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CHINA-JAPAN RAPPROCHEMENT AND THE UNITED STATES

IN THE WAKE OF NIXON'S VISIT TO BEIJING

Ryuji Hattori



China-Japan Rapprochement and the United States

Based on extensive original research including interviews with key participants, this book examines how, following Richard Nixon's famous visit to China in 1972, Japan established formal diplomatic relations with China, doing so before the United States and other Western countries. It considers the key personalities, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ōhira on the Japanese side and Zhou Enlai on the Chinese side, outlines how the discussions unfolded, and discusses the key issues which divided the two sides and how these issues were resolved: Japanese war reparations to China, how the two countries perceived their past, how Taiwan should be treated, and possession of the Senkaku Islands. The book also shows how Tanaka and Ōhira sought to reconcile China–Japan relations with the US–Japan Security Treaty and to continue non-governmental exchanges with Taiwan following the severing of relations. Overall, the book emphasizes that the nature of the relationship established in 1972 continues to be very important for understanding present-day China–Japan relations.

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Preface

China casts an incomparably large shadow over Japan and the rest of Asia. This has always been the case, regardless of the era, but as China enjoys its current remarkable rate of development, its existence is becoming only more important. Japan's relations with China potentially determines its fate. These two neighbors are never far from each other's minds, and their relationship has shown itself capable of influencing international relations on a global scale.

There can be no disputing that the 1972 normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan marked a major turning point in the 2,000-year history of their relations. On September 25, 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi arrived in Beijing. There, they met with Premier Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders for five days of tense talks that culminated in the signing of the Sino-Japanese joint statement (sometimes also referred to as the Sino-Japanese joint communique) on September 29. This rapprochement served as an opportunity for Australia, New Zealand, and even the United States to also establish diplomatic relations with China in the years that followed.

The negotiations between Tanaka, Ōhira, and Zhou represent a distillation of the contentious issues that then held sway in Sino-Japanese relations: the payment of war reparation to China, how the two countries perceived their shared past, how Taiwan should be handled, and possession of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Tanaka and Ōhira sought to reconcile Sino-Japanese relations with the US–Japan Security Treaty and to maintain non-governmental ties to Taiwan after severing relations with them.

The personalities of the two principal Japanese figures behind normalization, Tanaka and Ōhira, were markedly in contrast with one another. Tanaka was bold and unconcerned with details while Ōhira was quiet and meticulous. It was precisely this difference in personalities that caused them to become steadfast allies and to resonate together as they made skillful use of the Japanese bureaucracy.

But if Tanaka and Ōhira played the primary roles in public, it was the officials of the foreign ministry who took the lead behind the scenes. These officials worked well to provide the politicians with the support they needed during normalization. Working-level officials in the ministry such as Treaties Bureau Director Takashima Masuo, China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi, and Treaties

Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu played pivotal roles. Others include Foreign Affairs Councilor Nakae Yōsuke, who was in charge of Taiwan, and Ohara Ikuo, who returned to Tokyo from the Hong Kong consulate and translated the “meiwaku” speech into Chinese.

Using diplomatic records from Japan, China, and Taiwan, as well as original interviews, this book examines the process through which the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan came to be and the nature of the political leadership exercised by Tanaka, Ōhira, and Zhou. This effort is indispensable for examining not only modern Sino-Japanese relations but also the US–Japan security framework. The Japanese leadership went to great pains to ensure that the US–Japan security framework would be maintained even as they pursued normalization with China.

To discuss the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China is to examine one of the most critical moments in the history of East Asian international politics and the nature of political leadership.

Acronyms

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Timeline

1945/8/15	End of the Second World War
1946/7	Chinese Civil War begins
1949/10/1	People's Republic of China established
1951/9/4	San Francisco Peace Conference (until 9/8)
1952/4/28	Treaty of Taipei signed between Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
1955/8/16	Chinese foreign ministry releases statement asserting its right to war reparations
1962/11/8	CCP Central Foreign Affairs Department Secretary-General Zhao Anbo indicates to Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Okazaki Kaheita that China would renounce its right to reparations
1962/11/9	Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki exchange the Memorandum on Sino-Japanese Trade (LT Trade Agreement)
1962/11/30	Finance Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ōhira attend the second meeting of the Joint Japan–US Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs
1964/1/27	France announces it is recognizing China
1964/2/10	Relations severed between France and Taiwan
1964/2/12	Ōhira tells the Diet that, should China join the UN with the “blessings of the world,” then Japan would look into normalizing relations
1965/5/31	Zhao indicates to Utsunomiya Tokuma that China would renounce its right to reparations
1971 (Summer)	LDP Secretary-General Tanaka begins study sessions on China
1971/7/15	President Nixon announces his visit to Beijing (Nixon Shock)
1971/9/1	Ōhira's speech to his faction calling for making contact with China
1971/9/2	LDP delegation under Kawasaki Hideji visits Beijing
1971/9/16	Diet Members' League for the Promotion of the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China Chairman Fujiyama Aiichirō's third visit to China
1971/10/25	UN General Assembly votes to admit China and expels Taiwan

xii *Timeline*

1971/11/10	Zhou Enlai meets Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryōkichi in Beijing, criticizes the Hori Letter
1972/1	China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi submits report to Tanaka on Japan's relations with China
1972/2/21	Nixon's visit to China
1972/3/22	Fujiyama's fourth visit to China
1972/3/23	MITI Minister Tanaka tells Diet that Japan "caused great <i>mei-waku</i> " to China
1972/4/21	Miki Takeo meets with Zhou in Beijing
1972/7/2	Tanaka, Ōhira, and Miki meet and reach an "agreement on policy"
1972/7/5	Tanaka wins overwhelming victory in LDP presidential election
1972/7/7	Tanaka government formed. Ōhira becomes foreign minister for second time, directs Hashimoto to prepare for Sino-Japanese normalization
1972/7/10	Shanghai Ballet Troupe visits Japan with Sino-Japanese Friendship Association Deputy Secretary-General Sun Pinghua as director (until 8/16)
1972/7/16	Former Socialist Party Chairman Sasaki Kōzō meets with Zhou in Beijing
1972/7/20	Fujiyama hosts welcome party for Sun and Xiao Xiangqian
1972/7/22	Ōhira meets with Sun and Xiao
1972/7/24	First meeting of LDP Sino-Japanese Normalization Council (under Kosaka Zentarō as chairman)
1972/7/25	Ōhira meets with Taiwanese Ambassador Peng Meng-chi and expressed his "firm resolve" to normalize relations with China
1972/7/27	Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu meets with Zhou in Beijing (until 7/29)
1972/8/2	Ōhira holds first meeting of the foreign ministry's Council for Measures on the China issue
1972/8/4	Takeiri reports to Tanaka and Ōhira after returning from China
1972/8/10	Diet Member Tamaki Kazuo visits Taiwan and meets with top Taiwanese officials
1972/8/15	Tanaka meets with Sun and Xiao. Foreign ministry responds to Kaya Okinori's question
1972/8/23	Tanaka appoints Shiina Etsusaburō as special envoy to Taiwan
1972/8/31	Hashimoto and other foreign ministry officials head to China as an advance party. Tanaka and Ōhira meet with Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers in Hawaii
1972/9/1	US-Japan joint statement released
1972/9/4	Tamaki visits Taiwan, requests they accept Shiina as special envoy
1972/9/8	LDP Sino-Japanese Normalization Council releases its report
1972/9/9	LDP members Furui Yoshimi, Tagawa Seiichi, and Matsumoto Shun'ichi visit to Beijing

- 1972/9/12 Mizuno Kiyoshi and Matsumoto Ayahiko meet with Chang Ch'un in Taipei to request that Taiwan accept Shiina as special envoy
- 1972/9/13 Letter from Tanaka to Chiang Kai-shek completed
- 1972/9/14 Group of 23 LDP members under Kosaka visit China, meet with Zhou
- 1972/9/17 Shiina and party encounter anti-Japan demonstrations at Songshan Airport
- 1972/9/18 Shiina meets with Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan, Vice President Yen Chia-kan, and General Ho Ying-chin
- 1972/9/19 Shiina meets with Chiang Ching-kuo
- 1972/9/20 Shiina reports to Tanaka and Ōhira, explains that he told Taiwan that maintaining relations "includes diplomatic relations." Okazaki visits China
- 1972/9/25 Tanaka and Ōhira visit China. First Tanaka–Zhou meeting. Tanaka gives "meiwaku" speech at the Great Hall of the People
- 1972/9/26 First and second Ōhira–Ji meetings. Second Tanaka–Zhou meeting
- 1972/9/27 Unofficial foreign ministers' meeting. Third Tanaka–Zhou meeting. Tanaka meets Mao. Third Ōhira–Ji meeting
- 1972/9/28 Fourth Tanaka–Zhou meeting
- 1972/9/29 Ambassador Uyama Atsushi gives advance notice of Sino-Japanese joint statement in Taipei, delivers telegram from Tanaka to Chiang Kai-shek. Signing ceremony in Beijing. Ōhira announces severing of relations with Taiwan. Tanaka, Ōhira, and Zhou visit Shanghai and meet with Shanghai Revolutionary Committee Chairman Zhang Chunqiao. Taiwan announces it is severing diplomatic relations with Japan
- 1972/9/30 Tanaka and Ōhira return to Japan, give report to LDP lawmakers
- 1972/10/6 Ōhira gives speech on normalization at the Research Institute of Japan
- 1972/10/10 Ōhira visits Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and USSR (until 10/25)
- 1972/10/18 Tanaka gives speech at the Japan–America Society
- 1972/11/2 Tanaka testifies before the Diet
- 1972/11/8 Ōhira testifies before the Diet

Usage notes

- To reduce ambiguity, the Republic of China is generally referred to as “Taiwan” and the People’s Republic of China as “China.”
- Chinese names are romanized using Hanyu Pinyin and Taiwanese names using Wade-Giles.
- Japanese names are listed family name first.
- When quoting from the 1972 Sino-Japanese joint statement, a lightly edited version of the English translation released by the Japanese foreign ministry is used.

Introduction

The road to Beijing

The San Francisco System

In order to discuss Sino-Japanese peace – that is, the normalization of diplomatic relations between the countries that occurred in 1972 – a brief overview of the state of East Asian international politics following the Second World War is necessary.

It was at the San Francisco Peace Conference held in September 1951 that Japan recovered its independence following its wartime defeat. Fifty-two nations participated in the conference, including Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and communist nations like the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Japan signed a peace treaty with forty-eight of these nations at the city's War Memorial Opera House (the three communist nations did not sign).

Despite having suffered the most damage during the Pacific War, neither China nor Taiwan was invited to the conference, the result of a lack of consensus among the Allies: while Britain had assumed that China would participate, the United States wanted Japan to establish relations with Taiwan instead.

On the same day that it signed the San Francisco peace treaty, Japan also entered into a security treaty with the United States. With this act, coordination with the United States became the axis upon which Japan's postwar foreign policy was oriented. Japan's US-centered orientation during the Cold War is sometimes referred to as the "San Francisco System."

Having been incorporated into the United States' Cold War strategy, Japan signed the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (hereafter, the "Treaty of Taipei") with the Republic of China (Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government in Taiwan) in April 1952. In this treaty, which consisted of a preamble and fourteen articles, Taiwan renounced its right to war reparations and the state of war between Japan and Taiwan legally came to an end.

Naturally, the Treaty of Taipei was denounced by China as illegal. And Japan was not entirely sure about whether the treaty was applicable to the Chinese mainland, either. Taiwan sat on the United Nations Security Council, and the UN General Assembly had labeled China an "aggressor" in February 1951 due to its involvement in the Korean War. While establishing diplomatic relations with China continued to be a matter of the highest priority for Japanese foreign policy, this was complicated by the confrontation between China and the United States.

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Japan traded with China under the principle of “keeping economics and politics separate,” and legislators belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Socialist Party of Japan frequently paid visits to the country. In the late 1950s and 1960s, China was in turmoil due to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. During this period, the Chinese government criticized the Japanese governments of Kishi Nobusuke (1957–60) and Satō Eisaku (1964–72). There was a limit to how close the countries would be able to become while keeping economics and politics separate.

As the Sino-Soviet split became more noticeable in the late 1960s, the international environment that defined Sino-Japanese relations gradually changed. In July 1971, US President Richard Nixon announced that he would be visiting China. This “Nixon Shock” would serve as a turning point; in October of that year, the right of representing China in the United Nations was transferred from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China.

Paying little attention to the great shock his actions had caused Japan, Nixon visited China in February 1972. China’s conflict with the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly serious at this time, and it thus considered it necessary to improve its relations with the United States and Japan. In September, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi visited Beijing and established diplomatic relations with China (and severed its relations with Taiwan).

Three topics of this book

Tanaka and Ōhira’s success in achieving Sino-Japanese normalization was largely brought about by changes in the international environment (the Nixon Shock being the most prominent of these). Japan’s decision to recognize Taiwan rather than China had itself been a product of the Cold War in the first place, and the time was becoming ripe for Sino-Japanese normalization. This book seeks to examine three topics as it takes up the subject of Sino-Japanese peace.

The first of these topics is the diplomatic negotiations between China and Japan over normalizing relations, with a particular focus on the way that the two countries handled Taiwan.¹

In approaching normalizing relations with Japan, Zhou Enlai put forward “three principles for the restoration of relations”: The People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China; and the Treaty of Taipei is illegal and must be renounced.

And yet, despite the importance which China placed on Taiwan, Japan was able to rapidly reach an agreement without merely agreeing to China’s position. As will be discussed later, a successful *modus vivendi* was found for the Taiwan issue and became Article 3 of the Sino-Japanese joint statement.

Other aspects of the negotiations, such as the process by which China made its decision to renounce war reparations, the true nature of Tanaka’s “*meiwaku*” statement on the war (which caused distrust between the two countries), the apology in the preamble of the joint statement, and the way in which both sides approached the Senkaku Islands, offer valuable hints even today.

Table 0.1 China's Three Principles for the Restoration of Relations

-
- 1 The People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China.
 - 2 Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.
 - 3 The Treaty of Taipei is illegal and must be renounced.
-




Figure 0.1 Japanese Foreign Ministry Hierarchy (September 1972)

The second topic is the political leadership of Tanaka and Ōhira.² It was the leadership of these two men that brought about the dramatic normalization of relations with China.

Nixon may have visited China, but the United States had still not established such relations itself, and the ruling LDP contained a deeply entrenched pro-Taiwan faction. Neither was the foreign ministry leadership, led by Vice-Minister Hōgen Shinsaku, contemplating the immediate establishment of relations with China. While changes in the international environment played a role, it was the fierce personalities of Tanaka and Ōhira that led the way to Sino-Japanese peace.

The third topic is the internal processes of the Japanese foreign ministry.

It was officials in the Japanese foreign ministry who authored the Sino-Japanese joint statement and engaged in the work of adjusting its text during the negotiations in Beijing. The most significant of these were Treaties Bureau Director Takashima Masuo, Asia Bureau China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi, and Treaties Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu. The foreign ministry provided its support to Tanaka and Ōhira, and they made skillful use of its officials in turn.

Interviews

It is difficult to gain a grasp of the policymaking process and how those involved perceived their counterparts from official documents alone. For this reason, it was

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particularly important in this case to make use of interviews in addition to conducting research through diplomatic records and publications.

To help ascertain Tanaka's thoughts, I gathered the opinions of Kiuchi Akitane and Konaga Keiichi, both of whom served as his secretaries during his time as prime minister. These men were dispatched to the prime minister's office from elsewhere in the bureaucracy; Kiuchi came from the foreign ministry and Konaga from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).

For Ōhira, I interviewed Morita Hajime, who was dispatched from the finance ministry to serve as his secretary while he was the foreign minister. Morita was a native of Kagawa prefecture like Ōhira, and he would go on to serve as transport minister and become Ōhira's son-in-law.³ I also made use of Morita's diary from this period.

I discussed Shiina Etsusaburō's visit to Taiwan with Mizuno Kiyoshi, a member of his faction. I spent a great deal of time discussing Sino-Japanese relations with former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served as MITI minister during the Tanaka government and consulted his oral history of this period.⁴ Also, I spoke with Noda Takeshi, a former finance ministry official and Diet member, and learned about the relationship between his father-in-law Noda Takeo and LDP Secretary-General Hori Shigeru and other topics.

Interviews with Hashimoto Hiroshi, Kuriyama Takakazu, and Nakae Yōsuke were important for understanding the role played by foreign ministry officials in normalization. Hashimoto enjoyed close relationships with both Tanaka and Ōhira and, in his position as director of the China Division, he was more involved with normalization than his superior Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō. Trusted by the Chinese as well, he would lead the way for the Emperor's 1992 visit to China to mark the twentieth anniversary of normalization.⁵

Moreover, to better understand developments within the China Division, I interviewed Deputy Director Watanabe Kōji and Ogura Kazuo, two of Hashimoto's subordinates. Watanabe witnessed the Nixon Shock's effects on the division, and Ogura oversaw the drafting of Tanaka's letter and telegram to Chiang Kai-shek with Hashimoto.

Also, I interviewed Nakae Yōsuke, a foreign affairs councilor in the Asia Bureau and one of Hashimoto's superiors. He was the second most senior official in the bureau and in charge of negotiations with Taiwan. He also accompanied Shiina on his trip there.⁶

For Shiina's trip to Taiwan, I interviewed Wakayama Kyōichi, a member of the foreign ministry's "China school" (diplomats who had received training in the Chinese language). Wakayama learned Chinese in Taiwan and was appointed to the Foreign Service Training Institute after spending four years working in Taipei. During the preparations for Tanaka's visit to China, he was recalled to the home ministry and placed in charge of Japan-Taiwan relations.

Alongside the Asia Bureau, the Treaties Bureau also played a central role in the foreign ministry's handling of normalization. After Japan regained its independence, skilled personnel were assigned to the bureau to address the postwar situation in which the nation found itself and take on the task of reestablishing

diplomatic relations with its neighbors. Serving under Bureau Director Takashima Masuo, Treaties Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu was a key figure in these efforts. Kuriyama, who would go on to serve as vice-minister and ambassador to the United States, drafted the Sino-Japanese joint statement alongside Takashima and Hashimoto.⁷

Also, I spoke to Ohara Ikuo about Tanaka's "meiwaku" speech. He translated this speech (which had been written by Hashimoto) into Chinese. Ohara worked at Japan's consulate in Hong Kong but was temporarily reassigned to the home ministry and joined the Japanese delegation during Tanaka's visit to China.

Contemporary significance

What is the significance of Sino-Japanese normalization, something that happened fifty years ago? I would like to raise three points with regard to this.

First, the Sino-Japanese peace serves as a prototype for modern East Asian international politics.

While the 1972 joint statement naturally serves as the foundation for Sino-Japanese relations, the negotiations that led to it also reflected the US-Japan relationship over Taiwan. Examining Sino-Japanese peace means discussing the US-Japan security framework and Japan-Taiwan relations. This book also considers the connections between the circumstances underlying the joint statement's article on Taiwan, the treatment of the Senkaku Islands during the negotiations, and the US-Japan security treaty's Far East clause.

The second point concerns the nature of political leadership.

There is a striking contrast in the ways that Tanaka and Ōhira, both of whom had been in China before the Second World War, involved themselves in China policy as politicians. Tanaka devoted himself to domestic politics and only issued broad directives when it came to foreign policy, choosing to leave the details to Ōhira and the foreign ministry. Ōhira, however, having already served as foreign minister during the Ikeda Hayato government (1960–64), had his own views when it came to foreign policy. He would later conclude an aviation agreement with China and, while serving as prime minister, launch the yen loan program for it.

The third point is the role played by the foreign ministry.

The manner in which the Japanese media frequently reports on Japanese diplomacy toward China suggests that the foreign ministry's China school is at the helm. At the time of normalization, the China school's Beijing faction (which emphasized the importance of relations with China over Taiwan) included such prominent figures as Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō, Hong Kong Consul General Okada Akira, and Foreign Service Training Institute Director Ogawa Heishirō. Ogawa would serve as the first ambassador to China and Yoshida the third. Others within the ministry, such as Vice-Minister Hōgen (a member of the Russia school), belonged to a Taiwan faction that saw Japan's relationship with Chiang Kai-shek as primary.⁸

But did the Beijing faction take the lead on Sino-Japanese normalization? Absolutely not; in fact, they were actually excluded from the negotiations.

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Treaties Division Director Kuriyama, who worked with Hashimoto to draft the joint statement, belonged to the US faction, the mainstream group in the ministry that placed Japan's relationship with the United States at the center of its foreign policy. That it was a member of the US faction who wrote the Sino-Japanese joint statement is a perfect distillation of the unique characteristics of Japanese foreign policy.

The United States' shadow has always loomed large over Sino-Japanese relations, and that is unlikely to change in the near future. By analyzing the internal processes and personal dynamics of the foreign ministry, I would like to throw the diplomatic traditions of the Japanese bureaucracy into relief. Sino-Japanese normalization not only became a prototype for modern East Asian international politics, but it also suggests what the ideal relationship between politicians and bureaucrats looks like. It is history that is still alive.

Notes

- 1 The following are notable pieces of scholarship on Sino-Japanese normalization: Haruhiro Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking: A Case Study in Foreign Policymaking," in T.J. Pempel, ed., *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1977), 61–102; Besshi Yukio, "Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka no Seiji Katei – Seisaku Ketteisha to Sono Kōdō no Haikai," *Kokusai Seiji* 66 (1980), 1–18; Tanaka Akihiko, *Nicchū Kankei 1945–1990* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1991), 61–83; Ogata Sadako, *Sengo Nicchū/Beichū Kankei*, trans., Soeya Yoshihide (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1992), 69–98; Soeya Yoshihide, *Nihon Gaikō to Chūgoku – 1945–1972* (Tokyo: Keio University, 1995), 187–254; Wang Taiping, ed., *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaoshi*, Vol. 3 (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1999), 19–25; Tamura Shigenobu, Toyoshima Norio, and Koeda Yoshito, *Nikka Dankō to Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka* (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 2000); Luo Pinghan, *Zhongguo Duri Zhengce Yu Zhongri Bangjiao Zhengchanghua – 1949–1972 Nian Zhongguo Duri Zhengce Yanjiu* (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2000); Ikeda Naotaka, *Nichibei Kankei to "Futatsu no Chūgoku" – Ikeda/Satō/Tanaka Naikaku* (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2004), 407–457; Wakatsuki Hidekazu, "Zenhōkui Gaikō" no Jidai – Reisen Henyōki no Nihon to Ajia 1971–80 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2006), 39–54; Mōri Kazuko, *Nicchū Kankei – Sengo kara Shinjidai e* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 49–94; Ni Zhimin, "Tanaka Naikaku ni Okeru Chūnichi Kokkō Seijōka to Ōhira Masayoshi," Part 1, *Ryūkoku Daigaku Keizaigaku Ronshū* 45:5 (2006), 19–51, Part 2, *Ryūkoku Daigaku Keizaigaku Ronshū* 46:5 (2007), 45–68, Part 3, *Ryūkoku Daigaku Keizaigaku Ronshū* 47:3 (2008), 33–68, Part 4, *Ryūkoku Daigaku Keizaigaku Ronshū* 47:3 (2009), 83–96; Yin Yanjun, *Nicchū Kōwa no Kenkyū – Sengo Nicchū Kankei no Genten* (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 2007), 243–300; Koike Seiichi, "'Ōhira Gaikō' no Keisei – Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka o Meguru Nihon Gaikō no Sōkoku," *Kokusai Kyōryoku Kenkyūshi* 14:2 (2008), 103–116; Inoue Masaya, *Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka no Seijishi* (Nagoya: Nagoya University, 2010).
- 2 Recent biographical scholarship includes Fukunaga Fumio, *Ōhira Masayoshi* (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 2008); Wakatsuki Hidekazu, "Tanaka Kakuei – 'Jishu Gaikō' no Tsuikyū to sono Genkai," in Sadō Akihiro, Komiya Kazuo, and Hattori Ryūji, eds., *Jinbutsu de Yomu Gendai Nihon Gaikōshi – Konoe Fumimaro kara Koizumi Jun'ichirō made* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2008), 224–239; Sadō Akihiro, "Ōhira Masayoshi – 'Hoshu Honryū' no Shimeikan," in Sadō, *Gaikōshi*, 256–268.
- 3 The interviews held on September 5, September 19, October 3, and October 24, 2009, have been collected in Morita Hajime, *Kokoro no Ittō – Kaisō no Ōhira Masayoshi – Sono*

Hito to Gaikō, eds., Hattori Ryūji, Nobori Amiko, and Nakajima Takuma (Tokyo: Dai-ichi Hōki, 2010).

- 4 The author interviewed Nakasone twenty-nine times. Sino-Japanese normalization was discussed at the tenth session held on August 6, 2009. See also Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon Gaikō*, eds., Nakajima Takuma et al. (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2011).
- 5 Hattori Ryūji, *Nicchū Rekishi Ninshiki – “Tanaka Jōsōbun” o Meguru Sōkoku 1927–2010* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2010), 275–276.
- 6 On the interviews held on January 24, February 21, and March 21, 2009, see also: Nakae Yōsuke, *Ajia Gaikō: Dō to Sei – Moto Chūgoku Taishi Nakae Yōsuke Ōraru Hisutorī*, eds., Wakatsuki Hidekazu et al. (Tokyo: Sōtensha, 2010).
- 7 The interviews held on September 4 and 17, 2008, March 10 and October 15, 2009, and April 8, 2010, have been collected in Kuriyama Takakazu, *Gaikō Shōgenroku – Okinawa Henkan/Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka/Nichibei “Mitsuyaku”*, eds., Nakajima Takuma, Hattori Ryūji, and Etō Naoko (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010). Sino-Japanese normalization is also briefly touched upon in GRIPS Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, *Kuriyama Takakazu (Moto Chūbei Taishi) Ōraru Hisutorī – Tenkanki no Nichibei Kankei* (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), 10–11.
- 8 On the China, Beijing, and Taiwan factions, see also: Nagano Nobutoshi, *Gaimushō Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Saimaru, 1975), 61–62.

1 Tanaka Kakuei and Ōhira Masayoshi

Two types of leadership

Tanaka Kakuei

There is likely no Japanese politician who is as widely known, talked about so passionately, and about whom opinion is so divided, as Tanaka Kakuei, the man who plays the leading role in this book. Let us first look at his career as it would be matter-of-factly summarized in a textbook:

Born in Futada Village, Kariwa County, Niigata Prefecture in 1918. Graduated from Futada Higher Elementary School in 1933 and moved to Tokyo. Studied engineering at the Chuo College of Technology at night while working for various companies (including Inoue Kōgyō, a construction company) during the day. Opened the Kyōei Architectural Office after failing to gain admission to the Imperial Navy Academy. Drafted into the 24th Cavalry Regiment in Morioka, Iwate Prefecture in 1938. Dispatched to Fujin, Manchukuo but returned home due to sickness and became president of Tanaka Construction.

Joined the Progressive Party during the Occupation of Japan and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1947. Joined the Satō faction of the LDP. Served as postal minister (Kishi government), finance minister (Ikeda and Satō governments), MITI minister (Satō government), LDP Policy Research Council chair, and LDP secretary-general. Published *Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago* at the end of the Satō government.¹

Became prime minister in July 1972 at the young age of fifty-four and was known as the “modern Hideyoshi” due to his humble origins. Reestablished diplomatic relations with China but resigned in November 1974 due to a financial scandal. Arrested in 1976 for his involvement in the Lockheed bribery scandal but continued to wield political influence as the “shadow shōgun” afterwards. Retired in 1990 and died in 1993.

However, such a dictionary-like profile is incapable of conveying the triumph and turmoil with which this man’s life overflowed.

Born the eldest son of an unsuccessful livestock dealer and without any particularly notable education to his name, Tanaka charmed the public with his skilled oratory and distinctively husky voice. Once described as “a computer connected to a bulldozer” for his intelligence and energy, he managed to win over both politicians and bureaucrats.

Tanaka contracted diphtheria at the age of 2 and nearly died. As a child, “he became introverted due to a severe stammer” but managed to overcome both of these through hard work.²

The book *The Tanaka Kakuei We Remember*, published by the Tanaka Kakuei Memorial Museum, collects written memorials from many of his childhood classmates and provides a picture of the young Tanaka. As described in these accounts, Tanaka was an excellent student who was chosen as class president.

Tanaka was so successful in correcting his stutter that he received the lead role of *Benkei* at a school arts festival. He also acted as a conductor for his school’s drum and fife band as it saw soldiers off to the fighting that followed the Manchurian Incident.

The young Tanaka exercised his father’s horses every day. The young women of the village loved to watch as he brought the horses to the bank of the Sakata River close to his home and quietly brush them. They would hide when the sounds of the herds’ hooves drew near and silently watch. The same river still flows peacefully today, providing an echo of that time.

Unable to attend middle school due to his father’s business failures, he headed to Tokyo at the age of 15.³ There he spent his days working for Inoue Kōgyō and other companies while heading to Chuo College of Technology by bicycle at night.

Tanaka spent two years as a soldier in China before the beginning of the Second World War. In March 1939, the twenty-one-year-old was drafted into the 24th Cavalry Regiment located in Morioka, Iwate Prefecture. In late spring, he headed via Korea for Fujin in northern Manchukuo. He contracted pneumonia, was admitted to a field hospital in China, and ultimately returned to Japan without having ever seen combat, however. He later wrote:

I am filled with emotion when I think back on those two years I spent in Manchuria, never even dreaming that I would become sick and be able to return to Japan.⁴

Tanaka was elected to the House of Representatives in the first elections held under the postwar constitution. He was twenty-eight. Politicians he respected at this time included Yoshida Shigeru and Shidehara Kijūrō, both of whom served as prime ministers during the Occupation.

Yoshida and the politicians produced by his faction would dominate Japanese conservative politics for decades, becoming known as the “conservative mainstream.” The most notable among Yoshida’s disciples were Ikeda Hayato (prime

minister from 1960 to 1964) and Satō Eisaku (prime minister from 1964 to 1972).⁵ Tanaka was conscious of this lineage and associated himself with it:

Those like myself who come from Yoshida's line – men like Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku – we all form a perfect whole from the moment we meet. . . . I have truly walked the path of the conservative mainstream.⁶

Tanaka would become the leader of the Satō faction while Ōhira Masayoshi, his longtime ally, would take up the reins of the Ikeda faction. These two men were the faces of the conservative mainstream in the 1970s.

But while he belonged to the Satō faction, Tanaka broke convention by, for example, making visits to Ikeda's home.⁷ According to his secretary Hayasaka Shigezō, Tanaka felt closer to Ikeda than he did to Satō:

While Tanaka happened to become a member of the Satō faction, there's no question that he followed in the footsteps of Ikeda Hayato in terms of his political lineage. He was also quite fond of Ikeda on a personal level. But, by a strange twist of fate, he ended up settling down with Eisaku. Perhaps you could say that he got started on the wrong foot. In any case, this relationship continued until he became prime minister.⁸

From “Domo-Kaku” to eloquence

Tanaka was a masterful speaker. Standing 164 centimeters tall, he was already a big man, but he seemed even larger when he spoke.⁹ Former prime minister Kaifu Toshiki, who frequently gave an opening speech for Tanaka while he was campaigning, wrote of his oratory:

His public speaking could not be surpassed. No politician could charm an audience like he could when it came to giving campaign speeches on the street. Passersby would actually stop and laugh when he spoke. The construction of his arguments was all over the place and yet, when he called out to the crowd at the end in his husky voice and asked, “How about it, everyone? Don't you agree with me?” the crowd would roar in approval anyway.

No politician in the Tanaka faction (or the Takeshita faction that succeeded it) inherited Kaku's rhetorical skills.¹⁰

But while Tanaka's popular image is that of an eloquent speaker, as mentioned earlier, he suffered from a severe stammer in his youth. Teased with the nickname “Domo-Kaku” (derived from his first name and the Japanese word for stammer), the young Tanaka tried every method he could find to overcome this. He participated in poetry recitals and memorized Buddhist sutras and classical Chinese poetry. He collected recordings of *rōkyoku*, a kind of narrative singing, and tried to sing along out in the mountains. He also read aloud from difficult law books.

He was desperate, although, as he would later write, “the fervent studying I did at this time appears to have laid the foundation for my later studies.”¹¹

Prior to his entry into politics, Tanaka worked in the construction industry. Somewhere along the way, he gained a mastery of *kouta* and *dodoitsu*, two types of folk song. He registered with the Kasuga school of *kouta* and received the stage name “Toyotoshi Zumi.” *Dodoitsu* songs follow a 7-7-7-5 structure and usually feature themes of love.

Tanaka, known for both working and playing hard, would liven up drinking parties by signing *dodoitsu* accompanied by a geisha playing the shamisen:

Furaretemo	Even if stamped on
Keraretemo	Even if kicked
Tsuite ikimasu	I’ll stay by your side
Geta no yuki ¹²	Like the prints of <i>geta</i> in the snow

Tanaka’s stammer also led him to begin studying calligraphy in his youth, something that he continued even after becoming a successful politician. He adopted the pseudonym “Etsuzan,” a reference to his beloved hometown. Examples of his calligraphy can still be seen at the Tanaka Kakuei Memorial Museum located near his birthplace. A variety of messages, all written in powerful characters, are on display: “Koshiji Bridge,” “Valiant Spirit,” “With harmony, all can go smoothly,” “Fight with all your might,” and “Pray for victory.”

According to Tanaka’s secretary Asaka Akira, he dedicated a message to the youth of Japan: “Even the mountain waters that flow into the ocean may have started as small drops, passing through the leaves of trees.” These words were filled with understanding and were meant to give hope to young people: “Even if what you’re capable of now seems small, soon you will be successful and take a central role in society.” Following the Lockheed scandal, however, Tanaka’s mood changed and the only thing he would write was “steadfast determination.”¹³

Ōhira Masayoshi

It was Ōhira Masayoshi, the man who once declared, “I am the conservative mainstream,” who Tanaka chose as his closest political ally.¹⁴ Let us begin with a brief overview of his career as well:

Born in Wada Village, Mitoyo County, Kagawa Prefecture (what is today Kanonji City) on March 12, 1910. Graduated from Mitoyo Middle School, Takamatsu Higher Commercial School, and the Tokyo University of Commerce. Joined the finance ministry, where he served as head of the Yokohama Tax Office and in other positions. Dispatched to the newly established East Asia Development Board in 1939 and worked in Zhangjiakou in Inner Mongolia. Served as Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato’s secretary during the Occupation and participated in a survey of science and technology in the United States.

First elected to the House of Representatives in 1952. Served as chief cabinet secretary (Ikeda government), foreign minister (Ikeda and Tanaka governments), MITI minister (Satō government), finance minister (Tanaka and Miki governments), LDP Policy Research Council chair, and LDP secretary-general. Promoted Sino-Japanese normalization while serving as foreign minister in the Tanaka government. Leader of the Ikeda faction (Kōchikai). Became prime minister in December 1978 and passed away suddenly in June 1980 while still in office.

Unlike the cheerful and active Tanaka, Ōhira's plain demeanor caused him to receive the nickname "Dongyū" (slow bull). A considerate and devout Christian, he rarely spoke but read widely and was known for being a skilled writer.

Like Tanaka, Ōhira had been in China before the Second World War. But while Tanaka had experienced it as a private in Manchukuo, Ōhira worked for eighteen months at the East Asia Development Board's Mengjiang Liaison Department in Zhangjiakou, Inner Mongolia. This body was tasked with governing occupied Chinese territory during the Second Sino-Japanese War and had other liaison departments in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen.

When Ōhira was chosen to be the finance ministry's representative for the board in Zhangjiakou, Vice-Minister of Finance Ōno Ryūta approached him with the following pitch: "If you go . . . well, it'll be like you're the finance minister there. You'll have a free hand to do the work of finance and economics. It'll be like drawing on a blank canvas, won't it?"

Despite having only been married for a little over a year, Ōhira decided to go alone to China. He had been excited to take up the position but found Zhangjiakou "very different from what I'd been told, once I actually saw it." What actually awaited him were vast, empty swathes of earth rife with scorpions and a cold reception from the Japanese army:

Zhangjiakou was a "dirt city," completely lacking in trees. . . . Regardless of what things were supposed to be like, in actual practice it was the local military headquarters that held the dominant position in local administration. The young company and field grade officers appointed there flaunted their power.¹⁵

Like Tanaka, Ōhira had nothing but bitter memories of the time he spent in China.

After the war, Ōhira served in other positions in the finance ministry such as secretary to Finance Minister Ikeda before being elected to the House of Representatives for the first time in 1952.

What was Ōhira like as a politician? Unlike the eloquent, dashing, and fast-moving Tanaka, Ōhira was a poor public speaker, so much so that he would later be mocked as the "'Umm . . . Err . . . ' Prime Minister." No one would dispute that few could match his skill at formulating an argument and his eloquence in writing, however. As such, his reputation has become increasingly favorable.

While Tanaka could stir up a crowd with his extraordinary speeches, Ōhira was able to impress intellectuals with his penetrating philosophy. How did these two men, different in so many respects, first meet?

Tanaka's appraisal of Ōhira

It was shortly after Tanaka was first elected to the Diet that he met Ōhira (who was still an official at the finance ministry at this time):

I knew Ōhira before he became [Finance Minister Ikeda's] secretary. This was when I was living in [Ushigome] and he was head of the Public Works Division at the Headquarters for Economic Stabilization, one of the contact points for the occupying forces. He lived near me, so that's how we met.

