emphasis on actors' behaviour, on political will, and on the conditions under which international cooperation was negotiated. Few authors now seemed to believe, as the functionalists had done, that objective problem pressure alone could induce new forms of international cooperation.

Interestingly, other elements of the functionalist account remained almost unquestioned. Despite the rehabilitation of politics and intergovernmentalism, the expert still enjoyed pride of place. I will examine the emergent literature on global environmental problems, to be tackled by new international 'regimes', which boomed in these years and became a new field for expert-driven, de-politicized governance. While the regime literature may represent a revival of liberal internationalism, technocratic forms of public planning were still present on the left of the political spectrum. The partisans of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) envisaged global administrative bodies as managing and re-distributing the world's resources. The international administration of the deep-seabed minerals is a case in point, which I will discuss by way of example.

The critique of the technocratic form

Perceptive observers had seen from the beginning that with its undisputable functional advantages, technocratic governance also had a downside. As outlined in Chapter 1, Max Weber already spotted deep ambiguities in the Western rationalization project. To recall, for him the advance of the *Fachbürokratie* was universal and unstoppable, thanks to its technical efficiency, but it came with an oppressive potential.⁷ Binding bureaucrats strictly to the law made their actions predictable but also left them incapable of reflecting on, or re-defining, the values on which they operated. Weber knew that bureaucracies had the tendency to ossify in their routines, to become status-quo-oriented and risk-averse, lacking creativity and critical spirit.

Literary dystopias of totalitarian regimes elaborated further on such themes, with George Orwell's 1949 book *Nineteen Eighty-Four* being arguably the most famous example of that genre.⁸ The merciless bureaucratic apparatus in that novel was inspired by the Soviet Union under Stalin. Yet critical voices that associated technocracy with totalitarianism and oppression did not gain the upper hand in the post-war years. The long boom of the Western economies and enduring faith in technological progress limited the purchase of such principled doubts about

⁷ See Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), pp. 9–10.

⁸ George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949).

expert governance. On the contrary, technical expertise seemed to show a way out of an overly 'ideological' age. It was widely believed in the 1950s that

industrial society, by its potential to solve fundamental social problems, had eliminated the conditions that gave rise to extreme ideologies of right and left and even made interest politics itself obsolete. What was required was the application of administrative, intellectual, and mechanical technology to the pragmatic resolution of particular social issues.⁹

By the 1970s, in contrast, many Western intellectuals looked at technocratic forms of governance with suspicion. The fear was that technocracy would encroach upon democracy and wrestle control of the political process from the electorate.¹⁰ Researchers in the humanities investigated the inner contradictions of the modernization project, citing a mounting critical literature that associated administrative machinery with dictatorship. Next to the Soviet Union already mentioned, Nazi Germany had become a key point of reference. The evidence had been mounting since the 1950s that many of the atrocities of the Nazi regime had been meticulously planned and painstakingly executed by its capable bureaucratic apparatus.¹¹ In his monumental study of the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg came to the conclusion that '[t]he machinery of destruction, then, was structurally no different from organized German society as a whole; the difference was only one of function. The machinery of destruction was the organized community in one of its special roles.'¹² Many different branches of Germany's modern bureaucracy had contributed to the persecution, deportation, and killing of millions of European Jews. The Nazi regime even produced its own specialized bureaucratic figure for the persecution of the Jews, the *Judensachbearbeiter*.¹³

⁹ John G. Gunnell, 'The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy', *Technology and Culture*, 23 (1982): pp. 392–416, at pp. 395–6. On the perceived end of ideology, see Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001 [1955]), pp. 313–14; Edward Shils, 'The End of Ideology', *Encounter*, 5 (1955): pp. 52–8; Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); M. Rejai, W. L. Mason and D. C. Beller, 'Political Ideology: Empirical Relevance of the Hypothesis of Decline', *Ethics*, 78 (1968): pp. 303–12.

¹⁰ Gunnell, 'The Technocratic Image', pp. 396–7.

¹¹ Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944); Eugen Kogon, *The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System Behind Them* (New York: Berkley, 1950); Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future* (New York: Harper, 1975); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

¹² Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Vol. 3 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003 [1961]), p. 1061, emphasis in the original; see also Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker, 'Scientists, Engineers and National Socialism', in *Science, Technology and National Socialism*, edited by Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1–29.

¹³ Christopher R. Browning, 'The German Bureaucracy and the Holocaust', in *Genocide, Critical Issues of the Holocaust: A Companion to the Film Genocide*, edited by Alex Grobman and Daniel Landes (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center / Rossel Books, 1983), pp. 145–9, at p. 147.

Such insights also led to a reappraisal of the sociological classics and their account of modernization. In his study of the Holocaust, Richard Rubenstein argued that ‘almost everything Weber wrote on the subject of bureaucracy can in retrospect be read as a description of the way the bureaucratic hierarchies of the Third Reich “solved” their Jewish problem.’¹⁴ Under the impression of totalitarian bureaucracies also older contributions to the technocratic tradition, such as Saint-Simonianism, were re-visited. Historian Georg Iggers did not find in the writings of the Saint-Simonians a romantic, emancipatory progressivism but a precursor of 20th-century totalitarianism.¹⁵ He made that point by highlighting the elements of hierarchy and centralized control that the Saint-Simonian schemes undoubtedly contained.

Such themes from the dark side of modernity were taken up in the social theory and philosophy of the 1970s. I will pick out two voices whose critique of technocratic modernity proved to be particularly influential. In France, Michel Foucault explored and dissected the techniques of governmental control that modernity had brought about. In 1975, he published *Discipline & Punish*, an acclaimed study of the emergence of the modern prison in the 19th century.¹⁶ For Foucault, the prison was only one instance of a rationalized institution, a prism to open up a new perspective on modernity in general and on what Foucault called ‘disciplines’, the ‘techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities.’¹⁷ The enhanced control and surveillance, the restless gathering of information and its aggregation into statistics, the rational design of societal institutions, the conformity and predictability of conduct—Foucault denounced as instruments of repression what to conventional and optimistic readings of modernity were forces of progress and enlightenment. Foucault underlined the ‘normalization’ at work here that aimed to eliminate, as far as practically possible, deviance. He elaborated further on these general tendencies in his lectures at the Collège de France, where they began to revolve around the central concept of governmentality.¹⁸

In Germany, Jürgen Habermas laid out a critique of technocratic rationality that became one of the major foundations of his opus magnum, the *Theory of Communicative Action*.¹⁹ Habermas developed his approach to technocratic rationality in dialogue with the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, in

¹⁴ Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History*, p. 27.

¹⁵ Georg G. Iggers, *The Cult of Authority: The Political Philosophy of the Saint-Simonians. A Chapter in the Intellectual History of Totalitarianism* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958); Georg G. Iggers, ‘Heine and the Saint-Simonians: A Re-Examination’, *Comparative Literature*, 10 (1958): pp. 289–308.

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

¹⁷ Foucault, *Discipline & Punish*, p. 218.

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978* (New York: Picador, 2007); Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979* (New York: Picador, 2008).

¹⁹ Jürgen Habermas, ‘Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’’, in *Toward a Rational Society*, edited by Jürgen Habermas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 81–122; Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975); Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*

particular Herbert Marcuse's work.²⁰ So equipped he re-visited Max Weber's concept of instrumental rationality. Habermas agreed that its advance was characteristic of the path to industrial modernity but criticized Weber for over-emphasizing the instrumental side of rationality. What he had neglected was the emancipatory potential inherent in rational communication. To recover this potential, Habermas made a distinction between the 'system', permeated by instrumental rationality, and the human 'lifeworld', where communicative rationality coordinates human interactions.

Unlike Foucault, Habermas often uses the term technocracy, defined as 'a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness of the depoliticized mass of the population where it can take on legitimating power'.²¹ Technocratic consciousness, as Habermas sees it, penetrates ever more deeply into the sphere of social living, where it edges out potentially disruptive ethical questions and bolsters the status quo of a technology-based capitalism. The technocratic mindset thus loses the emancipatory potential that Habermas still sees in the enlightenment project and continues to defend.

This brief excursion into European philosophy and social theory serves to illustrate the anti-technocratic intellectual tide of the 1970s. The works of Foucault and Habermas, with some delay, also impacted the literature on IR where Richard K. Ashley introduced them to a wider audience in the early 1980s.²² Still, critical approaches to IOs and their legitimacy had already made an impact in the 1970s. Inspired mainly by Gramsci, Robert Cox provided a new and critical take by arguing that IOs were complicit with powerful social forces in exerting a form of global ideological hegemony.²³ For Cox, Mitranian-style functionalism, promising a de-politicized management of common problems for the benefit of all, was at the heart of the modern ideology of international organization.²⁴ What the functionalist narrative obscured was that IOs served some interests and some parts of the world more than others. Social scientific theorizing, Cox famously said, was always for some purpose and some interest, and that was true for theories of international organization as well.

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1979). For his more recent thinking on such issues, see Habermas, *The Lure of Technocracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015).

²⁰ Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon, 1964); for a comparison of the respective approaches, see Andrew Feenberg, 'Marcuse or Habermas: Two Critiques of Technology', *Inquiry*, 39 (1996): pp. 45–70.

²¹ Habermas, 'Technology and Science', p. 105.

²² Richard K. Ashley, 'Three Modes of Economism', *International Studies Quarterly*, 27 (1983): pp. 463–96; Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', *International Organization*, 38 (1984): pp. 225–86.

²³ Robert W. Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony', *International Organization*, 31 (1977): pp. 385–424; Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 12 (1983): pp. 162–75.

²⁴ Robert W. Cox, 'Labor and Transnational Relations', *International Organization*, 25 (1971): pp. 554–84, at pp. 579–82; Robert W. Cox, 'On Thinking About Future World Order', *World Politics*, 28 (1976): pp. 175–96, at p. 188.

An increasingly critical attitude to technocracy also spread to the field of international theory and especially international organization studies, where a critique driven by normative considerations came to complement more conventional questions about empirical feasibility and resilience. Neo-functionalist theories of European integration were a main target. Their critics argued that

integration theorists have not confronted the problems of the dehumanizing aspects of technology, the growth of bureaucracy, and the lack of political participation. They have not faced these issues because they assume that technocratic elitism and democracy are compatible, and that the future greatness of Europe is dependent upon centralization.²⁵

There was an increasing awareness among political scientists that international integration projects came at a democratic price because they benefitted the executive and limited parliamentary oversight.²⁶

That criticism went to the core of legitimization narratives of the functionalist kind. International organization was undesirable because it undermined democracy and popular sovereignty, ushering in largely autonomous, self-serving elites. Neo-functionalists, such as Ernst Haas, had certainly assumed a common good orientation of international technocracies.