I immediately got to work writing laws after entering the Diet in 1947 . . . which meant that I also got to know him through work.

After Ōhira became a Diet member, Tanaka made the following appraisal of him: "Even Ikeda would sometimes get sloppy after drinking, but Ōhira was always meticulous. Meticulous to the point of excess." Because Ōhira was so serious and reserved, his public speaking was lacking. Tanaka felt impatient as he listened to his speeches:

With that sleepy demeanor, his [speeches] were like songs without a shamisen accompanying them. He was always going "umm" and "err." His speeches weren't going to seduce anyone [laughs]. But when you looked at the transcript afterwards, all of his sentences were complete and entirely consistent. You could have printed it up as an article without making any changes. Who talks like that?

Tanaka once told Ōhira that "Your speeches are better constructed than mine in terms of their actual text, but they're no good when you give them. You sound like you want to fall asleep." Ōhira acknowledged that Tanaka was "certainly more persuasive," then joked that "maybe that why you manage to trick me." Tanaka tried to teach Ōhira how he gave speeches, explaining the importance of using pauses.

At some point, the two men became unrivaled friends despite belonging to different LDP factions. Tanaka later looked back on this friendship: "Ōhira was in many ways a truly rare friend. He helped me, and I helped him. When he felt distressed, he would call and tell me everything. He would also send me letters."

Also, Tanaka considered Ōhira as being "tougher" than he was: "Ōhira was a man of letters. And he had had a difficult life, more difficult than Maeo [Shigesaburō's], which made him tough. A lot tougher than someone like me." He

once described the difference between them to Ōhira by referencing their home areas:

When people talk about how tough people from Niigata are, it's because it snows there, and you have to walk in it barefoot. That's the degree of toughness that they're talking about. But you're like one of the paving stones on the Shikoku pilgrimage trail. Pilgrims have been stepping on you for a thousand years. And that makes you tougher.

After Ōhira's death, Tanaka commented that he "had used one hundred percent of me."¹⁶

"This Man Will Be Prime Minister"

What was it that made these two men, so different in terms of both personality and background, into such close friends?

According to Morita Hajime, a finance ministry official who served as Ōhira's secretary for many years and married his eldest daughter Yoshiko, Tanaka and Ōhira first met after Tanaka was elected to the Diet in 1947. Ōhira was head of the Public Works Division at the Headquarters for Economic Stabilization at the time, though he would soon run for office with Tanaka's backing.

Morita felt that this was a significant point in the two men's relationship: "When Ōhira ran in the 1952 general election, Tanaka Kakuei came to offer his support. I believe that this is when each man realized of the other that 'this man will be prime minister.'" That is, each man realized that it would be to their benefit to get along well with the other.¹⁷

Ōhira was eight years older than Tanaka but entered the Diet five years behind him. According to Satō Akiko, Tanaka's secretary and the "Queen of the Etsuzankai" (Tanaka's electoral support group), Ōhira called Tanaka "older brother" while visiting him at the Members' Office Building as a freshman Diet member.

Both men loved *sukiyaki* and would always serve it when holding a dinner, although their tastes differed somewhat:

Ōhira had a sweet tooth so would add lots of sugar. But Tanaka preferred things to be salty, so he would pour in lots of soy sauce. Sometimes the two would add so much sugar and soy sauce that the food would become inedible.

This is how Tanaka described Ōhira to those around him:

Ōhira's from Sanuki on Shikoku, and the people there have been getting trampled by military shoes from the mainland going back to the Sengoku period. He's inherited their toughness. He's like one of the stones of Shikoku.

Tanaka had absolute trust in Ōhira. Malicious gossip about Ōhira sometimes circulated in the press, claiming that it was just a matter of time before he betrayed

Tanaka. Tanaka rejected these warnings, however, noting that “if that happens, it means that I’m a complete failure at judging people. I believe that Ōhira will stick with me until the bitter end.”¹⁸

The “Taikaku Combo” under Ikeda

It was around the time of the Kishi government (1957–60) that the two men began exerting an influence on the political scene. This was when Tanaka entered the cabinet for the first time to serve as postal minister. Ōhira would become chief cabinet secretary in the Ikeda government that followed before becoming foreign minister in the same government.

It was during that same government that Tanaka, while serving as LDP Policy Research Council chair, began communicating closely with Ōhira on the instructions of Satō Eisaku. According to former prime minister Hata Tsutomu, it was this relationship that “would develop into the later Tanaka-Ōhira alliance.”¹⁹

While Tanaka was solely concerned with the domestic political situation, Ōhira kept an eye on foreign affairs also. He had taken a lengthy trip to the United States prior to running for office and had also increased his knowledge of foreign affairs while serving as chief cabinet secretary to Ikeda. His son-in-law Morita recalled that:

It was during his time as chief cabinet secretary that Ōhira really began to feel comfortable with foreign policy. This is because Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeuchi Ryūji would come to brief him on international issues for a couple of hours every week. I think that he had already clearly decided by this time that he wanted to serve as foreign minister after leaving the position of chief cabinet secretary.

Ōhira acted to make this desire a reality during the July 1962 reorganization of the Ikeda cabinet. He visited Tanaka’s mansion in Mejiro with Morita to help lay the groundwork for his plans for the new cabinet. He had told Morita to prepare a box of sweets with five million yen in it, and the two men “climbed over the outer wall” of the grounds so as not to be seen by any reporters or other politicians.

When Tanaka appeared at his door, Ōhira leaned forward and said, “I realize that you might feel a little out of place in the position, but I’d like you to serve as finance minister.”

At this point, Tanaka had only been serving as Policy Research Council chairman for a year and it was likely that he would be reappointed to the position (Maeo Shigesaburō and Akagi Munemori, the men who served as secretary-general and General Council chair, the two other major party positions, would in fact continue on in those posts). He did not want the position of finance minister, but he agreed to go along with Ōhira’s plan and began studying intensively to prepare himself for the role.

It goes without saying that Tanaka also accepted the box with the five million yen in it. Morita reports that the money was “ultimately just a gesture, a way for

Ōhira to ask Tanaka to go along with his vision [for the cabinet]" because "for Kaku, five million yen was nothing."

Afterward, Ikeda called Ōhira to the prime minister's office and asked him to draw up the list of cabinet ministers for the new cabinet. He did so (including "Finance Minister Tanaka Kakuei" on the list, of course) but, in a gesture of modesty, left the position of foreign minister blank.

When Ikeda looked over the list, he was initially confused: "Wait, where's your name?" But he soon realized Ōhira's intention and wrote in his name as foreign minister.²⁰ With this, the "Taikaku Combo" (a name derived from combining characters from each of their names) began exercising considerable influence on the direction of the Ikeda government.²¹

The second meeting of the Joint Japan-US Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held in Washington on November 30, and both men were in attendance. As they were flying to the conference, Tanaka stared out the window at the vast American continent. He called out, "Hey, Ōhira. I can't believe we went to war against such a big country." Ōhira smiled and nodded. His daughter Yoshiko noted that "When they weren't talking about work, Tanaka was someone who could really make Dad laugh."²²

Ōhira was not as interested in the LDP's internal factional politics as Tanaka, but he did not view the factions as being inherently harmful, either. In fact, he felt they provided necessary backing for carrying out policy. According to Morita, "It felt less like he viewed [factions] favorably and more like he tried to fairly gauge the advantages and disadvantages they presented."²³ It would be due to support from Tanaka and his faction that Ōhira would be able to challenge and defeat Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in the 1978 LDP presidential election.

Furui Yoshimi, a member of the LDP's pro-China faction who had visited the country numerous times prior to normalization and served as an advisor to Ōhira, described the partnership between the two men as follows:

Tanaka had plenty of experience when it came to domestic politics, but he was a lot weaker when it came to foreign policy. He was the kind of person who wanted to come up with ideas and make decisions by himself, but I don't think he was able to do that [when it came to foreign policy]. . . . So when Tanaka became prime minister, he told Ōhira that he wanted him to do all the thinking. One of the great things about Tanaka was that he didn't stick his nose into things he didn't understand. Instead, he asked Ōhira to handle it for him. So that meant Ōhira had total authority [over foreign policy].²⁴

It was because they were such different people that Tanaka and Ōhira needed one another. And as soon as he became prime minister, Tanaka tapped Ōhira as his foreign minister.

Anticipating Chinese entry into the United Nations

Although Tanaka and Ōhira would ultimately express a desire to create a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations, the position of the Japanese government

since the time of Prime Minister Yoshida had been to recognize Taiwan, not China.

Japan had established diplomatic relations with Taiwan via the 1952 Treaty of Taipei. This was sometimes referred to as a “limited recognition” not extending to the Chinese mainland, but such a position would be impossible under international law as both China and Taiwan asserted that only one legal government existed and exercised jurisdiction over all Chinese territory.

The Japanese government was not always consistent in the way that it described the Treaty of Taipei, and this was criticized by both Taiwan and China. This cannot be entirely blamed on Japan, however. The fundamental issue was that both China and Taiwan claimed to be the sole legal government of all of China. It was fictitious for Taiwan to make this claim, but it was also clear that China did not exercise any actual control over Taiwan. With the two governments asserting that there was only “one China,” Japan was forced into making a difficult decision.

The international situation in the 1950s had made establishing diplomatic relations with China problematic. Not only had the United States been exerting pressure on Japan to choose Taiwan, but China had also been recently condemned by the United Nations for its “aggression” in Korea.

Ōhira would be the first of the two men placed in a position with responsibility over Japanese relations with China. As already mentioned, he had become foreign minister when the Ikeda government was reorganized in 1962. In January 1964, de Gaulle’s France announced that it would be recognizing China, and Taiwan severed relations with it on February 10.

At the meeting of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs held the following day, Ōhira was asked about this by Hozumi Shichirō of the Socialist Party. He answered that:

I believe that, should the Communist Chinese government be admitted to the United Nations with the blessings of the world, our nation would have to make a weighty decision. I believe that would only be natural.

Ōhira thus stated that Japan would have to explore the possibility of normalizing relations with China should it be admitted to the United Nations with the “blessings of the world.” Hozumi persisted in his questioning on this point, pressing him on whether the Japanese government would hinder China in securing representation in the United Nations. Ōhira flatly rejected this possibility:

I feel that this question is quite rude to the Japanese government. The Japanese government will engage in United Nations activities fairly, in line with its Charter.²⁵

It should be noted that Ōhira’s answers did not favor the idea that there were “two Chinas.” From his perspective, this was a message that “I will bring about Sino-Japanese normalization even if it takes the rest of my life.”²⁶

MITI Minister Ōhira and Prime Minister Satō

The 1964 Tokyo Olympics served as a last hurrah for the Ikeda government, as Ikeda stepped down due to health reasons and was replaced by Satō Eisaku in November. In the lead up to the change in government, Tanaka had been in touch with Ōhira and worked to ensure that Satō would become Ikeda's successor.²⁷ The Satō government would last until July 1972, making it the longest-lasting consecutive government in Japanese history until it was surpassed by that of Abe Shinzō in 2020.

Ōhira, who served as LDP chief deputy secretary-general during the latter part of the Ikeda government, did not belong to Satō's faction, but he still worked hard to bring about the creation of a Satō government. His confidante Morita explained how:

Ōhira saw Satō as the only possible successor to Ikeda . . . [He] visited Ikeda everyday at the hospital. And each time he did so, he would look over the visitors log and try to imagine what kind of advice each of Ikeda's visitors would have given him. He would then, over the course of idle conversation with Ikeda, try to correct that advice. He worked everyday to turn Ikeda towards Satō.

Ōhira supported Satō, another member of the conservative mainstream deriving from the old Yoshida faction, as Ikeda's successor. But according to Morita, once Satō became prime minister, he distanced himself from Ōhira:

I think Satō had two reasons for shunning Ōhira. First, while [Satō] believed he would be able to manipulate Fukuda Takeo and Tanaka Kakuei, he felt it would be a little more difficult to do the same to Ōhira due to his shrewdness. Second, he knew that he could weaken the power of the Kōchikai [(the Ikeda faction)] by driving a wedge between Maeo and Ōhira. So, he decided to do that. For these reasons, he tried to avoid bringing Tanaka Kakuei and Ōhira closer to each other.

Satō was concerned about the possibility of Tanaka and Ōhira conspiring together and thus sought to divide them.²⁸ Tanaka remained on as finance minister in the new Satō government and would later be appointed to important positions like LDP secretary-general and MITI minister. Ōhira would get off to a bit of a late start but would ultimately serve as Policy Research Council chair and MITI minister. He would also succeed Maeo as head of the Kōchikai.

Japanese relations with China were at a standstill during this period. China was critical of the Satō government for its "policy of viewing China as an enemy" and, in any case, its attention was almost entirely devoted to the internal power struggle of the Cultural Revolution. Rather than work to improve relations with China, Satō made the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control his primary foreign

policy objective. He visited the United States in November 1969 for a summit with President Nixon as part of this effort.

The Satō–Nixon joint statement released following the summit included the statement, “The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.”²⁹ By invoking the “security of Japan,” this clause meant that the US military forces stationed in Japan under the US–Japan Security Treaty could be used in the defense of Taiwan. This was fiercely denounced by China. China had little hope of improving relations with Japan under Satō and decided that it would wait until the next Japanese government was formed to pursue Sino-Japanese normalization. It had particularly high hopes for a potential Tanaka government.

While the United States and Japan had established a timeline for the return of Okinawa, trade frictions between the two countries over textiles were becoming increasingly fraught. There were rumors in Japan that Satō had made concessions on textiles as part of a deal for the return of Okinawa.

It was precisely because he was worried about giving the Japanese public this kind of impression that Satō had avoided including any language about textiles in the joint statement. But he had made what Nixon considered a personal commitment to resolve the textile issue within about a year (his failure to do so was at least partially responsible for the Nixon administration keeping him in the dark over its plans for China).

Yet when Ōhira asked Satō about the rumors, he flatly denied them and stated that he had “absolutely not” made any such agreement. As MITI minister, he was the figure responsible for resolving trade frictions and, if such concessions had been made, he should have been one of the first informed. But Satō continued to keep Ōhira at arm’s length and gave him no notice or warning of what he was doing. As such, Ōhira had no way of handling the situation.

Satō has been praised for his skill in personnel management and his method of governing has been called the “politics of waiting” due to his tendency to wait for an opportune moment before acting. But it seemed callous to Ōhira. He had worked tirelessly to bring about a Satō government and believed that he deserved better. But he was always good at seeing the bigger picture and so remained calm and did not lash out against Satō. Ultimately, he would leave the position of MITI minister without having been able to resolve the frictions over textiles. His successor Miyazawa Kiichi would also make little progress in the negotiations over the issue.³⁰

MITI Minister Tanaka and Prime Minister Satō

Satō appointed Tanaka (who had been serving as LDP secretary-general) as MITI minister on July 5, 1971. He also told Tanaka the truth about his deal with the United States. He thus showed that he trusted Tanaka, a member of his faction, more than he had Ōhira.³¹

Once in his new position, Tanaka moved to resolve the issue in one swift blow by placing voluntary export restrictions on textiles and pouring financial

assistance into the textile industry. The following account of how this came about comes from Konaga Keiichi, Tanaka's secretary at the ministry (and a future MITI vice-minister).

Tanaka visited the United States in September and met with Treasury Secretary Connally. According to Konaga, Tanaka

took a firm stance of “no restrictions on trade without compensatory damages” [at the meeting] in strict accordance with the choreography laid out by the relevant authorities within MITI.

This caused the officials at MITI to view [Tanaka] with great respect. Judging from the later results, this could be considered the first example of Tanaka's skillful way of winning people over to his side.

But as Connally also refused to make any concessions, Tanaka returned home from the United States without having secured an agreement. He then met with MITI Vice-Minister Morozumi Yoshihiko and told him that “I did as you guys asked, but it didn't resolve anything. It seems to me that we won't be able to resolve this problem unless we try something new.” The ministry leadership also understood that just continuing to assert “no restrictions on trade without compensatory damages” was not going to bring about a conclusion.

The plan that resulted was one that combined voluntary restrictions on textile exports to the United States with domestic relief measures. The cost would be a massive 200 billion yen. “The officials in the ministry only went along with the final plan with great reluctance, but Tanaka leapt at it.”

After the plan was presented to him, Tanaka leaned forward and asked, “What's the problem here? What's the problem with the plan?”

The MITI leadership was pessimistic. “How could we possibly get the funds to pay for it? The ministry's total budget is 500 billion yen. There's no way we can use 200 billion on the textile industry alone.”

“That's the only problem?” When they confirmed that the cost was their only objection, he immediately said, “In that case, leave it to me.” As they watched, he called Satō and Finance Minister Mizuta Mikio.

“This is the only way to conclude the textile negotiations with the US. We need 200 billion yen. That doesn't seem like all that much, given the size of the entire national budget.”

Overwhelmed by Tanaka's fervor, Satō ultimately gave in, leaving Mizuta no choice but to accept. In an artful touch, Tanaka smoothly wrote out “I would appreciate receiving 200 billion yen” on a business card and had it sent to the accountants at the finance ministry after he got off the phone with Mizuta.

According to Konaga, “Tanaka never failed to be considerate of the relevant officials when he made political decisions. And because of that painstaking consideration, the officials would work to move things forward in a way that prevented any major arguments from arising.”³²

In a collection of people's recollections of Tanaka, Konaga wrote that the textiles plan “truly went at lightning speed. It only took about fifty days from that

initial political decision to the final resolution.”³³ It was a characteristically masterful move by the shrewd Tanaka.

Also, he worked to lay the groundwork for his plan by gathering the secretary-generals of the Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party, and the Kōmeitō at a hotel, noting that “We were all colleagues not so long ago, right?” Socialist Party Secretary-General Ishibashi Masashi later wrote that “while Kaku caused a lot of harm, it is at least true that he never betrayed us when we worked together.”³⁴

As Tanaka increasingly distinguished himself within the party, he rapidly became a strong candidate to become the next prime minister. The other major candidate was Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo. But before the two men could face one another, the Satō government was rocked by the “Nixon Shock.” While this event was truly a nightmare for the Japanese government, it also served as a prelude to the birth of the Tanaka government and the achievement of Sino-Japanese normalization.

Notes

- 1 Tanaka Kakuei, *Nihon Rettō Kaizōron* (Tokyo: Nikkan Kōgyō Shimbun, 1972).
- 2 Tanaka Kakuei, “Watakushi no Rirekisho,” in Kishi Nobusuke et al., eds., *Watakushi no Rirekisho – Hoshu Seiken no Ninaite* (Tokyo: Nikkei Business Books, 2007), 323, 331, 343–344.
- 3 Tanaka Kakuei Memorial Museum, ed., *Watakushi no Naka no Tanaka Kakuei* (Kashiwazaki: Tanaka Kakuei Memorial Museum, 2005), 189–253.
- 4 Tanaka, “Watakushi no Rirekisho,” 413, 424, 426–436.
- 5 Ryuji Hattori, *Eisaku Satō, Japanese Prime Minister, 1964–72: Okinawa, Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics and the Nobel Prize*, trans., Graham Leonard (London: Routledge, 2021), 117–20.
- 6 Hayasaka Shigezō, *Hayasaka Shigezō no “Tanaka Kakuei” Kaisōroku* (Tokyo: Shōgakusan, 1987), 35–39.
- 7 Kimura Mitsugu, *Sōri no Hinkaku – Kantei Hishokan ga Mita Rekidai Saishō no Sugao* (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2006), 33.
- 8 Hayasaka Shigezō, *Oyaji to Watashi* (Tokyo: Shūeisha Bunko, 1993), 79–80.
- 9 According to page 394 of Tanaka Kakuei, “Watakushi no Rirekisho,” his height was 164 centimeters.
- 10 Kaifu Toshiki, “Mitabi Majieta Watashi ga Kanjiru Dōshiyōmonai Ozawa no Seiheki,” *Shinchō Bessatsu* 45 (April 2010), 125.
- 11 Tanaka Kakuei, *Watakushi no Shōnen Jidai* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1973), 36, 76.
- 12 Hayasaka Shigezō, *Oyaji no Yuigon* (Tokyo: Shūeisha International, 2004), 16–20. See also: Tsuji Kazuko, *Jōnetsu – Tanaka Kakuei o Toriko ni Shita Geisha* [Passion: The Geisha Who Made Tanaka Kakuei Her Prisoner] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2004).
- 13 Asaka Akira, “Ningen Tanaka Kakuei no Jitsuzō,” *Shinchō* 45 (July 2010), 119.
- 14 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 74.
- 15 Ōhira Masayoshi, *Watakushi no Rirekisho* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1978), 46–48.
- 16 Tanaka Kakuei, “Waga Sengo Hishi,” *Gendai* (February 1994), 28–46.
- 17 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 39.
- 18 Satō Akiko, *Tanaka Kakuei* (Tokyo: Keizaikai, 2005), 134–136.
- 19 Hata Tsutomu, *Shōsetsu – Tanaka Gakkō* (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1996), 58–59.
- 20 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 51–54. See: Tanaka Kakuei, *Daijin Nikki* (Niigata: Niigata Nippō Jigyōsha, 1972), 10–12 to see how Tanaka’s memories on this point differed.

- 21 Hata, *Tanaka Gakkō*, 60.
- 22 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (April 8, 2010, evening edition).
- 23 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 139.
- 24 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, ed., *Nicchū Fukkō* (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1972), 62–63. See also: Furui Yoshimi, “Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka no Hiwa,” *Chūō Kōron* (December 1972), 145–146; Furui Yoshimi, *Nicchū 18 Nen – Ichi Seijika no Kiseki to Tenbō* (Tokyo: Makino, 1978); Furui Yoshimi, *San’in Umare – Ichi Seijika no Jinsei* (Tokyo: Makino, 1979); Furui Yoshimi, Ide Ichitarō, and Tamura Masakichi, eds., *Hōchū Shoken* (self-published, Furui Yoshimi, 1959); Matsuo Takayoshi, ed., *Furui Yoshimi Ibunshū – Ichi Seijika no Chokugen* (Tokyo: Nicchū Yūkō Kaikan, 1997), 180–239; Iyasu Tadashi, *Aru Hoshu Seijika – Furui Yoshimi no Kiseki* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1987); Lu Xueying, “Furui Yoshimi to 1968-Nen no Nicchū LT Bōeki Kōshō,” *Shirin* 91:5 (2006), 99–131; Lu Xueying, “Furui Yoshimi to 1970-Nen no Nicchū MT Bōeki Kōshō,” *20 Seiki Kenkyū* 9 (2008), 51–72; Lu Xueying, “Furui Yoshimi to Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka – LT/MT Bōeki no Enchōsen kara Miru Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka,” *Sirin* 93:2 (2010), 310–345.
- 25 Minutes of the 46th Diet – House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, 2 (February 12, 1964), 4–5.
- 26 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 66–67, 97.
- 27 Hata, *Tanaka Gakkō*, 61.
- 28 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 78–79.
- 29 Hosoya Chihiro et al., eds., *Nichibei Kankei Shiryō 1945–97* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1999), 786.
- 30 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 88–89; Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki*, ed., Itō Takashi (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1998), Vol. 3, 355, 389, 395, 432, 515, 527–528, 533, Vol. 4, 23, 315–316, Vol. 5, 160, 164. For more on the trade frictions over textiles, see Ishii Osamu, “Dai Ni Ji Nichibei Sen’i Funsō (1969–1971) – Meisō no 1000 Nichi,” Part 1, *Ikkyō Hōgaku* 8:2 (2009), 3–33, Part 2, *Ikkyō Hōgaku* 9:1 (2010), 1–46.
- 31 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 89; Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki*, Vol. 4, 368–370, 423, 425–427, 429, 432–433, 440, 442–445.
- 32 Interview with Konaga Keiichi, June 11, 2010. See also: Konaga Keiichi, “Nihon Rettō Kaizōron Torimatome to Tanaka Naikaku no Kiseki,” in National Institute for Research Advancement, ed., *Sengo Kokudo Seisaku no Kenshō*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 1996), 173–175.
- 33 Konaga Keiichi, “Nichibei Sen’i Kōshō – Denkō Sekka no Sabaki,” in Tanaka Kakuei Memorial Museum, ed., *Watakushi no Naka no Tanaka Kakuei*, 91.
- 34 Ishibashi Masashi, *Ishibashi Masashi Kaisōroku – “55-Nen Taisei” Uchigawa kara no Shōgen* (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1999), 96–97.

2 The Nixon Shock – moving beyond Satō

“America Would Just Do Whatever It Wanted”

On the evening of July 15, 1971, the White House made a phone call to the home of Murata Ryōhei, first secretary at the Japanese embassy in Washington. Murata (who would later go on to become vice-minister) was not at home, but the harried official on the other end of the line carelessly divulged to Murata’s wife that he was calling “about President Nixon’s visit to Beijing.” The call had been made on the instructions of Secretary of State Rogers as the Americans were desperately trying to reach Ambassador Ushiba Nobuhiko.¹

Once he had finally gotten Ushiba on the phone (at shortly after 10 p.m.), Rogers spoke quickly:

National Security Advisor Kissinger visited Beijing from the 9th to the 11th of July and held talks with Premier Zhou Enlai. At Zhou’s invitation, President Nixon will be visiting Beijing at an appropriate time by May of next year. . . . He will be announcing this on television at 10:30 p.m. tonight, so we are contacting you to give you advance notice.

Ushiba immediately called Foreign Affairs Councilor Yasukawa Takeshi in Tokyo to pass on this astounding message. A mere thirty minutes after Japan was tipped off, Nixon made the shocking announcement to the world that he would be visiting China.²

Prime Minister Satō’s diary shows his thoughts: “I don’t know what was behind the decision. Perhaps [Nixon’s] focus is on bringing about a rapid end to the war in Vietnam. . . . In any case, it may be a sign that the Communist Chinese are adopting a more flexible attitude.” The announcement came as a double shock to Satō: not only was he surprised that Nixon would be visiting China, but he had also not expected China to agree to receive him.³

Satō had been working on his keynote address for the start of the Diet session on July 17 and now revised his draft. The astonishment felt by Satō and the foreign ministry is easy to imagine. It was a black mark of the worst kind on the foreign ministry’s reputation that the United States had decided to move forward with a

presidential visit to China without consulting Japan (and, indeed, only informed them immediately before the information was made public).

The “Nixon Shock” cast a large shadow over Japan. Murata recalls:

The lateness of the notification gave some Japanese (particularly those within the foreign ministry and the LDP) the impression that there was no real need to consult with the United States on China and Taiwan; America would just end up selfishly doing whatever it wanted. I believe that Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was probably one of those who had received this impression. Calls for normalizing relations with China became more frequent and those who called for not acting in haste or for giving more consideration to Taiwan were shouted down. In that sense, [Nixon’s actions] were an unfortunate shock.⁴

Why had Japan not been informed earlier? Ushiba explained:

There was absolutely no sense among Nixon or his inner circle that they should go out of their way for the sake of Japan. I believe this is because they strongly felt that they had been betrayed on the textile issue.⁵

Changing China policy

When MITI Minister Tanaka was informed of Nixon’s announcement, he muttered to his secretary Konaga that “the world has changed.”⁶

Ōhira, who was more inclined to think things through rationally, maintained a cautious position in the immediate aftermath of the Nixon Shock. But he would soon come out in favor of recognizing China.

At a training session for the Kōchikai’s Diet members held at a hotel in Hakone on September 1, 1971, Ōhira (who did not hold a position in the government at the time) gave a speech titled “The Opening of a New Century for Japan: Changing the Tides.” He began by noting that:

Our nation is now approaching a turning point, a sort of conclusion to the postwar period. We have hitherto single-mindedly worked to accumulate wealth, but true happiness and a reason for living cannot necessarily be found in the riches that we have gained.

As he began to speak on the increasingly prominent question of China, he strengthened his tone:

Since last Autumn, there has been a rapidly growing trend among the membership of the United Nations towards granting Beijing the right to represent China. The number of countries establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing has continuously increased and this is echoed in the movement of popular opinion within our nation. It is my judgment that the time is fully ripe

for the government to make an accurate assessment of the situation and bring about a resolution to the so-called “China issue.”⁷

Ōhira’s speech calling for making contact with Beijing was clearly made with the next LDP presidential election in mind. Also, it served as a criticism of Prime Minister Satō and his strict adherence to Taiwan. The headline on the frontpage of the following day’s *Asahi Shimbun* read “Ōhira Makes ‘Anti-Satō Declaration’ – ‘Hurry Up and Change Policy on China.’”⁸

The admission of China to (and the Taiwanese withdrawal from) the United Nations on October 25 served to provide further support for Ōhira’s offensive posture. The international environment necessary for bringing about Sino-Japanese normalization was falling into place.⁹

The Nixon Shock also had a strong impact on the foreign ministry’s China Division. Director Hashimoto Hiroshi was resentful of the Americans’ actions, commenting “So, they’ve gone and done it, have they? Figures.”¹⁰

At the time, the China Division had twenty-six staff members and was therefore a sizeable group within the ministry. It was led by Director Hashimoto and Deputy Director Watanabe Kōji and was largely composed of career officials who had studied Chinese and specialists from other areas. Watanabe, who had not studied Chinese, followed Sino-American relations. The division was further broken down into sections including the General Affairs Section made up of the division’s leaders and career staff and more specialized groups like the Political Affairs Section, Economic Section, and Taiwan Section.

As changes in Japanese policy toward China could greatly influence the situation in East Asia, the United States took a keen interest, and a secretary from the US embassy met with the division’s director every week. This regular contact with the Americans made the shock from the lack of advance notification concerning Nixon’s announcement all the greater.¹¹

Governor Minobe’s visit to China and the Hori Letter

Having been betrayed by the Nixon administration, the Satō government finally attempted to make contact with China. Neither the government nor the LDP was in complete agreement on what policy toward China should look like, however. Fukuda Takeo, foreign minister at this time, later commented that “of those within the Satō power structure, Hori Shigeru was proactive on Sino-Japanese issues and I was more cautious.”¹² Hori was secretary-general of the LDP at the time.

When the opposition and LDP’s dovish faction accused the government of having “no enthusiasm for normalizing relations with China,” Fukuda would say that “while a duck may appear to be merely floating calmly in the water, it is actually paddling furiously beneath the surface.”¹³

There were numerous third-party attempts to bring about closer relations with China, including visits to China by Diet Member Kawasaki Hideji (a member of the LDP’s pro-China faction) and former foreign minister Fujiyama Aiichirō, the head of the Diet Members’ League for the Promotion of the Restoration of

Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China. But the best example of these efforts is most likely Hori Shigeru's letter to Zhou Enlai (the "Hori Letter").

Hori entrusted this letter to Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryōkichi prior to the latter's November 1971 visit to China.¹⁴ According to Diet Member Noda Takeshi, his father-in-law Diet Member Noda Takeo told him that Hori had "consulted with him on various aspects of Sino-Japanese normalization."¹⁵

Hori's letter to Zhou included the following passages:

I have always understood and recognized that there is only one China, that the People's Republic of China is the government that represents China, and that Taiwan is the territory of the Chinese People. . . .

I will increase my efforts to rapidly bring about the normalization of relations between our countries. It is my most fervent desire that, by working together, we can create peace in Asia and the world.¹⁶

In a curious bit of coincidence, Hori's letter was dated October 25, the same day that China was admitted to the United Nations. But while the letter took a pro-Chinese position, Zhou took no interest in it when he met with Minobe in Beijing on November 10. Bluntly rejecting the effort, he said that "normalizing relations between China and Japan will be impossible so long as a man who thinks as Satō does [is in power]."

Describing the scene, Minobe recalled that

Zhou hated Satō, he really hated him. So, I suspect that he took [the letter's] words as being made in bad faith . . . the feeling I got was that there was absolutely no way it could be done if Satō was in power. My impression was that there would be no success under Satō.¹⁷

Memories of Satō's attempt to protect the Taiwanese seat at the United Nations were still fresh in Zhou's mind and he had decided that Sino-Japanese normalization would not be possible without a change of government in Japan.

The Hashimoto Report

Focusing on the post-Satō political situation, both Tanaka and Ōhira began to openly argue for normalizing relations with China. Let us examine Tanaka's actions first.

Unlike Ōhira and his wide foreign policy experience, Tanaka was essentially an amateur. Aware of his unfamiliarity with the topic, he had begun holding study sessions on China in the summer of 1971. These took the form of lectures by China Division Director Hashimoto.

Hashimoto was first assigned to the China Division in 1966 and became its acting director in January 1968 (he assumed this role permanently in April of that year). This meant that he had been in the position of division director for an unusually long time. He visited Tanaka's home in Mejiro numerous times to

give him advice on China. Hashimoto described his relationship with Tanaka thusly:

When we first met, Kaku was LDP secretary-general. *Tokyo Times* reporter Hayasaka [Shigezō] and Fumoto [Kuniaki] (who he had poached from Kyodo News to serve as his secretary) approached me to give their boss briefings on the China issue. Kaku had decided that the time had come for him to put his thoughts on the issue into order and come to a definite opinion.

As Tanaka was still LDP secretary-general when this first contact was made, it means that he had begun to show interest in China even before the Nixon Shock (as he would become MITI minister in July, ten days before the Nixon Shock). “I met with Kaku numerous times afterwards, mainly to talk about China.”

Observing Tanaka at a meeting of the LDP General Council, Hashimoto immediately understood that he was no ordinary politician:

I was called to the LDP General Council to speak on the China issue and rushed over. There were a large number of people in attendance, maybe thirty or forty . . . this was in the largest meeting room at the party’s headquarters. When a busy looking Kaku – that is, Secretary-General Tanaka – entered, the effect on the room was immediate. It was like a cold gust of wind had blown over a group basking in the lazy spring sun. As soon as he entered, the atmosphere in the room became tense. I realized he was something extraordinary.

Hashimoto submitted a report (the “Hashimoto Report”) to Tanaka in January 1972, a month before Nixon visited China. The report analyzed the contemporary international situation and argued for normalizing relations with China:

I began my argument by explaining why the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan was necessary. I put forward a broad outline of what would happen if we normalized relations with China. America had spent more than twenty years, the entire postwar period, constantly telling Japan not to turn to Beijing. To remain focused on Taipei. But despite that, it had sent Kissinger and now Nixon to visit China. So, they wouldn’t be in a position to complain [if we normalized relations with China]. And, just as I had expected, they didn’t. I wrote in the report that there was no need to worry about our relations with America.

Also, taking into account what the likely responses from the Soviet Union and the rest of Asia would be, Hashimoto told Tanaka that “generally speaking, the negatives that would result from normalization are not significant enough to worry about.” But what about Japan’s relations with Taiwan?

With regards to Taiwan, I thought we should show them the utmost sincerity until the absolutely last moment. But normalizing relations with China meant

immediately severing relations with Taiwan. We would need to show them the greatest courtesy and our best manners as we explained Japan's reasons. I believe that both Tanaka and Ōhira shared my thoughts on this.

Hashimoto gave Tanaka three copies of his report. Tanaka agreed with it and gave one of these copies to Aichi Kiichi, another member of the Satō faction. He had Hayasaka hold on to the last copy. According to Hashimoto, Tanaka gave a copy to Aichi because, anticipating becoming prime minister, he wanted Aichi to serve as an “advisor on diplomatic issues.”¹⁸ Aichi had served as Satō's previous foreign minister and overseen the distinguished accomplishment of the return of Okinawa.

There is no question that the Hashimoto Report influenced Tanaka's views. He had decided to run for party president (and thus prime minister) and wanted to eliminate any unease he felt on diplomatic issues by having Aichi and Hashimoto as advisors (Aichi would ultimately join the second Tanaka government as finance minister).

“Guilty Conscience”

Ōhira also sought out Hashimoto's opinion on normalization. Hashimoto recalls:

By the end of the Satō government, Ōhira had become somewhat estranged from Satō. That might not be the best way to put it, but he wasn't given a position in the cabinet even though he was the head of the Kōchikai. That meant that he had a lot of free time on his hands. And so he would frequently give me a call.

This is because he was spending a lot of time thinking about the China issue at the time. Sino-Japanese normalization. I told him that I was willing to go talk to him about it whenever he wanted. But while I did meet and explain things to him in person once or twice, it was mostly done over the phone.

Thus, Tanaka and Ōhira were both considering the idea of establishing diplomatic relations with China at this point and consulting with Hashimoto. Did he perceive any differences between the two men in this area?

How did Tanaka and Ōhira differ? As Japanese of their generation, both Kaku and Ōhira had a “guilty conscience” about all the terrible things that had been inflicted upon the Chinese people. But I felt that this sense of guilt was most intense with Ōhira.¹⁹

It seems likely that most Japanese of that time felt some guilt about the incalculable damage caused by the Second Sino-Japanese War, but Hashimoto felt that Ōhira's was remarkably strong.

Three-party talks and the China issue

Chairman Fujiyama of the Diet Members' League for the Promotion of the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China made his fourth visit

to China on March 22, 1972. He visited Tanaka just before his departure and was told, “Once I’m [prime minister], I’ll go [to China] immediately. When Fujiyama met with Zhou Enlai in Beijing, he was clearly told that the Chinese would “no longer tolerate anything like the ‘duck-paddling’ approach adopted by Satō.”²⁰

What was Tanaka’s perception of China? At the March 23 meeting of the House of Representatives’ Budget Committee, he was asked by Kawasaki Hideji (a pro-China member of the LDP) about having a “sense of atonement with regards to diplomatic relations between China and Japan.” He answered as follows:

I served as a private on the Manchurian-Soviet border for a year and a half, from 1939 to 1940. Although I feel a faint sense of happiness in the bottom of my heart that I never personally hurt or killed anyone during that period, I will never fail to state that we caused great *meiwaku* [trouble] to the Chinese mainland. I have expressed that sentiment both in public and in official documents. That we caused them *meiwaku* is a fact. The most important thing about normalizing relations with China is that the feeling that “We caused you great *meiwaku* and we sincerely apologize for it” is an absolute prerequisite [for approaching them]. I do not believe that my feelings on this point will change now or in the future.²¹

As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, Tanaka would later invite the anger of Zhou Enlai and others when he said that “our nation caused tremendous *meiwaku* to the Chinese people” during a speech in Beijing, as they regarded his use of the term “*meiwaku*” as showing insufficient remorse. But as shown here, for Tanaka, the word was an expression of sincere apology.

In any case, why is it that Tanaka, with his lack of foreign policy experience and devotion to domestic politics, come out in favor of normalizing relations with China? Ōhira’s confidante Morita explained:

It wasn’t so much a matter of Kaku being interested in the issue of relations with China as it was that he felt that he needed to win over Miki [Takeo] if he was wanted to win the presidential election. This is because he had judged that if he could get Miki on his side, then Nakasone would come along with him.

Tanaka’s focus was on the LDP presidential election, and he saw Sino-Japanese normalization as a potential way to gain power. According to Morita, Tanaka had secretly held talks with Ōhira and Miki in the spring of 1972 with the goal of winning over Miki, who was passionate about normalizing relations with China. Morita had accompanied Ōhira to the meetings.²²

Miki met with Zhou in Beijing on April 21 and told him, “I am determined to make every possible effort to bring about the restoration of diplomatic relations” with China.²³ He also met with other figures involved in the effort, such as Wang Guoquan, deputy chairman of the Sino-Japanese Friendship

Association. He made his views clear at a press conference upon his return to Japan:

I have long said that we should hold discussions on the basis of [China's three principles for the restoration of relations]. My meeting with Premier Zhou was merely an extension of that position.²⁴

By taking the acceptance of China's three principles as a given, Miki was idly throwing away diplomatic leverage to no benefit. Given the other factors in play, such as the legality of the Treaty of Taipei, Japan's relations with the United States, and the US–Japan security framework, Miki's statement has to be regarded as having been ill-considered for someone who hoped to become prime minister.

Both Tanaka and Ōhira intended to have Tanaka become prime minister and Ōhira foreign minister when Tanaka won the presidential election. As the older of the two men, Ōhira was proud enough to believe that he should have become prime minister first, but he had no choice but to acknowledge that Tanaka's lead was due to his accomplishments as a politician.²⁵

Nakasone Yasuhiro's memories

With the race for LDP president solidifying around Tanaka, Fukuda, Ōhira, and Miki, Nakasone reconsidered running:

At the time when the Tanaka government was going to be formed, Ōhira, Miki, and I got together and talked about making Tanaka the next prime minister. We made it conditional on him agreeing to work with China. That's what the three of us agreed upon. He didn't want to do it. But we were making him the next party president, so he really didn't have any choice but to swallow it. Then when he became prime minister in July, he was taking his sweet time on it. At first. Around August, I told him, "Get it done. Get it done now."²⁶

In other words, Nakasone's recollection is that he forced Tanaka to agree to take firm action on normalizing relations with China as a condition for withdrawing his candidacy.

Tanaka, Ōhira, and Miki held another meeting on July 2 in which they reached an "agreement on policy" for the new government. The section of this agreement dealing with China read: "National opinion is now in favor of normalizing diplomatic relations with China. We will carry out negotiations with the aim of concluding a peace treaty with the People's Republic of China."

The level of enthusiasm for normalization varied between the three men. Miki was already prepared to accept China's three principles, while Tanaka and Ōhira were more cautious. But they were all willing to compromise for the sake of solidifying the alliance against Fukuda.

Nakasone later joined the agreement, and in the final round of voting, the Tanaka, Ōhira, Miki, and Nakasone factions all voted in unison for Tanaka. The presidential election had effectively been a contest between Tanaka and Fukuda,²⁷ and the agreement on policy laid down a path to a Tanaka government.

The other candidate, Fukuda, did not take a firm stance on China policy. His faction (which was derived from the former Kishi faction) included many pro-Taiwan members, and he himself felt that “it is difficult to express the great kindness that President Chiang showed our nation following the war, such as the generous attitude with which he approached the compensation issue.”

As foreign minister, Fukuda had participated in the Satō government’s behind-the-scenes attempts to make contact with China (as referenced in the aforementioned “duck-paddling” quote). But he had “never dreamed that Tanaka would visit Beijing a mere two months after forming a government.”²⁸ The two candidates’ decisions on Sino-Japanese normalization would determine the results of the July 5 LDP presidential election.

Notes

- 1 Murata Ryōhei, *Murata Ryōhei Kaisōroku – Tatakai ni Yabureshi Kuni ni Tsukaete*, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2008), 219–220. On Sino-American rapprochement, see: Masuda Hiroshi, *Nikuson Hōchū to Reisen Kōzō no Henyō – Beichū Sekkin no Shōgeki to Shūhen Shokoku* (Tokyo: Keiō University, 2006); Kan Hideki, “Beichū Wakai to Nichibei Kankei – Nikuson Seiken no Higashi Ajia Chitsujo Saihen Inishiatibu,” in Kan Hideki, ed., *Reisenshi no Saikentō – Henyō suru Chitsujo to Reisen no Shūen* (Tokyo: Hōsei University, 2010), 301–332; Sahashi Ryō, “Beichū Wakai Purosesu no Kaishi to Taiwan Mondai – Amerika ni yoru Shinraisei to Antei no Kinko no Tsuiskyū,” *Nihon Taiwan Gakkaihō* 12 (2010), 173–197.
- 2 Telegram from Ambassador to the United States Ushiba Nobuhiko to Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo, July 15, 1971, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2-1234-1, MOFA. See also: GRIPS Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, *Matano Kagechika (Moto Suwēden Taishi) Ōraru Hisutōri* (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), 219–221; Oshii Isamu, “Nikuson no ‘Chaina Inishiatibu,’” *Ikkyō Hōgaku* 8:3 (2009), 53–87.
- 3 Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki*, Vol. 4, 377.
- 4 Murata, *Murata Ryōhei Kaisōroku*, Vol. 1, 220.
- 5 Ushiba Nobuhiko, *Ushiba Nobuhiko Keizai Gaikō e no Shōgen* (Tokyo: Diamond, 1984), 77. See also: Armin H. Meyer, *Tōkyō Kaisō*, trans., Asao Michiko (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1976), 100–101.
- 6 Interview with Konaga, June 11, 2010.
- 7 Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku Kankōkai, ed., *Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku – Shiryōhen* (Tokyo: Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku Kankōkai, 1982), 206–212. See also: Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku Kankōkai, ed., *Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku – Denki-hen* (Tokyo: Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku Kankōkai, 1982), 310–313; Morita, *Kokoro no Itō*, 92–95.
- 8 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 2, 1971); Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku Kankōkai, *Denki-hen*, 313.
- 9 Yanagida Kunio, *Nihon wa Moete Iru ka* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1983), 260, 273. Tōgō Fumihiko, *Nichibei Gaikō 30 Nen* (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1989), 192.
- 10 Interview with Hashimoto Hiroshi, November 1, 2008.

- 11 Interview with Watanabe Kōji, April 18, 2009.
- 12 Fukuda Takeo, *Kaiko 90 Nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 205.
- 13 Hori Shigeru, *Sengo Seiji no Oboegaki* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1975), 128–129.
- 14 On the process behind the Hori Letter, see: Nakajima Mineo, “‘Hori Shokan’ no Omoide,” in Hori Shigeru-Den Kankō Inkai, ed., *Tsuisō Hori Shigeru* (Tokyo: Hori Shigeru-Den Kankō Inkai, 1985), 347–348; Nakajima Mineo, “*Nicchū Yūkō*” to *iu Gensō* (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2002), 83–99.
- 15 Interview with Noda Takeshi, September 28, 2010. See also: Hori, *Sengo Seiji*, 129.
- 16 Kishimoto Kōichi, *Issei no Michi – Hori Shigeru to Sengo Seiji* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1981), 143–147.
- 17 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 76–78.
- 18 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008. See also: Hayasaka Shigezō, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1987), 363; N.H.K. Shuzaihan, *Shū Onrai no Ketsudan – Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka wa Kōshite Jitsugen shita* (Tokyo: NHK, 1993), 66–68; Yabuki Susumu, *Gekikara Shohyō de Shiru – Chūgoku no Seiji/Keizai no Kyojitsu* (Tokyo: Nikkei BP, 2007), 134.
- 19 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008.
- 20 Fujiyama Aiichirō, *Seiji, Waga Michi – Fujiyama Aiichirō Kaisōroku* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1976), 211–215. See also: Hayasaka, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei*, 364.
- 21 Minutes of the 68th Diet – House of Representatives’ Budget Committee Fourth Subcommittee, No. 4 (March 23, 1972), 10. See also: Hayasaka, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei*, 362.
- 22 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 98–102.
- 23 “Miki Takeo/Shū Onrai Kaidan Kiroku” [Record of Conversation Between Miki Takeo and Zhou Enlai], April 21, 1972, *Miki Takeo Kankei Shiryō* 5363–14, Center for the History of Meiji University. See also: Kuno Yasushi, “Kakuei/Shū Onrai Kaidan – Saigo no Shōgen,” *Bungei Shunjū* (February 2007), 359; Muramatsu Genta, “Miki Takeo no Seijiteki Hatsuwa to Sono Suikō Katei,” *Daigakushi Kiyō* 14 (2010), 138–146.
- 24 See also: “Chūgoku Kankei” [Related to China], *Miki Takeo Kankei Shiryō* 4513; “Hōchū Kankei” [Related to Visiting China], April 24, 1972, *Miki Takeo Kankei Shiryō* 6540; “Memochō/Hōchū no Inshō” [Notebook/Impressions from Visiting China], *Miki Takeo Kankei Shiryō* 7810–7813; *Asahi Shimbun* (April 25, 1972).
- 25 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 101.
- 26 Interview with Nakasone, August 6, 2009. See also: Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Jiseiroku – Rekishi Hōtei no Hikoku to shite* (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2004), 99; Nakasone, *Sengo Nihon Gaikō*.
- 27 *Yomiuri Shimbun* (July 3, 1972). See also: Hayasaka, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei*, 366; Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 112.
- 28 Fukuda, *Kaiko 90 Nen*, 177–178, 205–206. See also: Tamura et al., *Nikka Dankō*, 122.

3 Formation of the Tanaka government and the Takeiri Memo – first approaches to China

Tanaka's victory

A party congress was held at Hibiya Public Hall on July 5, 1972, to determine the next president of the LDP. Tanaka, Ōhira, Fukuda, and the other candidates were all in attendance.

Tanaka took the lead in the first round of voting with 156 votes, followed by Fukuda with 150, Ōhira with 101, and Miki with 69. In the final round of voting, which came down to Tanaka and Fukuda, Tanaka won an overwhelming victory with 282 votes to Fukuda's 190 as a result of the Ōhira and Miki factions throwing their support behind him.

As the hall filled with cheers, Tanaka stood at the podium and spoke to the assembled members of the party:

I am painfully aware of the grave responsibility that comes with having just now been elected to this position at your recommendation. The situation now facing us at home and abroad is serious. . . . I pledge to make every possible effort [in addressing them] with the unity of the entire party [behind me].

Fukuda glared at Tanaka as he spoke, a pale expression on his face. Ōhira wore a faint smile. As the party's new president shouted, "Long live the Liberal Democratic Party!" tears flowed down his cheeks like rain.¹

What had been the determining factor between Tanaka and Fukuda? According to Democratic Socialists Party Chairman Kasuga Ikkō, "the cause of Fukuda's defeat was, unsurprisingly, the issue of China."² That is, bound by his ties to Kishi Nobusuke and others, Fukuda had not been able to approach China policy with a free hand, and this had affected his electoral chances.

Fukuda possessed the steadiness of a former bureaucrat and had experience as foreign minister. He was clearly an outstanding candidate for the presidency. But Tanaka was more decisive. And the Chinese viewed Tanaka as a more appropriate partner for establishing diplomatic relations with than Fukuda, who had been foreign minister in a government that they had detested.

When Tanaka was asked "How will you proceed on Sino-Japanese normalization?" at a press conference at LDP headquarters following his victory, he stated clearly that "the time is ripe for normalization."³

After attending a party at the prime minister's residence, Tanaka walked to his office in nearby Hiranumachō. According to his secretary Satō Akiko, his "face had already become that of a prime minister. It had a dignified tension that hadn't been there before, and he seemed more difficult to approach." Praised as the "modern Hideyoshi" in the press for his humble origins, he coyly remarked that "I prefer Nobunaga to Hideyoshi" in reference to the more ruthless of the three unifiers of Japan.⁴

"While They're Still Alive"

The Tanaka government finally came into being on July 7. Ōhira became foreign minister despite being "pressured [by some in his faction] to demand the position of LDP secretary-general or finance minister."⁵ It had been eight years since he had last held the position. Also, Tanaka named his close confidante Nikaidō Susumu to the powerful position of chief cabinet secretary.

Following his first cabinet meeting, Tanaka released an informal statement in which he stated that "Moving to foreign policy, I will work to hasten the normalization of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and forcefully promote the diplomacy of peace within the everchanging international situation."⁶ Tanaka's stance was widely reported in China in *Reference News*, an internal publication aimed at members of the Chinese Communist Party.⁷

Moreover, Tanaka spoke about China in the following way:

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai built the China of today. Being communists, they suffered to get to where they are today and came face to face with death numerous times. Despite having absolutely nothing, they managed to unify that massive country. They understand well what is now needed to run it. And they enjoy the support of its people as well. We need to resolve things while they're still alive.⁸

He would thus attempt to achieve normalization while Mao and Zhou were "still alive." Prime Minister's Secretary Kiuchi Akitane wrote the following on Tanaka's plans for foreign policy:

Prime Minister's Tanaka's diplomatic strategy was to first consolidate relations with America. That having been accomplished, he could then turn to carrying out the great task of Sino-Japanese normalization. He also intended to solidify Japan's friendship with the leaders of Western Europe – France, Britain, and West Germany – before taking on the extremely difficult task of working to improve relations with the Soviet Union.⁹

What was the relationship between Tanaka and Ōhira like now that they were prime minister and foreign minister? A former diplomat who had served them as an interpreter said the following on condition of anonymity:

Tanaka and Ōhira weren't like a boss and his follower. They were like brothers, and it wasn't necessarily clear which one was the older and which one

was the younger. From the outside, it would seem to most people that Tanaka, as prime minister, would be the older brother. But in actual practice, it felt like he left the routine work of foreign policy entirely to Ōhira aside from some vital areas. And Ōhira seemed quite relieved by this, taking the position “Good. I’ll do thing my way, then.”¹⁰

While Tanaka was known for his decisiveness, there was no way that he would have been able to achieve Sino-Japanese normalization by himself. The support he received from Ōhira was essential.

Why did Tanaka entrust foreign policy to Ōhira? There was, of course, a calculation typical of the man behind it. Tanaka would have Ōhira focus on foreign policy while he himself worked to solidify his domestic political base. Ōhira’s secretary Itō Masaya noted that “as foreign minister, Ōhira had been discreetly shoved off to one side.”¹¹ Despite being aware of what would happen, Ōhira did not hesitate to take up the position of foreign minister. He now planned his first steps in approaching the Chinese mainland.

Ōhira’s secret instructions

Ōhira summoned China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi to his office on July 7, his first day at the foreign ministry, saying “I would very much like to see Hashimoto.” When he arrived, Ōhira revealed the following to him:

I had a conversation with Kaku last night. We’re going to normalize diplomatic relations [with China]. But we want to proceed with absolute secrecy. No doubt Tanaka and I . . . will have to make a trip to China.

He then lowered his voice and said, “Please make all of the arrangements for the trip to China. But this matter is of the utmost secrecy. Don’t say anything to the vice-minister.” The preparations for Tanaka’s China visit were thus entrusted to Hashimoto.¹²

From then on, Hashimoto would diligently visit the minister’s office and personally discuss things with Ōhira, sidelining his superior Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō (a member of the ministry’s China School). This was not a normal course of affairs under the conventional wisdom of the bureaucracy, and Yoshida was likely not pleased at being excluded. But Ōhira trusted Hashimoto and Hashimoto liked acting on his own (a trait uncommon for a government official).¹³

There were limits to what Hashimoto could accomplish by himself, however, and several days later he admitted defeat: “Minister, you told me to personally make the preparations and not talk to anyone else about this, but it’s impossible for me to do it alone.” Ōhira nodded and answered, “You’re right. I can understand that. I’ll speak to Vice-Minister Hōgen.”¹⁴

Administrative Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Hōgen Shinsaku was a holdover from the Satō government and belonged to the anti-communist pro-Taiwan faction within the ministry. But Ōhira managed to convince him to help and brought about a sharp change in foreign ministry policy as a result. Under Hōgen,

the ministry now shifted to advocating a policy of having the United States and Japan isolate the Soviet Union by improving relations with China and thereby drive a wedge into the Sino-Soviet alliance.¹⁵ When asked by a reporter about the change in ministry policy, Hōgen chuckled bitterly and noted that “a wise man adapts to changing circumstances.”¹⁶

The Ōhira–Hashimoto group also included Treaties Bureau Director Takashima Masuo and Treaties Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu, both of whom were close to Hashimoto. While Hashimoto had gone over his bureau director’s head to work with Ōhira, however, Kuriyama operated under instructions from Takashima. He was a reserved man but would go on to bear the heavy responsibility of creating the Japanese proposal for the Sino-Japanese joint statement.

The first moves toward Sino-Japanese normalization were thus carried out by Ōhira in secret. Working under his direction, Hashimoto, Takashima, and Kuriyama would become the force driving forward normalization behind the scenes. While extremely small, this policy group would create the path that normalization would follow. And, while not part of this group, Hōgen had also come to view establishing diplomatic relations with China as the trend of the times.

Hashimoto explained Ōhira’s rationale for emphasizing secrecy this way:

At that time, the LDP was on the brink of breaking out into outright violence over the question of whether to establish relations with China or not. People were throwing ashtrays and knocking over desks and chairs. It really was on the brink. That’s how intense things had gotten. The party was split into pro-Beijing and pro-Taiwan factions, just like the [foreign] ministry was. Though, in the case of the ministry, I was the only one to openly say that we needed to normalize relations with China as quickly as possible.¹⁷

After discussing everything in detail with Takashima and Hashimoto, Ōhira took the group to Sakaeya, a restaurant in Shinbashi. Operated by a woman from Hiroshima, it had been a favorite of the Kōchikai since the days of Ikeda Hayato.¹⁸

As he did not drink alcohol himself, however, the visit to the restaurant was intended to show Ōhira’s appreciation for the work being done by the bureaucrats and to provide an opportunity for gathering information from others there like Diet Member Furui Yoshimi, one of the LDP’s China experts. All secrets were safe at Sakaeya.¹⁹

Ōhira called Hashimoto to his office the following day to put the finishing touches on their plans. The following days were extremely busy.²⁰ Hashimoto established a “China Visit Preparation Office” within the ministry and put his subordinates to work getting ready for the visit.²¹ He would also lead the advance party of ministry officials that visited China on August 31.²²

It was not unusual for division directors to play the central role in the foreign ministry’s policymaking process. Even so, the work done by Hashimoto and Kuriyama was exceptional and there can be no doubt that the combination of the two men put Ōhira’s mind at ease. Hashimoto in particular was such an influential player in this process as to be able to directly make calls to Tanaka.

If one were to name the foreign ministry official who was most important to bringing about Sino-Japanese normalization, it would not be the vice-minister or some bureau director. It would clearly have to be Hashimoto.

The Sasaki–Zhou meeting

Upon assuming office, Tanaka received a congratulatory telegram from Taiwanese Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (the son of Chiang Kai-shek). He replied on July 11, writing that he was

deeply grateful for having received your kind congratulations on my assumption of the post of prime minister so quickly. You have my most sincere thanks, and I would also like to take this opportunity to wish for Your Excellency's continued good health.²³

But when Ōhira met with Taiwanese ambassador Peng Meng-chi on July 25, he “declared his firm resolve” to normalize relations with China and end diplomatic relations with Taiwan.²⁴ In Ōhira's words:

The international situation has changed greatly. The number of countries recognizing the Beijing government is gradually increasing and, while our nation worked with the United States to the very end to defend your right of representation at the United Nations, we saw how that question came to a conclusion last year. And, as you are aware, domestic public opinion polls show that a significant majority of our citizens has come to favor the position that we should transcend ideology and normalize relations [with Beijing] . . .

In light of these domestic and international conditions, the government has been placed in a position where it must turn to normalization. . . . If such a path is found, I believe that the natural result will be that – and this is truly regrettable – diplomatic relations will be unable to continue with your nation as they currently are . . . Japan is a free country, however, and even if diplomatic relations come to an end, we intend to work hard to ensure that economic, technological, cultural, and other relations are able to continue as they always have.

Peng, a former chief of the Taiwanese general staff, countered that “while Japan has a history of treating the Republic of China poorly, there is no corresponding history of us doing the same to Japan.” This did not cause Ōhira's resolve to waver, however. As this meeting preceded Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu's visit to China (which will be discussed in the following section of this chapter), it shows that Ōhira was going farther on normalization at this point than Tanaka was.²⁵

When states do not share diplomatic relations, it provides ground for unofficial actors to play an active role as go-betweens. And in the case of Japan and China, the opposition parties of the Socialist Party and the Kōmeitō also sought to open

the door to China. Sasaki Kōzō, a former chairman of the Socialist Party, visited China on July 12 and met with Zhou Enlai four days later.²⁶

Zhou told Sasaki that they “would welcome a visit by Prime Minister Tanaka to Beijing.” Sasaki, whose view of Tanaka was not entirely positive, warned Zhou that “Tanaka Kakuei is one of Satō’s followers” and noted that “the Socialist Party criticizes and attacks the Tanaka government. It is a government that we must eventually bring down.”

After returning to Japan, Sasaki shared information about the meeting with Tanaka, although he told him only “about sixty percent of what was said” (although he also said that “the only thing I did not initially speak very clearly to Prime Minister Tanaka about was the compensation issue”). There was no way that the Tanaka government could act on the basis of such uncertain information.²⁷

Tanaka and Ōhira wanted to obtain a definite promise in advance from China that it would be renouncing its right to compensation. This was because (as touched upon in this book’s introduction) Taiwan had already made such a renunciation when signing the Treaty of Taipei. Chinese acceptance of the US–Japan security framework was another Japanese precondition for normalization. Japanese foreign policy was based around the United States, and this was not something that the act of establishing relations with China could be allowed to undermine.

Yasukawa Takeshi (a future ambassador to the United States) later wrote the following:

I felt slightly uneasy about the effect that Sino-Japanese normalization would have on Japanese relations with the United States. More specifically, I was concerned about the inclusion of Taiwan under Article 6 of the US–Japan security treaty (the so-called “Far East clause”). The joint statement released following the Satō–Nixon talks on returning Okinawa had included a sentence noting that Taiwan’s security was important to the security of Japan.²⁸

As made explicit by the Satō–Nixon joint statement, the US–Japan security framework incorporated Taiwan. If China attempted to oppose this, it would make achieving normalization difficult.

The Takeiri–Zhou meeting

Tanaka and Ōhira’s uneasiness on this point would be soothed by Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri’s visit to China on July 25, however. The Kōmeitō had long been an advocate of Sino-Japanese normalization and Takeiri had already met with Zhou in Beijing a year earlier.²⁹ When Takeiri visited the “Mejiro Palace” (Tanaka’s home) before departing for China, he found Tanaka wary about acting:

Takeiri, I haven’t had time to think about the China issue and I’m not interested in acting on it right now. The pro-Taiwan faction is powerful, and they’ll have my head if I start meddling with it. I’ve only just formed my government. No way.

Tanaka had retreated on the issue since becoming prime minister. His original interest in Sino-Japanese normalization had been as a means of securing the premiership. Now that he *was* prime minister, he was, frankly, unsure of what to do and hesitating.

When Takeiri said, “In that case, perhaps you could write something saying that I’m a good friend of yours?” Tanaka brusquely refused.³⁰

Takeiri met with Zhou Enlai for three days in Beijing starting on the 27th. Surprisingly, Zhou started their talks by telling Takeiri that he would not go against either the US–Japan Security Treaty or the 1969 Satō–Nixon joint statement. He was thus willing to accept the US–Japan security framework without the Japanese having to even make a request to that effect.

He then brought up “the issue of the treaty with Chiang,” that is, the Treaty of Taipei, and asked Takeiri about Tanaka’s intentions: “Prime Minister Tanaka has repeatedly stated since taking office that he understands the three principles for the restoration of relations that have been laid out by the Chinese government. Does that mean that he respects them?”

As discussed in the Introduction (Table 0.1), these three principles stated that the People’s Republic of China was the sole government of China, that Taiwan was an unalienable part of the territory of China, and that the Treaty of Taipei was illegal and should be discarded.

When Takeiri conveyed the Japanese view that “taking the position that the Treaty of Taipei has always been illegitimate and illegal would cause chaos in Japan,” Zhou demurred on the issue and said that he would “report to Chairman Mao on this matter. We will examine the question within the party.”

Zhou then made another concession to Japan by telling Takeiri that “Chairman Mao says that we will renounce our rights to compensation as seeking compensation would only place a burden on the Japanese people.”

According to Takeiri,

I had been convinced that we would have to pay about fifty billion dollars [in compensation], so this response was entirely unexpected. My body shook.

Premier Zhou’s words came as a bolt of lightning. He had read the minds of the Japanese. He could see that even if we had wanted to pay, for the Chinese to bring up the issue of compensation would make it impossible for the LDP to form a consensus.

Zhou made the following statement on the next day:

There is no need for us to touch upon the Senkaku Islands issue. I don’t imagine that you have any interest in those islands. I didn’t either, but there’s the question of oil and some historians have made them an issue. And Inoue Kiyoshi in Japan is passionate about the topic. But there is no need to regard them as an important issue.

The Inoue Kiyoshi to whom Zhou referred was a professor at Kyoto University who had released a paper earlier that year favorable to China’s territorial claims to the islands.

Zhou brought up the Northern Territories on the 29th while showing Takeiri a draft for the Sino-Japanese joint statement. “Japan gave up Taiwan and the Pescadores. We support the four islands to the north of Japan being returned to it.” These were islands that had been occupied by the Soviet Union in the closing days of the Second World War over which Japan continued to claim sovereignty.

The Chinese proposal for the joint statement consisted of eight articles. These included language on the ending of the state of war between China and Japan (“the state of war is terminated on the date on which this statement is issued”), China’s three principles (“the Government of Japan expresses its full understanding of the three principles for the restoration of relations put forward by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and recognizes that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”), international relations (“each [country] is opposed to efforts to establish hegemony”), and compensation (“the Government of the People’s Republic of China renounces its right to seek war reparations from Japan”).

The anti-hegemony clause was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union.

The most significant remaining issue needing to be addressed was that of Taiwan. Zhou proposed the language “Taiwan is the territory of the People’s Republic of China and the liberation of Taiwan is an internal Chinese matter” and said that he wanted to reach a “tacit understanding” on this point. He was thus sounding out the possibility of a secret agreement with Japan recognizing the liberation of Taiwan as an internal matter.

Zhou had already accepted the US–Japan security framework, renounced reparations, and decided not to touch on the Senkaku Islands issue. Taiwan was the only area on which he was not willing to make concessions. It seems likely that as Zhou made this peace proposal, he was actually conveying a decision that had been made by Mao Zedong. That China was willing to show this draft proposal to Takeiri, who was, after all, merely the chairman of an opposition political party, shows how aggressively it was pursuing normalization and how quickly it wished to proceed.³¹

“You *are* Japanese, right?”

Making a copy of the eight articles of the Chinese proposal for the joint statement (and the proposed “tacit understanding” clause), Takeiri returned to Japan. He reported to Tanaka about his trip at the prime minister’s office on August 4.

After rushing to the office, Ōhira’s face quickly broke into a smile as he looked over Takeiri’s memo. Placing the memo into the inside pocket of his suit, he brought it to the foreign ministry.³² Giving it to Morita Hajime, his secretary at the ministry, he told him that it was “to be treated as a top-secret item and its use restricted to the foreign minister.”³³

Analyzing the Takeiri Memo, Ōhira accurately grasped Zhou’s intentions. According to Morita, “We had repeatedly examined the issue, but Ōhira had been uncertain of what attitude the Chinese would take. The ‘Takeiri Memo’ was thus invaluable to us.”

The Chinese renunciation of reparations was particularly important.

I believe that, had the Chinese demanded reparations, it would have been a major problem, severe enough that we would have had no choice but to abandon normalization. The most important [facet] of the Takeiri Memo was that it gave us confirmation of the Chinese position on reparations.

Ōhira had heard much along the same lines from Furui Yoshimi, a leading pro-China Diet member who had visited China in May. Still, he took courage from the Takeiri Memo. All that remained now was for the prime minister to make the decision to act and for a Japanese proposal for the joint statement to be drawn up. He pressed Tanaka to make the call, saying “Let’s just go for it.” Despite Tanaka’s popular reputation for being decisive, in this case he needed a push from the plain but dependable Ōhira.³⁴ Tanaka had been wavering on the topic prior to Takeiri’s visit, but Ōhira had been steady. And now he set Tanaka’s sights on Beijing.

Tanaka called Takeiri to Hotel New Otani on August 5. Takeiri handed him a detailed record of his conversations in Beijing.

“Okay, I’ve read it. The back and forth here is correct, right?”

“Every word is correct. It was closely checked by the Chinese.”

“There’s no mistakes, right? You *are* Japanese, right?”

“What are you talking about? I’m a true-blooded Japanese.”

“Alright, I’ll go to China.”³⁵

Now that Tanaka had made the decision to visit China, Ōhira began the work of ironing out a draft for the joint statement.

According to Tanaka’s secretary Kiuchi, when Tanaka gave the order to Ōhira to proceed, he told him, “I’ll take all of the political responsibility, so Ōhira, you and the officials do a good job negotiating.” Tanaka had found his determination and was unwavering.³⁶

Ōhira’s actions were partially responsible for Tanaka’s newfound determination. He had already created the Council for Measures on the China Issue with the ministry leadership (the vice-minister and bureau directors) on August 2. The problem of normalization had thus been elevated to the status of involving the entire ministry, and its personnel were hard at work assessing what its effects would be on areas such as US–Japan, Japan–Soviet, and Japan–Taiwan relations. The council held further meetings on August 4, 9, 12, and 16.³⁷

Kotani Hidejirō, a professor at Kyoto Sangyo University, supplied the Taiwanese with the main points of the Takeiri Memo by mid-August.³⁸ There can be no question that its contents must have rocked the Taiwanese government.

China’s renunciation of reparations

When did China make the decision to give up its right to reparations? It is worth looking back and considering this question.

On August 16, 1955, the Chinese foreign ministry released a statement in which it asserted its right to demand compensation as Japan had “slaughtered more than ten million Chinese and caused tens of billions of dollars of damage to public and private property.”³⁹ But when Takasaki Tatsunosuke, a member of the House of Councilors, and JAL President Okazaki Kaheita visited China in October and November 1962 as part of a Japanese delegation seeking to reach a trade agreement, the Chinese indicated that they intended to renounce reparations.

On November 8, Zhao Anbo, secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Department, told them that:

While China certainly has the right to demand reparations, it does not intend to strongly assert that right, even when it comes time to restore diplomatic relations with Japan. Why not? Because doing so would give rise to fascism in Japan. This is made clear from the example of Germany following the First World War.⁴⁰

Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, and Wang Xiaoyun – known as the “triumvirate of businessmen with Japanese expertise”⁴¹ – were in attendance as part of the Chinese delegation at these talks. The next day, Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki exchanged the Memorandum on Sino-Japanese Trade, known as the “LT Trade Agreement” after the initials of the two men.⁴²

For his part, Zhao had studied at the First Higher School in Tokyo before the war and made contact with Sasaki Kōzō, chairman of the Leftist Socialist Party, during a visit to Japan in January 1964.⁴³

And when LDP Diet Member Utsunomiya Tokuma visited China on May 31, 1965, Zhao (now director of the Central Foreign Affairs Department) indicated that China would not demand reparations as “it would be illogical to do so as a generation who bears no responsibility for the war would also have to pay.”⁴⁴ Utsunomiya passed this comment on to Hashimoto, who commented on this in an interview:

Utsunomiya told me about Zhao Anbo’s renunciation of reparations and his other comments. . . . I was extremely close to him so he would tell me everything. I had a number of sources, so I thought I had a pretty good grasp on what China was thinking.

Despite this confidence, Hashimoto considered the confirmation provided by the Takeiri Memo as having “played an extremely important role.”⁴⁵

The unpaid reparations

How should Japan’s ultimate failure to pay reparations to China be assessed? It was, after all, the country that suffered the most damage at the hands of the Japanese.

The excellent scholar of international relations Kōsaka Masataka made a conscientious argument on this point in 1964, saying “Should not Japan pay greater reparations to China than to any other country, whatever name they take? Doing so would have Japan’s responsibility for the war take a concrete form.”⁴⁶

I also believe that reparations on the grandest scale should have been paid to China. But that is something which I believe on an emotional level, and things work differently when it comes to actual foreign policy. Hashimoto commented on this:

Paying reparations does not mean that Japan goes around to other countries saying, “We lost the war. We will pay you this much.” That is not the nature of reparations, not at all. Reparations are something demanded of the defeated by the victor. That is the position from which negotiations over reparations begin.⁴⁷

It would have been the presentation of demands by China, the victor, that would have enabled Japan, the defeated, to begin exploring the payment of reparations. Japan may have instigated the war with China but, as the defeated party, it was not its place to raise the issue.

Japan’s position was that the issue of reparations had already been resolved by the Treaty of Taipei. It thus naturally considered that treaty to be both legal and in force. There is no evidence showing that the foreign ministry considered the idea of paying reparations to China. It had judged on the basis of the Takeiri Memo that China would renounce its right to compensation. Had China unexpectedly sought reparations anyway, it would likely have meant the collapse of the negotiations.

It is an admittedly unrealistic hypothesis, but what if Japan had made the bold decision of offering reparations despite knowing China’s intentions? While this would appear at first glance to be a sign of sincerity, it would likely have caused chaos for the Chinese. They would have undoubtedly been confused by the proposal, given that they had already communicated that they would not be seeking reparations. But failing to accept the offer once it had been made would have made even Mao and Zhou into targets for resentment by the Chinese people.

Accordingly, a Japanese offer could have damaged the reputation that China prizes so highly. For the Japanese, the only option was to gratefully accept the Chinese renunciation.

Notes

1 *Asahi Shimbun* (July 5, 1972).

2 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 103.

3 *Asahi Shimbun* (July 6, 1972). See also: Fujiyama, *Seiji*, 216.

4 Satō Akiko, *Ketteiban Watashi no Tanaka Kakuei Nikki* (Tokyo: Shinchō Bunko, 2001), 16, 13.

5 Diary of Morita Hajime, July 7, 1972.

6 *Asahi Shimbun* (July 8, 1972). See also: Satō Akiko, *Tanaka Kakuei Nikki*, 119.