Haas accepts on faith that these technocrats will make their decisions for the benefit of all by upgrading the common interests of the community. We find it difficult to believe that the end result of a bargaining process participated in by elitist bureaucrats from the national governments, elitist European technocrats (Eurocrats), and representatives from oligarchically controlled interests groups, will, without question, benefit the interests of the common Europeans; the end result is far more likely to benefit the interests of the participants.²⁷

Suspensions of ideological rigidity and self-serving behaviour in IOs were not only held by scholars on the 'critical edge' of the IR spectrum, but also on the 'problem-solving' side.²⁸ As Edward Morse wrote,

²⁵ W. John Sloan and R. Harry Targ, 'Beyond the European Nation-State: A Normative Critique', *Polity*, 3 (1971): pp. 501–520, at p. 511.

²⁶ Karl Kaiser, 'Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process', *International Organization*, 25 (1971): pp. 706–20.

²⁷ Sloan and Targ, 'Beyond the European Nation-State', p. 514.

²⁸ The distinction between these two types of theorizing was introduced by Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10 (1981): pp. 126–55, at pp. 128–9. For the 'ideological' character of functionalist theorizing, see also Robert Keohane, 'The Functional Theory of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 72 (1978), pp. 805–6; Thomas G. Weiss and Jean Siotis, 'Functionalism and International Secretariats: Ideology and Rhetoric in the UN Family', in *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in*

modernization has been associated with the notion that political structures can become increasingly rationalized and thus better able to maintain control over the events within society as well as in the environment of international affairs. Yet modernization also worsens the problem of control by creating roadblocks to efficient and rational policy-making.²⁹

In the field of IR, a literature oriented towards problem-solving and removing those 'roadblocks' began to address pathologies of international administration. To illustrate this rather constructive, reform-oriented line of critique, I turn to the early writings of Tom Weiss.

Thomas George Weiss still today is one of the leading scholars, and defenders, of the UN system.³⁰ He started his academic career in the early 1970s with a PhD dissertation that was published under the title *International Bureaucracy*, in his own words 'a skeptical, yet concerned critique of the administrative structures of international secretariats'.³¹ Weiss's purpose was to confront theories of international administration with organizational realities, with the explicit aim of improving, rather than dismissing, IOs as an institutional form. His diagnosis was, typical for the decade, one of crisis. The performance of functional IOs was poor, Weiss argued, and no match for the escalating global problems that they were designed to tackle. Yet the reason for their failure was not, as IR realists maintained, to be found in geopolitical stalemates or the unwillingness of hegemonic states to support IOs. Rather, Weiss hypothesized that there was a mismatch between the ambitious goals of functional organizations and the administrative apparatus at their disposal.³² The reason for the poor organizational performance of IOs was to be found in their 'internal bureaucratic politics'.³³

In his review of canonical works on the international civil service, Weiss found a classic Weberian understanding of expert public administration. He called that (self-)description a 'myth', but one from which the functionalism of the post-war era had distilled some empirical predictions about the growing role of IOs in world politics.³⁴ Drawing on IO documents and recruitment practices, Weiss also

International Relations, edited by A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (London: University of London Press, 1975), pp. 173–89.

²⁹ Edward L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 103.

³⁰ A summary of his current views can be found in Thomas G. Weiss, *Would the World Be Better without the UN?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2018).

³¹ Thomas G. Weiss, *International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975), p. xiii.

³² Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, pp. 21–3.

³³ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, p. 125.

³⁴ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, p. 33, referring to Alexander Loveday, *Reflection on International Administration* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956); Georges Langrod, *The International Civil Service* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1963); and, Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945); see also Tien-cheng Young, *International Civil Service: Principles and Problems* (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1958); F. R. Scott,

showed how the idea of an impartial, competent, and autonomous international administration permeated the League of Nations and the early UN, not least thanks to Eric Drummond's pioneering efforts (see Chapter 3). To him, however, all the talk about an expert civil service at a global level was 'more a eulogy than an objective analysis of the reality of international administration', and the textbook figure of the 'international technocrat' an 'ideal-type' not to be found operating anywhere.³⁵

In Weiss's critical work, we find an acute awareness that the image of a competent and impartial technocracy served justificatory purposes. He clearly saw that 'the promotion of its own legitimacy as a global actor with global perspectives' was one of the core activities of an IO secretariat and its staff.³⁶ Weiss's own scholarly project was to contrast such narratives with social-scientific fieldwork that explored the real functioning of IO secretariats. Unlike Cox, who intended to reveal the biased, parochial nature of IOs and their phony universalism, Weiss wanted to improve their functioning, driven by the fear 'that the activity of international administrations is not efficient or effective even according to the low standards usually applied to measure their behaviour'.³⁷

In his empirical analysis of IO secretariats, Weiss identified some general pathologies of bureaucracy but also particularities of international administration. Among the general problems were inertia, a status-quo orientation, and a lack of creativity and flexibility in responding to new situations. The growing size and complexity of the administrative machinery were typical of the age and affected international secretariats as well, in particular the UN bureaucracy. Complexity created a whole new class of problems that would not exist otherwise. Bureaucratic organizations started focusing more on managing themselves than on the substantial problems on their agenda.³⁸

Other challenges were unique to IO secretariats. Particularly problematic were the heterogeneity of the international civil service and national quotas in recruitment. Such quotas undermined meritocratic principles and fostered the allegiance of civil servants to their home countries which had nominated them for the position. Weiss contrasted the UN with the League of Nations, whose staff he found more idealistic and committed to the internationalist cause than typical UN officials.³⁹ The East-West conflict exacerbated that problem as civil servants were expected to conform to the political ideologies of their home countries, leading to an increasingly 'politicized bureaucracy'.

The World's Civil Service: International Conciliation (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1954).

³⁵ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, pp. 49–50.

³⁶ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, p. 149.

³⁷ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, p. 75.

³⁸ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, pp. 72–3.

³⁹ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, p. 60; UN recruitment practices are also harshly criticized in Shirley Hazzard, *Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

Comparing several IO secretariats, Weiss singled out the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) as a commendable example due to its 'programmed flexibility, the degree of decentralization, the commitment to global service, and the concern to optimize the efficiency of financial expenditures'.⁴⁰ Based on this analysis, he came to propose a set of reforms. To avoid the pitfalls of organizational complexity, Weiss suggested the de-centralization of existing bureaucracies and the creation of smaller, more flexible secretariats. National staff quotas should be abolished, he argued, and recruitment practices instead should aim at a good balance in terms of sex, age, race, and language group, so as to guarantee plurality of perspectives. The number of permanent contracts should be reduced and temporary appointments become the rule; salaries should be lowered, and external expertise brought in by way of temporary 'fellowships'. Such reforms were designed to attract truly committed candidates and to deter those with a more mundane interest in secure and well-paid lifetime positions. The resulting reduction of administrative expenses would also free resources for the organization to pursue its substantive policy goals.⁴¹

Weiss's reform proposals seem to echo some themes from the liberal critique of bureaucracy that worries most about its inefficiency and a misallocation of resources. Classic liberal critiques of bureaucratization, planning, and big government were written in the 1940s by Ludwig von Mises and F. A. von Hayek.⁴² In particular von Mises went to great lengths to argue that, by its very nature, public administration was inefficient, wasteful, rigid, and unresponsive when compared to the shining example of the private business enterprise.

Congenial to the principled liberal scepticism of bureaucracy was the behaviourist turn in the academic analysis of public administration. In 1947, Herbert Simon attacked the traditional wisdom of the discipline and dismissed the general principles of public administration as mere 'proverbs' that lacked both theoretical grounding and empirical proof. Simon wanted to shift the focus of analysis instead to the choices that individuals made within bureaucratic institutions, and the interests driving those choices.⁴³ The behaviourists were quick to point out that the interests of individual administrators did not necessarily coincide with the public interest that their organization was pursuing. Moreover, bureaucratic organizations were often caught up in rivalries with other bureaucracies, and he argued that behaviourism could offer a reason why this happened.

⁴⁰ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, p. 140.

⁴¹ Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*, pp. 152–3.

⁴² Ludwig von Mises, *Bureaucracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944); Friedrich A. von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (London: Routledge, 1944).

⁴³ Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization* (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

From the late 1940s onwards, this insight circulated in the US under the name of 'Miles' law', postulating that 'where you stand depends on where you sit'.⁴⁴ The phrase suggests that political positions of career bureaucrats would predictably follow the interests and needs of their particular organization or department. Organizations wanted competences, autonomy, staff, and financial resources—the more the better. A high-level bureaucrat loyal to his or her organization, he said, would always keep these general organizational interests in mind when formulating policy proposals.⁴⁵ Career prospects would depend on the bureaucrats' ability to secure resources for their organization rather than on their hardly measurable contribution to an elusive public good.

Such disenchanting perspectives on public administration came to prominence in IR around 1970 through the 'bureaucratic politics' approach. Of great impact was Graham Allison's study of the Cuban missile crisis that documented how organizational self-interest and rivalries in the US governmental apparatus affected even a high-level foreign policy decision.⁴⁶ Most commentators in the IR field had limited interest in organizational management and leadership, however. They were interested in the causal explanation of foreign policy decisions and gauged the explanatory power of bureaucratic politics vis-à-vis other factors.⁴⁷ Still, the advance of the bureaucratic politics paradigm had repercussions also on how IOs and their secretariats were seen and what assumptions were made about their functioning.⁴⁸ Thomas Weiss, as we have seen, was certainly influenced by it.

Behaviouralism in the study of public administration flourished in the 1970s also thanks to the influence of institutional economics. The 'public choice' approach conceived public administrators as self-interested, rational individuals who pursued maximizing strategies.⁴⁹ In hierarchical bureaucracies, where promotion was based mainly on experience, civil servants had little reason to care for efficient outcomes. That assumption informed a programme of public sector

⁴⁴ Rufus E. Miles, 'The Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law', *Public Administration Review*, 38 (1978): pp. 399–403.

⁴⁵ Miles, 'Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law', p. 401.