- 7 *Reference News* (July 7, 1972; July 9, 1972).
- 8 Hata, *Tanaka Gakkō*, 202.
- 9 Kiuchi Akitane, “Tanaka Kakuei-shi no Gaikō Shuwan,” in Tanaka Kakuei Memorial Museum, ed., *Tanaka Kakuei*, 87.
- 10 Interview with a former diplomat, April 1, 2010.
- 11 Itō Masaya, *Jimintō Sengokushi*, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Chikuma Bunko, 2009), 97.
- 12 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008. Letter from Hashimoto to the author, February 26, 2009.
- 13 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 103–105.
- 14 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008. Letter from Hashimoto to the author, February 26, 2009.
- 15 Letter from Hashimoto to the author, February 26, 2009.
- 16 Nakae Yōsuke, “Fū Yaopan ga Sasaeta Nicchū Yūkō,” *Tōa* 422 (2002), 29.
- 17 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008. See also: Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 127.
- 18 Furukawa Shinji, “Kaku-san to Ōhira-san no Sukiyaki,” in Tanaka Kakuei Memorial Museum, ed., *Tanaka Kakuei*, 93; Kimura, *Sōri no Hinkaku*, 22.
- 19 Diary of Morita Hajime, July 25, 1972, July 29, 1972, August 23, 1972.
- 20 Furui, *Nicchū 18 Nen*, 122–128; Furui, *San'in Umare*, 149; Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 104, 110.
- 21 Yoshida Shigenobu, “*Chūgoku e no Nagai Tabi*” *Moto-Gaikōkan no Bibōroku* (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 2010), 56.
- 22 China Division, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Sōri Hōchū Senkentai ni tsuite” (On the Advance Party for the Prime Minister’s Visit to China), undated, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–647. Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 23 “Ribei Neige Zongli Dachen Tianzhong Jiaorong Han Xingzhengyuan Yuanzhang Jiang Jingguo Wei Ganxie Jiurensi Lai Handian He” [Letter from Prime Minister of Japan Tanaka Kakuei to President of the Executive Yuan Chiang Ching-kuo Thanking Him for His Congratulatory Telegram at the Time of his Appointment], Jiang Jingguo Zongtong Wenwu 005000001848A, AH.
- 24 Diary of Morita Hajime, July 25, 1972.
- 25 Ōhira Gaishō Hō Taishi Kaidanroku [Record of Conversation Between Foreign Minister Ōhira and Ambassador Peng], July 25, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–1045.
- 26 China Division, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Sasaki Giin no Daijin ni Tai suru Hōchū Hōkoku” [Report by Diet Member Sasaki to the Minister on His Visit to China], July 24, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–647. CPC Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, ed., *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1997), 536–537. Sasaki had made several earlier visits to China. See: “Mao Zedong Zhuxi Jiejian Zuoquomu Gengsan, Heitian Shounan, Xipo Jianguang Deng Riben Shehui-dang Zhong Zuopai Renshi Tanhua Jilu” [Record of Conversation Between Chairman Mao Zedong and Members of the Leftist Socialist Party of Japan Sasaki Kōzō, Kuroda Hisao, Hososako Kanemitsu, etc.] 105-01897-01, FMA; Guowuyuan Waibian Waishi Jianbao: Riben Zuoquomu Gengsan Zhihan Liao Chengzhi Tichu Sanxiang Yaoqiu [State Council Foreign Affairs Report: Three Requests Made in Letter from Sasaki Kōzō (Japanese) to Liao Chengzhi] 105-01759-28, FMA; “Sasaki Kōzō no Ayumi” Henshū Iinkai/Sōgō Seikei Kenkyūkai/Sasaki Kōzō Rengō Kōenkai, eds., *Taishū Seijika Sasaki Kōzō no Ayumi* (Tokyo: Sōhyō Shiryō Hanpukai, 1980), 465–488; Liu Deyou, *Toki wa Nagarete – Nicchū Kankei Hishi 50 Nen*, trans., Wang Yadan, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2002), 327–331.
- 27 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, ed., *Nicchū Fukkō*, 124, 126, 135. Kashima Heiwa Kenkyūjo, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Shuyō Bunsho/Nenhyō*, Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1985), 64.

- 28 Yasukawa Takeshi, *Wasureenu Omoide to Korekara no Nichibei Gaikō – Pāru Hābā kara Hanseiki* (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugoki, 1991), 192–193.
- 29 Tian Huan, ed., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, 1971–1995* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1997), 20–23.
- 30 *Asahi Shimbun* (August 27, 1997).
- 31 Ishii Akira et al., eds., *Kiroku to Kōshō – Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka/Nicchū Heiwa Yūkō Jōyaku Teiketsu Kōshō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), 11–14, 20, 29, 31–33, 1101–1112; “Zhou Enlai Zongli Jiejian Riben Shehuidang Ren Tanhua – Guanyu Riben ‘Nan Qindao’ Wenti Bufen” [Conversation Between Premier Zhou Enlai and Members of the Japanese Socialist Party – Regarding the “Southern Kuril Islands” Issue] 105-01897-04, FMA.
- 32 Takeiri Yoshikatsu, “Rekishī no Haguruma ga Mawatta – Nagare Kimeta Shū Shushō no Handan – ‘Tokushi Modoki’ de Hisō-na Ketsui no Hashiwatashi,” in Ishii et al., eds., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 205–206. See also: Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 145; Yanagida, *Nihon wa Moete Iru ka*, 278–279.
- 33 Diary of Morita Hajime, August 4, 1972.
- 34 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 106–109. Furui Yoshimi argued that, at the time of the formation of his government,

Prime Minister Tanaka was still a little indecisive, or perhaps lacking in self-confidence. But I believe he was fully aware that normalization had to happen. Foreign Minister Ōhira didn’t say much, but he was already prepared. . . . Prime Minister Tanaka didn’t say that he would himself would go at first; he wanted someone else to do it. Furui, “Seijōka no Hiwa,” 145–146.
- 35 Takeiri, “Rekishī no Haguruma,” 206.
- 36 Interview with Kiuchi, June 19, 2010.
- 37 “Chūgoku Mondai Taishō Kyōgikai Dai Ikkai Kaigi Yōroku” [Digest of First Meeting of the Council for Measures on the China Issue,” August 2, 1972; “Chūgoku Mondai Taishō Kyōgikai Dai Ni Kai Kaigi Yōroku” [Digest of Second Meeting of the Council for Measures on the China Issue,” August 4, 1972; “Chūgoku Mondai Taishō Kyōgikai Dai San Kai Kaigi Yōroku” [Digest of Third Meeting of the Council for Measures on the China Issue,” August 9, 1972; “Chūgoku Mondai Taishō Kyōgikai Dai Yon Kai Kaigi Yōroku” [Digest of Fourth Meeting of the Council for Measures on the China Issue,” August 12, 1972; “Chūgoku Mondai Taishō Kyōgikai Dai Go Kai Kaigi Yōroku” [Digest of Fifth Meeting of the Council for Measures on the China Issue,” August 16, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2010–472. See also: Yanagida, *Nihon wa Moete Iru ka*, 283; Inoue Masaya, “Nicchū Seijōka Kōshō ni okeru Taiwan Mondai 1971–72 Nen,” in Kobayashi Michihiko, and Nakanishi Hiroshi, eds., *Rekishī no Shikkoku o Koete – 20 Seiki Nicchū Kankei e no Shinshiten* (Tokyo: Chikura Shobō, 2010), 211–231.
- 38 “Zhou Fei Enlai Dui Gongmingdang Zhuru Weiyuanzhang Zhi Tanhua Yaozhi” [Outline of Conversation between the Bandit Zhou Enlai and Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri], Rifei Gouda Qianhou, 11-EAP-00567, 005.22/0005, AS.
- 39 Kazankai, *Nicchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshū 1949 Nen – 1997 Nen* (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998), 91; Kosaka Zentarō, *Arekara Korekara – Taikenteki Sengo Seijishi* (Tokyo: Bokuyōsha, 1981), 161. On the reparations issue, see: Zhu Jianrong, “Chūgoku wa Naze Baishō o Hōki shitaka – Seisaku Kettei Katei to Kokumin e no Settoku,” *Gaikō Fōramu* (October 1992), 27–40; Yang Zhihui, “Sensō Baishō Mondai kara Sengo Hoshō Mondai e,” in Liu Jie, Mitani Hiroshi, and Yang Daqing, eds., *Kokkyō o Koeru Rekishi Ninshiki – Nicchū Taiwa no Kokoromi* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo), 315–345.
- 40 China Division, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Takasaki Tatsunosuke Giin no Hōchū ni Kan suru Ken” [On Diet Member Takasaki Tatsunosuke’s Visit to China], December 20, 1962, Honpō Taichū Bōeki Kankei – Minkan Bōeki Kyōtei Kankei – Takasaki/Liao Oboegaki Kōkan (1962), E’.2.5.2.2-1-2, Reel E’-0212, MOFA. See

also: *Mainichi Shimbun* (June 18, 1998). “Okazakai Kaheita Kankei Bunsho” Scraps 26 (Kaheita Okazaki Memorial Hall) includes information on the deciding of the Sino-Japanese trade memorandum. On Okazaki’s perception of China, see: Okazaki Kaheita, “Watakushi no Rirekisho,” in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, ed., *Watakushi no Rirekisho*, Vol. 32 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1968), 156–161; Okazaki Kaheita, *Chūgoku Mondai e no Michi* (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1971); Okazaki Kaheita, *Watakushi no Kiroku* (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1979); Okazaki Kaheita, *Owari naki Nicchū no Tabi* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1984); Okazaki Kaheita, “Nicchū Kankei no Kongo,” *Kiyō Dai Nī Gō Okazaki Kaheita Kōenshū Nī* (2005), 83–93; Okazaki Kaheita, “Korekara no Nicchū Mondai,” *Kiyō Dai San Gō Okazaki Kaheita Kōenshū San* (2006), 27–59; Itō Takeo, Okazakai Kaheita, and Matsumoto Shigeharu, *Warera no Shōgai no Naka no Chūgoku – 60 Nen no Kaiko*, eds., Sakatani Yoshinao, and Tai Kokuki (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1983).

- 41 Fujiyama, *Waga Michi*, 216. For Chinese trends, see: “Liao Chengzhi Guanyu Jiedai Gaoqi Dazhizhu Ji Qi Suixing Renyuan Di Qingshi Laifang Renwu Cailiao He Yan-lun” [Request for Instructions on the Visit to Liao Chengzhi by Takasaki Tatsunosuke and his Companions – Materials on and Statements by Visitors] 105-01151-01, FMA.
- 42 Tian Huan, ed., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, 1945–1970* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1999), 643–649. On letters between Takasaki and Liao, see: “Hōchū Kankei Shōwa 34–37 Nen” [Related to Visits to China, 1959–1962], Takasaki Tatsunosuke Bunsho A-3, Tokyo Institute of Food Technology.
- 43 Guowuyuan Waibian Waishi Jianbao: Riben Shehuidang Zuoquomu Gengsan Gei Liao Chengzhi Di Xin [State Council Foreign Affairs Report: Letter from Sasaki Kōzō of the Japanese Socialist Party to Liao Chengzhi] 105-01657-11, FMA; Zhao Anbo, “Watashi no Ikkō Jidai,” in Jinmin Chūgoku Zasshisha, ed., *Waga Seishun no Nihon – Chūgoku Chishikijin no Nihon Kaisō* (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1982), 175–186.
- 44 Nicchū Kokkō Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Renmei, ed., *Nicchū Kokkō Kaifuku – Kankei Shiryōshū* (Tokyo: Nicchū Kokkō Shiryō Inkai, 1972), 531. See also: Nagano Shin’ichirō, and Kondō Masaomi, eds., *Nihon no Sengo Baishō – Ajia Keizai Kyōryoku no Shuppatsu* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1999), 171.
- 45 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008.
- 46 Kōsaka Masataka, “Chūgoku Mondai to wa Nani ka,” *Jiyū* (April, 1964).
- 47 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008.

4 Under America's Shadow – the Tanaka–Nixon summit in Hawaii

Visit by the Shanghai Ballet Troupe

The previous chapters of this book have focused on the period leading up to the Takeiri Memo from the perspective of Japanese policymakers including Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira Masayoshi, and the officials of the Japanese foreign ministry. But China was hardly standing idly by during this time.

On July 10, 1972, three days after the formation of the Tanaka government, more than 200 members of the Shanghai Ballet Troupe arrived at Haneda Airport via Hong Kong. This was not merely a cultural visit, however; the troupe carried secret orders from Zhou Enlai and its director was Sun Pinghua, a businessman with considerable expertise on Japan. Sun had been told to extract a definite promise from Tanaka to visit China.

Prior to leaving, he had been given the following instructions from Zhou:

Use the opportunity provided by this trip to Japan to meet directly with Prime Minister Tanaka. During that meeting, convey the message that the Chinese government would welcome a visit by him. Make sure that his response to the proposal is positive.¹

While Sun was deputy secretary-general of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association and well versed in the Japanese language, when it came to ballet he was “a complete outsider, entirely ignorant.”²

Serving as Sun's secretary and interpreter during the trip was Tang Jiaxuan, who would later go on to become Chinese foreign minister and a state councilor. According to Tang, Zhou's perception was that “President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 would undoubtedly lead to a major change in Sino-Japanese relations and that the Shanghai Ballet Troupe's visit would have political implications.”³

As the troupe would be staying in Japan for over a month, Sun and Tang waited in the troupe's rooms at Hotel New Otani in Tokyo for an opportunity to make contact with Tanaka. This meeting would finally happen on August 15, the day before the troupe returned to China (and, coincidentally, the anniversary of the end of the Second World War).

Tanaka's formal statement

It would be Ōhira who helped arrange the meeting between Sun and Tanaka. On July 11, the day after the troupe's arrival, he dispatched China Division Director Hashimoto to Tang's room with a proposal:

I understand that you wish to meet with the prime minister. We would like Director Sun to meet with Foreign Minister Ōhira first, however. We will then make arrangements for a meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka at an appropriate time.

Naturally, Sun and Tang did not object.⁴

Fujiyama Aiichirō, chairman of the Diet Members' League for the Promotion of the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China and a former foreign minister, hosted a welcome party for Sun and Xiao Xiangqian at Hotel New Japan on July 20. Xiao, who was just as knowledgeable about Japan as Sun, had just arrived in Japan to take up the position of head of the Tokyo Liaison Office for the Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade Office. Ōhira attended the grand party, as did Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaidō Susumu, State Minister Miki Takeo, and MITI Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.

Sun approached Ōhira at the party and requested a meeting, noting that there were "a number of things I would like to talk to you about." Ōhira readily accepted and had former foreign minister Kosaka Zentarō make the arrangements.⁵ His appearance at the welcome party had not been a coincidence, of course. He had visited Fujiyama's home on July 18 and promised him that he would be there.⁶

Ōhira met with Sun and Xiao at Hotel New Otani at 3:30 p.m. on July 22. He told them that

Prime Minister Tanaka and I are inseparable allies, and he has entrusted me with full authority on foreign policy. The time is now right for the leaders of the Japanese government to visit China and resolve the matter of normalization.

This statement was welcomed by Sun and Xiao.⁷

Earlier that same morning, Ōhira had met with Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu from 8:30 to 10 a.m. to carefully discuss the latter's trip to China (which would begin in three days).⁸ While Tanaka may have been cautious about moving forward with China prior to seeing the Takeiri Memo, Ōhira was not waiting. He had already mentioned at a press conference that he was attempting to make contact with China.⁹

After repeatedly meeting with Sun and Xiao, he informed them that Tanaka "wants to meet with you and to visit China." By this time, Ōhira was already carrying out the preliminary arrangements for such a visit.

Tanaka and Nikaidō finally met with Sun and Xiao on August 15 on the top floor of the Imperial Hotel.¹⁰ With a glimmer in his eyes, he got straight to the

heart of the matter and told them, "I hope my discussions with Premier Zhou will be fruitful." This was his formal statement that he would make the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to China. The entire floor of the hotel had been reserved for the meeting, and the men's conversation was thoroughly friendly from start to finish.¹¹

Taiwanese ambassador Peng Meng-chi made fierce protests to Ōhira upon learning of Tanaka's statement, but Ōhira was unmoved.¹²

Drafting the Sino-Japanese joint statement

Having ascertained the Chinese government's intentions via the Takeiri Memo and discussions with Chinese figures like Sun Pinghua, Tanaka and Ōhira decided to prioritize the drafting of the Japanese proposal for a Sino-Japanese joint statement.

According to the Takeiri Memo, Zhou Enlai wanted Japan to acknowledge – as a "tacit understanding" – that the fate of Taiwan was an internal Chinese matter. This was not something the Japanese government could do, however, and they thus needed to come up with a counterproposal.

The foreign ministry officials to whom Ōhira had shown the Takeiri Memo agonized over the wording of the joint statement. According to Hashimoto, this was another area where Ōhira decided to rely upon him:

There were things [in the joint statement] that really belonged in a peace treaty. Things like ending the state of war [between China and Japan] and reparations. But in any case, I wrote up memos on these issues and asked Treaties Bureau Director Takashima and Treaties Division Director Kuriyama to turn them into a Japanese draft for the joint statement. I was fortunately very close to both men and we all trusted each other. So I was able to ask them to work in secret, which they agreed to. No one else was involved.¹³

Hashimoto thus sketched out the outline of the joint statement, and Takashima and Kuriyama created the actual draft. These three were the only figures at the foreign ministry involved in creating the Japanese draft for the statement.

Ōhira had also asked Hashimoto about the Chinese proposal on reaching a "tacit understanding" over Taiwan. Hashimoto opposed this suggestion, noting that,

There isn't a single instance of a secret being successfully kept in Japan today. And should even one secret leak and become public, it will cause unjust suspicion that there are any number of additional arrangements that just haven't been found yet.

Ōhira agreed and informed Tanaka that the foreign ministry's position was that no secret agreements should be made.

According to Hashimoto, Zhou broached the subject at the talks in Beijing by saying, "If there are any portions of the joint statement where it would be more

convenient for the Japanese government for those matters to be made into tacit agreements, we are willing to entertain that at any time.” Tanaka shrugged this offer aside, however, saying, “That is a most thoughtful consideration, but there is no need.”¹⁴

The actual writing of the draft was done by Kuriyama, who also created an explanatory text for the Chinese:

I took my summer vacation. I left Tokyo for a week (borrowing a friend's summer house) and – not to sing my own praises – wrote every word of Foreign Minister Ōhira's speaking notes. That is, how he should explain our proposal for the joint statement to the Chinese. It was an absolutely silent environment in which to work. I completed the notes during my vacation and showed them to Hashimoto once I got back, telling him, “This is what I want to go with.”¹⁵

Excluding the China school

A question comes to mind at this point. What was the involvement of the foreign ministry's “China school” in the drafting of the joint statement?

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō was a member of the China school and had been excluded from setting policy by Hashimoto, his subordinate. Kuriyama acknowledged that “it was Division Director Hashimoto who managed the Asia Bureau” and suggested that it was an example of *gekokuujō* (rule from below).¹⁶ But what about the rest of the China school? Kuriyama shed some light on this point:

Ogawa Heishirō and Okada Akira – both my seniors in the ministry – were the only members of the “Beijing faction” that I was really aware of. And to be completely frank, I never actually worked with either of them. . . . It was extremely clear to me why their opinions on the matter were not sought. It was because we knew from the beginning that their opinions were fundamentally different from ours. . . . Had we taken their opinion, the result would have been Sino-Japanese normalization taking priority over the San Francisco system. And that was not a feasible course for Japanese foreign policy. We were thus very much aware that it would be meaningless to consult with them.

In other words, Foreign Service Training Institute Director-General Ogawa and Hong Kong Consul General Okada were excluded from the work on normalization due to their membership in the China school.¹⁷ This was done so that it would proceed within the framework of the San Francisco System.

Kuriyama was a member of the “America school” and would later reach the peak of the foreign ministry, serving as Treaties Bureau director, North American Bureau director, vice-minister, and ambassador to the United States. That it was he who wrote the Japanese proposal for the Sino-Japanese joint statement

reflected the central position of the United States in Japanese foreign policy. His views make this clear: "Sino-Japanese normalization could not take a form that infringed upon the [US-Japan] security framework. More specifically, Taiwan could not be excluded from the scope of the [US-Japan security treaty's] 'Far East' clause."¹⁸

Kuriyama judged that Japan had not and should not change its fundamental policy of orienting its foreign policy around the United States. While this was a subdued strategy, it was one typical of Japan. The United States' shadow loomed large over Sino-Japanese relations.

Okada was appointed ambassador to Bulgaria at this time and briefly returned to Japan from Hong Kong prior to taking up his new post. He approached Ōhira about normalization, although this only took the form of him offering his opinions on the matter (such as saying that there should be a clear Japanese rejection of Taiwanese independence). There is no evidence that Okada influenced Ōhira in any way, however.¹⁹

The legal status of Taiwan

To summarize, Hashimoto created an outline for the Japanese draft of the joint statement after learning Tanaka and Ōhira's intentions. The actual draft was then written by Kuriyama at Hashimoto's request. During the work on the draft, Hashimoto focused on political aspects and Kuriyama on legal ones.²⁰ Based on the impression I received interviewing the two men, I would describe Hashimoto as an influential figure in the ministry, an energetic man with patriotic inclinations. By contrast, Kuriyama was a moderate realist well versed in international law.

Kuriyama explained how work on the joint statement proceeded:

Because the Chinese had put forward their "three principles on the normalization of diplomatic relations," we had to figure out how we were going to respond. We at the Treaties Bureau had no reason to object to the first principle . . . so the problem became how to handle the other two.²¹

The second and third principles had to do with the legal status of Taiwan and the Treaty of Taipei. In addressing these, it was important to take the Shanghai Communiqué released during Nixon's visit to China into account. This document said that the United States "acknowledges" the Chinese assertion that Taiwan was part of China.

But when Kuriyama contacted the US government to confirm what was meant by "acknowledges," he received the response that "acknowledges means acknowledges, 'nothing more, nothing less.'"

Kuriyama interpreted this as follows:

The only thing that was clear was that the United States had not recognized China's position that Taiwan was the territory of the People's Republic of China. And, given that Japan could not give recognition to something that

the United States had not, we thus had to find an acceptable compromise with China that did not extend to recognition. We had to make use of our basic knowledge concerning the legal status of Taiwan.

The United States did not view Taiwan as Chinese territory, and Kuriyama's judgment was that Japan should not go any farther than the United States had in accepting the Chinese position.²² China clearly did not have effective control over Taiwan (as it still does not).

As mentioned earlier, Zhou Enlai had sounded out Takeiri on the possibility of reaching a "tacit understanding" that Taiwan was an internal Chinese matter, only for this to be rejected by Ōhira and Hashimoto. This view was also shared by Takashima and Kuriyama, who agreed that the joint statement had to be the only agreement made by the two countries.

Kuriyama explained his reasons for rejecting a secret agreement:

There would always be the possibility that, should we do something like that, it would end up getting leaked. Particularly in a place like Japan, [such an agreement] would immediately get out. This would be because politicians would want to talk about it, not so much due to the media.²³

Having rejected the Chinese proposal on Taiwan, Japan looked for a counterproposal. Its draft for the joint statement, as conceived by Hashimoto and written by Kuriyama, included the following language:

The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stance of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Their proposed text – "fully understands and respects" – would later become a point of contention during the negotiations in Beijing.

According to the outline that Kuriyama prepared for explaining the Japanese draft to the Chinese, Japan agreed that Taiwan was something that "should be resolved as an internal Chinese matter." However, it was

the basic view of the Japanese government that the issue of Taiwan must be resolved in a peaceful manner as it is the heartfelt wish of the entire Japanese people that a military confrontation between China and the United States be avoided.

The outline also included the following language on the legality of the Treaty of Taipei (the third of China's principles):

If diplomatic relations between China and Japan are normalized, the Treaty of Taipei will completely lose any substantial ongoing significance. The Japanese government is prepared to publicly confirm the termination of said

treaty by some appropriate means to make clear that Sino-Japanese relations will henceforth be based on a completely new foundation.²⁴

Japan would thus “prepare” some means of severing its relations with Taiwan that was separate from the joint statement. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 9, this ultimately took the form of a telegram from Tanaka to Chiang Kai-shek and a public statement by Ōhira.

The Hawaii summit – seeking American understanding

As reflected in Kuriyama’s attempt to obtain clarification on the meaning of “acknowledges,” Japan was unable to ignore the presence of the United States in many important aspects of its modern foreign policy. As such, Tanaka and Ōhira chose Hawaii as the first foreign visit by the new Tanaka government.

A JAL airliner carrying Tanaka and Ōhira landed at Hickam Air Force Base outside Honolulu at 8:20 p.m. on August 30, 1972. Tanaka descended the airstairs with his usual rapid pace and shook hands with President Nixon and his wife. The two men stood as a salute was fired in their honor and the two nations’ national anthems were played. Those looking on included National Security Advisor Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, Under Secretary of State Johnson, and Ambassador Ushiba Nobuhiko.

Tanaka had acted indifferent about the trip during the flight, telling the others on board that “I don’t feel particularly moved by the occasion” and that “this is just the first trip like this. I’ll jump on a plane and go anywhere I need to.” But as he stood on that stage at the airport, his face was entirely that of a prime minister.²⁵ After giving a brief statement in which he remarked that “I earnestly hope that this summit will mark a new era, one of uninterrupted dialogue between Japan and the United States,” his party departed the airport.²⁶

Meetings were held with Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers on August 31 and September 1 at the Kuilima Hotel. China and US–Japan trade frictions were among the topics discussed.

Article 3 of the joint statement released upon the conclusion of the summit on September 1 read:

The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the President’s recent visits to the People’s Republic of China and the USSR were a significant step forward. In this context, they shared the hope that the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister to the People’s Republic of China would also serve to further the trend for the relaxation of tension in Asia.²⁷

Nixon, having already visited China himself, thus expressed understanding for Tanaka and Ōhira’s planned visit.

But how did Tanaka and Ōhira address the issue of China while speaking with Nixon and Kissinger, two noted strategists? Let us first turn to the discussions of August 31.

Nixon may have visited China in February, but the United States had not recognized its government and still maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. He asked, "I understand the Prime Minister will be visiting Beijing soon. What do you see as the future of Japanese relations with China?"

Tanaka responded,

To begin with my conclusion, I will first note that the restoration of diplomatic relations with China cannot be permitted to cause any harm to US-Japan relations. I believe that the restoration of such relations can ultimately be in the interests of the United States. . . . The only problem is Taiwan.

Nixon emphasized the significance of Taiwan to the United States, saying

The United States attaches great importance to preserving the economic independence of Taiwan. As you know, this is an issue upon which the United States and China "agreed to disagree" in the Shanghai Communique. The policy of the United States is to do all it can for Taiwan's economic independence.

Tanaka attempted to dispel Nixon's concerns by saying, "Just to be clear, in seeking to restore diplomatic relations, Japan will not merely follow whatever course Beijing has laid out for us. We will not be told what to do by them."

Ōhira echoed this sentiment: "Our basic policy is to take care to ensure that nothing we do harms our friendship with the United States, particularly the US-Japan security framework that symbolizes our relationship."

In any case, the United States had not consulted with Japan a year earlier when it had begun its rapprochement with China and announced Nixon's visit. It could thus hardly voice any objections to Tanaka and Ōhira's intention to restore diplomatic relations with China in a way that still firmly maintained the US-Japan security framework. The central question for the United States was how Taiwan would be treated during the Sino-Japanese negotiations in Beijing. China would assert that Taiwan was part of their territory. How far would Japan go in recognizing that position? This question was left to the following day's discussions.²⁸

"One China"

On September 1, the second day of the US-Japan summit, the topics under discussion were the outlook for Sino-Japanese normalization and Taiwan's future.

Tanaka made the following request:

Japan would like to continue to engage in economic activities with Taiwan moving forward but believes it inevitable that diplomatic relations between us will come to an end. We ask for American understanding on this point and for your support in helping to ensure that friendly relations with Taiwan continue to greatest extent possible.

Nixon expressed reluctance, however. "President Chiang is a proud man who has done everything possible to maintain his convictions. He is also quite elderly. Convincing him will not be easy."

Tanaka argued that

[T]he root of the problem is that both China and Taiwan assert that they are the sole legitimate government of China. Japan will informally point out to Taiwan that, under the current circumstances, it is placed in a position where it is forced to choose either one or the other.

Nixon responded by noting that "I have met with both Chiang Kai-shek and Zhou Enlai. These men, who hold different opinions on absolutely everything else, are united in the belief that 'there is only one China.' The problem is, which China?"

Nixon was raising the "one China" issue. Japan was now attempting to go farther than what the United States had been willing to with China. The United States had yet to establish diplomatic relations with China, but Japan intended to do so and to sever such relations with Taiwan. It was Ōhira who made Japan's position clear:

The basic issue taken up during our visit to China will be the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Should we be able to come to an agreement, we will likely establish such relations immediately. Japan has no preconditions for concluding a peace treaty with China. We will not independently recognize [China's] possession of Taiwan.

He also predicted how Japan's relations with China would develop following the visit:

Once we have established diplomatic relations, we will likely conclude a peace treaty or treaty of friendship. This will then gradually be followed by agreements on areas such as aviation, commerce, and fishing. As of now, Beijing has not done anything in response to this Japanese course of action that would seem to make reaching a definitive agreement difficult. As such, I predict we will be able to establish diplomatic relations during Tanaka's visit to China.

While the kind of working-level agreements that Ōhira mentioned are generally negotiated in parallel with the normalization of diplomatic relations, he wanted to achieve normalization first and deal with them afterward. Ōhira was generally taciturn, but when he felt it time to speak up, his words were always on the mark.

He also noted that

Our diplomatic relations with Taiwan are going to change, but we will do all we can to otherwise maintain the status quo. While issues will arise in areas such as the movement of people, trade, investment, customs, the application

of tariff preferences, and establishing contact points, Japan intends to do all it can on these. The response from the Taiwanese will not necessarily be favorable, however.

He then concluded his remarks:

Japan renounced all its rights and claims to Taiwan. The future of Taiwan is thus in the hands of the Allied Powers that signed the Treaty of San Francisco, but they have failed to reach a decision. Given these circumstances, Japan is in no position to recognize Taiwan as Communist Chinese territory. It is able to express understanding and respect for China's assertion that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China" but can go no further than that. We are, in other words, following the same formula adopted by the Netherlands. We will compare the phrasing used by the Allied Powers – such as "acknowledge" (Britain), "take note of" (Canada), and "not challenge" (America) – and use whatever language goes the farthest. But we will go no farther than that. That is a barrier that we cannot cross.

Ōhira thus clarified that Japan would "understand and respect" the Chinese position but was in "no position to recognize Taiwan as Communist Chinese territory." As mentioned previously, this language – "understands and respects" – had been proposed by Hashimoto and Kuriyama and would be incorporated into the Japanese draft of the Sino-Japanese joint statement brought to Beijing.

Ōhira was not an eloquent speaker, but as the two days of talks entered their final stage, he became an increasingly significant presence. Tanaka could be very verbose, but Ōhira chose his words carefully, using logic to convince Nixon and the other US officials to accept his arguments.²⁹ When the Hawaii summit drew to a close, it was declared a success by the media.³⁰

While the talks themselves had been a success, the visit to Hawaii would ultimately serve as a prelude to a still unseen nightmare for Tanaka, as it was during the summit that the first contacts that would lead to the Lockheed scandal were made. Ōhira had repeatedly warned Tanaka not to "take any foreign money," but "Kaku didn't pay any heed to these."³¹ Tanaka had no way of knowing that these actions would soon lead to the end of his political career.

Notes

- 1 Tang Jiaxuan, "Tanaka Kakuei kara Koizumi, Ozawa made – Nihongo Tsūyaku kara Hajimatta Tainichi Kōsaku no Sekininsha ga Kattata 48-Nen," *Bungei Shunju* (April 2010), 165–166.
- 2 Sun Pinghua, *Nihon to no 30 Nen – Nicchū Yūkō Zuisōroku*, trans., Andō Hikotarō (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1987), 151. This book is a Japanese translation of Sun Pinghua, *Zhongri Youhao Suixianglu* (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1986). See also: Sun Pinghua, *Chūgoku to Nihon ni Hashi o Kaketa Otoko* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1998), 136–153.
- 3 Tang, "Tanaka Kakuei kara Koizumi," 165.

- 4 Ibid., 166.
- 5 Sun, *Nihon to no 30 Nen*, 159–160. Xiao Xiangqian, *Eien no Rinkoku to shite*, trans., Takeuchi Minoru (Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai, 1997), 155–156; Sun Pinghua, Morizumi Kazuhiro, “Nicchū Kokkō Kaifuku no Tobira wa Kōshite Hirakerareta,” *Chūō Kōron* (August 1992), 154.
- 6 Journal of Morita Hajime, July 18, 1972.
- 7 Sun, *Nihon to no 30 Nen*, 160–161. Journal of Morita Hajime, July 22, 1972.
- 8 Journal of Morita Hajime, July 22, 1972.
- 9 Fujiyama, *Waga Michi*, 217.
- 10 Tang, “Tanaka Kakuei kara Koizumi,” 166.
- 11 *Asahi Shimbun* (August 16, 1972); Kazankai, *Nicchū Kankei*, 1060; Kajima Institute of International Peace, *Nihon Gaikō*, 68.
- 12 “Telegram from Taiwanese Embassy in Japan to Foreign Ministry, August 16, 1972,” Tianzhong Neige Yufei Gouda (Dianbao), Vol. 1, 11-EAP-00573, 005.22/0011, AS.
- 13 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 14 Letter from Hashimoto to the author, April 2, 2009.
- 15 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 120.
- 16 Ibid., 126–127.
- 17 Ibid., 100–101.
- 18 Ibid., 118, 125.
- 19 Journal of Morita Hajime, September 14, 1972; Okada Akira, *Suichō Gaikō Hiwa – Aru Gaikōkan no Shōgen* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1983), 181, 195.
- 20 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 124.
- 21 Ibid., 124.
- 22 Ibid., 125–126.
- 23 Ibid., 243.
- 24 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 117, 113, 115–116.
- 25 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 1, 1972).
- 26 North America 1st Division, American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tanaka Sōri Daijin no Beikoku Hōmon (Hawai Kaidan)” [Prime Minister Tanaka’s Visit to America (Hawaii Summit)], September 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–645, 15.
- 27 Kajima Institute of International Peace, *Nihon Gaikō*, 68, 589.
- 28 Hattori Ryūji, “Tanaka Shushō/Nikuson Daitōryō Kaidan Kiroku – 1972/8/31, 9/1,” *Jinbunken Kiyō* 68 (2010). This article was derived from “Nichibei Shunō Kaidan (Dai Ikkai Kaidan)” [US–Japan Summit (First Meeting)], August 31, 1972; “Dai Ikkai Gōdō Kaidan” [First Joint Meeting], August 31, 1972; “Nichibei Shunō Kaidan (Dai Ni Kaidan)” [US–Japan Summit (Second Meeting)], September 1, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–645. See also: Ishii Osamu, ed., *Nikuson Daitōryō Bunsho – Tanaka Kakuei/Nikuson Kaidan Kankei Bunsho Hoka*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kashiwashobō 2009), 83–108.
- 29 Hattori, “Kaidan Kiroku,” 437–438, 442–443.
- 30 “Tanaka Sōri Hōbei (Hawai Kaidan) Kankei (1972/8) – Kaidan Kankei” [Prime Minister Tanaka’s Visit to America (Hawaii Summit) (1972/8) – Related to the Summit], A’I.5.2.24-1, CD-RA’435, MOFA.
- 31 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 132.

5 Taiwan – the Shiina–Chiang talks as *Kanjinchō*

Japan's debt to Chiang Kai-Shek

Tanaka and Ōhira wanted to maintain non-governmental ties with Taiwan following the ending of diplomatic relations and sought President Nixon's assistance in this area. But, as suggested by the discussions at the Hawaii summit, the Japanese government's handling of Taiwan and the severe backlash that followed proved to be a difficult problem.¹

Ōhira frequently mentioned to officials at the foreign ministry that “While we may refer to ‘Sino-Japanese’ relations, what we’re actually talking about is Japan-Taiwan relations.” What he meant by this was that “we have always had friendly relations with the Taiwanese, and it is the management of those relations that actually makes normalizing diplomatic relations with China difficult.”²

The idea that Japan must not forget its debt to Chiang Kai-shek was firmly ingrained within the right wing of the LDP. Among the most prominent proponents of this idea was Kaya Okinori.³ A former finance minister in the cabinets of Konoe Fumimaro and Tōjō Hideki, Kaya had been sentenced to life imprisonment as a Class A war criminal during the Tokyo Trials. After his parole, he was elected to the House of Representatives and went on to serve as chair of the LDP Policy Research Council and as justice minister in the Ikeda government.

Eighty-three at the time of formation of the Tanaka government, Kaya described the moral obligation that he believed that Japan had toward Chiang Kai-shek:

Setting aside what things were like earlier, the moral obligation we have had to Taiwan since the end of the war beggars description. How much would Japan have suffered had it been divided up during the Occupation? Chiang Kai-shek's renunciation of the idea that China should occupy part of Japan was key in preventing this from coming to pass. He did this to prevent a Soviet occupation of part of Japan. He also renounced war reparations, despite China having the greatest potential claim to them. And he has supported Japan's emperor system. . . . While this is not something that has been commonly recognized in Japan, he also allowed the more than two million Japanese soldiers in China to return home, an extraordinary act.⁴

How could Japan possibly forsake Chiang and Taiwan, given that it was thanks to him that a defeated Japan was spared a divided occupation, allowed to maintain its emperor, and had been able to withdraw its defeated armies from the continent? This view of Kaya's was shared by other prominent LDP politicians like Nadao Hirokichi and Fujio Masayuki.⁵

These politicians who placed such importance on the Japanese relationship with Taiwan made up a faction within the LDP that argued that Japan should hold back from normalizing relations with China. This group was not monolithic; according to Tanaka's secretary Hayasaka Shigezō, it was split "between a prewar faction exemplified by Kaya Okinori and a postwar faction made up of those like Nakagawa Ichirō."⁶

These self-described "very courageous men" – Nakagawa Ichirō, Watanabe Michio, Ishihara Shintarō, Tamaki Kazuo, and others – adopted a position of absolute opposition to Sino-Japanese normalization (they would later sign blood oaths and form the Seirankai, a fiercely anti-communist group within the LDP).⁷ Tamaki in particular had visited Taiwan numerous times since the time of the Satō government.⁸ Following the severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Nadao would form the Japan–Taiwan Diet Members' Forum with Tamaki and visit Taiwan to try to maintain working-level ties between the two countries.⁹

The Sino-Japanese Normalization Council

On July 24, 1972, Tanaka created the Sino-Japanese Normalization Council. The council existed under the direct authority of the LDP president and was intended to coordinate the party's actions on normalization as many of its lawmakers held pro-Taiwanese sentiments (as described earlier).

Tanaka named Kosaka Zentarō to chair the council. Tanaka's choice was a figure with extensive experience. Kosaka had visited Taiwan with former prime minister Yoshida Shigeru and served as foreign minister in the Ikeda government. During the Satō government, he had also visited China (then in the midst of the Cultural Revolution) and met with Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi.¹⁰

Tanaka's choice was likely a reflection of Ōhira's preferences. He once said that "Ōhira and I don't need to speak; we're in perfect attunement with each other. So that caused him a lot of trouble. Managing Taiwan came down to his diplomatic wisdom."

Once, when Tanaka and Ōhira were conferring, Ōhira let out a long sigh. He crossed his arms and said, "So, about Taiwan." Tanaka was blunt in his response.

That's something for the foreign minister to think about. It's not something I have to think about.

"But what about things in the party?"

"Have Kosaka or somebody deal with it."

"Hmm."

"You still had something to say?"

“I’ll ask again, what are we going to do about Taiwan?”

“Like I said, that’s something for you to deal with. I have no idea.”

Tanaka bluntly admitted that “it’s doubtful that Sino-Japanese normalization would have happened without Ōhira.”¹¹

Tanaka’s plan was to use the Sino-Japanese Normalization Council under Kosaka to consolidate the various views within the party into a single position. When he called Kosaka to the prime minister’s office to convince him to cooperate, he told him:

I want Sino-Japanese normalization to happen no matter what. The only way to get it done is for you to step forward. We already have a number of bodies in the party [that could do it], but I’m going to create a new one under the direct control of the president. I would really like you to serve as its chairman.¹²

The council was a massive-sized body with 316 members (212 members of the House of Representatives, 99 members of the House of Councilors, and five former legislators), who held a diverse array of opinions on normalization, some in favor and some opposed.

Its first general meeting was held on July 24. In his remarks on the occasion, Tanaka stated that “the time is ripe for Sino-Japanese normalization” and declared his determination to see it through:

While there have been many efforts made in this area in the past by the opposition parties and the Diet Members’ League for Sino-Japanese Friendship, it will be this council, representing the Liberal Democratic Party, who will now play the central role. We will need consensus within the party and its strong support if we are to be successful.¹³

Pressure from hawkish Diet members

Ōhira attended the council on August 3 and made the following statement:

It would be difficult to normalize relations with China while maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese government as we currently do. Once an agreement is reached with China on normalizing relations, it is unlikely that we will be able to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.¹⁴

Ōhira felt that he was merely stating the fact that cutting off relations with Taiwan was inevitable, but his words sparked an explosion of anger from the members of the pro-Taiwan faction. He came under attack from Kaya Okinori, Kitazawa Naokichi, Watanabe Michio, Fujio Masayuki, Nakagawa Ichirō, Nakayama Masaaki, and Hamada Kōichi on the grounds that “the Taiwan issue is of the utmost seriousness and severing diplomatic relations should not be spoken of so lightly.”

Ōhira was forced to backtrack and explain that he wanted only “basic issues such as the treatment of Taiwan to be thoroughly discussed by the Council.”¹⁵ And when Chairman Kosaka requested that “the foreign minister be more cautious in his speech and behavior,” he answered that he would “closely listen to the views of the Council and [would] come before it at any time to provide thorough explanations” on any topic.¹⁶

Kaya submitted a question to the foreign ministry asking whether “Sino-Japanese normalization and severing relations with the Nationalist government are inseparable.” On August 15, the ministry responded that “Under the basic views of both governments, it is impossible for any country to simultaneously maintain diplomatic relations with both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China.”¹⁷

Nikaidō Susumu, who was serving as chief cabinet secretary at the time, later reflected on the difficult situation that Ōhira found himself in:

The party’s Sino-Japanese Normalization Council (chaired by Kosaka Zentarō) brought Ōhira in to testify a dozen times and each time they raked him over the coals for six or seven hours. . . . Both Tanaka and Ōhira knew they were risking their lives, because the situation was such that even I was receiving phone calls from members of the far right telling me, “You have just one week left to live.”¹⁸

The council was “in absolute chaos due to the fierce attacks coming from the hawks.” “The storm just continued from one day to the next.”¹⁹

Finally, on September 8, the council held a general meeting at which it decided on a basic policy on Sino-Japanese normalization. This was in turn immediately adopted by the party’s General Council. The preamble of the council’s report declared that

In light of the deep relationship between our nation and the Republic of China, the negotiations [with the People’s Republic of China] should be conducted in a manner that gives sufficient consideration to continuing our existing relations [with the Republic of China].

The phrase “continuing our existing relations” was doing a lot of heavy lifting here. Unable to resolve the dispute within the party over whether Japan’s future relationship with Taiwan would include diplomatic relations or not, the Council had ultimately arrived at this ambiguous phrase.²⁰

With the council having nominally reached a conclusion, LDP politicians began to actively visit China. On September 9, Furui Yoshimi, Tagami Seiichi, and Matsumoto Shun’ichi arrived in Beijing. This visit was undertaken at the request of Ōhira, who wanted “Furui and Tagawa to make the path forward a bit smoother.” As always, Tanaka was “leaving everything to Ōhira for the most part.”

The flight also included personnel from the Japanese television networks who would be making the necessary preparations for the live broadcast planned for

Tanaka's visit. During this trip, Furui and the others met with Zhou Enlai, Liao Chengzhi, Zhang Xiangshan, Wang Xiaoyun, and Sun Pinghua.²¹

Another delegation of 23 LDP lawmakers led by Kosaka departed for China on September 14, where they discussed normalization with Zhou.²² Okazaki Kaheita, head of the Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade Office, also visited China on the 20th.²³

Appointment of Shiina Etsusaburō as a special envoy

With his visit to China drawing near, Tanaka decided to send a special envoy to Taiwan. The man he chose for this task was former foreign minister Shiina Etsusaburō, who had overseen the normalization of relations with South Korea as foreign minister in 1965. He had also visited Taiwan in 1969 as a member of the Diet and met with President Chiang Kai-shek, Vice President Yen Chia-kan, and Secretary General of the Presidential Office Chang Ch'un.²⁴ Tanaka had high regard for Shiina's competence.

Tanaka phoned Shiina (who was in Hokkaido to escape the summer heat) in early August 1972 to tell him that he wanted to appoint him vice president of the LDP. Also, he asked him to accept the position of special envoy to Taiwan.

Shiina was made vice president on August 22 and was called to the prime minister's office the next day to receive his appointment as special envoy. For Shiina, who had a strong emotional attachment to Taiwan, it was the acceptance of a difficult assignment.²⁵

When Ōhira contacted Taiwanese Ambassador Peng Meng-chi to ask that the Taiwanese receive Shiina, Peng firmly rejected the request due to his suspicions about the reasons for the appointment. Taiwan was becoming increasingly critical of Japan, and should it not consent to Shiina's visit, it would undoubtedly have a negative effect on Japan–Taiwan relations.

Faced with this situation, Ōhira called Matsumoto Ayahiko at his home on August 19. Matsumoto was an employee at LDP headquarters who had previously briefed Ōhira on Japan's interactions with Taiwan. Matsumoto was only thirty-two, but he was acquainted with Taiwanese Premier Chiang Ching-kuo.²⁶

Ōhira got straight to the point:

I met with Ambassador Peng and tried to explain our thoughts on various issues, but he aggressively objected to everything I had to say! At this rate, there's no way they'll accept a special envoy from us. It's completely outrageous!

This was a rare display of anger from the normally calm Ōhira, showing that he may have been quite offended at Peng's attitude.

When Ōhira asked him to serve as a bridge to the Taiwanese, Matsumoto was initially hesitant and insisted that "someone as young as I am is utterly unqualified for such an important assignment." Ōhira sent him anyway, however, saying "I want you to take the job. You'll be doing it for Japan."

Upon his arrival, Matsumoto judged that “given the history of Japan-Taiwan interactions, Secretary General of the Presidential Office Chang Ch’un was the only possible person to go to.” Chang was close to Chiang Kai-shek and a graduate of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy. A former foreign minister, he was among the most knowledgeable figures about Japan in Taiwan. After retiring as secretary general of the presidential office, he had become a senior advisor to the president.

Matsumoto met with Chang on September 12 at the presidential office and asked that Taiwan accept Shiina as a special envoy. Chang smiled and replied in Japanese: “Allow me to give the topic some consideration first.” The Taiwanese response would come surprisingly quickly, however. Japanese Ambassador to Taiwan Uyama Atsushi was told by Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan the very next day that they were willing to receive Shiina.²⁷

Mizuno Kiyoshi and Tamaki Kazuo

It was not due to the efforts of Ōhira and Matsumoto alone that Taiwan had rapidly decided that they would accept Shiina. Mizuno Kiyoshi (a Shiina faction Diet member) and Tamaki Kazuo (a member of the LDP’s right wing) were also active in Taiwan during this time. Chang met with Mizuno at 10 a.m. on September 12, just a few hours before his meeting with Matsumoto.²⁸

Mizuno had never visited Taiwan before; his convictions actually lay closer to China than they did to Taiwan, and he had visited Beijing the previous September with Kawasaki Hideji and met Zhou Enlai. Outside of his membership in the Shiina faction, he could hardly be considered an appropriate choice to herald Shiina’s visit.

He may have been part of the Shiina faction, but it had not been Shiina who had sent Mizuno to Taiwan. He had been approached by Ko Chen-hua of the Taiwanese foreign ministry about visiting Taiwan; he was thus actually there at their invitation.

As Ko was in charge of Japanese affairs at the ministry, he frequently traveled between Taipei, Tokyo, and Osaka. He was also present at the September 12 meeting between Matsumoto and Chang to serve as an interpreter. Ko and Mizuno were old acquaintances, and Ko had set his sights on Mizuno because of his membership in the Shiina faction.²⁹

Ko met with Mizuno and told him that “the reason that [Taiwan] won’t agree to Shiina’s visit is that more groundwork is needed.” Mizuno hesitated, noting that he was “seen in Japanese as being part of the pro-China faction” and that “while I’ve been to Beijing, I’ve never been to Taipei.”

Ko was undeterred, however, and continued to strongly request that Mizuno visit Taiwan, telling him that “You belong to the Shiina faction. That’s good enough.” While he agreed to go, he also explained that “I may be part of his faction, but we’re not particularly close.” Mizuno did not meet with Shiina prior to departing; the only steps he took were checking with Shiina’s secretary to make sure that it was acceptable for him to make the trip.

When Mizuno met with Chang on the 12th, there was no one else present. He discussed the current international situation and informed Chang that Tanaka and Ōhira would be visiting Beijing. Chang replied with a warning:

In the end, the Chinese Communist Party will have deceived you. They're in a tough spot at the moment because they aren't getting along with the Soviets. But once things get better, they will betray you.

Mizuno was always more favorably inclined toward China, so it is no surprise that he and Chang were not on the same wavelength. Their conversation had not gone anywhere, but Mizuno still made a request of Chang: "I came here to request that you receive Shiina. Please allow him to come."

After giving the matter some thought, Chang picked up his telephone and – as Mizuno watched – told Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan to allow Shiina to visit Taiwan. Mizuno's interpretation of the affair was that "Taiwan was asserting its importance. They were always going to receive Shiina, but they were going to make one of us come and ask first."

What Taiwan had wanted was to play out a script where a member of the Shiina faction came to Taiwan and pleaded for his visit. According to Mizuno, this was the "narrative" that Taiwan was trying to establish. This would be the only time that Mizuno and Chang ever met.

Ko accompanied Mizuno to Taipei's Songshan Airport following the meeting. As they went their separate ways, Ko made a prediction: "We're going to get a little rough with Shiina. We're not going to get physical with him, though."

Shiina was thus destined to receive a somewhat rough reception in Taiwan. As for Ko's motives in giving him this message, Mizuno believed that "It was an act, though I couldn't say whether or not the Taiwanese foreign ministry had put him up to it." He did not give a particularly detailed account of his trip to Shiina after his return to Japan.³⁰

Tamaki Kazuo, who was closer to Shiina, had visited Taiwan a few weeks earlier, arriving on August 10. During his stay, he met not only with Chang but also with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan, and Secretary-General of the Kuomintang Central Committee Chang Pa-shu. Tamaki was shocked at the level of hostility displayed by the Taiwanese, with some telling him that "any disavowal of the peace treaty would mean the restoration of a state of war."

Tamaki visited Taiwan again on September 4 to attempt to convince them to receive Shiina. When the Taiwanese implied that there would be retaliatory measures, he told them, "We must avoid returning to a state of war at all costs. Please receive Special Envoy Shiina." He claimed to have been just barely successful in obtaining informal consent for Shiina's visit. Tamaki, who had argued against Japan normalizing relations with China, worked to soothe Taiwanese anger and to maintain ties.³¹

Despite Tamaki's efforts, the Taiwanese attitude remained harsh.³² He described this to a general meeting of the LDP's Diet members on September 30:

I discussed this matter in some depth with Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan and Secretary-General Chang Pao-shu in Taiwan. During our conversation, they presented some of the specific measures then under consideration while acknowledging that retaliatory measures would lead to ill feelings between our nations. . . . I worked hard to get Taiwan to receive Special Envoy Shiina. All of their forecasts [for the visit] were accurate. When it was time for me to leave, they told me – in a seemingly unconcerned tone – that “when angered, that will be reflected in our negotiations.”³³

Tamaki had been involved in consultations with the Taiwanese even before Matsumoto and Mizuno's visits. He gave what is likely a somewhat exaggerated description of these to Ōhira at the April 9, 1973, meeting of the 2nd Subcommittee of the House of Councilors' Budget Committee:

This was before September 29, right when Shiina had come [to Taiwan]. I don't know if this was meant to be used for propaganda or something else, but at that time, they were investigating all of the countries that Japan imports its 220 million tons of oil from to try to see which tankers were from countries that had established relations with Beijing. They had even worked out a classification system under which only those that were from countries they had relations with would be okayed and allowed to pass. . . . If they had actually done that to us, it would have been terrible. They put their land, sea, and air forces on a full-time war footing. . . . Seeing what they were being like and not knowing if they were going to do this and how terrible it would have been if they did, we did everything we could [to dissuade them].³⁴

Vague instructions for Shiina

With Taiwan becoming increasingly critical of Japan, Shiina's visit was set for September 17. He paid a visit to the prime minister's office prior to his departure, but Tanaka made no attempt to give him any definite guidelines for the trip. When Shiina asked Tanaka what he should do in Taiwan, Tanaka looked pained. The only response was, “I leave foreign policy to Ōhira, so please ask him.”³⁵

Faced with Tanaka's refusal to commit to any particular course of action, Shiina was dumbfounded. “What are you saying? How am I supposed to get anything done if you won't tell me what your true intentions are?” Shiina kept these thoughts to himself, however.

According to Nakae Yōsuke of the foreign ministry's Asia Bureau, Shiina “knew it was a waste of time saying anything, so he acted like he didn't care. There's no question that he privately thought that Prime Minister Tanaka was a horrible person for doing this to him, though.”³⁶

Shiina visited Ōhira next and asked him “How far are you planning to yield to the Communist Chinese on Taiwan? What should I do to persuade Taiwan?” As always, Ōhira’s response was inarticulate. He stammered out, “If you recognize one half of a divided state, you can’t recognize the other half. That’s a major principle of modern diplomacy,” before Shiina said “I’ve heard enough” and left.

Why were Tanaka and Ōhira vague when speaking to Shiina? Because they knew that there was a possibility that, given his pro-Taiwanese leanings, Shiina would have resigned if they had clearly stated their intention to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. And should Shiina resign, it was unlikely that Taiwan would have accepted a different special envoy even if one was appointed. Tanaka and Ōhira did not speak frankly with Shiina because they judged it more important to ensure that he actually went.³⁷

Prior to his departure, Shiina had already received the label of the “apology envoy” from the media, something that he vented his frustrations about. “I don’t want to go there to apologize.” Keeping his ill feelings toward Tanaka and Ōhira to himself, he privately decided that rather than the views of the government, he would convey those of the LDP’s Sino-Japanese Normalization Council. As the council’s findings could be read as calling for continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan, they were potentially in conflict with the policies of the Tanaka government.³⁸

The delegation of Diet members that accompanied Shiina

As usual, the detailed work on Shiina’s trip was left to Ōhira. But Taiwan represented a difficult problem for him as well. Also, he found himself at a loss coordinating with the LDP. Shiina was a veteran party politician and not someone who would just do as asked without question. Ōhira thus decided to have Foreign Affairs Councilor Nakae accompany Shiina on the trip. As he left, Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō told Nakae, “We’re leaving Taiwan in your hands.”³⁹

Ōhira frequently called Nakae to the restaurant Sakaeya in Shinbashi to consult with him.⁴⁰ Nakae was in touch with the director of the Tokyo branch of Taiwan’s Central News Agency and regularly received information directly from him. And what he was hearing was different from the information coming from the LDP’s pro-Taiwanese Diet members:

I heard almost nothing threatening, such as that Japan normalizing relations with China would lead to Japanese property being seized, [Japanese] aircraft being unable to fly to Taiwan, and Japanese ships being unable to pass through the Taiwan Strait. Those claims were coming from pro-Taiwanese politicians. They were coming from Nadao Hirokichi and his sidekicks Tamaki Kazuo and Fujio Masayuki.⁴¹

LDP Diet members were unsure about whether they should accompany Shiina on his trip. According to Nakae, “Everyone took into account whether going with the special envoy was in their interest or not. Whether it would be better for the next

election to go or to stay home.”⁴² Only seventeen Diet members would be allowed to join the delegation.

Nakae repeatedly consulted with Shiina as he drew up the list of Diet members who would be accompanying him as there could be no mistakes in the ordering of the names. He relied on Takeshita Noboru and his wealth of knowledge about the party’s members as he did so.⁴³ Takeshita had served as chief cabinet secretary during the Satō government and became LDP chief deputy secretary-general under Tanaka.

When he showed the list to Takeshita and asked him about how to order their names, Takeshita just said, “Ah, leave that to me,” and immediately supplied the proper order. He had a brief record of each Diet member’s career (such as how many times they had won election) memorized. Nakae was astounded. “It was as if he had the directory of Diet members in his head.”⁴⁴

Yasuoka Masahiro’s revisions to Tanaka’s letter

Shiina carried a letter from Prime Minister Tanaka to President Chiang Kai-shek, a letter that had actually been written by the foreign ministry rather than Tanaka. The initial draft of the letter as created by the China Division referenced the “severing of diplomatic relations” but sought to continue non-governmental ties with Taiwan.⁴⁵

China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi explained the letter’s intended purpose:

[Tanaka and Ōhira] were extremely concerned about our relations with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government. Normalizing relations with China naturally meant that diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government would be broken off. It wasn’t that we had had a fight and that was why we were parting ways. It was just that, as a result of changes in the international situation, the Nationalist and Japanese governments had to go their separate ways. So we wanted to pay all possible courtesies to them.⁴⁶

Based on the documents on Tanaka’s letter disclosed by the foreign ministry following a declassification request, it was revised at least five times. Comparing these drafts reveals three notable characteristics to the changes made.

First, the letter was rewritten from a practical style of Japanese to one reminiscent of *kanbun*, a form of written Japanese imitative of Classical Chinese. Second, the portion of the letter that said that Sino-Japanese normalization would “have the result of severing formal relations between our government and that of your country” was rewritten to be more ambiguous. Now, normalization was deemed as rendering “an acute contradiction between our nations inescapable.” Third, any language requesting the continuation of non-governmental ties was removed.⁴⁷

These changes can be regarded as having been done out of careful consideration for Chiang Kai-shek.

According to Hashimoto, “I wrote the initial draft in Japanese and then brought it to Ōhira, the foreign minister. I had naturally discussed the letter with [Vice-Minister Hōgen], and a number of people had been involved in its creation.” Upon reading the draft, Ōhira said “I don’t know who wrote this, but this is very well done.”

By contrast, Tanaka told Hashimoto that “In terms of the content, this is fine. But this is a letter for Chiang Kai-shek. He’s not just some soldier or politician; he created an era. Could you make it into something that’s a little grander?” After giving the matter some consideration, Tanaka directed Hashimoto to keep the content as it was but have Yasuoka Masahiro take care of the letter’s actual form. Thus, the China Division’s draft would be revised by a scholar of the Chinese classics.⁴⁸

Yasuoka was well known for his role as advisor to a number of prime ministers, and he had also worked on the text of the Emperor’s surrender broadcast that ended the Second World War. When the Ikeda faction was formed, it had been Yasuoka who had chosen its name (Kōchikai) at Ōhira’s request.⁴⁹

He accepted the request to revise Tanaka’s letter, remarking that he would “write something that will cause the powerful of Taiwan to remark upon the skillful use of language even as they are angered by its content.”⁵⁰ Taking up a fountain pen, he transformed the letter, rewriting it in an elegant *kanbun* style, utilizing conventions from Literary Chinese and references to the Chinese classics. While the letter is fairly long and some of its impact is lost in translation, it will be reproduced here in full:

To Your Excellency President Chiang Kai-shek,

My thoughts turn to Your Excellency, who I have long admired. I am sure you are walking a blessed course, enjoying peaceful banquets and good fortune.

Recently, there has been diverse discussion regarding negotiations between our nation and the Beijing government. Your Excellency will have heard denunciations of us from those accompanying you, claims that the government of this nation has disgraced itself by failing to maintain its own ideals and that we have committed acts damaging to our national prestige. I would like to humbly request Your Excellency’s sympathetic understanding as I now respectfully state the Japanese government’s views on this matter.

Reflecting on the more than twenty years that have passed since the ending of the war, the unwavering kindness that Your Excellency has conferred upon the Japanese nation and people has been met with equal admiration from the same. Since the conclusion of the peace treaty between our nation and your government in 1952, the government and people of our nation have been united in faithful abiding friendship with your nation at every opportunity. In particular, during the deliberations held last year over the right of representing China at the United Nations, the government of our nation devoted all of its energies to protecting your nation’s seat, leading the way in the attempt to

overcome the difficulties presented and to resolve the confusion. This act will long be spoken of in history and will not be forgotten by any of the friends of both our nations.

Despite these efforts, the international situation has undergone sudden changes in recent years. These have included such incidents as the resolution in the United Nations General Assembly on the right of representing China, the recognition of the Beijing government by a succession of states, and the visit to Beijing by President Nixon. There are those who speak eloquently for acting in harmony with these changes and seeking to improve relations with the Beijing government.

Our nation is different from them. The people of Japan have held the nation and people of China in extraordinarily high esteem from ancient times. Accordingly, in light of the present trends of the times, the situation has become one where it is truly unavoidable for the government of Japan to judge that it is an opportune time for the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan.

It goes without saying that our nation takes parliamentary democracy as its fundamental principle of national governance. The government has an obligation to embody the views and hopes of the majority of its people. This is the reason why, having given careful thought and deliberation on the matter, we will be establishing diplomatic relations with the Beijing government. In doing so, we are neither meaninglessly succumbing to pressure, nor adopting a shortsighted policy of drawing closer to Beijing for profit.

The execution of this policy will naturally make an acute contradiction between our nations inescapable. I believe that sometimes the unfortunate can be unavoidable. This will be handled with the utmost sincerity, in the spirit of calm and dedication.

I humbly request your friendship and pray for Your Excellency's continued good health and longevity.

September 13, 1972

Tanaka Kakuei, Prime Minister of Japan⁵¹

The official copy of Tanaka's letter was written out with a brush. It touched upon Japan's friendship with Taiwan, but also spoke of the "sudden changes" in the international situation that had created an "opportune time" for Sino-Japanese normalization. It made no clear reference to breaking off relations with Taiwan, speaking only of the "acute contradiction" that would be created.

The most significant change made by Yasuoka (who was, of course, only a private citizen without any official authority) was to "completely remove any discussion of the severing of diplomatic relations and maintaining friendly non-governmental ties afterwards."⁵²

According to Ogura Kazuo, who had succeeded Watanabe Kōji as deputy director of the China Division, Ambassador to Taiwan Uyama Atsushi was also involved in the drafting of Tanaka's letter. He said that the letter had been drafted by the China Division's General Affairs Section and then revised by Hashimoto

and himself. It was then shown to their superiors before being turned over to Yasuoka as described earlier.

Why was it that, despite its removal of any mention of severing diplomatic relations, Yasuoka's revised version of the letter would go on to become the official form of Tanaka's letter without any significant changes? Ogura explained:

There was a discussion questioning why it was necessary for Japan to say that it would be severing diplomatic relations when that was a given. Taiwan remained fixed to the One China policy and asserted that there was only one China. So long as Taiwan didn't declare independence or something, Japan normalizing relations with the Beijing government meant, legally speaking, that its diplomatic relations with Taiwan would be severed. It was, legally speaking, like the sun not rising from the west meaning that it rose from the east. So, the argument went, why did Japan have to explicitly spell it out?

Ogura also recalled receiving signals from the Japanese embassy in Taipei that Taiwanese Japan experts were requesting that Japan not say that it was severing relations.⁵³

Summoning the ambassador

Anti-Japanese sentiment in Taiwan was reaching its peak as the finishing touches were being put on Tanaka's letter and Shiina prepared for his trip. On the morning of September 15, Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan summoned Ambassador Uyama to the foreign ministry (Shen had returned to the position of foreign minister in May 1972 after having earlier served in the position from 1960 to 1966). When Uyama arrived, Shen read a statement:

The government of your nation has clearly already decided to embark upon policies unfriendly to our nation. We cannot help but view Special Envoy Shiina's visit as being for the purpose of informing us of this fact. Not only is this kind of attitude difficult for our government to accept, but it is sure to enrage our entire people.

We hope that the government of your nation will quickly clarify [its position on] this point. If it does not, the Nationalist government will have to make important policy considerations concerning the visit by the special envoy.

In light of the importance of Special Envoy Shiina's visit, we hope that no policy statements of any kind will be announced following his arrival here or during his stay.⁵⁴

After he finished reading the statement, Shen added that "We would like you to adequately communicate to your government the true state of things here, that the people are indignant and popular opinion very sensitive."

Uyama replied that "I have not the slightest doubt that the government of Japan and Special Envoy Shiina will pay the utmost attention to the position of your country's government."⁵⁵

Out of consideration for the Taiwanese request, Uyama cancelled the prepared statement for Shiina's arrival at the airport. As Shiina, Nakae, and the rest of the delegation boarded their flight at Haneda Airport, opposition to their visit was growing in Taiwan.

Shiina's visit to Taiwan and the "Government-Manufactured Demonstration"

When Shiina's party arrived at Taipei's Songshan Airport on the afternoon of September 17, they were met by 300 protestors, many of them students. Shouting "Shiina Go Home!" and "You Won't Be Going Home If You Abuse the Nationalist Government's Friendship!", the enflamed crowd threw stones and eggs at their motorcade, beat on their cars with sticks, and spat at them.⁵⁶

With the airport surrounded by the crowd, the fourteen cars in Shiina's motorcade, Japanese flags waving from their hoods and led by police cars with blaring sirens, attempted to escape through a gate reserved for military use. They found their path blocked by a mob holding placards and eggs.

Table 5.1 Schedule of Special Envoy Shiina's Visit to Taiwan

9/17 (Sunday)

13:45	Arrival at Songshan Airport
14:10	Arrival at Grand Hotel
17:15	Departure from Grand Hotel for residence of Ambassador Uyama
17:30–20:45	Social gathering with Japanese residents of Taiwan
21:00	Returned to Grand Hotel

9/18 (Monday)

08:45	Departure from Grand Hotel
09:00–10:50	Meeting with Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan (Foreign Ministry)
11:00	Arrival at Presidential Office Building
11:10–12:25	Meeting with Vice President Yen Chia-kan
13:00	Lunch (Grand Hotel)
15:00	Departure from Grand Hotel
15:15	Social gathering with Taiwanese legislators (Armed Forces Officers Club)
15:40	Departure from Armed Forces Officers Club
15:50–16:50	Meeting with General Ho Ying-qin at his home
18:15	Departure from Grand Hotel
18:35–19:30	Second meeting with Foreign Minister Shen
19:30	Banquet hosted by Foreign Minister Shen
22:30	Arrival at Grand Hotel

9/19 (Tuesday)

08:45	Departure from Grand Hotel
9:00–11:00	Meeting with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (Executive Yuan)
11:00	Meeting with Secretary General Chang Ch'un (Presidential Office Building)
13:00–14:30	Meeting of the Japan-Taiwan Cooperation Committee (Grand Hotel)
16:10	Departure from Grand Hotel for Songshan Airport
16:25	Departure from Taiwan

Source: Telegram from Uyama to Ōhira, September 21, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–715.

The windshields of the third and seventh cars (carrying Fukunaga Kazuomi and Hamada Kōichi respectively) were smashed. While Hamada was a man always quick to enter a fight, for once he calmly told those riding with him that they needed to quietly endure the abuse. When the motorcade finally arrived at the delegation's accommodations at the Grand Hotel, the bodies of half of their cars had suffered noticeable damage.

The anti-Japanese demonstration was odd, given that Taiwan was under martial law in September 1972 (as it would be from 1949 to 1987, the longest such in world history) and such gatherings were not permitted. According to Matsumoto Ayahiko (who was present), the protests were said to have been “the first in Taiwanese history to have been done with governmental approval; that is, they were protests manufactured by the government.”⁵⁷

Was Matsumoto's claim about the origins of the protests actually correct? Wakayama Kyōichi, a member of the foreign ministry who joined the trip, spoke to this point:

Shiina's car quickly left, to be followed by the second. It was only then that the men surged forward and began beating on the [third] car carrying Kimura with sticks . . . the third and later cars carried Diet members in the delegation. More important figures like Murakami Isamu and Akita Daisuke were either riding with Shiina [in the first car] or in the second car. Those farther back were younger people and the like.

Wakayama thus claimed that the first two cars were allowed to pass before the protestors started beating on the motorcade and screaming at them. But how real was the violence?

If you looked closely at the sticks that the protestors were carrying, they weren't solid blocks of wood. They were made to be long and flat. They made a lot of noise but didn't do all that much damage to the bodies of the cars. There was some cracked glass and broken side mirrors and the like, but that was the extent of the damage.

The protestors were thus holding themselves back; what they were engaged in was closer to a performance than actual violence. The Diet members were initially scared but, according to Wakayama, “as the cars were being beat on, we gradually realized that no harm was going to come to us.” Wakayama's testimony seems to support Matsumoto's conjecture that the government had instigated the protests.⁵⁸

After the delegation arrived at the Grand Hotel and everyone had calmed down, they gathered for a meeting. Hamada sought instructions from Shiina: “How should we attend the official functions that will begin tomorrow? . . . What intentions did you come to Taiwan with? We can't do anything until we know that.” Shiina astonished the group by telling them that “each of you can express your own thoughts on the matter.” It was truly typical of a gathering of LDP Diet members for them to still be unable to form a consensus at such a late stage.

When another of the Diet members, unable to bear the situation, asked about the letter from Tanaka, Shiina bewildered the group by answering that “It’s a personal letter, so I can’t very well make its contents public, can I? Anyway, it’s probably just a bunch of lofty stuff.” It seems likely that Shiina actually was aware of what was written in the letter but had judged that he would be unable to maintain control of the delegation if he revealed its contents.⁵⁹

Shiina had already privately decided by this time that he would give the Taiwanese his own thoughts on the matter rather than convey the government’s position. As an extremely experienced politician with pro-Taiwanese leanings, he was not about to just do what the government told him. According to Nakae, Shiina was, generally speaking, “an actor who would not read the lines written for him and, indeed, never had any intention of learning the script in the first place.”⁶⁰

The Shiina–Chiang meeting

Shiina met with Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan, Vice President Yen Chia-kan, and General Ho Ying-chin the next day.⁶¹ All of these men were obviously strongly opposed to Sino-Japanese normalization and Shiina had not seen any of them for three years. Yen formally accepted Tanaka’s letter to Chiang from Shiina.⁶²

President Chiang Kai-shek, the key figure in Taiwanese politics, was convalescing and did not attend any of the meetings.⁶³ For this reason, it would be the following day’s meeting between Shiina and Chiang Ching-kuo that would serve as the critical point of the visit.

Shiina and Chiang met on September 19. The eldest son of the elderly Chiang Kai-shek, the sixty-two-year-old Chiang was a powerful figure who had just been elevated from the position of vice premier to premier in May.⁶⁴

After paying his respects and offering his best wishes for Chiang Kai-shek’s health, Shiina conveyed the Japanese plans as follows: “A ‘Sino-Japanese Normalization Council’ was created under Chairman Kosaka, and Tanaka has stated numerous times that he intends to handle matters in accordance with its views.”

He then continued:

It is written in the preamble to that council’s findings that, given our particularly strong relations with the Republic of China, the deliberations on Sino-Japanese normalization should be approached with a mind to maintaining “our existing relations” [with Taiwan]. Something that was argued until the very end was that the meaning of “our existing relations” included diplomatic relations.

Far from informing the Taiwanese that Japan would be severing relations with Taiwan, Shiina was actually telling Chiang that the “existing relations” between the countries, including diplomatic relations, would be maintained. This was not the policy of the Tanaka government, but rather that of the LDP. Shiina also definitively stated that the phrasing used in the original council report supported

continuing diplomatic relations with Taiwan when it had in fact been ambiguous on this point.

Chiang was unable to understand the true significance of what Shiina was saying. “We place great importance on Foreign Minister Ōhira’s words to Ambassador Peng. He told the ambassador that ‘with the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, the Treaty of Taipei will be no more.’ What is the meaning of this?”

Despite the contradictions between his own words and those of Ōhira being pointed out, Shiina did not waver; he calmly answered that “[Ōhira] is quite close to Ambassador Peng, and I believe he was sharing his impressions with him in that context.” According to Shiina, Ōhira’s statement was “neither a declaration of the severing of diplomatic relations nor advance notice of such.”

Unable to accept Shiina’s explanation, Chiang began to speak at length:

The issue of Japan is a matter of great interest to President Chiang Kai-shek. Having long had a particularly strong interest in Sino-Japanese relations, prior even to the militarists beginning the war, he paid careful attention to whether Japan viewed China as a friend or an enemy. He protected the Emperor system, opposed an occupation under which Japan would be divided between four countries, and concluded the Treaty of Taipei with Japan. He dealt with all of these matters consistently, with an eye towards history. It is his view that the reason that the development of Japan and peace in Asia have been able to be secured in a collaborative way is because there has been a Japanese government opposed to communism and close to the Republic of China.

He then adopted a stronger tone:

Through its invasion, Japan caused great misery to our seven hundred million comrades. The past is the past, but should Japan normalize relations with Communist China, you will cause great misery to our seven hundred million comrades for perpetuity. You will have once again committed a great crime, one that we will be unable to overlook. We may be in Taiwan now, but this is nothing more than a base until we retake the mainland. And it is my firm conviction that we will do so.

Chiang concluded with a warning: “The facts prove what the result of Sino-Japanese normalization will be: you are clearly ‘inviting a wolf into your home’ [(i.e., bringing disaster upon yourselves)].” Shiina told Chiang that he would accurately convey the message to Tanaka.⁶⁵

Thus, both Shiina and Chiang made claims at their meeting that were objectively improbable. Shiina said that the “existing relationship” between Japan and Taiwan would continue, and Chiang said that Taiwan would retake the mainland. Both men were fully cognizant of the unlikelihood of these things coming to pass.

Nakae looked back on the meeting as follows:

My impression was that [Chiang Ching-kuo] skillfully handled the discussion in a way that prevented Shiina from losing face. He understood what was going on and thought highly of Shiina Etsusaburō, an elderly man who had traveled a long way. It was reminiscent of *Kanjinchō*. Togashi knew that Benkei and Yoshitsune were lying. But he pretended to be deceived and let them pass through the gate anyway. Chiang Ching-kuo knew that what Shiina was saying was a lie, that Japan had indeed decided to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. That Shiina was dragging out the normalization council's resolution because if he stated [the government's policy], there was nothing to talk about. Chiang ended the talk with Shiina in a way that made it seem as if they had been able to have a discussion while still hinting that he knew that Japan planned to cut off relations with Taiwan.⁶⁶

A *kanjinchō* was a register used for the collection of donations for the construction of a temple or shrine. In *Kanjinchō*, the kabuki play being used as an example by Nakae, Benkei and Minamoto no Yoshitsune (famous 12th-century figures) are attempting to flee the province of Mutsu. They are challenged by Togashi Saemon, a local official, as they approach a checkpoint. Benkei promptly produces a blank scroll, which he claims to be a *kanjinchō*, and reads aloud from it. Togashi sees through Benkei's ruse but allows the two men to pass by anyway. Both Togashi and Benkei are aware of the latter's lie but feign ignorance.

How should Shiina's "acting" be assessed in this context? Even understanding the difficulty of the position in which he found himself, he attempted to raise the hopes of Taiwan's officials to no real end. And it goes without saying that his words angered China.