⁴⁶ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications', *World Politics*, 24 (1972): pp. 40–79; Morton H. Halperin, 'Why Bureaucrats Play Games', *Foreign Policy*, 2 (1971): pp. 70–90; Irving M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

⁴⁷ Robert J. Art, 'Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique', *Policy Sciences*, 4 (1973): pp. 467–90; Desmond J. Ball, 'The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory', *Australian Outlook*, 28 (1974): pp. 71–92; Morton H. Halperin, *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

⁴⁸ Thomas G. Weiss and Robert S. Jordan, 'Bureaucratic Politics and the World Food Conference: The International Policy Process', *World Politics*, 28 (1976): pp. 422–39; Raymond F. Hopkins, 'The International Role of "Domestic" Bureaucracy', *International Organization*, 30 (1976): pp. 405–32.

⁴⁹ Gordon Tullock, *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965); William A. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1971); Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, 'Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration', *Public Administration Review*, 31 (1971): pp. 203–16.

reform that later became known as 'New Public Management' (NPM). In the 1980s and 1990s, it became an internationally dominant paradigm of administrative practice and was also promoted by some IOs, first in line the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD).⁵⁰ It is interesting to see how Weiss's proposals for IO reform from the 1970s already ticked important boxes on the checklist of the 'doctrinal components' of NPM that Christopher Hood suggested: smaller administrative units; move to fixed-term contracts; more flexibility in hiring; cutting costs 'to do more with less'; and a general emphasis on organizational goals and outputs.⁵¹

To summarize, the enthusiasm for formal IOs with traditional, 'Weberian' bureaucratic structures and hierarchies vanished in the 1970s. I have distinguished here two types of critique that can be located at different ends of the political spectrum. The emancipatory critique from the left denied that IOs could ever be something like impartial guardians of the global public interest. Instead they served their masters, that is, powerful states and transnational social elites, and appeared as an 'institutionalization of hegemony'.⁵² A second strand of criticism, formulated by liberals, targeted less the goals of global governance than their institutional form, the *Fachbürokratie* as described by Max Weber. IOs were denounced as formalistic, status-quo-oriented, inefficient, and unresponsive to new needs. Even if it is possible to thus distinguish a left-wing and a right-wing variant of the new scepticism, we should recognize that there was some common ground between them. Both agreed that an expansion of the technocratic form, nationally and internationally, would come at the expense of popular sovereignty and democratic self-determination.

The backlash against bureaucracy and expert government not only left traces in the realm of academic international theory.⁵³ Even if it was not always intended, the new criticism of IOs undermined their traditional legitimization strategy, most conspicuously the claim that international civil servants could be trusted as impartial guardians of the global public interest. On the other hand, disenchantment with the international *Fachbürokratie* did not eliminate the practical need for 'international machinery'; nor did it render expertise in policy-making redundant. In the remainder of this chapter, I will demonstrate how technocratic thinking continued to inform visions of international cooperation

⁵⁰ On NPM, see Christopher Hood, 'A Public Management for All Seasons?', *Public Administration*, 69 (1991): pp. 3–19; Christopher Hood, 'The "New Public Management" in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme', *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 20 (1995): pp. 93–109; Gernod Gruening, 'Origin and Theoretical Basis of New Public Management', *International Public Management Journal*, 4 (2001): pp. 1–25.

⁵¹ Hood, 'Public Management', pp. 4–5.

⁵² Cox, 'Crisis of World Order', p. 377.

⁵³ Yves Beigbeder, *Threats to the International Civil Service* (London: Pinter, 1988); Thomas G. Weiss, 'International Bureaucracy: The Myth and Reality of the International Civil Service', *International Affairs*, 58 (1982): pp. 287–306; Norman A. Graham and Robert S. Jordan, *The International Civil Service: Changing Role and Concepts* (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. First, I will discuss the evolution of liberal internationalism into something called 'regime theory'. I will then turn to proposals for the anti-hegemonic institutions that the global South (and some Western intellectuals) had pushed for.

The new science of interdependence management

Chapter 6 showed to what a great extent technocratic ideas informed the mainstream of post-war international thought in the form of (neo-)functionalism. Functionalist theorizing, focused as it was on ever-closer regional integration and the imminent demise of the nation-state, lost much popularity in the 1970s. Ernst Haas, the leading academic voice of neo-functionalism, declared his own theory redundant in 1975.⁵⁴ The stalling integration process in the EU since the empty chair crisis, which had ended Hallstein's tenure as president of the Commission, eliminated the prospect of 'ever-closer union'. Faced with the 'Euroclerosis' of the 1970s, many political scientists came to believe that further advances in integration would depend, first, on the political willingness of the member states. Rather than the hidden hand of functional spill-over, governmental action seemed to be driving (and halting) the integration process. At a global level, the crumbling of the Bretton Woods system equally seemed to show that any process of international organization was empirically reversible.

Despite the critique of functionalism as academic theory and practical manual, many scholars and political pundits still asked for more, rather than less, international cooperation and organization. As I briefly described above, there was robust consensus in the 1970s that global interdependence was rapidly increasing and that it needed to be managed politically. In the Western world, new initiatives emerged from the trading zone between the theory and practice of international relations. The Club of Rome and the Trilateral Commission were two elite initiatives to strengthen global dialogue on pressing interdependence problems. In that function they joined the established internationalist thinktanks, such as the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Britain (founded in 1920) and the American Council on Foreign Relations (1921).

The Club of Rome started in 1968 as a group of concerned scientists, diplomats, business people, and IO officials who were committed to a global outlook, systemic thinking, and long-term scenarios. In its early years, work revolved around the concept of the *problematique*.⁵⁵ The term is attributed to one of its

⁵⁴ Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).

⁵⁵ The IR literature of the 1970s picked up the neologism of the *problematique* to describe the new challenges that complex interdependence brought about, see Hayward R. Alker, 'A Methodology for Design Research on Interdependence Alternatives', *International Organization*, 31 (1977): pp. 29–63,

conveners, the Italian industrialist Aurelio Peccei, and refers to a cluster of complex and intertwined global problems. The understanding was that these problems 'are system-wide, interdependent, interactive and intersensitive; that they transcend national frontiers, or even regional boundaries; and that they are seemingly immune to linear or sequential resolution.'⁵⁶ The global *problematique* was so complex that it could only be understood at a systemic level and addressed through systemic change. Not surprisingly, scientists were allotted a major role in the investigation, and prospective resolution, of the *problematique*. The first scientific report that the Club of Rome commissioned was published in 1972 and had considerable impact. Under the title *The Limits to Growth* its authors warned against the depletion of natural resources and environmental pollution, accentuating the tension between the industrial economy and the capacity of the planet to sustain it.⁵⁷

While the Club of Rome raised awareness of global interdependencies, the practical management of global problems was the subject of the Trilateral Commission, a discussion group founded in 1973 by David Rockefeller, banker, internationalist, and one of the richest men in the world. Its membership included business managers, politicians, journalists, and scholars. Trilateral meant that these members came from the three 'industrialized democratic regions', North America, Western Europe, and Japan. The idea was that these regions should jointly sponsor a new world order and make up for the lack of US leadership under President Richard Nixon.⁵⁸ Internationalist foundations but also multinational companies sponsored the work of the group. The existence of the Trilateral Commission fuelled suspicions on the political left and right that an international elite was trying to instate a new world order that would benefit precisely that elite, especially when word spread that US President Jimmy Carter, who took office in 1977, and many important figures of his administration were members.⁵⁹

The Trilateral Commission published a bulletin called *Dialogue* and commissioned academic reports from economists, IR specialists, and lawyers.

at p. 30; Jan Tinbergen, 'The Need for an Ambitious Innovation of the World Order', *Journal of International Affairs*, 31 (1977): pp. 305–314, at p. 310.

⁵⁶ Club of Rome, *The Predicament of Mankind: Quest for Structured Responses to Growing World-Wide Complexities and Uncertainties* (Geneva: Club of Rome, 1970), p. 16.

⁵⁷ Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. III Behrens, *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

⁵⁸ Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 132–8; Marina von Neumann Whitman, 'Leadership without Hegemony: Our Role in the World Economy', *Foreign Policy*, 20 (1975): pp. 138–60.

⁵⁹ Holly Sklar, ed., *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management* (Boston: South End Press, 1980); Laurence H. Shoup, *The Carter Presidency and Beyond: Power and Politics in the 1980s* (Palo Alto, CA: Ramparts Press, 1979); Brad Roberts, 'The Enigmatic Trilateral Commission: Boon or Bane?', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 11 (1982): pp. 185–202.

These reports, the *Triangle Papers*, invariably stressed the need for new or reformed international institutions to tackle interdependence in global trade and finance.⁶⁰ For the 1976 report, *The Reform of International Institutions*, the *rapporteurs* consulted a veritable 'who's who' of liberal internationalist IR scholars. Credentials are given, *inter alia*, to Hayward Alker, Graham T. Allison, Seyom Brown, Ernst Haas, Harold Jacobson, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Donald Puchala.⁶¹ Liberal economists, such as C. Fred Bergsten, Miriam Camps, Richard N. Cooper, and Marina von Neumann Whitman also became important voices in the debate over international cooperation.

The influence of economists is evident from the vocabulary of the Trilateral Commission and 1970s liberal internationalism at large. 'Complex interdependence', the informal paradigm of the trilateralists, originated from economists' diagnosis of ever closer connections in trade and finance.⁶² The other buzzword was 'management'. Taken together, these two concepts formed the double diagnosis of complex interdependencies not managed adequately. Unlike administration, management is supposedly goal-oriented instead of rules-oriented, more active, energetic, and flexible. In the imagery of global cooperation, the managers edged out Weber's *Fachbeamte*. Interdependence management marked not only the publications of the Trilateral Commission but the entire mainstream of North American IR, where it became canonical with Robert Keohane's and Joseph Nye's *Power and Interdependence*, published in 1977.⁶³

In stark distinction to the functionalist ideas of the post-war years, the new liberal internationalism of the 1970s stressed the need for political resolve and leadership. Some emphasized the need for renewed American (post-)hegemonic leadership, but most trilateralists imagined coalitions of like-minded Western states and pledged outreach to the developing world. In any case, the

⁶⁰ Trilateral Commission, ed., *Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports, 1-7: The Triangle Papers. A Compilation of Reports from the First Two Years of the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1977); Trilateral Commission, ed., *Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports, 9-14: A Compilation of Reports to the Trilateral Commission Completed in 1976 and 1977* (New York: New York University Press, 1978). Two reports about the future of the international order are of particular interest for the purpose of this study: Fred C. Bergsten, Georges Berthoin, and Kinhide Mushakoji, *The Reform of International Institutions* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1976); Richard N. Cooper, Karl Kaiser, and Masataka Kosaka, *Towards a Renovated International System* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1977).