The impact of Shiina's words

A summary of Shiina's visit to Taiwan made it to Zhou Enlai that very day. Kosaka Zentarō and nine other Diet members were visiting China at the time, and upon hearing that Shiina had told the Taiwanese that Japan would be maintaining its diplomatic relations, Zhou reprimanded them at the Great Hall of the People that evening:

I am told that Special Envoy Shiina said in Taiwan that diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan would be maintained following Sino-Japanese normalization. That's completely different from what you've told me, isn't it? I am displeased that something like this would happen concerning such a fundamental issue.

Kosaka could only tell the angered Zhou that the report "couldn't possibly be true."⁶⁷

As Shiina's party left Taiwan, they were unaware of what had transpired and, having completed their great responsibility, felt a sense of relief. When they landed at Haneda Airport, Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō rushed onto their plane and revealed what had happened to Kosaka:

Your statements in Taipei have become a problem in Beijing. Kosaka Zentarō (chairman of the LDP Sino-Japanese Normalization Council) is currently visiting the city. Yesterday, he was summoned by Premier Zhou Enlai in the middle of the night and grilled on whether Special Envoy Shiina's words in Taipei meant that the Japanese government intended to recognize two Chinese governments.

Shiina barked back at Yoshida, telling him that "I don't need you to tell me that!"⁶⁸ He had likely already been prepared for the fact that his words in Taiwan would have repercussions. His perspective was that "As Tanaka didn't tell me anything, I merely relied upon the party's resolution."⁶⁹

Shiina visited Tanaka and Ōhira on September 20 and reported that "I explained to the Taiwanese government that maintaining the existing relationship between Japan and the Republic of China included diplomatic relations." Ōhira's secretary Morita wrote in his diary that "this was unexpected and seems to have come as a great shock to the minister."⁷⁰

Shiina was critical of Tanaka and Ōhira, believing that

[I]f they were going to accept [China's] three principles for the restoration of relations, well, then I was going to show the presence of mind and power to parry their efforts and boldly put forth my own three reverse principles.⁷¹

Shiina's favorite phrase was "eliminate things" (*shōji*). This was derived from the aphorism "it is best to eliminate things" found in the *Caigentan*, a 16th-century Chinese work. He used the phrase to mean "eliminate the trivial and concentrate on the important; act from a broader perspective." According to those close to him, he took this as his personal motto. "Only deal with what you consider important, otherwise, don't bother."⁷²

One cannot help feeling, however, that it is questionable that Shiina was taking a broader view when it came to Taiwan. It was entirely clear that Japan would not be able to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan once it normalized relations with China.

Years later, Ōhira would attend Shiina's party funeral as prime minister. There, he read a eulogy in which he stated that Shiina had "devoted yourself to the philosophy of 'eliminating things.' You always grasped the big picture and avoided getting hung up on small matters. You leave countless accomplishments behind you."⁷³ Despite this praise, the two men had been estranged since the time of Sino-Japanese normalization. It is quite possible that as Ōhira spoke, he was bitterly remembering Shiina's visit to Taiwan.

Chiang Kai-shek's reply

But what of Chiang Kai-shek, who had entrusted the meeting with Shiina to his eldest son? It is likely that the proud man's eighty-four-year-old body shook with anger as he read Tanaka's letter. Yet, with Taiwan facing a life-or-death crisis, he needed to act.

Doing his best to quiet his rage, he wrote a response to Tanaka:

Everyone is well aware that the Chinese Communists seek the communization of Asia, to be followed by the entire world. Even if your nation establishes diplomatic relations with them, you can expect no rapid benefits, economic or otherwise. What is it that you seek, that causes you to so hastily take this action? By doing so, you betray our trust, forsake justice, invite a wolf into your home, and treat bandits with respect. . . . If your country establishes relations with this regime of violence that oppresses the people of the Chinese mainland, you will make no less than the entirety of the Chinese people into your enemies. I privately believe that your nation would not do such a thing. I fervently hope that Your Excellency will hear my meager opinion and reconsider what you would actually gain from this act.⁷⁴

Chiang was elderly and prone to illness. Yet this final attempt to prevent Sino-Japanese normalization burned with the last of his tenacity, even if it came at the cost of his strong pride.

How did Tanaka and Ōhira react to this reply that Chiang had poured his life into? According to Prime Minister's Secretary Kiuchi Akitane, neither man said anything after reading it. "While they could not help but privately feel sympathy [for Chiang], this was not something they could express with their visit to China pending." Chiang's efforts had no impact on their determination.⁷⁵

With right-wing speaker trucks denouncing him as a traitor, Tanaka told his secretary that he was prepared for the worst:

I go as the prime minister of a country and I will not engage in kowtow diplomacy. I will fight and prioritize the interests of the nation. It is possible that the talks will collapse in the end. If that happens, I will take full responsibility.⁷⁶

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotōda Masaharu remarked that

[T]he prime minister, Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, and Nikaidō departed for China without having first adequately secured consensus within the party. They left me behind to keep an eye on things, but it was the decision of a prime minister who was truly taking his political career into his hands.⁷⁷

Hashimoto Hiroshi echoed these words:

He didn't pay any heed to the attacks from the right as he visited China. There were many in China who had lost loved ones in the Second Sino-Japanese

War and there were concerns that he might be attacked. By visiting China, he was truly risking his life.⁷⁸

Ōhira and Nikaidō also received death threats. Meticulous as always, Ōhira wrote out a will out of concern that harm might come to him.⁷⁹ Yoshiko, his daughter, recalled that “Father wrote a will prior to visiting China. He didn’t know what shape he’d make it back in. That’s how resolved he was to go.”⁸⁰

September 25, the date of their departure for Beijing, was fast approaching.

Notes

- 1 On the severing of diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan, see Ishii Akira, “Nittai Dankōji no ‘Tanaka Shinsho’ o Megutte,” *Shakai Kagaku Kiyō* 50 (2000), 89–109; Hiyaama Yukio, “Nicchū Kokkō Kaifuku ni Tomonau Nikka Kokkō Danzetsu ni Okeru Shiina Etsusaburō/Shō Keikoku Kaidan Kiroku ni Tsuite – Gaimushō Sanjikan Nakae Yōsuke no Kaidan Kiroku ‘Nakae Memo’ no Shiryōron,” *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyū* 24:1 (2003), 135–196; Shimizu Urara, Matsuda Yoshiro, and Yang Yongming, eds., *Nittai Kankeishi 1945–2008* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2009), 95–125.
- 2 Nakae Yōsuke, *Rashikunai Taishi no Ohanashi* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1993), 53.
- 3 On the background of the LDP’s pro-Taiwan faction, see Katō Kiyofumi, “Taiwan Hikiage to Sengo Nihonjin no Taiwankan,” in Taiwanshi Kenkyūbukai, ed., *Taiwan no Kindai to Nihon* (Tokyo: Chūkyō Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 2003), 138–141.
- 4 “Kaya Okinori Danwa Sokkiroku” [Stenographic Records of Conversations with Kaya Okinori], Vol. 2, NDL Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, 46–50.
- 5 Nakae Yōsuke, *Nokosareta Shakai Shugi Taikoku – Chūgoku no Yukue* (Tokyo: KK Bestsellers, 1991), 28, 31. See also: Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitōroku Kankōkai, *Kiroku Shiina Etsusaburō*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitōroku Kankōkai, 1982), 137–140.
- 6 Hayasaka, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei*, 377.
- 7 Hata Tsutomu, *Kokorozashi* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1996), 80. See also: Nakagawa Ichirō, *Seirankai – Keppan to Yūkoku no Ronri* (Tokyo: Rōman, 1973).
- 8 “Ribei Yiyuan Yeliang Gongyi, Gaojian Sanlang, Tanwei Hongji, Yuzhi Helang Fanghua” [The Visit to Taiwan by Japanese Legislators Nora Kyōichi, Tamaki Saburō, Nadao Hirokichi, and Tamaki Kazuo], 11-EAP-01049,012.22/0059, AS. “Ribei Renshi Fandui Rifei Jianjiao” [Japanese Opposition to Establishing Relations with the Bandits], 11-EAP-00289,00.7/0001, AS.
- 9 “Tanwei Hongji /Shen Chang-huan Huitan Jilu” [Record of Conversation between Nadao Hirokichi and Shen Chang-huan], October 1, 1973, Rifei Gouda Ziliao, 11-EAP-00 568,005.22/006, AS. Nadao Hirokichi Sensei Tsuitō Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Watakushi no Rirekisho – Nadao Hirokichi* (Tokyo: Nadao Hirokichi Sensei Tsuitō Henshū Iinkai, 1996), 116, 132–133.
- 10 Kosaka Zentarō, *Chūgoku Mitamama* (Tokyo: Kashima Technical Research Institute, 1967), 21–24, 63, 77–78, 138; Kosaka Zentarō, *Arekara Korekara*, 156–170; Liberal Democratic Party, *Jiyū Minshutō Tōshi* (Tokyo: Liberal Democratic Party, 1987), 582–583; Liberal Democratic Party, *Jiyū Minshutō 50 Nenshi*, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Liberal Democratic Party, 2006), 326–327.
- 11 Tanaka Kakuei, “Nicchū no Kadai wa ‘Shingi’ to Ryōkokumin no ‘Jiyū na Ourai’ da – Ima Hajimete Akasu Nicchū Kokkō Kaifuku no Hiwa,” *Hōseki* 11–12 (1984), 74–75.
- 12 Kosaka Zentarō, *Arekara Korekara*, 172. See also: Kosaka Zentarō, “Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka Kyōgikai no Kaichō toshite,” in Liberal Democratic Party, ed., *Jiyū Minshutō Tōshi (Shōgen/Shashin-hen)* (Tokyo: Liberal Democratic Party, 1987), 230–231.
- 13 Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitō Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 141–142.

- 14 Diary of Morita Hajime, August 3, 1972.
- 15 Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitō Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 143.
- 16 Diary of Morita Hajime, August 16, 1972.
- 17 “Jimintō Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka Kyōgikai ni Okeru Kaya Okinori Sensei no Shitsumon ni tai suru Kaitō” [Answer to the Question by Kaya Okinori at the LDP Sino-Japanese Normalization Council], August 15, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–647. See also: Nakano Shirō, *Tanaka Seiken 886 Nichi* (Tokyo: Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1982), 116–118.
- 18 Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu, ed., *Kenryoku no Chūsū ga Monogatari Jimintō no 30 Nen* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1985), 173–174.
- 19 *Journal of Morita Hajime*, August 29, 1972.
- 20 Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitō Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 146–154. See also: Gekkan Jiyū Minshu Henshūbu, *Jimintō Seiken no 30 Nen – Nihon no Shinro o Kimeta Otoko-tachi* (Tokyo: Taiyō Kikaku, 1986), 220–228.
- 21 GRIPS Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, *Tagawa Seiichi Ōraru Hisutorī*, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2001), 256, 258; Tagawa Seiichi, *Nicchū Kōshō Hiroku – Tagawa Nikki 14 Nen no Shōgen* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1973), 356–378. According to Furui, “Tagawa held portraits of the late Matsumura [Kenzō] and Takasaka [Tatsunosuke] to his chest. . . . This first flight was to carry broadcast technicians in preparation for Tanaka’s visit to China” (Furui Yoshimi, *Nicchū Kokkō*, 136). See also: “Guowuyuan Waibian Waishi Jianbao: Riben Ziyou Minzhudang Guohui Yiyuan Tagawa Seiichi zhi Liao Chengzhi Han” [State Council Foreign Affairs Report: Letter from Japanese LDP Diet Member Tagawa Seiichi to Liao Chengzhi], 105-01657-05, FMA; CPC Central Committee Literature Center, ed., *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol. 2, 550–551.
- 22 Kosaka Zentarō, *Arekara Korekara*, 175–187. See also: “Liao Chengzhi Wenji” Bianji Bangongshi, ed., *Ryō Shōshi Bunshū*, trans., Andō Hikotarō (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1993), 51–57; CPC Central Committee Literature Research Center, ed., *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol. 2, 551.
- 23 Okazaki Kaheita-Den Kankōkai, ed., *Okazaki Kaheita-Den – Shin wa Tateito, Ai wa Yosoito* (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1992), 371–373.
- 24 “Zhuiming Yuesanlang Fonghua” [Visit to Taiwan by Shiina Etsusaburō] 11-EAP-01075,012.22/0088, AS. Shiina Etsusaburō, “Watakushi no Rirekisho,” in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, ed., *Watakushi no Rirekisho*, Vol. 41 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1970), 228–230.
- 25 Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitō Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 155–156. See also: Tamura Shigenobu, *Nichika Dankō*, 22–23.
- 26 Matsumoto Ayahiko, “Chūka Minkoku (Taiwan) Kenbunki,” in Matsumoto Ayahiko et al., eds., *Nittai Kankei no Aratana Sekkeizu – Jitsumu Gaikō to Kusa no Ne Kōryū* (Tokyo: Seizansha, 2010), 33.
- 27 Matsumoto Ayahiko, *Taiwan Kaikyō no Kakebashi ni – Ima Akasu Nittai Dankō Hiwa* (Tokyo: Kenbun Books, 1996), 130–146. See also: Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, ed., *Matsumoto Ayahiko Oral History* (Tokyo: Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, 2008), 29–33.
- 28 “Zhuiming Teshi Fanghua” [Visit to Taiwan by Special Envoy Shiina], Vol. 3, 11-EAP-01084,012.22/89033, AS. The Japanese foreign ministry record of the meeting between Mizuno and Chang no longer exists, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2010–613.
- 29 Mizuno Kiyoshi, “Satō Eisaku ni ‘Kokkō Kaifuku’ o Semmata Hibi,” *Gendai* (November 1992), 136–138. Matsumoto Ayahiko, *Taiwan Kaikyō*, 143–144; Japanese Historical Manuscripts Association, ed., *Matsumoto Ayahiko Oral History*, 32; Karasawa Shunjiro, *Karasawa Shunjiro Oral History – Sorosoro Zenbu Hanashimashō* (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū Kikaku Shuppanbu, 2009), 152.
- 30 Interview with Mizuno Kiyoshi, November 30, 2010.

- 31 Tamaki Kazuo Kirokushū Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Seitō Seijika Tamaki Kazuo* (Tokyo: Gakushū Kenkyūsha, 1988), 91–95, 696–697. See also: Fujio Masayuki, “‘Hōgen Daijin’ Futatabi Hoeru,” *Bungei Shunjū* (November 1986), 112.
- 32 Telegram from Acting Ambassador to Taiwan Itō Hironori to Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, September 6, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2010–438.
- 33 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, ed., *Nicchū Kaikō*, 207.
- 34 Minutes of the 71st Diet – 2nd Subcommittee of the House of Councilors’ Budget Committee, 4 (April 9, 1973). See also: Tamaki Kazuo, “Seirankai no Shōrai to Nihon – Nihon no Dōgi o Torimodosō,” in Nakagawa, ed., *Seirankai*, 176–179.
- 35 *Sankei* (March 30, 1977). Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitōroku Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 192. See also: Nakae, *Chūgoku no Yukue*, 30; Fukumoto Kunio, *Omote Butai, Ura Butai – Fukumoto Kunio Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2007), 54–55, 65, 69–70.
- 36 Nakae Yōsuke, *Nicchū Gaikō no Shōgen* (Tokyo: Sōtensha, 2008), 107.
- 37 *Sankei* (March 30, 1977). Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitōroku Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 192.
- 38 Nakae Yōsuke, “Namatamago o Butsukerareta Nittai Dankō Shisetsudan,” *Gendai* (November 1992), 139–140.
- 39 Nakae, *Rashikunai Taishi*, 54.
- 40 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 110–111. See also: Tamura et al., *Nikka Dankō*, 231–233.
- 41 Nakae, *Ajia Gaikō*, 129–130.
- 42 Nakae Yōsuke, “Nicchū Seijōka to Taiwan,” *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyū* 24:1 (2003), 98.
- 43 Takeshita Noboru, *Shōgen – Honshu Seiken* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1991), 83–85. See also: Takeshita Noboru, GRIPS Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, ed., *Seiji to wa Nani ka – Takeshita Noboru Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2001), 274–278.
- 44 Nakae, *Ajia Gaikō*, 133–134. See also: Nakae, *Rashikunai Taishi*, 53–55; Nakae, *Nicchū Seijōka*, 98.
- 45 Ogura Kazuo, “Wakare no Gaikō no Dorama – Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka no tai Taiwan Gaikō to Iwareru ‘Tanaka Shinsho’ o Megutte,” in Ishii et al., eds., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 230.
- 46 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 47 “Tanaka Sōri no Shō Kaiseki Sōtō-ate Shinsho (An)” [Letter from Prime Minister Tanaka to President Chiang Kai-shek (Draft)], Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2010–267.
- 48 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 49 Kimura, *Sōri no Hinkaku*, 24.
- 50 Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitōroku Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 175.
- 51 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 145–149. See also: Takahashi Masahiro, Wakayama Kiichirō, “Tōjisha ga Akiraka ni shita 30-nenme no Shinjitsu: ‘Nicchū’ ka ‘Nittai’ ka de Yureta Nihon Gaikō,” *Chūō Kōron* (April 2003), 60–74.
- 52 Ogura, “Wakare no Gaikō,” 231.
- 53 Interview with Ogura Kazuo, June 1, 2010.
- 54 Telegram from Ambassador to Taiwan Uyama Atsushi to Ōhira, September 15, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–715.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 *Mainichi Shimbun* (September 18, 1972). See also: *Yomiuri Shimbun* (September 18, 1972); Nakae, “Nittai Dankō Shisetsudan,” 140; Tamura et al., *Nikka Dankō*, 51–57.
- 57 Matsumoto, *Taiwan Kaikyō*, 156–159. Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, ed., *Matsumoto Ayahiko Oral History*, 34–39. See also: Tamaki Kazuo Kirokushū Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Seitō Seijika*, 96.
- 58 Interview with Wakayama Kyōichi, August 3, 2010.
- 59 Matsumoto, *Taiwan Kaikyō*, 159–161.
- 60 Nakae, *Nicchū Gaikō*, 105–106.

- 61 A summary of Ho Ying-chin's remarks can be found in "Telegram from Uyama to Ōhira," September 21, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01-1933-16.
- 62 Telegram from Uyama to Ōhira, September 18, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008-715. Ishii, "Nittai Dankōji," 90-98. See also: Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 145.
- 63 "Zhuiming-Yan Huitan Jilu" [Record of Conversation between Shiina and Yen], September 18, 1972, Shiina Teshi Fanghua, Vol. 3.
- 64 Minguo 61-Nian Jiang Jingguo Dashi Riji Luegao [Abridged Version of Chiang Ching-kuo's Important Matters Diary for 1972] (Chiang Ching-kuo Zongtong Wenwu 005000000235A).
- 65 Nakae Yōsuke, "Shiina Etsusaburō/Shō Keikoku Kaidan Kiroku – 'Nakae Memo'," *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyū* 24:1 (2003), 59-80.
- 66 Nakae, *Ajia Gaikō*, 139-140.
- 67 Kosaka, *Arekara Korekara*, 186. See also: Kosaka, *Kaichō to shite*, 231.
- 68 Matsumoto, *Taiwan Kaikyō*, 181-182.
- 69 Nakae, *Chūgoku no Yūkie*, 32-34.
- 70 Diary of the Morita Hajime, September 20, 1972.
- 71 Shiina Etsusaburō, "Nicchū Mondai Oboegaki" [Memo on the Sino-Japanese Issue], undated, Shiina Etsusaburō Kankei Bunsho 78, NDL Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room.
- 72 Fukumoto, *Omote Butai*, 39-40.
- 73 Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku Kankōkai, ed., *Eien no Ima* (Tokyo: Ōhira Jimusho, 1980), 465; Prime Minister's Office, ed., *Ōhira Naikaku Sōri Daijin Enzetsushū* (Tokyo: Nihon Kōhō Kyōkai, 1980), 453.
- 74 Shiina Etsusaburō Tsuitōroku Kankōkai, *Kiroku*, Vol. 2, 176; Chang Ch'un, *Wo yu Riben 70 Nian* (Taipei: Zhongri Guanxi Yanjiuhui, 1980), 265-266; Chang Ch'un, *Nikka/Fūun no 70 Nen*, trans., Furuya Keiji (Tokyo: Sankei, 1980), 279-280. See also: Lin Jinjing, *Ume to Sakura – Sengo no Nikka Kankei* (Tokyo: Sankei, 1984), 295-296.
- 75 Interview with Kiuchi, June 19, 2010.
- 76 Satō Akiko, *Tanaka Kakuei*, 36, 106.
- 77 Gotōda Masaharu, "Watakushi no Rirekisho," in Kishi Nobusuke et al., eds., *Watakushi no Rirekisho – Hoshu Seiken no Ninaite* (Tokyo: Nikkei Business Bunko, 2007), 291. See also: Gotōda Masaharu, Mikuriya Takashi, ed., *Jō to Ri – Kamisori Gotōda Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Kōdansha Plus Alpha Bunko, 2006), 338-344.
- 78 Hashimoto Hiroshi, "Eiyū to Eiyū no Ketsudan," in Tanaka Kakuei Kinenkan, ed., *Tanaka Kakuei*, 95-96.
- 79 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 112.
- 80 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (April 8, 2010, evening edition).

6 Tanaka's visit to China and the "Meiwaku" speech (September 25)

"I Go Prepared to Die"

As Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi hurriedly made preparations to visit China, the Chinese government was doing all it could to convince their population to welcome the Japanese delegation despite their fresh memories of the war.

According to Wu Jinan, who was charged with carrying out these persuasion efforts at a cotton mill in Shanghai, one worker told him – tears in his eyes – that "My parents were killed by the Japanese military. I cannot welcome the Japanese prime minister."¹ This sentiment was undoubtedly echoed by many across China.

The Chinese foreign ministry issued a document titled "Outline for Internal Propaganda Related to Prime Minister Tanaka's Visit to China" and had study meetings held in each region to convince their local populations. According to this document, Sino-Japanese normalization would aid China in the struggles against the Soviet Union and the "revival of Japanese militarism," the struggle for the liberation of Taiwan, and in helping ease tensions in Asia. The ministry's release of the document was approved by Mao Zedong.²

According to Japan Division Deputy Director Ding Min, thorough background checks were undertaken on everyone who would be caring for the Japanese delegation – from the hotel staff to the delegation's drivers – to ensure that none of their parents had been killed by the Japanese.³

Before departing for China, Tanaka showed his determination to resolve the issues between the two countries, telling Konaga Keiichi, his secretary, that "it is when a politician is at the height of their power that they should take on the most difficult problems before them." He also spoke of the significance of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai's membership in the "first generation of the revolution":

The first generation – and this is true in every case – has a suitable level of leadership ability. But as you enter the second and third generations, that ability wanes. We need to resolve this difficult problem while that first generation is still healthy. And we need to do it while we are at our strongest.

Tanaka's view was that – with the first generation in China still alive and he at the height of his power – this was the only time when Sino-Japanese normalization could become a reality.⁴

Tanaka, Ōhira, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaidō Susumu arrived at Haneda Airport early on the morning of September 25, 1972. Among those seeing them off were Deputy Prime Minister Miki Takeo and LDP Vice President Shiina Etsusaburō, who Tanaka told, “We’ll talk when I get back.” The delegation of roughly fifty people boarded a specially arranged JAL flight at 8:10 a.m. and departed.⁵

As they left, Tanaka told Ōhira that “We promised the public that we’d resolve the Sino-Japanese issue, so we have to get this done. Let’s do this.” Despite this, Tanaka would describe himself in later years as having not been optimistic about the negotiations that awaited in Beijing, saying that “As we left for China, I didn’t believe that we would be able to resolve everything.”⁶ And according to Nikaidō, Tanaka even told him that “I go prepared to die.”⁷

However, appearing in good spirits, Tanaka displayed a quite different attitude to the foreign ministry officials on the plane. He told them that he was leaving everything up to them but that “I don’t at all mind going home empty-handed if we can’t get normalization done.” The officials took heart from his words. Looking back, Treaties Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu said that “Hearing him say that really put me at ease, even if I knew that he probably didn’t actually feel that way.”⁸

Shaking hands with Zhou Enlai

After landing at Beijing Airport at 11:30 a.m., Tanaka descended from the flight on stairs covered in a red carpet. Zhou Enlai, wearing a gray Mao jacket, approached and the two men exchanged a firm handshake, shaking their hands five or six times.

Tense expression on their faces, Tanaka and Ōhira’s attention was drawn to the tall flagpoles on which the Japanese and Chinese flags flew as *Kimi ga Yo*, the Japanese national anthem, played amidst the blue sky of a bright autumn day.

After reviewing the honor guard at the airport, Tanaka entered a car with Zhou and headed for his accommodations in the Diaoyutai State Guest House in western Beijing along an avenue lined with verdant trees.⁹ But as his motorcade traveled through the city, there was no sign of any welcoming Chinese public, only police officers stationed every 100 meters along the road.¹⁰

Arriving at the guest house, Tanaka and Ōhira were shown to Villa 18, which was surrounded by a large pond and a beautiful garden. This facility was reserved for use by heads of state (the Emperor would also use this villa during his visit to China).

As he entered his room, Tanaka’s eyes widened. He was very sensitive to heat, but while it was like a furnace outside, inside it was seventeen degrees, his preferred temperature. And sitting in the corner of the room were Taiwanese bananas

and *anpan* sweet rolls from Kimuraya in Ginza, both favorites of his. The Chinese had obviously thoroughly investigated his preferences.

Before he could stop himself, Tanaka muttered to his secretary Hayasaka Shigezō that “We’ve come to an extraordinary country. We’ll need to negotiate for dear life.” Similarly, the miso soup served to him for breakfast in Beijing each morning was made using Tanaka’s usual of three-year-aged miso from Nishimaki in Kashiwazaki, Niigata.

Chinese “journalists” had begun interviewing Tanaka’s secretaries and others about his likes and dislikes as early as May, nominally for the purpose of writing a story on him. China evidently sought to make the most of the personal information it had been able to gather on him. As he looked over the food in his room, Tanaka became keenly aware of how thorough the Chinese preparations for his visit had been and how enthusiastic they were about restoring relations with Japan.¹¹

The first Tanaka–Zhou meeting

Shortly after 2 p.m., the Chinese and Japanese leaders headed to the Ahui Hall at the Great Hall of the People. Along a long table, Tanaka, Ōhira, Nikaidō, and China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi faced Zhou, Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, Foreign Policy Advisor Liao Chengzhi, and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong. This meeting marked the opening of the Sino-Japanese negotiations.

Tanaka boldly began the talks by announcing that “The time is ripe for Sino-Japanese normalization. I absolutely want this trip to China to be a success and for us to make normalization a reality.” Ōhira echoed this sentiment, saying that “I would like for us to achieve Sino-Japanese normalization and, by doing so, take the first step towards a long-lasting friendship between China and Japan.”

He then clearly laid out Japan’s position:

We are faced with two issues.

The first is that of the Treaty of Taipei. We can well understand the Chinese position that the treaty was illegal and therefore invalid. However, it was ratified by the Japanese government with the approval of the Diet. Should the Japanese government accept the Chinese interpretation, it would have to bear the dishonor of having continually deceived the Japanese people and Diet for the past twenty years. We would thus like to ask for the understanding of the Chinese delegation towards [our position] that as soon as diplomatic relations between us are normalized, the Treaty of Taipei will have completed its purpose.

The other matter is that of relations with third parties. In particular, the US-Japan relationship is extremely important for the continued existence of Japan. . . . We would like for Sino-Japanese normalization to be achieved in a manner that does not damage our nation’s relationship with the United States.

Ōhira thus began the meeting by discussing the Treaty of Taipei and the importance of continuing the US–Japan security framework. As shown in his remarks, the Japanese position was that the state of war between China and Japan had already come to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Taipei.

Zhou argued against this:

While I acknowledge that the issue of the state of war is a difficult one for Japan, I am unable to completely agree with Minister Ōhira's proposal. If no state of war has existed since the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco, it would mean that China was not involved, despite being one of the concerned parties.

I will leave this issue to the foreign ministers to discuss. I believe that they will discover a formula to which both nations will be able to agree.

Turning to the second of Ōhira's issues, he softened his tone, noting that "We will not touch upon US-Japan relations. That is an issue for Japan alone." He expanded on this, going so far as to say that

China, Japan, and the United States are in agreement that the Soviet Union cannot be permitted to intervene in the Taiwan issue. We Chinese have no desire to infringe upon either the US-Japan security treaty or the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty.

Zhou was willing to accept the US–Japan security framework for the sake of prioritizing China's strategy toward the Soviet Union.¹²

The two sides having laid out their principal positions, the first meeting between the leaders came to an end. The Japanese foreign ministry's representative at the meeting had been Hashimoto. While Treaties Bureau Director Takashima Masuo and Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō were also present in China and more senior in the ministry's leadership, Hashimoto's presence at the meeting was taken as a given.¹³ Having provided support to both Tanaka and Ōhira prior to the trip, Hashimoto's position during the negotiations was absolute.

The "Meiwaku" speech

That evening, Zhou Enlai hosted a banquet for the Japanese delegation at the Great Hall of the People. Those invited included not only Tanaka, Ōhira, Nikaidō, and other Japanese officials but also members of the international media and figures involved in the LT trade. With approximately 600 guests in attendance (including those from China), the scale of the banquet greatly exceeded that held during Nixon's visit. The event was also broadcast live on Japanese television via satellite. The floor of the hall was covered with a deep red carpet and Chinese and Japanese flags decorated the center.¹⁴

Zhou sat at the center of the main table with Tanaka on his right and Ōhira on his left. Tanaka was restless, fanning himself and wiping sweat off his face

Table 6.1 Tanaka and Ōhira's Schedule for September 25

08:10	Tanaka and Ōhira's departure from Haneda Airport
11:30	Arrival in Beijing (12:30 Japan Standard Time)
14:55–16:50	First Tanaka–Zhou meeting (Great Hall of the People)
18:30–	Banquet hosted by Zhou (Great Hall of the People)

Source: Ishii Akira, et al., eds. *Kiroku to Kōshō – Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka/Nicchū Heiwa Yūkō Jōyaku Teiketsu Kōshō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), etc.

with a cool towel. By contrast, Ōhira was perfectly still and almost seemed to be asleep.¹⁵ Zhou used his chopsticks to serve Tanaka food and poured him generous amounts of *Maotai* and red wine, assuring him that “No matter how much of this you drink, it won’t go to your head.”¹⁶

The Chinese preparations for the banquet were as thorough as always. Uniformed members of the People’s Liberation Army orchestra began performing Japanese folk songs, including “Sakura, Sakura,” “Sado Okesa,” “Konpira Fune Fune,” and “Kagoshima Ohara Bushi.” These were songs from the hometowns of Tanaka, Ōhira, and Nikaidō, and their unlikely performance spoke of China’s enthusiasm for the Japanese visit.

Zhou then approached the dais and began to speak:

The invasion of China by Japanese militarists, which began in 1894 and lasted for half a century, caused the Chinese people tremendous misfortune and did great damage to the Japanese people as well. . . . The Chinese people, in accordance with the teachings of Chairman Mao Zedong, makes a distinction between the very few militarist elements in Japan and the entirety of the Japanese people. . . .

Prior to Your Excellency’s visit to China, you stated that you believed that the talks between our nations would result in an agreement, that they must result in an agreement. I am sure that by working hard, talking things out thoroughly, and laying small differences aside and aiming for unity on the major points, we absolutely will be able to achieve Sino-Japanese normalization.

As he finished, Zhou raised his glass in a toast. Then *Kimi ga Yo* played and it was Tanaka’s turn to approach the dais and speak. Given the heavy importance which China placed on ceremony, this was one of the highlights of Tanaka’s visit.

Despite his reputation as a gifted public speaker, even Tanaka was unable to hide his nervousness as he began to speak. Following opening pleasantries, he touched upon the history between the two countries:

Sino-Japanese relations regrettably followed an unfortunate course over several decades in the past. During this period, our nation caused tremendous *meiwaku* (trouble) to the Chinese people, for which I again express my deep regret. I have no choice but to frankly recognize as historical fact that an

abnormal and unnatural state has continued even following the end of the Second World War. . . .

I pray that we establish a new relationship as a good neighbor to great China and its people and that – while respecting the relationships each of us have with our allies – our nations contribute to peace and prosperity to Asia and the world.

Zhou and the other Chinese guests had applauded during each pause in Tanaka's speech but froze when Tanaka made his statement referencing the "meiwaku" that Japan had caused.

The wounds of the Second Sino-Japanese War were still unhealed in China, and from their perspective, Tanaka's words seemed extremely careless. Additionally, while Tanaka was well known for his oratory skill, he appeared stiff as he spoke, and the tone of his voice was nearly flat.¹⁷

That Zhou would fiercely criticize Tanaka over this statement at their meeting the following day is well known. The foreign journalists present also struggled to translate "meiwaku" into English.¹⁸

"The Pride of the Japanese People" – undefeated by China

A close examination of photographs of the event reveals that Tanaka was holding a small piece of paper in his left hand as he spoke. His speech had of course not been an impromptu event and Tanaka had not actually written a single word of it himself; drafting diplomatic language of this kind was generally the work of the foreign ministry.

But in that case, who was it at the foreign ministry who actually drafted the speech, and what were their intentions as they did so? Hashimoto explained:

On the evening of Tanaka Kakuei's arrival in China, a large banquet was held at the Great Hall of the People and Tanaka gave a speech. This was when he used the term "meiwaku," something that became a problem later. His use of the term was attacked as being overly shallow. Zhou Enlai was one of those who complained. Over the course of the entire trip, Tanaka would give speeches along the same lines as the one at the Great Hall of the People six or seven times. These were addresses which he gave as the prime minister of Japan at various occasions. I personally wrote every one of these myself. I didn't have a subordinate do it.

Hashimoto has a strong sense of responsibility, and he took on the burden of making high-level decisions himself rather than relying upon his subordinates to do it for him. What were his actual intentions behind the use of the term "meiwaku"?

It had been quite a while since the end of the war. Everyone understood that Japan had lost and that China had won. But the great majority of Japanese, both then and now, felt that we were defeated because we went to war with

America. They didn't feel that we had been defeated by China. We had to candidly acknowledge that the Japanese military had done terrible things to China. But I wanted to do what I could to protect the pride of the Japanese people. That was my intention as I wrote the speech, and neither Foreign Minister Ōhira nor Prime Minister Tanaka made a single change to the text that I prepared.¹⁹

So, while Hashimoto privately recognized that "the Japanese military had done terrible things to China," he also took into account the domestic sentiment that Japan "hadn't lost to China," and did what he could to protect the "pride of the Japanese people."

A speech that came as close to the line as possible

While Hashimoto's intention may have been to protect the "pride of the Japanese people," there will likely be criticism that his use of "meiwaku" was inappropriate. Four things should be kept in mind, however.

First, when viewed as a whole, the speech is clearly intended to be apologetic, as can be seen in Tanaka's words, "I again express my deep regret."

Second, as already discussed in Chapter 2, Tanaka had previously stated at the March 23 meeting of the House of Representatives' Budget Committee that "the major underlying premise of [Sino-Japanese normalization] has to be the sentiment that we caused them great meiwaku and sincerely apologize." For Tanaka, who had served in China, saying that Japan had "caused great meiwaku" was a statement infused with a feeling of genuine apology. Hashimoto was aware of this, and it is likely also why Tanaka did not make any amendments to Hashimoto's draft of the speech.²⁰

Third, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, Tanaka would go on to explain his intentions behind the use of the term "meiwaku" at his meeting with Zhou the following day. And not only did Zhou accept Tanaka's explanation, but Ji Pengfei recalls it as "having resolved the apology issue."²¹

Fourth, Tanaka and the other Japanese politicians expected to come under criticism from the Japanese right-wing and the foreign ministry officials involved with the trip were well aware of this. The contemporary domestic conditions under which the speech was drafted cannot be disregarded; its language was polished to come as close to the line as possible.

With the hindsight of history, it seems likely that Tanaka could have made a somewhat more in-depth apology. But at the time, they needed to take domestic factors into account (such as the faction of the LDP reticent to normalize relations with China). Because Hashimoto wanted Sino-Japanese normalization to succeed, he took the domestic situation into account. He attempted to make the speech's apologetic intention apparent when viewed as a whole but in a way that would not cause problems after Tanaka returned home.

The talks in Beijing were negotiations intended to bring everything to a conclusion in one fell swoop in a way acceptable to everyone, both at home and abroad.

Tanaka's speech was part of this effort. Wakayama Kyōichi, who had accompanied Shiina on his trip to Taiwan, later reminisced that "Whether discussing Japan-Taiwan relations or Japan-China relations, the truth of the matter is that to great extent, it's about Japan-Japan relations."²²

Was "Meiwaku" mistranslated?

As Tanaka spoke (keeping to the draft prepared by Hashimoto), a Japanese diplomat served as an interpreter for the Chinese. During this interpretation, "meiwaku" was translated into Chinese as "tian le mafan," a phrase that made Zhou and the other Chinese officials present indignant. It was this translation that actually angered China, not Tanaka's use of the term "meiwaku."

Does this mean that the translation provided by the Japanese foreign ministry was problematic? There were certainly those who felt that way at the time, including Lin Liyun, who was a fluent Japanese speaker.