⁶¹ Bergsten et al., *Reform of International Institutions*, pp. iii-iv.

⁶² Gill, *American Hegemony*, p. 222; Marina von Neumann Whitman, 'Economic Openness and International Financial Flows', *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 1 (1969): pp. 727-49; one of the key proponents of the concept in the Trilateral Commission was economist Richard Cooper; Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Richard N. Cooper, 'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies', *World Politics*, 24 (1972): pp. 159-81; Miriam Camps, *The Management of Interdependence: A Preliminary View* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974).

⁶³ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Longman, 1977); see also Miriam Camps and Catherine Gwin, *Collective Management: The Reform of Global Economic Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981); Kal J. Holsti, 'A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence', *International Organization*, 32 (1978): pp. 513-30.

understanding was that progress of international cooperation depended on political will rather than amorphous problem pressure or the competence of expert administrators.

National governments were framed as the key actors, engaged in 'games' of cooperation and conflict. The game-theoretical framing of international cooperation was a heritage of economics and had come to IR via nuclear strategy.⁶⁴ It relied on a number of rationalist assumptions about cooperation driven by constellations of state interests. It was considerably more state-centric than functionalist theorizing of the post-war decades. It was also reductionist as it zoomed in on states as actors, at the expense of other facets of trans-border cooperation, such as societal relations. There was a deliberate choice to 'put some of these complexities aside in order to develop a clearer conceptualization for understanding cooperation among states.'⁶⁵

That rationalist and intergovernmentalist framing proved compatible with neorealist assumptions about the problem of cooperation under anarchy and the enduring predominance of the state as political unit.⁶⁶ As they shared the fundamentals, rationalist institutionalists found it easy to engage academic (neo) realism on such issues in the 1970s and early 1980s. Debates between the contending schools focused on the probability that cooperation would emerge under conditions of anarchy, which in the end boiled down to some older questions about the relative political importance of national security versus economic interest, or 'power versus plenty'.⁶⁷

The rationalist literature on cooperation with a strong intergovernmental bent increasingly revolved around the term 'international regime'. As a concept, regime had origins in international law where it used to designate structures of cooperation that were less than a formal intergovernmental organization but more than just a treaty among states.⁶⁸ The term regime also seemed convenient in capturing incipient forms of cooperation across the East-West divide that

⁶⁴ For game-theoretical approaches with IR implications, see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

⁶⁵ Robert O. Keohane, 'Preface to the 2005 Edition', in *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. xvii.

⁶⁶ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 23–4; David A. Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', *International Organization*, 34 (1980): pp. 471–506; David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

⁶⁷ Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', *World Politics*, 44 (1992): pp. 466–96; Jacob Viner, 'Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *World Politics*, 1 (1948): pp. 1–29.

⁶⁸ Ernst B. Haas, 'On Systems and International Regimes', *World Politics*, 27 (1975): pp. 147–74; Stephen Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', *International Organization*, 36 (1982): pp. 1–21; Jens Steffek, Marcus Müller and Hartmut Behr, 'Terminological Entrepreneurs and Discursive Shifts in International Relations: How a Discipline Invented the 'International Regime'', *International Studies Review*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viaa003> (accessed 9 November 2020).

evolved in the process of *détente*. In the regime perspective, formal IOs played a role as facilitators, supervisors, and guarantors of interstate cooperation, yet without much independent agency, or any motivation to supplant the state. Rather, states would 'act through' international institutions.⁶⁹

Thus, the turn to intergovernmentalism led to a different framing of formal organizations and their bureaucratic machinery. Some core assumptions of functionalist theorizing were incorporated into the new approach, such as the still popular division of cooperation tasks into small, technical issues that could be treated separately.⁷⁰ Economists, in particular, were inclined to accept the functionalist ideas of 'objective needs' and objectively given problems that institutions should tackle. They talked about them in terms of 'public goods' that private actors had no incentive to supply; or of 'commons' overused by private actors.⁷¹ Such conceptual framings were widely applied when transnational environmental problems became a key issue in regime theory; as pollution transcended borders, international regimes were needed to manage the endangered global commons.

Fred Bergsten, an economist, flagged candidates for issue-specific cooperation in the environmental field. He wrote,

Among the 'commons' the most urgent requirement is the creation of an international regime for the oceans to cover a host of related issues including fishing, shipping, mining from the deep seabeds, and ocean pollution. [...] Other 'commons' which may need new regimes include Antarctica, outer space, and the weather and climate of our planet.⁷²

The turn to the environment, a highly scientific issue, also gave a new role to scientific experts and institutions, both domestic and international ones. Organizations like the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were taking quite literally a global view on the planet and its atmosphere.⁷³

⁶⁹ Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42 (1998): pp. 3–32.

⁷⁰ Cooper et al., *Towards a Renovated International System*, pp. 34–8; Eugene B. Skolnikoff, *The International Imperatives of Technology: Technological Development and the International Political System* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1972).

⁷¹ Paul A. Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 36 (1954): pp. 387–9; Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); James M. Buchanan, *The Demand and Supply of Public Goods* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968); Garrett Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons', *Science*, 162 (1968): pp. 1243–8.

⁷² Fred C. Bergsten, 'Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions', *International Organization*, 30 (1976): pp. 361–72.

⁷³ Hopkins, 'International Role of "Domestic" Bureaucracy'; Allan A. Needell, 'James E. Webb, Technocracy, and the New Deal Roots of "Space Age Management"', *Technology and Culture*, 58 (2017): pp. 790–814.

Experts, however, had a slightly different role to play here compared to functionalist schemes of previous decades. The ideal was no longer technocracy in the strong sense of experts taking decisions, replacing politicians and their way of reasoning. Rather, experts were seen as

advising politicians on issues never before on the international agenda, and they are designing programs of research and action with a potential for altering the way in which we interpret the international system. [...] Scientific advisers are not philosopher kings, but they seem to be standing ever closer to the throne.⁷⁴

Specific about experts was their horizontal organization in peer networks that crossed borders, contrasting the vertical hierarchies in the field of politics. As outlined in Chapter 2, scientists had been at the forefront of globalization since the 19th century. In the internationalist literature, their networks became known as 'epistemic communities', a term that became prominent in IR in the 1990s.⁷⁵ They exerted influence by creating a knowledge base to inform governments in making decisions, but also by setting the agenda for and framing various issues and problems.

A second job description for international experts, and here especially for the jurists among them, was as guardian of cooperation. Although generally sceptical about public bureaucracy, liberals do see the need for independent, guardian-like institutions, as, for them, social cooperation is based on contracts, and compliance with contractual obligation becomes crucial. Rational individuals often might seek to shirk their obligations and hence they need to be brought into line and, if necessary, punished. This theory of cooperation translates easily onto the international stage where states might pledge to honour treaty obligations, but there is always some uncertainty as to the degree to which they really do so.⁷⁶

Liberal regime theory acknowledged that compliance is a key problem for international cooperation and saw part of the solution in setting up international institutions that would act as compliance monitors. Competence and relative independence would enable civil servants to detect and denounce violations of international obligations by states. 'Managing compliance' thus becomes a task for IOs and their civil servants.⁷⁷ Equally, international institutions could improve

⁷⁴ Ernst B. Haas, Mary P. Williams and Don Babai, *Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 12–13.

⁷⁵ Peter M. Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', *International Organization*, 46 (1992): pp. 1–35.

⁷⁶ Oran R. Young, *Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, 'On Compliance', *International Organization*, 47 (1993): pp. 175–205.

⁷⁷ On 'managing' compliance in an international context, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

state compliance through technical assistance when non-compliance has been due to a lack of state capacity. If non-compliance is intentional, monitoring would deliver the evidence for coercive measures to be taken by IO member states or international courts.

The new liberal internationalism thus embraced technocratic elements of rule and inserted expertise as well as guardian-like institutions, integrating them into a picture of international cooperation dominated by governments and their interests. Yet it would be a mistake to assume any necessary connection between liberalism and technocratic tendencies in international political thought. Previous chapters have already shown how effortlessly technocratic ideas combined with socialist and fascist political ideologies. In the next section, I will show how technocratic ideas permeated world order proposals of the more emancipatory kind that were inspired by some broadly socialist ideas.

Machinery for global economic justice

From today's perspective, it is easy to underestimate how central the North-South conflict was to world order debates of the 1970s and 1980s. The former colonies began to unite at the African-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955, and to institutionalize their cooperation with the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77. Developing countries, as they were conventionally called in the 1960s, thus emerged as a 'third force' in world politics.⁷⁸ De-colonization shifted the numerical majorities in the global IOs that the Western powers had created after the Second World War. A revision of these institutions was put on the agenda, to make them more responsive to the needs of developing countries. The first major achievement was the creation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, conceived as an alternative to the liberal General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It also served as a thinktank for the global South, where economists worked on the set of reform proposals, mentioned earlier, known as the NIEO.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Karl P. Sauvant, *The Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization* (New York: Oceana, 1981); John Toye, 'Assessing the G77: 50 Years after UNCTAD and 40 Years after the NIEO', *Third World Quarterly*, 35 (2014): pp. 1759–74; Marc Williams, *Third World Cooperation. The Group of 77 in UNCTAD* (London: Pinter, 1991).

⁷⁹ Craig N. Murphy, *The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Jens Steffek, *Embedded Liberalism and Its Critics: Justifying Global Governance in the American Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), ch. 4; Alfred George Moss and Harry N. M. Winton, eds., *A New International Economic Order: Selected Documents, 1954–1975* (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research [UNITAR], 1978).