Lin, who was born in Taiwan and raised in Kobe, was prized by Zhou for her ability as a Japanese interpreter, and she was listening at his side as Tanaka spoke. As soon as "meiwaku" was translated as "tian le mafan," she became concerned about the quality of the translation. When Tang Wensheng, who was translating the speech into English for the various foreign ambassadors present, muttered to himself that "that's far too mild," she quietly nodded.²³

Tanaka's speech had been translated into Chinese by Ohara Ikuo, a member of the foreign ministry's China Division. Ohara had been born and raised in China, spoke Chinese natively, and had studied the language at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He had been temporarily reassigned to Tokyo from the Japanese consulate general in Hong Kong for the purpose of the trip.

Would Ohara have made such a crucial mistake? As the speech was not spontaneous, the Chinese translation would almost certainly have been prepared in advance. Based on an interview with Ohara, let us reexamine Tanaka's speech from the perspective of interpreting.

As he worked on the translation of the speech, Ohara felt that he had to "find matching language that was neither better nor worse" than the original:

Had the Japanese been a little more specific . . . for example, had it mentioned the misfortune or suffering caused by the war, I would of course have been able to translate that verbatim. But it wasn't. It used the phrase "caused meiwaku." And so, I had no choice but to find the [Chinese] expression usually used to translate that. Accordingly, I do not perceive [my choice of words] as having been a major problem.

Ohara had a good relationship with Hashimoto and was fully aware of his intentions behind the speech. Furthermore, he had his translation checked by several other members of the China Division. No one there had any issues with it, including its translation of "meiwaku." He describes the office as having been very busy at the time, with "everyone running back and forth."

The translation of the speech was given to the Chinese in advance so that it could be typed and distributed to the hall. This meant that the Chinese knew about the translation's use of "tian le mafan" prior to Tanaka delivering the speech. Zhou's speech had been translated into Japanese in the same way.

The day of the speech, Ohara met with Tanaka and gave him "a copy of the speech with each paragraph marked with the places where I wanted him to pause" to allow for interpreting.

As Tanaka gave the speech, Ohara was standing in a corner of the stage. The stage was brightly lit with spotlights, making it difficult to see the audience and increasing Ohara's nervousness. Ohara followed the draft of the speech as Tanaka spoke and provided interpreting:

You can't say anything that the person actually giving the speech hasn't said. There are those who like to go off script, sometimes frequently. In the case of Prime Minister Tanaka, he stuck to the prepared text religiously.

In response to the criticism that there had been a mistranslation, Ohara responds that

Our duty was to [translate] things faithfully; if I had apologized in a way not actually in the Japanese text, *that* would have been a terrible mistranslation . . . it was extremely upsetting for me to see reporting and commentary that acted as if my translation must have been in error.

Despite this, Ohara also felt uneasy:

I didn't think that [the apology] would make it through the negotiations unchanged. I assumed that [Hashimoto] must have had some kind of reason for choosing that kind of language. It was obvious that the phrasing wouldn't make it into the final document on normalization as it was.

Ohara's prediction that "meiwaku" would not be a sufficient expression of apology for the Chinese would be proven true the following day.²⁴

Notes

- 1 *Asahi Shimbun* (August 27, 1997).
- 2 CPC Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, ed., *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, Vol. 13 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1998), 316. See also: Hu Ming, "Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka ni Okeru Chūgoku no Tainichi Gaikō Senryaku," *Kokusai Kōkyō Seisaku Kenkyūjo* 11:2 (2007), 237–238.
- 3 *Asahi Shimbun* (August 27, 1997).
- 4 Interview with Konaga, June 11, 2010.
- 5 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 25, 1972, evening edition).
- 6 Tanaka, "Nicchū no Kadai," 76.
- 7 *Asahi Shimbun* (August 27, 1997).

- 8 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 128.
- 9 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 25, 1972, evening edition).
- 10 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, ed., *Nicchū Fukkō*, 47.
- 11 Hayasaka, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei*, 364; Shuzaihan, *Shū Onrai*, 141–142; Liu Deyou, *Toki wa Nagarete*, Vol. 2, 516.
- 12 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 52–55; Zhang Xiangshan, “Chūnichi Fukkō Danhan Kaiko,” *Nihon Gakkan* 1 (1998), 34–48.
- 13 Letter from Hashimoto to the author, February 26, 2009.
- 14 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, ed., *Nicchū Fukkō*, 48.
- 15 *Mainichi Shimbun* (September 26, 1972).
- 16 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 26, 1972).
- 17 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, ed., *Nicchū Fukkō*, 48; *Asahi Shimbun* (September 25, 1972, September 26, 1972). See also: Jiyū Minshutō Kōhō Iinkai Shuppanyoku, ed., *Hiroku Sengo Seiji no Jitsuzō* (Tokyo: Jiyū Minshutō Kōhō Iinkai Shuppanyoku, 1976), 357–358; Satō Akiko, *Tanaka Kakuei*, 198; Kazankai, *Nicchū Kankei*, 422–423.
- 18 *The New York Times* (September 26, 1972); *the Washington Post* (September 26, 1972); *Yomiuri Shimbun* (September 27, 1972, evening edition). See also: Yabuki, *Gekikara Shohyō*, 101–102.
- 19 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008. See also: Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 130.
- 20 Tanaka also made statements along these same lines to the press corps on September 21, 1972. *Asahi Shimbun* (September 22, 1972). Tabata Mitsunaga, “1972-nen 9-gatsu 25-nichi – 28-nichi no Pekin,” in Ishii et al., eds., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 245.
- 21 Ji Pengfei, “Chishui Buwang Wajingren,” in N.H.K. Zaifengzu ed., *Zhou Enlai de Jueduan: Rizhong Bangjia Zhengchanghua de Lailong Qumai*, trans., Xiao Hong (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian, 1994), 167; Ji Pengfei, “Chishui Buwang Wajingren – Zhongri Jianjiao Jishi,” in An Jianshe, ed., *Zhou Enlai de Zuihou Suiyue: 1966–1976* (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1995), 290.
- 22 Interview with Wakayama, August 3, 2010.
- 23 *Asahi Shimbun* (February 26, 2008); *Asahi Shimbun Shuzaihan*, *Rekishi wa Ikite iru – Higashi Ajia no Kingendai ga Wakaru 10 no Teema* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 2008), 251; On Lin Liyun, see Ogawa Heishirō, *Pekin no 4 Nen* (Tokyo: Saimaru, 1977), 46–47; Honda Yoshihiko, *Nichi/Chū/Tai Mizaru Kizuna – Chūgoku Shunō Tsūyaku no Mita Gaikō Hiroku* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2006).
- 24 Interview with Ohara Ikuo, March 18, 2009. See also: Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 50–51.

7 Zhou Enlai's "Bluff" and Ōhira Masayoshi's "Trump Card" (September 26)

The first Ōhira–Ji meeting

Accompanied by Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō, Treaties Bureau Director Takashima Masuo, Secretary to the Prime Minister Kiuchi Akitane, China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi, Treaties Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu, and Secretary to the Foreign Minister Fujii Hiroaki, Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi arrived at the Great Hall of the People at 10:20 a.m. on September 26 for the first meeting of the foreign ministers. It was during this meeting that the Japanese proposal for the Sino-Japanese joint statement would have to be introduced and explained to their counterparts.

The Chinese delegation included Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong, Advisor on Foreign Affairs Zhang Xiangshan, Department of Asian Affairs Director-General Lu Weizhao, Department of Asian Affairs Deputy Director-General Wang Xiaoyun, Department of Asian Affairs Director Chen Kang, and Department of Asian Affairs Director Gao E.

Ōhira opened the meeting by stating that he wanted to “hear the thoughts of the Chinese delegation on the Japanese government’s proposal for the joint statement.” He then called on Takashima to begin his explanation.¹

Takashima’s wartime experiences had been bitter ones. He had entered the foreign ministry in 1941 after passing its entrance examination only to be drafted into the army the following year. He had then been detained in Siberia following the war, where he had lost some of his toes to frostbite. Despite these setbacks, he ultimately had a distinguished career, serving as the director of the Treaties Bureau, vice-minister, and ambassador to the Soviet Union before becoming a justice of the Supreme Court (a position he still held at the time of his death). Kuriyama, who worked under him, described Takashima as being “like a warrior of old, a diplomat from before the war.”²

Takashima began with the first clause of the Japanese draft, which read “The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China hereby confirm that the state of war between Japan and China has concluded.” He explained that “because this language only states that the state of war has ended and makes no explicit mention of *when* it ended, it is possible to maintain the positions of both China and Japan on this point.”

According to Takashima, the Treaty of Taipei that Japan had signed with Taiwan had been a valid treaty; Japan could not accept the Chinese position that it had been illegal. He also said that "the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan should not involve the creation of any kind of document that could be considered a secret agreement" between the two countries, thus rejecting the Chinese proposal for a "tacit agreement" on Taiwan.

The Japanese proposed the inclusion of the following language on Taiwan:

The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stance of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Takashima explained that "the fundamental view of the Japanese government is that the Taiwan issue must be resolved peacefully." And while Japan appreciated China's renunciation of its rights to reparations, it could not "agree to the use of any language in the joint statement that explicitly meant that the peace treaty that Japan concluded with Taiwan has always been invalid."

This was an indirect way of stating that, as Taiwan had already renounced its rights to compensation in the Treaty of Taipei, Japan's position was that China did not have any such rights. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the summarized explanation that Takashima was reading from had been written by Kuriyama.

After Takashima's explanation had ended, Ji expressed disapproval of how the Japanese proposal addressed the ending of the state of war and the "Japan-Taiwan treaty." The proposal was not, he said, "something that the Chinese people would be able to accept."

The language used in the Chinese draft for these two points was "The state of war that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which the joint statement is issued" and "The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." (Based on the Cairo Declaration, the Government of Japan gives its approval to this stance of the Chinese government.)

Another distinguishing characteristic of the Chinese draft in comparison to that of the Japanese was the inclusion of the phrase "The Government of Japan deeply reproaches itself for the war damage that Japanese militarism caused to the Chinese people in the past" in the joint statement's preamble. The Japanese

Table 7.1 Tanaka and Ōhira's Schedule for September 26

10:20–11:40	First Ōhira–Ji meeting (Great Hall of the People)
14:00–16:30	Second Tanaka–Zhou meeting (State Guest House)
17:10–18:20	Second Ōhira–Ji meeting (State Guest House)

Source: Ishii, *Kiroku to Kōshō*, etc.

delegation knew that usage of the term "Japanese militarism" would cause problems back home and they were therefore reluctant to accept it. The greatest issue of contention between the two sides – Taiwan – would continue to be discussed by Tanaka and Zhou in their talks later that day.³

After the meeting between the foreign ministers came to an end, Ōhira gathered together the foreign ministry leaders (Takashima, Yoshida, Kuriyama, and Hashimoto) and discussed what language to use on the end of the state of war, Japanese militarism, and the Chinese claim to Taiwan.⁴

The second Tanaka–Zhou meeting – Zhou's verbal attack on Takashima

During the second meeting of the prime ministers held at the State Guest House at 2 p.m., Zhou Enlai pushed back hard against the Japanese. He began the meeting by expressing his displeasure at Tanaka's *meiwaku* speech from the previous evening:

Prime Minister Tanaka's statement that Japan had "caused *meiwaku* to the Chinese people" has evoked the hostility of the Chinese people. In China, we only use the term "*meiwaku*" when dealing with matters of little importance.⁵

According to Hashimoto's description of the scene, "[Zhou] seemed absolutely furious and all the color immediately drained from Ōhira's face."⁶

Also, Zhou attacked the explanation that Takashima had provided of the Japanese position on the Treaty of Taipei earlier that morning:

I want to make our position on the Treaty of Taipei clear. That is Chiang Kai-shek's problem. I was shocked to hear the [Japanese] foreign ministry's interpretation that because Chiang renounced compensation, there was no need for China to do the same. . . . It was the Chinese mainland that suffered during the war. . . . We cannot accept the premise that this matter is settled merely because Chiang Kai-shek renounced [his claims].

Japan had approached this issue from a legalistic perspective, but for China it was nothing less than a matter of honor. Raising his voice, Zhou went so far as to angrily declare, "You are insulting us."

He did not merely explode in anger during the meeting, however. As he continued, he sought to leave ground for compromise by making a distinction between Takashima and the Japanese political leaders present: "I value the thoughts of Tanaka and Ōhira [on these matters]. Surely these statements by the foreign ministry must go against their beliefs."

Moreover, he adopted a more conciliatory tone on other points, noting that "as for the US-Japan security treaty, we do not believe that Taiwan will be liberated through force. And you bear no responsibility for the joint statement which Nixon and Satō released in 1969." And, bringing up the Northern Territories issue, he

mentioned that "Mao has said that all of the Kurile Islands are the territory of Japan."

In the face of Zhou's remarks, Tanaka merely stated that "the joint statement is a matter of great historical importance. I am absolutely confident that, if the ministers discuss it between themselves, they will be able to reach a conclusion." He thus left the difficult question of Taiwan to Ōhira to solve.⁷ He would, however, offer a defense of his speech the previous evening (as will be discussed shortly).

Hashimoto (who was present for this exchange) interpreted the rationale behind Zhou's attack on Takashima thusly:

I think it was a kind of bluff. I mean, Zhou outright said, "Those were Takashima's views. I'm sure there's no way that Tanaka and Ōhira believe that." [laughs] Director Takashima had of course worked everything out in advance with Foreign Minister Ōhira and was speaking on his behalf. And Prime Minister Tanaka had naturally given his approval to the statements as well. But if Ōhira had actually spoken up and said, "My views are the same as Takashima's," it would've immediately killed the negotiations.⁸

Under this interpretation, this "bluff" had been an attempt to gain concessions from Tanaka and Ōhira by making Takashima a scapegoat. Kuriyama had written the Japanese proposal for the joint statement and Takashima had provided Tanaka and Ōhira with a full explanation of its contents before making his presentation to the Chinese. There were no differences of opinions between Tanaka, Ōhira, and Takashima on these issues. Zhou was, of course, well aware of this. But by shifting the blame to Takashima, he sought to avoid a breakdown in the negotiations.

There are some sources that claim that Zhou insulted Takashima by calling him a "legal bandit" (*hōhi*), but this did not actually happen. According to Hashimoto, "None of the Chinese – not Zhou, not Ji Pengfei – ever called Treaties Bureau Director Takashima a 'legal bandit.' That's a lie."⁹ And Takashima himself would later tell Foreign Affairs Councilor Nakae Yōsuke that "everyone believes the story and spreads it. It doesn't do any good to deny it, so I just keep quiet and let it be."¹⁰

Tanaka's rebuttal

Did Tanaka have nothing to say in his defense upon hearing this fierce criticism of his speech? While his words are absent from the foreign ministry's record of the meeting, Tanaka did respond to Zhou's criticism of his use of "meiwaku." Tanaka later gave the following description of the exchange:

To say that you have caused someone *meiwaku* is not a superficial gesture. You have interpreted these words as being equivalent to merely saying "sorry," but that is not the case in the Japanese language. I was directly expressing my sincerest feelings of remorse. They were the words that come naturally, without artifice, to a Japanese. We were the ones who caused

meiwaku and it was thus only natural that I go to apologize. It was with those intentions that I have come to Beijing despite facing opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party.

Premier Zhou lightly nodded as he heard these words and made no further demands of us on this point. When I tried to explain the significance of my visit to China further, he changed the subject, saying, "I understand. I will stop finding fault with your words. We have more important issues in front of us, so let us quickly move on to those."

Tanaka thus claimed that once he had explained that his words had been sincere, this explanation was accepted by Zhou.¹¹ We do not have to rely upon Tanaka's word on this point, however, as a description of the exchange can be found in Ji's memoirs:

Tanaka explained to us that "To say that you have caused someone meiwaku is a sincere apology in Japanese. It means that you will not repeat the same mistakes and wish the other party's forgiveness. If you feel that more appropriate language could be used, you may revise my words in accordance with your customs." With this, the apology issue was resolved.¹²

Similarly, Zhang Xiangshan attributed the following words to Tanaka:

The phrase "I have caused you meiwaku" is an expression of heartfelt apology in Japan. It expresses a desire for forgiveness and includes a guarantee that the same mistakes will not be repeated.¹³

When I asked Hashimoto to confirm this, he told me that "[Tanaka] handled things in an appropriate manner immediately following Zhou's remarks."¹⁴

In defending himself, Tanaka attempted to dispel the Chinese doubts concerning his words. And, given that Ji recalls the issue as having been "resolved," it seems fair to say that this was an instance of the media making things seem worse than they had actually been (something that can also be seen in the case of the "legal bandit" myth).

The second Ōhira–Ji meeting

The second meeting between Ōhira and Ji was held at 5:10 p.m. at the State Guest House's Villa No. 18, with attendance limited to the two foreign ministers, Hashimoto, Zhang Xiangshan, interpreters, and notetakers.

Recognition of China's claims over Taiwan and the declaration of the end of the state of war were the issues of contention during the meeting. On the second of these issues, Ōhira put forward two potential drafts.

The first stated that "The Government of the People's Republic of China hereby declares that the state of war between China and Japan has ended." It thus took the form of a unilateral declaration on the part of China as the victor.

The second refrained from making any definitive statement regarding when the state of war had ended, saying only that "The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China hereby declare that henceforth, relations between Japan and China will be completely peaceful."

The two sides made little progress on this issue, however, as Ji responded that "We have received two Japanese proposals today on the ending of the state of war. However, we Chinese view the question of timing as one of the utmost importance." He held firm to the Chinese proposal that the state of war would come to an end "on the date on which this joint statement is issued."

When it came to the issue of Taiwan, however, Ōhira had come prepared with a trump card which he now read aloud:

The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stance of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stance under the Potsdam Proclamation.

Ji withheld judgment on this proposal.¹⁵

The Japanese proposal presented to the Chinese the day before had only said that the Japanese government "fully understands and respects" the Chinese position; Ōhira had now added that it "firmly maintains its stance under the Potsdam Proclamation." It seems likely that the reason that Ji avoided giving an answer was that he was unable to immediately grasp the significance of this change.

Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation (which Japan had accepted when it surrendered) stipulated that the terms of the November 1943 Cairo Declaration would be carried out. This declaration, which had been adopted by the American, British, and Chinese governments, in turn held that Taiwan would be returned to the "Republic of China."

Despite Ji's initial abstention, the Chinese ultimately gave their approval and Ōhira's proposal was adopted nearly verbatim as Article 3 of the Sino-Japanese joint statement (the only change was that "Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation" was specified in the joint statement).

Ōhira's addition, a mere ten words, saved the negotiations from breaking down and laid out a path for reaching an agreement with China.

Kuriyama's preparations

But where had Ōhira gotten the idea to reference the Potsdam Proclamation from? Hashimoto said that "It was Kuriyama who wrote that. No doubt about it."¹⁶

According to Kuriyama, Ōhira slumped his shoulders following the second meeting between Tanaka and Zhou. Giving a bitter laugh, he noted to the foreign ministry officials that "This really isn't going the way you guys said it would, is it?"

When Takashima remained silent, Kuriyama spoke up. "No, Minister, this is a staring contest. They want normalization just as much as we do, and that means they're just as desperate as we are." Ōhira seemed hesitant, but Kuriyama encouraged him, telling him that "You need to just think of it as a staring contest and keep fighting. The first one to blink loses."

And when Ōhira asked if they had nothing left, Kuriyama replied, "I wouldn't say that we're completely out of good ideas," and pulled a piece of paper from his suit pocket. It was this paper, which Ōhira took with him to his meeting with Ji Pengfei, that laid out language invoking the Potsdam Proclamation.

Kuriyama looked back on his suggestion as follows:

I thought it far too risky to go to Beijing without having some kind of plan or second proposal on hand if the Chinese rejected [our initial language of "fully understands and respects"]. It was because of this need to have another proposal ready that I thought up using the language "firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation." . . . I put this in my pocket and didn't show it to anyone . . .

As Ōhira readily understood, this phrasing meant that while Taiwan had not yet been returned to the mainland, Japan would not voice any objections when it happened in the future.

Ōhira made no changes to Kuriyama's proposal and his language would go on to be incorporated into Article 3 of the joint statement.

Kuriyama interpreted the difference between his proposal and the original Japanese draft this way:

[The expression "fully understands and respects"] is completely meaningless, legally speaking . . . Japan would have made no commitment as to what it would do if Taiwan expressed a desire for independence. Which is why I didn't think that China would accept it.

And if China rejected our first proposal, it would mean that we would have to sweeten the deal. The question was how. That was when I came up with "firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation." What did that mean? Well, it was written in the Cairo Declaration that Taiwan should be returned to the Republic of China. This was then carried over into the Potsdam Proclamation . . . So, in a sense, [the reference to the Potsdam Proclamation] meant that Japan was making a commitment to the idea of "one China" . . .

Zhou Enlai agreed to enter into an agreement with us because we had put down in writing that Japan would not support Taiwanese independence . . .

In that sense, Japan committed to Taiwan being returned to China . . .

But at the same time, Japan believed that Taiwan had not yet been returned to China as of September 29, 1972. The Chinese understood this and were extremely unhappy about it. . . . Nixon had taken the position in the Shanghai Communique of "acknowledging" but not "recognizing" the Chinese position. Japan could go no farther than that.

Kuriyama thus saw his proposal as a Japanese commitment to not support Taiwanese independence, and that is why the Chinese had accepted it. But at the same time, this language meant that Japan had not entirely accepted China's second principle for the restoration of relations, that is, that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China. It would not accept China achieving unification with Taiwan by force. According to Kuriyama, it was clear that unification had to be achieved through peaceful means:

We thought it so obvious that [unification] had to be undertaken peacefully that it didn't need to be stated. Under the formal legal argument adopted by China, the use of force against Taiwan would not be a war under international law because it was a part of China . . .

But the Chinese recognized that this was unlikely to hold up internationally. And therefore, they also understood that reunification would have to be achieved through peaceful means. But China's final position is that [they would use force] and we don't know what they would do if, for example, Taiwan declared independence. Which is why America asks Taiwan to please not do that and why Japan must continue to do the same.¹⁷

An anguished night

Let us return to the evening of September 26, 1972. Following their meeting with Ji, Ōhira and Hashimoto visited Tanaka's room. Nikaidō and Takashima also joined them.

The following re-creation of their meeting is based on interviews with Hashimoto and the account given in his memoir, *Eiyū to Eiyū no Taiketsu*.

Having attended three meetings that day, Ōhira was both exhausted and discouraged. Kuriyama's preparations had allowed him to continue to be hopeful for a resolution to the Taiwan issue, but the difficult question of the end of the state of war remained. China did not recognize the Treaty of Taipei and was holding firm to the idea of using the joint statement to end the state of war. His inability to find a solution on this point weighed heavily on Ōhira.

His eyes were blank as he arrived at Tanaka's room, Zhou Enlai's earlier anger still fresh in his mind. Even as dinner was brought in for Tanaka, Ōhira, Nikaidō, Takashima, and Hashimoto, Ōhira made no effort to reach for his chopsticks. Nearly the entire Japanese delegation was despondent.

The only man present who appeared to be in high spirits was Prime Minister Tanaka. For whatever reason, his face beamed with self-confidence. Ignoring Ōhira's unease, he downed a glass of *Maotai* and asked the group, "Hey, shouldn't we start eating?"

But Ōhira – who did not drink alcohol – could not get the remaining problems out of his mind. Unlike the Taiwan issue, no one had a secret plan for resolving the question of the state of war. And Zhou's fury during his second meeting with Tanaka had been entirely unexpected. Unless they were able to come up with some kind of ingenious proposal, it was entirely possible that the negotiations would collapse as early as the next day. He felt cornered.

Hashimoto was painfully aware of Ōhira's perception of an impending crisis:

There was an absolute feast laid out before our eyes, one dish after another. But Ōhira wasn't touching the food. And, because we were his subordinates, that meant that we couldn't eat, either. Treaties Bureau Director Takashima was fully aware that it had been his remarks earlier that day that had gotten things where they were. So, he [just stared down at the table].

Tanaka saw Takashima's demeanor and cheerfully tried to encourage him:

That was a tough one today, Takashima. If Zhou Enlai had gone any farther, I was really going to give it to him. But we only just got here, you know, and we didn't come to fight. Let's just eat and we can think about what to do afterwards.

This did not sit well with the ever-serious Ōhira. "Okay, so what are we going to take to the negotiations tomorrow? We surrendered unconditionally in 1945. Would you have us say that we're still at war now, in 1972?"

Tanaka poured himself another full cup of *Maotai* and downed it. He then turned to Ōhira and gave him a big smile. "College boys are never any good when things get tough like this."

In a rare display of emotion, Ōhira fired back: "Well, things have gotten tough. So what are we going to do at the negotiations tomorrow?"

Having predicted what his long-time ally's reaction would be, Tanaka burst into laughter. "Why are you asking me how we're going to come up with a counter-proposal for the Chinese? [I didn't go to college.] You guys did, right? This is a problem for the college boys."

Everyone broke into smiles at Tanaka's words and the room filled with laughter. While Tanaka had no unique perspective to offer on the situation, he had likely realized how terrible the atmosphere in the room would have become if even he, the prime minister, had allowed himself to act depressed.

Tanaka's unyielding attitude instantly cheered up Ōhira.¹⁸

An "Abnormal State of Affairs"

Having finally eaten, Ōhira headed back to his room and gestured to Hashimoto with his eyes for him to follow. When they entered, he turned to Hashimoto and asked, "Well, what are we going to do?"

Always a man of hot-blooded temperament, Hashimoto began arguing emphatically:

In the nearly thirty years since the end of the war, China hasn't fired a single shot at Japan. There is, in actual fact, no war going on between us. Whether we want to refer to that as peace or as a past state of war. . . . I don't think that's really all that important.

There was a forcefulness to Hashimoto's words that was unusual for a diplomat. Ōhira nodded as he listened. Hashimoto knelt next to him and continued:

The most important thing here is establishing friendly relations under which the people of both nations will be able to get along as good neighbors moving forward. That's essentially why we're normalizing relations, and China must naturally understand that. We need a simple phrase that provides an interpretation of the past that can then be used to lock that past away. How about "an abnormal state of affairs?"

As Hashimoto had noted, it certainly was abnormal for two neighboring countries to completely ignore one another. As both sides were unable to cede any ground on the term "state of war," he proposed that "abnormal state of affairs" be substituted in its place.

Ōhira's mood immediately improved as he heard this ingenious idea and he agreed to use it. It seems fair to say that Ōhira was never more grateful to one of his subordinates than he was on that day.

He put Hashimoto's idea forward to Ji Pengfei the next day, asking, "How would you feel about describing Sino-Japanese relations as they have existed as 'an abnormal state of affairs?'"

This language would ultimately be incorporated into Article 1 of the joint statement, which read that "The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Statement is issued."¹⁹

Having been filled with renewed vigor, Ōhira would strive to overcome China's remaining hurdles.

Notes

- 1 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 83–84.
- 2 Interview with Kuriyama Takakazu, March 10, 2009; Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 110–120.
- 3 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 85–86, 110–120.
- 4 Diary of Morita Hajime, September 26, 1972.
- 5 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 56.
- 6 Tabata, "Pekin," 241–242.
- 7 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 56–60.
- 8 Hashimoto Hiroshi, "Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka Kōshō," in Masayoshi Ohira Foundation, ed., *Kyokashūjitsu – Kikigaki Ōhira Masayoshi* (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Foundation, 2000), 158.
- 9 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008. See also: Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 128.
- 10 Nakae, *Rashikunai Taishi*, 28.
- 11 Tanaka, "Nicchū no Kadaï," 78–79. See also: Ni, "Tanaka Naikaku," Part 4, 78.
- 12 Ji, "Chishui Buwang Wajingren," 167; Ji, "Chishui Buwang Wajingren – Zhongri Jianjiao Jishi," 290.
- 13 Zhang Xiangshan, "Kaiko shi, Sikō shi, Teigen suru," *Jinmin Chūgoku* 59 (2002), 23.
- 14 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.

- 15 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 86–91.
- 16 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 17 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 129, 133–137. See also: Kuriyama Takakazu, "Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka," *Waseda Hōgaku* 74:4 (1999), 55; Kuriyama Takakazu, "Taiwan Mondai ni tsuite no Nihon no Tachiba – Nicchū Kyōdō Seimei Dai San Kō no Imi," *Kasumigasekikai Kaihō* 738 (2007), 11–15; Tōgō Kazuhiko, *Rekishi to Gaikō – Yasukuni/Ajia/Tōkyō Saiban* (Tokyo: Kōdansha Gendai Shinsho, 2008), 180–181.
- 18 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008. See also: Hashimoto, "Eiyū to Eiyū no Ketsudan," 96–97.
- 19 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.

8 The Senkaku Islands and Tanaka's meeting with Mao (September 27)

Informal discussions between the foreign ministers

Tanaka Kakuei and Ōhira Masayoshi received a tour of the Great Wall of China and the Ming Dynasty Tombs on the morning of September 27, causing Tanaka in particular to be in fine spirits due to the novelty of the experience.¹ But what is of more interest to us, however, is that Ōhira and Ji Pengfei shared a car while traveling to and from these sights, allowing the two men to hold unofficial discussions. And because there were few others with them, they were able to speak frankly about the joint statement.

When Ji requested that consideration be given to the inclusion of “some kind of clear statement” on the timing for the two countries’ exchange of ambassadors, Ōhira asked that the Chinese accept the use of “speedily,” the preferred Japanese language on the subject. He then explained why the Japanese did not want to be as explicit as Ji would have liked or go any farther than that:

First, there is the question of the safety of the 3,800 Japanese in Taiwan. We are concerned about how the Taiwanese are going to react. Next, we have no idea whether the Taiwanese embassy in Tokyo will immediately move to sever relations or if they will attempt to stay on. We wish you to understand, however, that we will take firm action should they show no intention of ever withdrawing.

The later joint statement would say that ambassadors would be exchanged “as speedily as possible.”

For his part, Ōhira used these discussions to express his misgivings about the Chinese draft’s mention of “Japanese militarism”:

The current visit of Prime Minister Tanaka to China is a demonstration of remorse towards the past, one he makes as a representative of the entire Japanese people. Because it is Japan as a whole that shows remorse for the war, we would like the language used to reflect that.

As discussed in Chapter 7, China had proposed including the language, “The Government of Japan deeply reproaches itself for the war damage that Japanese

Table 8.1 Tanaka and Ōhira's Schedule for September 27

08:00–13:00	Visit to Great Wall of China and Ming tombs; unofficial discussions between Ōhira and Ji (during car rides)
16:10–18:00	Third Tanaka–Zhou meeting (Great Hall of the People)
20:30–21:30	Tanaka–Mao meeting (Zhongnanhai)
22:10–00:30	Third Ōhira–Ji meeting (State Guest House)

Source: Ishii, *Kiroku to Kōshō*, etc.

militarism caused to the Chinese people in the past” in the preamble. Ōhira wanted to avoid the inclusion of any phrasing that could cause problems with conservatives back in Japan, however.

In response, Ji explained the Chinese rationale behind its use of the term “Japanese militarism”: “China’s approach on this topic is actually favorable to Japan, as we are making a distinction between the small group of militarists and the ordinary citizens who made up the majority of the Japanese population.”

He also stated that he

would like for us to do all we can to make a release of the joint statement either tonight or tomorrow morning possible. I would like to avoid a repeat of the situation with Nixon, where the statement was released in Shanghai.

Ji was thus trying to hasten the negotiations’ conclusion.²

Treaties Bureau Director Takashima and the other Japanese officials spent this morning coordinating with their Chinese counterparts and when Ōhira returned to the State Guest House at 1:25 p.m., he reported on their progress. They had narrowed down the remaining points of contention to whether the timing for the exchange of ambassadors would be specified, how the ending of the state of war was to be phrased, and what was to be said about the two countries’ intentions on a peace treaty.³

Takashima had felt ashamed after being rebuked by Zhou Enlai the day before, but he had been diligent in carrying out his duties in the absence of Tanaka and Ōhira.

The third Tanaka–Zhou meeting – a sudden mention of the Senkakus

The third meeting between Tanaka and Zhou was held at 4:10 p.m. at the Fujian Hall of the Great Hall of the People. Zhou opened the discussion by making the following statement:

Mr. Ōhira said that he wanted to include something in the joint statement to the effect that China and Japan wish to put an end to our past history and, through the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and peace, develop a constructive relationship going forward. We agree to this.

The talks between Ōhira and Ji had put Zhou in a better mood than he had been on the day before. He did voice some misgivings, however, noting that “looking at history, we are concerned about Japanese militarism.” Tanaka immediately rejected this possibility, stating definitively that “there will be absolutely no revival of militarism.”

Zhou then shifted his focus to the Soviets: “The Soviet Union calls for the abolishment of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. This must be exposed as the fraud it is.” The Sino-Soviet split was the primary reason that China sought to make peace with Japan quickly, and Zhou went so far as to claim that “should we cease our wariness of the Soviet Union, they will destroy us.” It seems likely that Zhou’s emphasis on the threat posed by the Soviets was a way of signaling to the Japanese that he was willing to compromise with them.

Tanaka responded by noting that “Given Japan’s level of industrial and technological development, we could produce nuclear weapons. But we do not, and neither do we possess any.” He then asked a surprising question: “What are your thoughts on the Senkaku Islands? I’ve been hearing a number of opinions on the matter.”

Tanaka’s sudden introduction of the Senkaku Islands – islands in the East China Sea which Japan had effective control of but whose ownership was disputed by China and Taiwan – was not something that any of the foreign ministry officials had foreseen.

As the room became tense, Zhou gently stopped Tanaka:

I do not wish to discuss the question of the Senkaku Islands at this time. It would not be beneficial to talk about this now. They have become an issue because of oil. If there were no oil, neither Taiwan nor the United States would make an issue of them.

He then changed the subject by asking, “How many months after normalizing relations shall we exchange ambassadors?”

Zhou shifted the course of the discussion to the topic of Taiwan and the meeting then came to a close.⁴

Tanaka, saved by Zhou

Tanaka had suddenly brought up the Senkaku Islands because he had wanted to secure a commitment from the Chinese on the issue that he could use to prevent a backlash back in Japan. China and Taiwan had begun to assert their claims to the islands in the early 1970s, and the issue had also been discussed between Japan and the United States in relation to the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control.⁵

The LDP Research Commission on Foreign Affairs had confirmed on March 28, 1972 that the Senkaku Islands were Japanese territory. According to the commission, the islands had been uninhabited when they were annexed by Japan via a cabinet order in January 1895, and that this had been in accordance with the

“international legal principal of first occupation.” They found this act to have been separate from the Treaty of Shimonoseki (signed two months later) under which China had ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan.

The Senkaku Islands had been placed under the US administration as part of Okinawa Prefecture following the Second World War (something to which the Chinese had voiced no objections). The commission thus found that they reverted to being Japanese territory after being returned to Japan under the Okinawa reversion agreement.⁶

Zhou was a seasoned veteran, however, and it was quite unlikely that he would easily agree with the LDP's interpretation. In fact, just by bringing a territory over which Japan exerted both *de jure* and *de facto* control into the discussion, Tanaka was potentially causing himself problems (diplomatic common sense held that it was unwise for a country exercising control over territory to invite discussion on that subject). It was because Tanaka had only been thinking in a purely domestic political context that he had referenced the Senkakus.

His act can thus be regarded as having been amateurish. It would have been easy for Zhou to seize upon Tanaka's question and assert that it meant that Japan recognized the existence of a territorial dispute over the islands. Far from securing a Chinese commitment over the islands, it is possible that Zhou could have laid the groundwork for future problems by making skillful use of Tanaka's words.

But Zhou had not done that. Instead, he had made an immediate decision that things would get out of control should the Senkakus come under discussion, and he thus let Tanaka's words pass by. Zhou's emphasis was on China's strategy toward the Soviet Union, and he wanted the Sino-Japanese joint statement to be signed quickly. Not only was Zhou a man capable of making rapid judgments, but he was more of a statesman than later Chinese politicians would be. It seems fair to say that Tanaka was unused to the workings of diplomacy and was saved by Zhou in this instance.

To put things another way, not only had China not made any demands regarding the Senkakus during the negotiations over normalization, but it had even blocked a Japanese attempt to introduce the subject. During the negotiations over normalizing relations between Japan and South Korea, the issue of Takeshima (a pair of islets claimed by both countries) had been taken up repeatedly. That did not happen here. No territorial disputes existed between the parties.

According to Hashimoto Hiroshi (who was present at the meeting), Zhou enlightened Tanaka as to the significance of his question by saying, “I understand how you feel, but once we start discussing it, who knows how many days it will take to resolve?”

Hashimoto gave the following interpretation of Tanaka's reasoning:

I think he anticipated being criticized about it once he got back to Japan (primarily from the right). “What, you just went along with whatever China said? You didn't even bring up the Senkakus?” So, he was trying to prevent that. He may have been negotiating with China, but his actual thoughts were of domestic politics.⁷

Hashimoto said that Tanaka had brought up the Senkakus based on his own judgment; he had not suggested it to him.⁸

The Tanaka–Mao meeting: a “Ceremony of Reconciliation”

As Tanaka, Ōhira, and Nikaidō ate their dinner at the State Guest House, Hashimoto received a visit from Han Xu, the Chinese director of protocol, who told him that “Chairman Mao Zedong has said that he would like to see Prime Minister Tanaka tonight. I would appreciate it if you would let me know in advance who will be accompanying him.”

Mao, China's highest leader, had not shown himself thus far, but he was now extending an invitation to the Japanese.