The NIEO was officially declared in 1974, by the UN General Assembly, but implementation was sluggish. For about a decade, the project kept political strategists of the South busy, along with progressively minded economists and political scientists in the West.⁸⁰ It fascinated academic theorists of international organization because it represented an alternative to the liberal, chiefly market-making, institutions that the US and their allies usually sponsored. The NIEO proposals were premised on an interventionist approach to economic policy, with strong elements of public planning, even nationalization of industries, and a re-distribution of resources across borders. A more equitable access for developing countries to the world's resources seemed to be within reach through a set of proposals concerning the oceans and sea that had been under discussion since the 1960s: 'The seabed portion of the Law of the Sea negotiations was perfect as a test bed for the New International Economic Order. It provided an opportunity to show the "proper" way to manage some of the world's raw materials.'⁸¹

In some areas of the oceans, the seafloor is dotted with so-called 'nodules', potato-sized lumps of metal that contain copper, cobalt, nickel, and manganese. Under traditional international law, which stipulated freedom of the seas, no one could be prevented from harvesting them.⁸² Even if the costs of deep-sea mining were still prohibitive around 1970, it was expected that scarcity of minerals (and, potentially, political wishes for a diversification of sources) would make it attractive in the near future. In practice, of course, only industrialized countries possessed the advanced technology necessary for mining minerals from the seabed. Without access to such technology, developing countries were destined to lose the race for these resources.⁸³

To prevent this, in 1970, they used their leverage in the UN General Assembly to have the mineral resources of the deep seabed declared 'common heritage of mankind'. Any exploration or exploitation of such resources should be 'carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole'.⁸⁴ On that basis, developing countries,

⁸⁰ Jyoti Shankar Singh, *A New International Economic Order: Toward a Fair Redistribution of the World's Resources* (New York: Praeger, 1977); Guy F. Erb and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out* (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1975); Karl P. Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpflug, eds., *The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Cooperation between North and South?* (London: Wilton House, 1977); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., *The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977); William G. Tyler, ed., *Issues and Prospects for the New International Economic Order* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1978).

⁸¹ Robert L. Friedheim and William J. Durch, 'The International Seabed Resources Agency Negotiations and the New International Economic Order', *International Organization*, 31 (1977): pp. 343-84, at p. 352.

⁸² Theodore G. Kronmiller, *The Lawfulness of Deep Seabed Mining*, 3 vols (New York: Oceana, 1980/1).

⁸³ Evan Luard, 'Who Gets What on the Seabed?', *Foreign Policy*, 9 (1972): pp. 132-47; F. M. Auburn, 'The International Seabed Area', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 20 (1971): pp. 173-94.

⁸⁴ UN General Assembly, Resolution 2749(XXV), 'Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction', 12

even the landlocked ones, could claim a share of the revenues from commercial seabed mining. The declaration called for an 'international regime' to be established, 'including appropriate international machinery', to 'provide for the orderly and safe development and rational management of the area [the deep seabed and the soil underneath] and its resources'.⁸⁵

The realization of this regime proved to be difficult. For one, state interests diverged widely on the issue, not only between North and South but also between producers and consumers of raw materials. Second, seabed mining had been included into a huge negotiation package for the codification of the entire law of the sea. Its result, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), was only finalized in 1982.⁸⁶ Provisions pertaining to the seabed regime were included as Part XI of the Convention, along with a new IO, the International Seabed Authority (ISA). The industrialized countries preferred for this agency to be a mere registry for licenses to exploit the seabed in a specific region, thus avoiding conflict over access. The developing world favoured an operational agency that would organize, either in cooperation with private partners or alone, the exploration and exploitation of the seabed.⁸⁷ A supranational 'enterprise' with operational capacities and a sizeable staff of expert administrators was envisaged to perform such tasks.

The latter design carried the day. According to the 1982 Convention, the ISA's task is the 'orderly, safe and rational management' of the resources. 'Activities in the Area shall be organized, carried out and controlled by the Authority on behalf of mankind as a whole'.⁸⁸ The ISA was supposed to authorize exploitation of deep-seabed resources through a rather complicated system of needs assessment and the monitoring of raw material markets. Such research would have been the task of ISA experts, assisted by a legal and technical commission and an economic planning commission. The economic planning unit would have also proposed compensation for developing countries whose mining industry suffered competition from the minerals produced from the seabed.

December 1970, Arts. 1, 7; on the interpretation of the common heritage principle, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, 'The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind', *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, 43 (1983): pp. 312–37; L. F. E. Goldie, 'A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of "The Common Heritage of Mankind"', *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*, 10 (1983): pp. 69–112.

⁸⁵ UN General Assembly, Resolution 2749(XXV), Art. 9. The 'area' is shorthand for the deep seabed and its subsoil; my insert in the square brackets.

⁸⁶ Alan Beesley, 'The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed Countries as Partners—a Pattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences', *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 46 (1983): pp. 183–94; Manjula Shyam, 'International Seabed Régime: An Empirical Analysis of State Preferences', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 11 (1976): pp. 111–34; Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 28 July 1994.

⁸⁷ Jack N. Barkenbus, 'The Future Seabed Regime', *Journal of International Affairs*, 31 (1977): pp. 53–65, at p. 59.

⁸⁸ UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Arts. 150, 151.

The new regime, however, did not become operational due to declining commercial interest in seabed mining and mounting political resistance. The US had refused to sign up to UNCLOS, objecting to the idea that an international agency would 'tax' revenues of developed countries that exploited resources of the deep seabed. As other Western countries also had reservations, provisions of Part XI were re-negotiated in the 1990s and amended by a protocol that practically abandoned the re-distributive mechanisms and mandatory technology transfer regarding the deep seabed.⁸⁹ It also de-activated the Economic Planning Commission. With these changes in place, the ISA became operational in 1994 but never fulfilled the function that partisans of an NIEO had hoped for. What carried the day here was the traditional US-led resistance against re-distributive elements in IOs, even if it is also doubtful if the complicated planning scheme devised in the 1970s would have ever worked to satisfaction.⁹⁰

What the episode shows is that new machinery for the management and distribution of the world's resources would have capitalized on the ability of a *Fachbürokratie* to act as guardian of a global public interest. As we have seen above, liberal regime theory imagined IOs as guardian-like institutions to monitor state compliance. In the seabed regime the guardian institutions also acquired operational functions to protect the interests of weaker states. In its original design, the ISA would have planned and implemented the exploitation of deep-seabed resources on behalf of the entire world. In Evan Luard's words,

exactly the same system employed within socialist states [...], under which resources are publicly owned and managed in the interest of the community as a whole, would now be applied at the world level; and public resources would be managed in the interest of a world community as a whole.⁹¹

And as in socialist states, it would have taken public expert administration to perform that task.

Conclusion

I have shown in this chapter how the manifold political and economic crises of the 1970s put an end to post-war optimism about the possibility of international organization. This, I have argued, needs to be understood against a background of general disenchantment with bureaucracy and expertise in governance at a

⁸⁹ Michael C. Wood, 'International Seabed Authority: The First Four Years', *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, 3 (1999): pp. 173–241, at p. 180; see also Caitlyn Antrim, 'The International Seabed Authority Turns Twenty', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 16 (2015): pp. 188–96.

⁹⁰ Steffek, *Embedded Liberalism*, pp. 151–2.

⁹¹ Evan Luard, *Socialism without the State* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 170.

domestic level. The archetypically modern organizational form, the *Fachbürokratie*, came under attack from two sides simultaneously. The political left saw in it a conservative bulwark against emancipation and a totalitarian threat; the right in these years revived its criticism of bureaucratic inefficiency and big government, promoting new visions of public management inspired by private sector practices and ideals of efficiency.

In the study of international organization, the backlash against technocracy combined elements of these criticisms with a more IR-specific, 'realist' argument about the eternal predominance of states and their interests. Accordingly, mainstream academic treatments of international organization shifted focus onto intergovernmentalism and the will of states to engage in new cooperative endeavours. This return to a state-centric perspective retained some functionalist undertones. The functional expert remained in the picture with a new role. No longer was a 'technocracy of scientists' the ideal, but 'visible or invisible colleges of experts working together with political decision-makers'.⁹² While the bureaucratic form of governance was viewed with increasing suspicion, the belief that progress was possible in international affairs with the help of scientific expertise and scientific modes of reasoning remained.⁹³

Developments at the international level supported the continuing role of experts. Rising awareness of environmental problems of transnational, even global, dimensions created awareness of a need for new international institutions to deal with them. These new institutions, by default, relied on expertise from the hard sciences. Efforts to curb trans-boundary air pollution and, in the 1980s, to combat anthropogenic climate change and depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer created new opportunities for international regime-building and expert governance. Moreover, economists and, in some cases, engineers were required to respond to calls for institution-building that emanated from the global South, addressing global economic inequalities.

I have ended the intellectual history of technocratic internationalism in the 1980s, not because all technocratic ideals and theorizers have disappeared from international theory since then. What have disappeared are technocratic world order utopias of the comprehensive kind, which could be found in the first half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, even after the great disenchantment of the 1970s, we find regular recourse to technocratic thinkers. Calls for expertise in governance are made time and again, along with a demand for independent institutions to work in the global public interest; such calls usually come, however, without an overarching framework of governance to stitch these elements together.

⁹² Haas et al., *Scientists and World Order*, pp. 326, 343.

⁹³ Ernst B. Haas, 'Reason and Change in International Life: Justifying a Hypothesis', *Journal of International Affairs*, 44 (1990): pp. 209–40, at p. 209.

Regarding the general attitude to technocracy, it seems that the basic intellectual constellation that emerged in the 1970s is still with us. There is little confidence that technocrats will solve our problems, and, indeed, there is a persistent fear that they may come to patronize us. On the other hand, creating expert bureaucracies remains the standard answer whenever a new problem enters the political agenda. I will explore this seemingly contradictory attitude in the next, concluding chapter.

Conclusion

The aims of this concluding chapter are threefold. I will review the overall historical evidence, carve out some defining characteristics of technocratic internationalism, and discuss these critically. In the first section, I will defend the idea that technocratic internationalism can be understood as a loose but distinct intellectual tradition. Since the late 19th century, varieties of technocratic internationalism have featured in International Relations (IR) theory and practice, even if never was a particularly coherent body of thought. Authors of different periods varied in which aspects they sought to emphasize and they adapted technocratic internationalism to differing ideological contexts, which could be variously liberal or non-liberal. I will also suggest a rough history of technocratic internationalism that distinguishes four phases: *pioneering*, *utopian*, *paradigmatic* and, eventually, that of *disintegration*.

In the second part of this chapter, I will extract from the historical material some recurring features of technocratic thought, such as the primacy of the expert in modern governance; the alleged objectivity of human needs, ecological imperatives, or technological necessities; and the ideal of 'best solutions' that can be universally implemented. I relate this to the politics-administration dichotomy that I introduced at the beginning of the book. I developed this dichotomy along the lines of Max Weber's ambivalent attitude towards the bureaucratization of the world and his idealization of heroic political resistance to it. Here, I use it to explore the contrast between governance based on disciplined *reason-giving*, which is typical of expert conversations and administrative practice, and governance based on the execution of a political *will*, either of individuals or groups.

The final section is dedicated to the criticism of international technocracy. Two types of critical argument can be found in the historical record: a pragmatic, empirically minded criticism of international technocracy as powerless and a more normatively inspired criticism of international technocracy as far too powerful. These two lines of criticism lead me to current research on international organizations (IOs) and populist resistance them. The present wave of nationalist populism that targets IOs is animated by anti-elite sentiments and, I contend, must be understood in the wider context of a backlash against the universal rationalization project that promoted the emergence of functional elites. Accordingly, anti-elitist populism reflects a fundamental challenge to modern political thought. The ideal of democratic self-government, directly controlled by the people and responsive to their wishes, needs to be reconciled with the demand for competence and predictability in public action.

Varieties of technocratic internationalism

The six history focused chapters of this book presented world order proposals that have appeared since the 19th century and have technocratic characteristics. As I cautioned already in the Introduction, I cannot claim that this historical account of technocratic ideas with a cross-border dimension is complete. First of all, my study privileged authors who wanted experts to *rule* relations among states. It has largely excluded writings on transnational private organizations, networks of scientist, social movements, or advocacy groups. I have concentrated instead on blueprints for technocratic institutions that would have had some form of public political authority, entitled to make decisions, and thus ‘governing’ international relations in the conventional sense of this term. In other words, I have emphasized the element of ruling, of *kratein*, in the word technocracy.

To aid in the analysis of the historical material, I suggest dividing the history of technocratic internationalism into four phases. During the first, pioneering phase, two distinctly modern ideas—the internationalization of governance and the professionalization of public administration—were combined. This happened, as I have shown, during the ‘long nineteenth century’ from the French revolution to the First World War. The horrors of this devastating war ushered in the second phase of technocratic world order thinking. In the 1920s and 1930s, a new wave of internationalist writings in the nascent academic discipline of IR placed emphasis squarely on problems of international collaboration and peace-building. In that context, institutions from the wartime cooperation between Western powers proved to be inspirational. Some internationalists believed that the transgovernmental machinery geared for fighting a war could be adapted to new peacetime needs.

The interwar years were an extraordinarily fertile and ‘utopian’ phase of technocratic-internationalist thinking, with new proposals coming from various ideological quarters. Already in the mid-1930s, however, we can see the beginning of an important interlude, as scepticism about all the various kinds of world order utopias began to leave its mark on international theory. The outbreak of the Second World War only furthered that scepticism and consolidated the rise of IR ‘realism’ in the 1930s. As I have shown in Chapter 5, visions of de-politicized expert governance nevertheless remained popular during the war and post-war years. In an age marked by violent clashes of political ideologies, the idea of de-politicized, technical cooperation retained its appeal.

The planning of a post-war order in the 1940s thus can count as the beginning of a third period, in which technocratic ideas, often in the guise of ‘functionalism’, became the dominant way of thinking about international organization. The functionalist paradigm was put into practice through a whole new generation of organizations and ‘programmes’ orbiting around the United Nations (UN), each designed to focus on a rather narrowly defined ‘technical’ task. Development

assistance emerged as a distinct field of international activity that, with its focus on growth, progress, and efficiency, was congenial to ideals of technocratic governance.

The relatively coherent post-war paradigm of 'functional' expert governance remained solid well into the 1960s. However, it disintegrated rapidly in the 1970s, a decade marking the beginning of a fourth phase that, in my view, stretches to the present day. As explained in Chapter 7, there was more than one reason for the decline of technocratic internationalism in the 1970s. Pillars of the post-war order began to crumble with the oil crisis and the decline of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Policy failures and organizational pathologies of IOs became apparent, especially in the field of development aid, where depressing realities betrayed the initially high hopes for a quick catching up of the global South. In Western Europe, the 'Eurosclerosis' of the 1970s demonstrated the reversibility of an integration project that its architects had imagined as a linear development towards 'ever closer union'.

Equally, these years saw a more general disenchantment with bureaucratic institutions and modes of governance, increasingly perceived as ossified, unresponsive, and formalistic. A revised view of public institutions and civil servants took hold in the academic literature. Instead of being idealized as guardians of the public good, civil servants were seen as pursuing their personal career interests; and bureaucratic organizations, their own parochial agenda. This bleak view of public administration also informed new theories of public management that were much less focused on lawfulness, correct procedure, and internal hierarchy. Instead, ideals of customer orientation and performance measurement from the private sector invaded the field of public administration.

Disenchantment with the traditional bureaucratic form did not imply, however, that the rationalization project was abandoned. As I also showed in Chapter 7, important elements of the disintegrated technocratic paradigm were inserted into new vocabularies of international regimes. Experts and expertise remained central to new notions of global governance even without the traditional frame of a formal organization. Theorizing on transnational 'epistemic communities' found a new field of application in policies against global environmental degradation. Even closer to the technocratic paradigm were visions of a New International Economic Order that would use elements of global economic planning to distribute the world's resources. More recent conceptual innovations, such as global administrative law, also seem to revive older ideals of international organization as public administration.¹

¹ Sabino Cassese, 'Global Administrative Law: The State of the Art', *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 13 (2015): pp. 465–8; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law', *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 68 (2005): pp. 15–61; Benedict Kingsbury, 'The Concept of "Law" in Global Administrative Law', *European Journal of International Law*, 20 (2009): pp. 23–57.

Table 1 Periodization of technocratic internationalism

Phase	Period
Pioneering	1815–1914
Utopian	1914–30s
Paradigmatic	1940s–60s
Disintegration	Since the 1970s

Over more recent decades, technocratic internationalism may have disappeared as a comprehensive blueprint for international organization. However, the underlying idea of rationalizing governance through the systematic application of topical expertise and institutionalized procedures of ‘giving reasons’ has never lost its appeal. Table 1 shows the four phases in the evolution of technocratic internationalism at a glance. For the first, pioneering phase it seems feasible to give a relatively exact start date. The Congress of Vienna saw the foundation of the first multilateral, technocratic IO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, and also Saint-Simon’s pioneering proposals for a European parliament of experts. With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 it has an equally clear and plausible end date. For the rest of the 20th century there are less marked ruptures, and the periods are simply divided by decades.

An alternative to such chronological ordering would be a more analytical, taxonomic approach to technocratic internationalism. Such a taxonomy could arrange varieties of technocratic international thought according to the type of institution that they envisaged. As we have seen, there were technocratic proposals that accepted states as the natural and enduring units of international order; and others that aimed to transcend the state-based system. Within the first category, we may further distinguish intergovernmental and transgovernmental institutional designs. The intergovernmental type of cooperation takes place in the classic ‘functional’ IOs envisaged by Reinsch, with international civil servants, usually recruited from the member states, working for them. In such an organization, rules and recommendations are prepared by international expert staff but adopted by member state representatives and implemented nationally through the normal legislative process. This is different under the transgovernmental design, where national experts come together in a transnational forum and implement resulting agreements directly through their national ministries. The allied wartime executives can count as a textbook example of such a transgovernmental institution.

A second category contains institutions that transcend the state-based design of international governance. Again, we may distinguish two types. The first would be a supranational institution that gives more power to the expert bureaucracy than IO secretariats would normally have. Councils steering the international economy and allocating resources, as envisaged in the 1930s and 1940s, would

have presided over states in that way. Among the existing institutions, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) probably was the most conspicuous product of such a design. The European Commission, the independent agencies of the European Union (EU), and the European Central Bank also represent the idea of a supranational technocracy that has achieved quite some independence from the states that founded it.

Much less equipped with formal authority is a fourth type of technocratic organization that one could call inter-sectoral. It equally transcends the state-based order, because inter-sectoral organizations include private actors in a decision-making role. The International Labour Organization (ILO) with its tripartite structure that adds representatives of trade unions and employers to national diplomats is a prominent example of this type. The International Standards Organization (ISO) or the Codex Alimentarius Commission also have private sector experts in a decision-making role, even if the norms they produce are recommendations only. Such standards can become *de facto* binding, however, when they are endorsed by public IOs, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).²

The discussion shows that there is not just one possible manifestation of technocratic governance beyond the state but many, with the autonomy and decision-making power of experts as a variable. In some designs, experts and civil servants have considerably more power to shape decisions and escape control by the member states. However, we need to acknowledge that there has been a turn away from the Weberian model of the hierarchical bureaucracy and its expert civil servants. Today, we find forms of expert governance, within and beyond the state, that take the form of polycentric networks rather than monolithic bodies. Weber's expert governors continue to exist but in a different institutional form, more open and permeable than the bureaucracies that Weber knew. The modernization ideals that underpinned expert bureaucracies have not gone away, however. Rationalization of government still is the goal.

A third way of approaching technocratic internationalism is to ask what its conceptual core is and what, if anything, is its conceptual opposite. What I would argue, in relation to the evidence assembled here, is that at the core of technocratic internationalism there is not a specific type of institution to be realized. As shown above, technocratic internationalism is a generative grammar that can produce quite different types of organizations. What really unites them is the presence of a certain type of personnel—the trained expert—and a certain way of making and communicating their decisions.

² See Michael A. Livermore, 'Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius', *New York University Law Review*, 81 (2006): pp. 766–800.

All technocratic bodies need to give reasons for their policies and decisions, always referring to the functional remit of the organization and citing the type of expertise that has predominated. And so, for example, in the World Health Organization it is predominantly medical expertise that informs and justifies policies; in the World Meteorological Organization, it is expertise in the natural sciences; and in the International Standardization Organization it is predominantly the knowledge of engineers. The policies of these technocratic organizations must be justified in terms of the field-specific expertise and the reasons given for choices must be gauged to convince external experts. The disciplining force of the peer community requires experts to rely on refutable and provisional argumentation, related to evidence and hence scientific truth. This style of reasoning distinguishes expert governance, nationally and internationally, from more politicized forms of decision-making. Accordingly, the 'other' of technocratic internationalism as a doctrine is not a specific type of international institution but a way of tackling international problems. I will elaborate more on this distinction in the next section, which analyses the building blocks of technocratic internationalism more closely.

Building blocks of technocratic internationalism

Taking a comprehensive view of the historical evidence, it is certainly possible to say that there is something like a 'tradition' of technocratic thought on IR, and in particular on IOs. To review, I use the term tradition in a rather loose sense here, denoting 'a group of ideas widely shared by a number of individuals although no one idea was held by all of them'.³ A tradition thus conceived does not require a doctrinal orthodoxy. The historical inquiry made clear that the tradition of technocratic internationalism is not a pyramidal body of thought where seminal contributions stack up, one above the other. In France, technocratic internationalist works at times referenced Saint-Simon or his followers, but not so in Britain or the United States (US). In the English-speaking world, on the other hand, we can reconstruct a relatively direct lineage of technocratic IR scholarship from Paul Reinsch through the works of Leonard Woolf and David Mitrany to the neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas. It needs to be stressed, however, that in the technocratic-internationalist tradition we rarely find extensive discussion of previous works, with the notable exception of the neo-functionalist reception of Mitrany.

One reason for this may be that many contributions to the technocratic tradition were not written by pure-bred academics, and they addressed audiences

³ Mark Bevir, 'On Tradition', *Humanitas*, 13 (2000): pp. 28–53, at p. 38.

beyond the scholarly community. These scholar-practitioners presumably were more interested in pragmatic problem-solving than intellectual history. As we have seen throughout this book, many proponents of technocratic internationalism straddled the line between theory and practice. They theorized, rationalized, and justified what they did. The group of technocratically inclined scholar-practitioners includes the 19th-century international lawyers who wrote about the IOs that they worked for: interwar figures such as James Arthur Salter and Albert Thomas, who were officials as well as interpreters of the League and the ILO, respectively. After the Second World War, IO directors such as Frank Boudreau and C. Wilfred Jenks continued the tradition. Some other representatives of technocratic internationalism, for instance Paul Reinsch and Giuseppe De Michelis, served their countries as diplomats.

What exactly, then, is technocratic internationalism, situated as it is at the intersection of international theory and practice? It certainly has features of an ideology, because it achieved a remarkable level of taken-for-granted-ness among practitioners of international affairs.⁴ That political problems of transnational scope need transnational solutions, and that IOs with in-house expertise are required to deliver them, is an almost unquestioned belief. It contains a strong element of naturalization, in the sense that the organizational form is supposed to follow from the given function and geographical scope of a problem. This justificatory narrative of what IOs are and what they are good for also gained credibility beyond academia and transnational elites. It is being re-produced not only by scholars.

On the other hand, a conceptualization of technocratic internationalism as ideology suggests a degree of intellectual autonomy, stability, and coherence over time that may not do justice to the historical evidence. The evidence, rather, shows that technocratic thinking has been extremely versatile. There is a discernible and quite persistent *technocratic blueprint* for international institutions that can be adapted to accommodate, chameleon-like, changing ideological surroundings. It has proved compatible with liberalism, socialism, and even fascism. The Soviet Union, traditionally hostile to the expansion of international authority, did not contribute much to this debate. Inputs rather came from heterodox socialist thinking. That observation brings us back to Max Weber's account of modernization as universal rationalization, and the link that he saw between the rise of the *Fachbürokratie* and industrial modernity.

⁴ On the notion of ideology in an IO context, see Benjamin Martill, 'International Ideologies: Paradigms of Ideological Analysis and World Politics', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 22 (2017): pp. 236–55; Leonie Holthaus and Jens Steffek, 'Ideologies of International Organization: Exploring the Trading Zones between Theory and Practice', in *Theory as Ideology: The Politics of Knowledge in International Relations*, edited by Benjamin Martill and Sebastian Schindler (London: Routledge, 2020), pp. 189–91; Jean-Philippe Thérien, 'The United Nations Ideology: From Ideas to Global Policies', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 20 (2015): pp. 221–43.

One of Weber's most famous predictions was that the socialist economy, which he never saw in action, would bureaucratize even more than has capitalism.⁵ From that perspective it seems natural that liberals, socialists, pacifists, and fascists should all commit to the rationalization of government, within and across state borders, by means of expert administration. As has been documented in the somewhat exotic case of the Fujimori regime in Peru, technocratic ideals can even be reconciled with certain types of populism.⁶ Modernization as rationalization was a megatrend of the 19th and 20th century that played out differently in different parts of the world and ideological contexts. All modernizers, however, relied on the technocratic form of governance in some way or the other, because they all needed to muster expertise.

Despite the context-specific variations, there are some features that particularly characterize technocratic ways of thinking over time. In the 1970s, Robert Putnam delivered a good description of what he called the 'technocratic mentality'. Reviewing the literature since Saint-Simon, he identified six central characteristics of technocratic thought that I paraphrase in the following list:⁷

1. de-politicization of issues as a strategy of rational decision-making;
2. hostility to political institutions and party politics;
3. hostility to democracy and equality-based decision-making;
4. preference for decision-making by consensus;
5. preference for debating in pragmatic rather than ideological terms;
6. strong commitment to progress and productivity.

Not surprisingly, these general traits of technocratic thinking also accord with its international applications studied in the historical survey in this book. Technocratic internationalism differs from Putnam's domestic scenario in one important respect, however, and that is the missing contrast with party politics and electoral democracy. In the international realm, the contrast is normally constructed differently, as that between competent international administration and traditional international politics or diplomacy.

⁵ Max Weber, 'Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order', in *Max Weber: Political Writings*, edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 130–271, at p. 147. On Weber's views on socialism more generally, see Stephen D. Parsons, 'Max Weber, Socialism, and the Space for Time', *Political Studies*, 49 (2001): pp. 495–512.

⁶ Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case', *World Politics*, 48 (1995): pp. 82–116; Bert A. Rockman, 'Bureaucracy between Populism and Technocracy', *Administration & Society*, 51 (2019): pp. 1546–75.

⁷ Robert D. Putnam, 'Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy', *Comparative Political Studies*, 10 (1977): pp. 383–412, at pp. 385–8.

As we have seen, technocratic internationalists often imagine a historical trajectory that leads from an outdated, essentially pre-modern way of policy-making under anarchy towards a modern 'organization' of international relations. Partisans of technocratic internationalism, especially the early ones, stressed the pathologies of the 'old' ways of international politics and the unstable equilibria they yielded. This argument was usually intertwined with another chronological narrative about ever-rising global interdependence and a shrinking global space that render cross-border cooperation logically imperative.

Such interdependence narratives, to be sure, are not hard-wired into a technocratic style of thought, since they also underpin proposals, for example, for collective security schemes.⁸ When technocratic internationalists elaborate on interdependence, they usually stress the need for more rational solutions to problems of human welfare (rather than addressing war and peace directly). Technocratic arguments connect welfare intimately to the presumed ability of experts and formal organizations to deliver such solutions. While relevant expertise may be gathered in 'epistemic communities' beyond formal institutions, the specially trained international civil servant certainly is the key figure populating technocratic utopias.

International civil servants, Weber's *Fachbeamte*, are experts in certain scientific or technical disciplines relevant to the task of their IOs, as described in the last section. There are, however, also the skills of statisticians, economists, and lawyers, which are needed across the whole sector. Jurists, in particular, are needed in every bureaucracy because it is an organization governed by law that resolves its conflicts through legal proceedings.

Next to their knowledge and skills, it seems, there is a second argument in use for the legitimacy of experts in governance, and this is their alleged ability to perceive and formulate a global public interest. Tom Weiss highlighted this point: 'While world interest is a lofty and idealistic concept, it is significant that one group of individuals, the international civil service, is theoretically committed to the concept's realization.'⁹ This idealized commitment to a global public interest distinguishes civil servants from national politicians or diplomats, so that 'in a transnational regulatory regime, politics and politicians tend to be identified with bad national self-interest, and international technicians with the common good'.¹⁰

This contrast of volatile, irrational politics, on the one hand, and disciplined, rational public administration, on the other, is distinctive of technocratic

⁸ Jaap De Wilde, *Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991). Collective security arrangements are diplomatic schemes to prevent or settle international conflict by mobilizing alliances against a state that has resorted to war or violated fundamental norms of international order.

⁹ Thomas G. Weiss, *International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975), p. xix.

¹⁰ Martin Shapiro, "Deliberative" "Independent" Technocracy V. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E.U.?, *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 68 (2005): pp. 341–56, at p. 349.

Table 2 The stylized international politics / public administration contrast

	International politics	International public administration
Actors	Politicians, diplomats	Experts, civil servants
- driven by	Will	Reason
- seeking	Rent	Solutions
- oriented towards	National interest	Global public interest
- accountable to	Territorial constituency	Bureaucratic superiors, peers
- interacting via	Bargaining	Deliberation

legitimation narratives in international governance. It has a paramount epistemic dimension where it suggests that mutual reason-giving, oriented towards consensus and informed by scientific evidence, is superior to the balancing of 'parochial interests or untutored value preferences of politicians'.¹¹ It posits that actors, in a binary fashion, are either oriented towards maximizing the interests of their constituency or to the resolution of global problems. This has repercussions on the mode of interaction that develops among them.¹² Seen in that light, the clash between 'volitional' politics, as Pitman Potter called it, and international expert governance reflects two quite different approaches to joint decision-making. One seeks compromise among given and stable preferences, the other aims at reasoned consensus based on persuasion.

This can be related back to the tensions between will and reason as drivers of human action that were discussed in Chapter 1. In Max Weber's work we find the marked contrast between the capriciousness of governance by feudal *Willkür* and the predictability of the bureaucratic machine that runs on formal procedure and rational calculation. While Weber associated capricious politics with monarchs and despots, Auguste Comte extended this criticism to parliamentary democracy. In Comte's view, the doctrine of popular sovereignty did nothing but 'replace the arbitrariness of kings with the arbitrariness of peoples'.¹³ In any event, will is associated chiefly with politics, reason with administration. For technocrats the road to progress therefore is, as in Putnam's account, the de-politicization of decision-making, domestically and internationally. Table 2 summarizes the contrast in style between international politics and public administration that permeates the history of technocratic internationalism.

¹¹ Thomas A. Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite: Legitimacy and Social Change in Mature Communism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 2.

¹² Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" Communicative Action in World Politics', *International Organization*, 54 (2000): pp. 1–39; Harald Müller, 'Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 10 (2004): pp. 395–435.

¹³ Auguste Comte, 'Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société', in *Appendice général du système de politique positive contenant tous les opuscules primitifs de l'auteur sur la philosophie sociale*, edited by Auguste Comte (Paris, 1854 [1822]), pp. 47–136, at p. 54; my translation.

As Table 2 shows, technocratic internationalism is constructed around a style distinction between politics and administration. The alleged ability of technocrats to deliver effective solutions to transnational problems is grounded in a number of assumptions that are not always made explicit and deserve further scrutiny. The first and perhaps fundamental contention is that politics is by necessity less rational than is expert administration. It does not seem to be suggesting, however, that politicians or diplomats are intellectually inferior to administrators, rather, that their reasoning follows a different logic.

Politicians focus on interests that, normally, their constituency articulate. The experts' 'global point of view', in contrast, is the result of a thought experiment that can be performed individually or in conversation with peers. In that experiment, experts deduce what is in the global public interest from the assumed (rather than articulated) interests of citizens. Epidemiologists, for instance, presume that rational people have a stable preference for health over illness; economists presume that rational people always prefer material wealth over poverty; and engineers presume that rational people prefer safe over unsafe technology. Technocratic reasoning thus hypothesizes that there is a set of uniform and transitive interests of persons, and, in a similar vein, 'direct and immediate needs of individuals'.¹⁴ A typical element in justifications of technocracy is that solutions found by experts will be in the best interest of the governed.

It is not surprising, perhaps, that technocratic internationalists find policy fields like environmental or health protection most amenable to their approach. The assumption that the goals of governance are uncontroversial because they are demonstrably in everybody's best interest is easier to defend in these fields. When individual or collective survival is at stake, the assumed interests of citizens seem to be straightforward. In other contexts, the intellectual construction of assumed interests is likely to become more controversial.

Partisans of independent central banking, for instance, argue that removing decisions on monetary policy from elected politicians will be in the best interest of the governed. Entrusting them to experts should prevent irresponsible and short-sighted capture by politicians who are chiefly interested in their own re-election and willing to sacrifice long-term economic gains for it. The case for expert governance in the field of monetary policy is more contentious, however, because it is based on certain liberal doctrines that people may disagree with. The perception is common that economic expertise is not a marker of technical knowledge in the same way that is expertise in chemistry or electrical engineering. The former is seen as normatively loaded, based on contested assumptions about human reasoning which are in danger of turning into an ideology, a rigid system

¹⁴ R. J. Vincent, 'The Functions of Functionalism in International Relations', *Yearbook of International Affairs*, 27 (1973): pp. 332–44, at p. 338.

of ideas immune to critical counter-argument. The next section will focus on such contestations against technocratic rule.

Contesting international technocracy

The previous section showed how technocratic institutions, whether national or transnational in scope, might be able to capitalize on the idea that experts can be trusted more than politicians to defend the public interest. In the contemporary IR literature, it is widely assumed that the authority and legitimacy of IOs rest on the expertise and ability of their staff to deliver solutions to global problems that are in everybody's interest.¹⁵ This argument, however, relies on a good dose of idealizations that can be challenged and rejected.

In the historical evidence gathered in this book, we can find two strands of anti-technocratic argument at work. Almost paradoxically, one strand criticizes technocratic IOs for being powerless while the other contends the opposite—that technocratic organizations are too powerful. In the context of international relations, the first type of criticism is conventionally labelled the 'realist' objection. The argument is easily summarized: whatever the rationalizing potential of public IOs may be in theory, in practice they remain the handmaidens of hegemonic states. If dominant countries in the international system turn their back on IOs, these organizations wither away. Therefore, it would be illusionary to believe that any 'global point of view' or any 'global public interest' would ever prevail over national interests. The realist objection is not specifically targeted at technocratic IOs, of course. It equally applies to collective security schemes and regional integration projects.

Interestingly, many realists question the feasibility of such projects rather than their intrinsic value, leaving room for the tragic conclusion that international institutions are badly needed but unattainable.¹⁶ In contrast, critics who argue that IOs are too powerful tend to reject the idea that the work of such organizations is beneficial or progressive. Among the critical authors discussed in this book, Hans Morgenthau elaborated most extensively on the fault lines of the scientific rationality that underpins their work. Morgenthau described the utopia of a scientific treatment of political questions more succinctly than most technocrats: 'Political maneuvering should be replaced by the scientific "plan," the political

¹⁵ Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Sikina Jinnah, *Post-Treaty Politics: Secretariat Influence in Global Environmental Governance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, ed., *The Politics of Expertise in International Organizations: How International Bureaucracies Produce and Mobilize Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2018).

¹⁶ On tragic realism, see Richard N. Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Konstantinos Kostagiannis, 'Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State', *The International History Review*, 36 (2014): pp. 513–29.

decision by the scientific “solution,” the politician by the “expert,” the statesman by the “braintruster,” the legislator by the “legal engineer.” And he concluded that “[t]his political philosophy thus ends in a scientific theory of society where politics has, at best, a place as the evil finally overcome.”¹⁷

In *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* from which this quote is taken, Morgenthau firmly rejected technocratic utopias of rationalization and de-politicization, as seen in Chapter 5. He insisted on the continuing relevance of traditional statecraft and the necessity to choose among values. Technocratic utopias, as we have seen, rely heavily on the idea that there are objectively ‘best solutions’ to problems whose description is largely uncontroversial. These solutions are not chosen but ‘discovered’ with the help of expertise and then universally implemented. As explained above, this relies on strong assumptions about the objectivity of human needs, ecological imperatives or technical necessities; and about the ability of experts to draw the right conclusions from the assessment of these needs in a complex historical situation.

The sceptics of technocracy shed doubt on these assumptions. Luther Gulick, a leading public administration scholar of the 1930s, formulated the central problem as follows:

Every highly trained technician, particularly in the learned professions, has a profound sense of omniscience and great desire for complete independence in the service of society. When employed by government he knows exactly what the people need better than they do themselves, and he knows how to render this service. He tends to be utterly oblivious of all other needs, because, after all, is not his particular technology the road to salvation?¹⁸

Gulick here points to cognitive limitations as an obstacle to sound technocratic governance. Experts not only have their own material or ideational interest influencing their decisions, just like laypeople, they fall prey to cognitive biases and group think. This dovetails with classic arguments of market liberals who denounced technocracy as oppressive. F. A. Hayek, for one, wrote in 1960 that ‘[i]t would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men who are most needed and most powerful in modern government, namely, the efficient expert administrators exclusively concerned with what they regard as the public good.’¹⁹ Similar concerns were raised in the international context. Recall that already in 1918 Norman Angell damned

¹⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 29, 32.

¹⁸ Luther Gulick, ‘Notes on the Theory of Organization’, in *Papers on the Science of Administration*, edited by Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937), pp. 3–45, at p. 10.

¹⁹ F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006[1960]), p. 228.

technocratic blueprints for the League of Nations, warning against the tyranny of a transnational techno-executive.

Such criticism has become far more frequent in recent years as the power of IOs and, in particular, of the EU has been increasingly felt.²⁰ Populists of the left and right are now exploiting this reservoir of sceptical argument to turn it against scientists and their expertise. They use rhetoric to pitch democracy against elitist rule by experts and administrators, heroic politicians against a mighty machinery. As a remedy, populists seek to ‘take back control’ and transfer competence to the people and their elected representatives.²¹ Part of the populist agenda in many countries is a withdrawal from IOs and, in Europe, a rollback of the integration project. In the populist view this is part of a broader campaign against ‘the elites’ and ‘big government’, ‘whether that government is in Beijing or that government is in Washington, DC, or that government is in Brussels.’²²

In the 21st century, populists have thus resuscitated Weber’s old ‘will versus reason’ dichotomy and side with the heroes against the experts and bureaucrats.²³ The COVID-19 crisis in 2020 dealt a blow to populist claims that politics can do without science or Michael Gove’s ‘organizations with acronyms’. The performance of populist governments faced with a global medical emergency was abysmal. The pitching and rolling of Donald Trump in the US, Boris Johnson in Britain, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil exposed the weaknesses of governing without, or even against, experts. If any evidence was still needed, the pandemic re-affirmed that popular self-government without institutionalized expertise is as chimeric as technocratic utopias of governance without politics.

This observation brings me to the conclusion of this chapter, and of the book. The rise and decline of transnational technocracy as a utopia need to be understood in the context of a fundamental tension of modern political life. The tension is brought about by two conflicting and essentially incompatible desires. One is a craving for self-government and popular sovereignty, the other for competence, performance, and predictability in public government. When it comes to institutional design, both domestically and internationally, these two

²⁰ Jens Steffek, ‘Legitimacy in International Relations: From State Compliance to Citizen Consensus’, in *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics*, edited by Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 175–92.

²¹ Harry Collins, Robert Evans, Darrin Durant, and Martin Weinel, *Experts and the Will of the People: Society, Populism and Science* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

²² Steve Bannon, speech given at the ‘Third International Conference on Human Dignity “Poverty and the Common Good: Putting the ‘preferential option for the poor’ at the service of human dignity”’ at the Dignitatis Humanae Institute of the Vatican, 25–9 June 2014, transcript available at: <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world> (accessed 9 November 2020).

²³ Daniele Caramani, ‘Will vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic Forms of Political Representation and Their Critique to Party Government’, *American Political Science Review*, 111 (2017): pp. 54–67.

desires seem to gesture in opposite directions, and it stands to reason that the tension between them can never be fully resolved. Weber has already reminded us that chains of reason-giving end at a point when ultimate values need to be chosen. From today's perspective we could add that scientific evidence is too often uncertain, partial, or contradictory; and global problems too 'wicked' to allow for the 'government of best solutions' that technocrats of all epochs have dreamed of.

This Conclusion is not the place to speculate on how democratic politics and expertise can best be reconciled. My point here is just to contextualize academic discussions of IOs within wider debates about government and public administration. In disciplinary discourses of IR, such parallels often slip out of sight. Yet even if the conflict between administration and politics, disciplined reason-giving and undisciplined wilfulness are ubiquitous in modern social life, there still is something particular about international affairs. An international machinery of expert government can be disrupted more easily, it seems, than most domestic equivalents, when a relapse into a politics of threats, bribes, and violent coercion is imminent. The realists' eternal fascination with this possibility, exciting and disconcerting as it is, made them aware of the frailty of the international machinery. Even if international technocratic machineries may at times seem mighty and powerful, it takes little to let them run idle.

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