Hashimoto ran into Tanaka's room and reported that “Mao Zedong says that he wants to see the prime minister tonight. Who will go with him?” Tanaka responded, “Alright! I'll take Ōhira.” Ōhira then added “Nikaidō, as well.” The party thus consisted of these three men. That a meeting with Mao was being arranged suggested that the negotiations would reach a successful conclusion despite the tense atmosphere that had accompanied them.⁹

At 8:30 p.m., Tanaka and the others were taken to Mao's study at the Zhongnanhai. There they were met by Mao, Zhou Enlai, Ji Pengfei, and Liao Chengzhi, all in Zhongshan (Mao) suits. Liao was a diplomatic advisor who had studied at Waseda University prior to the war and had worked with Takashima Tatsunosuke to create the LT trade agreement in the 1960s.

Mao exchanged firm handshakes with Tanaka and the others and then invited them into his spacious study. The walls of the room were filled with classic Chinese books and the floor was covered with a red carpet.

He opened the meeting by asking Tanaka, “Have you concluded your fight with Premier Zhao? It is only after one has fought that one can become friends.”¹⁰

Tanaka answered, “No, no, our discussions have been extremely friendly. We haven't fought.”

Mao smiled and said, “Just as how it is said that rainfall can make the earth firmer, arguing can actually bring people closer together.”

When he then changed the subject and asked, “Has the food in Beijing been to your liking?” Tanaka grinned and answered, “The food here has been so delicious that I have found myself drinking too much Maotai.”

Turning to a more serious topic, Mao argued that

Your visit to Beijing has caused the entire world to be filled with trepidation. I speak mainly of the two great powers of the Soviet Union and the United States. They are privately alarmed [by this development] and I wonder what they are secretly planning from the shadows.

Also, he stressed the importance of their visit, asking “How could the issue of Sino-Japanese normalization be resolved, if not by the key figures of the Liberal Democratic Party?”

Mao regarded the Soviet Union as an immediate enemy. He also hoped to use Sino-Japanese normalization as a means to improve relations with the United States, which had still not normalized relations with China.¹¹

He then struck at a sensitive point in the negotiations by asking “What became of the meiwaku problem?” This was, of course, a reference to Tanaka’s meiwaku speech.¹² While Mao’s voice was calm as he spoke, this was a question that could potentially reignite past arguments and Tanaka was likely quite nervous that the subject had been brought up.

Perceiving the delicacy of the situation, Ōhira tactfully answered that the statement “had been amended and the situation resolved in accordance with the Chinese views.” Ōhira was resolved to make an explicit statement of apology in the joint statement.¹³ According to Tanaka, Mao said on the subject that “Prime Minister Tanaka’s interpretation of the term meiwaku sounds like the better one.”¹⁴

As the meeting drew to a close, Mao presented Tanaka with a set of the *Chu Ci Jizhu* (Commentary on the Verses of Chu), an annotated collection of classical Chinese poetry, remarking: “There are more books here than I could ever read. I read many for pleasure every day. I present this set of books to Prime Minister Tanaka.”

Tanaka bowed deeply several times and said, “I knew that [you were] a man of great learning, but I was unaware that [you] made such efforts behind the scenes.” As he saw them off, Mao broke custom and accompanied the Japanese partly down the hall.¹⁵

Nikaidō looked back on the meeting between Mao and Tanaka as a “ceremony of reconciliation” (*teuchi-shiki*):

What on earth was the point of that meeting? Looking back on it, I ultimately realized that it had been a ceremony of reconciliation. It had been meant to resolve certain issues, most notably the arguments over meiwaku, ensure that there were no lingering hard feelings, and allow the negotiations to reach a conclusion.¹⁶

Mao’s authority and the Gang of Four

But why had Mao presented Tanaka a set of the *Chu Ci Jizhu*? Hashimoto believed that it was meant to serve as a reference when writing poetry:

Tanaka had a fair amount of free time on his hands in Beijing, as he left much of the work to the foreign minister and working-level officials. So – and I don’t know how serious he was about this – he wrote Chinese poetry. And someone on the Chinese side caught wind of this. The *Chu Ci Jizhu* was given to Tanaka with the idea that, if he was going to write and study poetry, then it would likely be a useful reference for him.

Mao Zedong seemed to be in quite fine spirits. Allowing a foreign guest to meet Mao was a signal that the important discussions were more or less over,

and it had been decided that the talks had been successful. When talks collapsed or ended in bickering, no one was ever allowed to see Mao.

While Mao did not serve any public role during the Sino-Japanese negotiations, he exercised great power standing behind Zhou. Chinese politics at this time was characterized by confrontations between Zhou and the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan), a group which had risen to prominence during the Cultural Revolution.

What role did Mao play in this rivalry? Hashimoto analyzed the situation as follows:

While Mao Zedong was at the top, the actual work of politics was carried out by the “Gang of Four.” They held the actual power in this period and were running wild. When a problem arose, it would ultimately be Zhou Enlai who was put on the spot to deal with it.

As Zhou worked to move Sino-Japanese normalization forward, he would make full reports to Mao on each topic and receive his approval on how to handle it. This began with the decision to issue an invitation to Tanaka to visit and naturally included the compensation issue. He chose the timing of each of these reports carefully. I heard this from Zhang Xiangshan.

What of the relationship between Zhou and the Gang of Four?

For the entirety of the time when he was dealing with the normalization issue, Zhou would report to Mao on everything, obtain his okay, and only then go to negotiate with the Japanese. Although this might not be the nicest way to put it, he did this to twist the Gang of Four's arm. Because they certainly had a number of complaints about the joint statement. But Zhou was able to use Mao's authority to keep them completely in check. It was really quite impressive.

Zhou thus used “Mao's authority” to prevent any pushback from the Gang of Four against the joint statement.¹⁷

The third Ōhira–Ji meeting – “Keenly Conscious of the Responsibility and Deeply Reproaches Itself”

Despite the late hour, vital negotiations still awaited Ōhira, namely the work of ironing out the draft joint statement on the basis of the working-level talks that had been held that afternoon. Accompanied only by Hashimoto and an interpreter, he met with Foreign Minister Ji and Zhang Xiangshan at 10:10 p.m. at the State Guest House.

When Ōhira commented that “our discussions of earlier today have become our work for tonight,” Ji answered that he was “used to working at night.” The

two men got along well and had traveled together in the same car to and from the Great Wall.

Ji raised the Japanese expression of remorse for the war, the ending of the state of war, and the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship as the topics needing to be discussed.

The Chinese proposal on this first point had included the term "Japanese militarism." This had been unacceptable to Japan, and the Japanese had instead proposed the language "[Japan] deeply reproaches itself for the suffering and damage it caused through war."

Ji suggested that "the suffering and damage" be replaced by "its responsibility for the serious damage." In exchange for dropping the reference to "Japanese militarism," China wanted the clause to make explicit mention of Japan's responsibility. Ōhira accepted this and incorporated the Chinese proposal in the statement's text as "[Japan is] keenly conscious of its responsibility for the serious damage that it caused and deeply reproaches itself."

On the second point, Ji proposed using the phrase "the extremely abnormal state of affairs is terminated" in Article 1 of the joint statement in addition to having similar language in the preamble. The Chinese had thus decided to accept the inclusion of language that allowed "both China and Japan to have their own interpretations as to the timing of the end of the state of war." Ōhira replied that he was "grateful that you have accepted the Japanese idea on this" and amended Ji's phrasing to read "the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed."

On the third point, Ji proposed the language "[China and Japan have] agreed to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship following negotiations." Ōhira noted that "that is a matter for the Diet" and said that "it would be desirable to have language which does not give the impression that we have overstepped our bounds with regards to the Diet." He amended the text to instead read that China and Japan "will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship."

Moreover, the two men hurried to finalize the text on the three principles for the restoration of relations, the Chinese renunciation of their rights to compensation, and concluding various agreements on other matters. With the conclusion of this, the final foreign ministers meeting, the difficult issues of Japan's apology, the timing of the termination of the war, and the signing of a peace treaty were finally laid to rest.¹⁸

Japan's apology was incorporated into the joint statement's preamble as: "The Japanese side is keenly conscious of its responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself." The mention of "Japanese militarism" suggested by the Chinese was thus successfully avoided.

Looking back, Hashimoto viewed Ōhira's mindset as he embarked on including an explicit apology as follows:

Ōhira . . . unsurprisingly, he had a guilty conscience when it came to China and thought that we had really caused them trouble. So it's natural that he

wanted to [include an explicit apology]. He was the one who came up with the language “[Japan is] keenly conscious of its responsibility and deeply reproaches itself.” And I remember agreeing that “if we don’t at least say this much, we can’t mollify the Chinese.” So I think describing it as a collaborative effort by the two of us would be the most accurate way to put things.¹⁹

But if that is how Ōhira felt, why avoid using the term “Japanese militarism?” Morita Hajime argued that “It was important to – as much as possible – avoid language that would set off the hawks. [He] was conflicted over what to do about the ‘militarism’ question.” Ōhira acted with an eye on how things would develop once they had returned to Japan.²⁰

When the meeting ended and Ōhira and Hashimoto stood up from their chairs, the needles on the clock read 12:30 a.m. Despite the late hour, Hashimoto and Kuriyama then began solemnly arranging the text of the joint statement. Their third night in Beijing would be an extremely long one.

Notes

- 1 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 27, 1972).
- 2 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 91–93.
- 3 Diary of Morita Hajime, September 27, 1972.
- 4 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 60–69. See also: Zhang Xiangshan, “Chō Kōzan Kaisōroku (Ge),” *Ronza* (January 1998), 207.
- 5 First North American Division, America Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Okinawa Henkan Mondai (Yoshino-Sunaidā Kaidan)” [The Issue of the Return of Okinawa (Conversation Between Yoshino and Sneider)], May 6, 1971, Chii Kyōtei/SOFA no Teikyō (STG – Shisetsu/Kuiki) (5), B’5.1.0.J/U24, CD-R H22-011, MOFA. First North American Division, “Okinawa Henkan Mondai (Aichi Daijin-Maiyā Taishi Kaidan)” [The Issue of the Return of Okinawa (Conversation Between Minister Aichi and Ambassador Meyer)], May 11, Okinawa Kankei 17, 0600-2010-00029, CD-R H22-012, MOFA. Ambassador to France Nakayama Yoshihiro to Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi, June 9, Okinawa Kankei 17, 0600-2010-00029, CD-R H22-012, MOFA.
- 6 Ōkuma Ryōichi, *Senkaku Shotō no Rekishi to Ryōyūken* (Tokyo: Jiyū Minshutō Kōhō Inkai Shuppankyoku, 1972).
- 7 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 8 Interview with Hashimoto, December 15, 2008.
- 9 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 10 Jiyū Minshutō Kōhō Inkai Shuppankyoku, ed., *Sengo Seiji no Jitsuzō*, 354. See also: Yokobori Katsumi, “Rekishi no Aratana Ichi Pēji ga Hirakareta Yoru: Mō/Tanaka Kaidan o Saigen suru,” in Ishii et al., ed., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 256–260.
- 11 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 127–130. The original can be found in Mao Zedong, “Jiejue Zhongri Fujiao Wenti Haishi Kao Zimindang Zhengfu” [Still Dependent on the Liberal Democratic Party Government for Resolution of the Sino-Japanese Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Issue], September 27, 1972, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, CPC Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, eds., *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan* (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1994), 598–599. See also: Wang Taiping, Zhang Guangyou, and Ma Kezheng, eds., *Xin Zhongguo Waijiao 50 Nian*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999), 448–451; Shiroyama Hidemi, *Chūgoku Kyōsantō “Tennō Kōsaku” Hiroku* (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2009), 153.

- 12 Diary of Morita Hajime, September 27, 1972.
- 13 Yokobori, "Hirakareta Yoru," 262–263.
- 14 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 201.
- 15 Wang Taiping, *Taiga Honryū*, trans., Aoki Reiko (Nara: Nara Nichinichi Shimbun, 2002), 174–175. See also: Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 127; Nikaidō Susumu, "Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka," in Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu, ed., *Kenryoku no Chūsu ga Kataru Jimintō no 30 Nen* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1985), 178.
- 16 Nikaidō Susumu, "Nicchū Kokkō Hiwa – Chūnankai no Ichiya," *Seiron* (October 1992), 70.
- 17 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 18 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 94–109.
- 19 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 20 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 119.

9 The Sino-Japanese joint statement and severing of relations with Taiwan (September 28–30)

The fourth Tanaka–Zhou meeting

With the Japanese delegation visiting Shanghai the following day, the negotiations drew to a close on September 28. At the fourth and final formal meeting between Tanaka and Zhou, the leaders would need to reach a decision on the Taiwan issue. At 3 p.m., Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Zhou Enlai met at the State Guest House.

When Zhou said, “I wish to talk about the Taiwan issue today,” Ōhira responded by bluntly stating that “diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan will be ended tomorrow.” He then read a prepared statement aloud:

The [Japanese] government will be unable to restrict non-governmental ties between Taiwan and our nation, most notably trade and the movement of people, so long as they do not cause harm to normal Sino-Japanese relations.

This was an attempt by Ōhira to allow room for continued non-governmental interactions between Japan and Taiwan. He also asked for “the understanding of the Chinese side” for the establishment of a “non-governmental office” in Taiwan.

According to Hashimoto Hiroshi, Zhou frowned as he listened to Ōhira read his statement but ultimately “nodded, an expression on his face that said, ‘there’s no need to worry, I understand.’”

Zhou thus gave his approval to non-governmental exchange between Japan and Taiwan and, in fact, then proceeded to go farther. Saying that he was “grateful for the good faith shown by Tanaka and Ōhira,” he suggested that it would likely “be best for Japan to take the leading role and establish its ‘office’ in Taiwan first.”

When Zhou spoke of wanting “to create a new relationship between China and Japan moving forward,” Tanaka responded that “It was with an extraordinarily firm resolve that we decided to visit China. The Taiwan issue will be made clear at Minister Ōhira’s press conference tomorrow.”¹

Tanaka hosted a return banquet at 6:30 p.m. in the Great Hall of the People.²

With the negotiations concluded and only the next day’s signing ceremony and press conference remaining, Treaties Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu called the home ministry in Tokyo to read out the text of the joint statement and

Table 9.1 Tanaka and Ōhira's Schedule for September 28

15:00–16:50	Fourth Tanaka–Zhou meeting (State Guest House)
18:30–	Return banquet hosted by Tanaka (Great Hall of the People)

Source: Ishii, *Kiroku to Kōshō*, etc.

ensure that there were no errors. As he did so, however, he noticed odd static on the line. He attributed this to being wiretapped:

We were all staying together at the State Guest House in Beijing. So it was trivial for them to listen in on us to their hearts' content. After everything had been finalized, I called Tokyo to read out the text of the Sino-Japanese joint statement and confirm that every last word was absolutely accurate. As the officer in Tokyo was reading it back to me, it became really hard to hear him as the line became filled with static. But as soon as I said, "I can't hear you" and "This line is really noisy," the line became clear.³

Tanaka's telegram to Chiang Kai-shek

In the early hours of September 29, several hours before the signing ceremony was to be held, Japan gave the Taiwanese advance notice of the content of the joint statement. This was done in both Taipei and Tokyo and treated with the greatest gravity. In Taipei, Ambassador Uyama Atsushi read out the joint statement at the Taiwanese foreign ministry, and he also turned over a telegram from Prime Minister Tanaka to Chiang Kai-shek.⁴

The telegram read as follows:

Through the joint statement issued by the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on this day, diplomatic relations will have been established between the two nations. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude for the deep understanding and warm consideration that [you have] shown our nation and people over the past more than twenty years. I earnestly pray that, with the spirit of friendship that has been fostered between the people of your nation and the Japanese people over many years, and the feelings of deep respect that the people of our nation hold for Your Excellency, the bonds formed between the people of both of our nations remain unchanged in the future.⁵

In Tokyo, Vice-Minister Hōgen Shinsaku summoned Taiwanese Ambassador Peng Meng-chi to the foreign ministry at 9 a.m. He informed Peng of the contents of the joint statement and told him about the telegram from Tanaka.⁶

Moreover, Hōgen told him that "With this normalization of relations, it will be impossible to maintain diplomatic relations between our nation and the Republic of China."

But when Peng asked whether this was “notification that you are severing diplomatic relations with us,” Hōgen answered that he “would prefer not to use the term ‘sever,’ but a natural consequence of this normalization of relations is that we will be unable to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.”

Peng persisted, noting that “the joint statement does not mention the Treaty of Taipei.”

Hōgen then explained that Ōhira planned to make a statement immediately following the release of the joint statement in which he would terminate the Treaty of Taipei. He also stated that Japan “would like to continue working-level relations between our countries even following the ending of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of China” and requested that “the Nationalist government show consideration for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese living in Taiwan.”

Peng ended the meeting by saying,

I am deeply grateful for the kindness that has been shown me by the Japanese government, foreign ministry, and my Japanese friends during the more than three years that I have been in Japan. You in particular have been especially good to me, Vice-Minister.

For his part, Hōgen concluded by noting that “Whatever the relations between our nations, individual friendships will be unaffected.”

At the end of the tense exchange, the two men smiled and departed.⁷

Japan had thus provided Taiwan with advance notice of the joint statement, and Tanaka had sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek. But with Tanaka in Beijing, when was this telegram written?

According to Ogura Kazuo, who was deputy director of the China Division at this time, the telegram had been prepared by himself and Hashimoto immediately before Tanaka’s departure. The telegram had been sent in advance to the Japanese embassy in Taipei and, this time, Yasuoka Masahiro had not been involved. The plan was that, once normalization had become certain and the Japanese delegation in Beijing gave its approval, Uyama would send it.

Table 9.2 Japanese Schedule for September 29

Early	Ambassador Uyama delivers Tanaka’s telegram in Taipei, provides advance notice of the Sino-Japanese joint statement’s contents
09:00	Vice-Minister Hōgen provides Taiwanese Ambassador Peng with advance notice of the joint statement
10:20	Signing ceremony of the joint statement
Noon	Ōhira issues statement on the Treaty of Taipei
14:30	Tanaka, Ōhira, and Zhou depart Beijing by plane
15:30	Arrival in Shanghai, tour of Maqiao People’s Commune
19:00	Welcome Banquet hosted by Shanghai Revolutionary Committee

Source: *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972), etc.

Ogura described the intentions behind the telegram as follows:

It was only natural that we would immediately pay our respects to Taiwan once negotiations had ended and we had normalized relations [with China]. We needed to notify them of what had happened and ask them to continue to protect Japanese citizens there despite the ending of diplomatic relations. And we had to include in the telegram that trade and the movement of people between us would continue despite the end of diplomatic relations.

I didn't think that they would completely cut off trade relations with us or harm any Japanese citizens there or anything, because our relations with Beijing and Taipei had switched places. I felt that there was no way that we would be unable to carry on with Taiwan to the same degree that we previously had with China.⁸

The signing ceremony

As Tanaka's telegram was being delivered in Taipei, preparations were under way in the West Hall of the Great Hall of the People for the signing ceremony. The floor was covered with a red carpet and the room was lit with chandeliers. A long table, covered by a green tablecloth and featuring small Chinese and Japanese flags in the center, was placed in front of a large folding screen. Four red-purple chairs were lined up on one side of it.

The officials who had carried out the fierce, protracted negotiations over the joint statement – Takashima Masuo, Yoshida Kenzō, Kuriyama, Sun Pinghua, Zhang Xiangshan, and Wang Xiaoyun – stood between the table and the screen. Tanaka and Zhou arrived at 10:20 a.m., followed by Ōhira and Ji. Tanaka and Ōhira sat on the left of the table and Zhou and Ji on the right. As the two delegations and the press watched, Tanaka and Zhou signed the statement after which the two foreign ministers did the same.

The appearance of the two national leaders as they signed struck a stark contrast. His lips drawn into a straight line, Tanaka moved his brush gracefully while Zhou grasped his with all the fingers of his right hand. Using the arm that he had injured during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Zhou slowly signed his name, opening the door for Japan.

After the signing was complete, Tanaka and Zhou stood and exchanged the official texts. They clasped their hands together in a firm handshake, one that they did not immediately move to end. At that moment, Japan became the seventy-ninth country to recognize China.⁹

The joint statement consisted of a preamble and nine articles. The preamble included the following passage on the termination of the state of war:

The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state

of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The preamble also incorporated an explicit Japanese apology:

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding “the three principles for the restoration of relations” put forward by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

The nine articles of the joint statement read:

- 1 The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People’s Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Statement is issued.
- 2 The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
- 3 The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stance of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.
- 4 The Government of Japan and the Government of People’s Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as of September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other’s embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.
- 5 The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan.
- 6 The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

- 7 The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
- 8 The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.
- 9 The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.¹⁰

The Ōhira statement – terminating the Treaty of Taipei

With the signing completed, champagne was brought into the hall. When Zhou unexpectedly downed his entire glass in one go, Tanaka, not one to be outdone, did the same.¹¹ While Tanaka's work was now done, Ōhira still bore a heavy responsibility: announcing the ending of relations with Taiwan.

Ōhira left the Great Hall of the People in the aftermath of signing the statement and headed directly for the Cultural Palace of Nationalities. Before the assembled reporters, he gave an explanation of the joint statement's contents and then resolutely made the following statement:

While this is not touched on in the joint statement, the view of the Japanese government is to recognize that, as a result of the normalization of relations between Japan and China, the Treaty of Taipei has lost its ongoing significance and has been terminated.¹²

This was a declaration terminating the treaty, and it was, of course, extremely unusual for a defeated nation to unilaterally renounce a treaty. The reporters were thrown into an uproar. While he had not stated it outright, it was clear that Ōhira's statement meant that Japan was severing its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.¹³

Sakurada Takeshi, chairman of Keidanren, the Japanese business association, told Ōhira's secretary Itō Masaya that "Ōhira's renunciation of the Treaty of Taipei is unprecedented. I've never heard of a nation defeated in war unilaterally annulling a treaty it had signed with the victor."¹⁴

The joint statement had not explicitly mentioned the Treaty of Taipei; instead, its fate had been left to Ōhira's statement. According to Kuriyama, "We had unofficially told the Chinese that we would be using a unilateral statement by Foreign Minister Ōhira to confirm that the Treaty of Taipei had been terminated. They

voiced no objections to this approach.” This was a tacit recognition by China of the Japanese position that the Treaty of Taipei had been valid up until that point.

Ōhira’s statement was the result of a thorough examination of the issue of the treaty by the foreign ministry and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Kuriyama’s conclusion was that

[T]he termination in substance of the provisions of the Treaty of Taipei as an unavoidable result of the change in governmental recognition did not need either the agreement of the government of the Republic of China or the approval of the Diet.¹⁵

The third of the three principles for the restoration of relations put forward by Zhou had held that the Treaty of Taipei was illegal and needed to be renounced. Nonetheless, Japan never wavered from its position that the treaty had been valid. Kuriyama explained:

China had of course delineated its three principles and worked hard to assert that they were prerequisites [for normalization]. But if you actually look at the joint statement that was ultimately produced, you’ll see that the second and third of these principles assumed a different form from what China had claimed was required.

This could perhaps be regarded as a concession made by the Chinese, but I would like to give my own interpretation of how the Chinese originally conceptualized the principles. What was basically clear was that the Chinese regarded normalizing relations with Japan as a major strategic gain for their country, even if it meant that the three principles had to be treated with a fair amount of flexibility.

While Chinese foreign policy appeared to place great importance on the principles at first glance, they were willing to be flexible on them for the sake of a greater national interest (their Soviet strategy).

And what of the second principle, which held that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China’s territory? Article 3 of the joint statement stated that Japan “fully understands and respects this stance of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”

This article served as the resolution of the Taiwan issue, and Kuriyama’s explanation of it can likely be considered an authoritative interpretation of it:

The issues surrounding Taiwan involved national security and the legal status of the island. But as Zhou Enlai decided to pursue Sino-Japanese normalization, he did so with an extremely clear understanding that China would not be able to convince Japan to accept its positions on these issues. I believe that he understood that China would be unable to force Japan to accept its assertion

that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China, that they would be unable to convince us due to the issue's connections to national security. He was extremely aware that there was absolutely no way that the Taiwan issue could be resolved without discussions with the United States; that Japan would not agree to anything that America had not approved.

Zhou was aware that Japan did not regard Taiwan as a part of China as things currently stood and that the United States and Japan considered the island as falling within the bounds of their security treaty. The major prerequisite Japan had on Taiwan entering the negotiations was that it "would not carry out Sino-Japanese normalization in a manner that would overturn what was written in the 1969 Satō-Nixon joint statement."¹⁶

From the Japanese point of view, they had not endorsed China's second and third principles, and Zhou understood this. At the same time, however, China treated its negotiations with Japan and its domestic propaganda as separate matters. The *People's Daily*, writing for a domestic audience, included an editorial that made it seem as if Japan had accepted China's three principles verbatim.¹⁷ And the issue of Taiwan was left as one that could resurface in the future.

Shanghai

The negotiations complete, Tanaka, Ōhira, and Zhou got into cars and headed to Beijing's airport for their next destination of Shanghai.

As their motorcade made its way to the airport, a surprising sight awaited the Japanese leaders along the side of the road. The roadsides that had consisted of nothing but police officers upon their arrival now overflowed with cheering men and women of all ages. The Chinese public would still have been unaware of the details of the Sino-Japanese joint statement (it having only been signed a few hours earlier), but they had already been mobilized for political purposes.

Those in the motorcade had mixed emotions as they watched. Kuriyama recalls:

It made me realize what an "amazing" country China was, although I don't mean that in a positive sense. It really drove home to me what being in a totalitarian state meant. . . .

There was a massive number of people waving flags along the side of the road to the airport in Beijing. The Chinese official in the car explained to us that the people were celebrating because they welcomed normalization. . . . I realized "So . . . this is China." It was a little reminiscent of prewar Japan. I found it amazing that so many people could be mobilized by the government and felt that this was the kind of country that I didn't want Japan to become. That was my impression of China at the time.¹⁸

After the parties arrived at the airport, the national anthems of both countries were played, followed by some marches. Students, workers, and farmers waved flowers and pieces of cloth, drums boomed, and flutes filled the air. The mood at the

airport was utterly unlike that of four days earlier during their arrival. When the crowd of 3,000 called out “Welcome! Welcome! A most passionate welcome!” Tanaka answered by raising his hand high. All the ambassadors in Beijing were in attendance.¹⁹

Walking forward with Zhou and Ōhira, Tanaka’s face was filled with joy as young women in colorful costumes danced in spectacular fashion. Shortly after 2:30 p.m., they briskly climbed the stairs of their plane and departed.²⁰

Surprisingly, Zhou joined them on their flight. Shanghai was one of the strongholds of the Gang of Four, and the delegation’s visit to the city was largely the result of Zhou’s strong desire that they do so. Tanaka had been impatient, wanting to immediately return to Japan, but Ōhira had managed to overcome his complaints and convince him to go. This done, Zhou had decided to accompany them.²¹

Tanaka sat across from Zhou, but as the plane departed, he succumbed to fatigue and fell asleep.²² Nikaidō immediately wanted to wake him, but Zhou just smiled and said, “Let him sleep, Mr. Nikaidō.”²³ The atmosphere in the cabin became a little uncomfortable, but the situation was saved by Ōhira, who served as a conversation partner for Zhou and nonchalantly paid careful attention to him.

Ōhira’s schedule had certainly been busier than Tanaka’s, but – in the words of his daughter Yoshiko – “Father later said that did what he could to attend to Zhou, as he felt awkward about the whole thing.”²⁴ Tanaka woke up as the plane landed in Shanghai.

When Tanaka and Zhou exited the plane at 3:30 p.m., they were greeted by an even larger crowd than had awaited them in Beijing. Elementary and junior high school students sang out “A passionate welcome to our Japanese guests” as several hundred red flags flew in the sky, and there were performances of mass gymnastics.

After shaking hands with Shanghai Revolutionary Committee Chairman Zhang Chunqiao and other local officials, Tanaka and the others took a tour of Maqiao People’s Commune on the outskirts of the city. Zhang was a member of the Gang of Four and Shanghai served as his base of operations. Zhou worked hard to ensure that the situation in Shanghai remained under control.²⁵

Secretary to the Prime Minister Kiuchi Akitane vividly remembers how Zhou acted at the time and how he allowed Zhang to benefit from the visit:

I thought that Zhou Enlai was outstanding. [Shanghai] was one of the Gang of Four’s strongholds and Zhang Chunqiao was a big shot there, so Zhou did what he could to make him look good. Because Zhang was the top figure in Shanghai, he introduced Tanaka to him and worked to get Zhang on his side to provide himself with cover. I believe that Zhou was extraordinary, both as a domestic and as an international politician.²⁶

That evening, Zhang’s Shanghai Revolutionary Committee hosted a welcome banquet. Sitting at the main table, Zhou poured *Maotai* for everyone. Perhaps, as a result of the exhaustion that he had accumulated over the past few days, Tanaka

became drunk, an unusual event. As he departed to applause, he seemed to move to embrace Zhou.²⁷ Ōhira did not drink alcohol but, perhaps because he was particularly happy that day, he had several glasses. Upon his return to the hotel, he collapsed on the bed, falling asleep without undressing.²⁸

The reaction of the Taiwanese government

As Tanaka and Ōhira were asleep in Shanghai, the Taiwanese foreign ministry announced at 10:30 p.m. that it was cutting off diplomatic relations with Japan:

Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and the leaders of the Chinese Communist bandit regime have released a “joint statement” and declared that the two would establish diplomatic relations with one another beginning September 29. Japanese Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi announced that, with this act, the Treaty of Taipei and diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of China had been terminated.

In light of this unjust betrayal by the Government of Japan and its disregard for its treaty obligations, the Government of the Republic of China hereby proclaims that it is severing its diplomatic relations with the Government of Japan and notes that the responsibility for this lies entirely with the Government of Japan.

It had been fully expected that the Taiwanese would announce that they were severing relations with Japan. But the final passage of the statement caused the Japanese embassy in Taipei to take note:

The Government of the Republic of China sincerely believes that the mistaken policies of the Tanaka government do not reflect the gratitude and admiration that the Japanese people have for the great virtues of President Chiang. Our government will thus continue to maintain its friendship with all of the anti-communist democrats of Japan.²⁹

The Taiwanese government had said that it would “continue to maintain its friendship” with the Japanese people following the severing of diplomatic relations. Despite the late hour, Envoy Itō Hironori telephoned Tokyo to inform Nakae Yōsuke at the Asia Bureau to inform him of this. Nakae recalls:

The question of how Taiwan would ultimately react to Sino-Japanese normalization was one of the things we were focused on [as we pursued it]. We were concerned about how they would comment on it, what steps they would take in response. We knew that they would most likely declare that they were severing relations with us, but we were also more than a little worried about the possibility that they might sink Japanese ships, seize Japanese property, or hold Japanese citizens. It was as we were awaiting their response with

bated breath – these possibilities circling through our heads – that Itō called. When he informed us [about the contents of the Taiwanese announcement], I thought to myself, “We’re saved.”³⁰

While Japanese in Taiwan initially avoided going outdoors and waited to see what would happen, there were no reprisals against them.³¹

Returning to Japan

When Tanaka and Zhou’s motorcade arrived at Shanghai Airport in the early hours of September 30, they were seen off by 5,000 people using songs, dances, gongs, and drums. Amidst a backdrop of paper lanterns, Tanaka waved to the women dressed in ethnic clothes and children wearing colorful costumes. The airport was overwhelmed by a passionate atmosphere of well-wishing.

As Tanaka and Zhou said farewell to one another, Zhou asked Tanaka to “Please give His Majesty the Emperor my regards upon your return.” Tanaka promised to do so, saying “I will absolutely tell him. Thank you, truly.”³²

As Tanaka and Ōhira climbed the steps to the plane, they repeatedly stopped to wave to the crowd before bowing their heads to Zhou and disappearing into the cabin. Their plane took off at 9:30 a.m., passing by a hanging red banner that read “Long live the friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples.”³³

When Tanaka’s plane landed at Haneda shortly before 1 p.m., it was met by Deputy Prime Minister Miki Takeo and LDP Vice President Shiina Etsusaburō. Socialist Party Chairman Narita Tomomi, Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu, and Democratic Socialist Party Chairman Kasuga Ikkō all shook Tanaka’s hand. The welcoming party consisted of more than 800 hundred people from across the political spectrum and the words “Long live Prime Minister Tanaka” were displayed across the airport’s observation deck.³⁴

Tanaka addressed the crowd:

I have just returned from my visit to China. With Foreign Minister Ōhira and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaidō at my side, I have done all that I could with my meager abilities to achieve a Sino-Japanese normalization based in our national interests. I believe that it is due to the support that we have received from all sectors of society that this weighty responsibility has been fulfilled.³⁵

There were faint tears in Tanaka’s eyes as he spoke. As the airport rang out with calls of “Banzai!” Tanaka and the others quickly got into cars and headed for the Imperial Palace to sign the registry and show that they had returned.³⁶

The general meeting of LDP Diet members

After holding a press conference at the prime minister’s residence,³⁷ Tanaka and Ōhira headed to LDP headquarters at 4:20 p.m. for a general meeting of the

party's legislators from both houses of the Diet.³⁸ Tanaka had contacted the party in advance and told them to gather the legislators as he would be heading there shortly after his return to Japan.

After the Diet members had gathered in the auditorium on the ninth floor, Tanaka and Ōhira gallantly strode into the room, just three hours since their return.³⁹ Tanaka began to speak:

As of yesterday, diplomatic relations have been established with China. Now, the party and government must join together to carry out the follow-up measures. There are many things that we must do moving forward to create a permanent peace. I want the party and government to join together with the public on these matters and would like your agreement.

Ōhira gave an explanation of the joint statement and described Article 3 as follows:

Regarding the issue of the possession of Taiwan, the Chinese assert in Article 3 that Taiwan is "an inalienable party of the People's Republic of China." But while we take the position of "understanding and respecting" this assertion, we do not accept it. In other words, by incorporating the long-held position of LDP governments into the document unchanged, we have indicated that our countries will never be able to reach an agreement on this point.

As always, Ōhira took a logical approach to his explanation. Also, he noted that "Even if our diplomatic relations [with Taiwan] have been severed, I believe that we must respect our working-level relationship."

When Tanaka and Ōhira finished speaking, Fujio Masayuki was the first to voice criticism of what they had done in China:

In return for establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, you have caused our relations with Taiwan to be severed and produced tensions comparable to those of the abnormalities of the past. According to telegrams from overseas, the nations of Southeast Asia and the Pacific are concerned about the repercussions of your actions.

Watanabe Michio also saw the severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a problem:

If you intended to renounce the Treaty of Taipei, you should have first unified the Liberal Democratic Party behind the idea. And, as the treaty had been ratified by the Diet, I believe that its renunciation should have been carried out with Diet approval. If treaties can be annulled through statements issued by the foreign minister, it would mean that the US-Japan security treaty could also be done away with at any time.

Ōhira rebutted these arguments by saying that

Sino-Japanese normalization meant that the Treaty of Taipei no longer had any space in which to function. No matter how you look at it, there can be no denying that it had lost its basis. I merely frankly stated that fact.

When Tamaki Kazuo also pressed Ōhira on the Taiwan issue, and other Diet members like Hamada Kōichi and Nakayama Masaaki asserted that his renunciation of the Treaty of Taipei had been unconstitutional, Ōhira ended the meeting on the following firm note:

I do not have the authority to cause a treaty to live or die by my word alone. What I am saying is that “as a result of Sino-Japanese normalization, the Treaty of Taipei no longer had any space in which to function.” Article 98 of the Constitution says that [“treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations”] are to be faithfully observed. I do not believe that I am required to seek the Diet’s judgment on this matter.⁴⁰

It was only because Ōhira was backed by Tanaka’s authority that he was able to prevail using this argument. Kiuchi portrayed the fighting between Tanaka, Ōhira, and the pro-Taiwan lawmakers as follows:

The outburst from the right-wing Diet members made the atmosphere in the room into one where you almost expected people to start knocking over their desks. People were shouting at one another, yelling “How could you have done that!?” and the like. The pro-Taiwan legislators felt like they had been shoved off of a cliff and were understandably furious.

Watching from the back of the room, I was impressed that [Tanaka and Ōhira] were able to just take it all head on. This wasn’t like the kind of fighting that goes on in the Diet; it was something worse. I think it probably would have been impossible for Ōhira to have gone out there and done that by himself. Without Tanaka backing him up, he wouldn’t have been able to do as much as he did.⁴¹

The meeting of the legislators came to a close much later than had been planned, and Tanaka and Ōhira ended up appearing on television at 11 p.m.⁴²

“Basically, an Internal Chinese Matter”

When Tanaka arrived at his office for the first time after his return, he spoke energetically about his trip and declared Zhou Enlai to be “the best politician in the world.” Prior to leaving, he had talked about how “After China comes the Soviet Union. I’m going to go to the Soviet Union.”⁴³

On October 18, Tanaka gave a speech to the Japan-America Society. With US Ambassador and Ingersoll and his wife among those in the audience, he again

emphasized how Japan's relations with the United States formed the cornerstone of his foreign policy:

About two weeks ago, I visited Beijing with Foreign Minister Ōhira and achieved the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Before doing so, I met with President Nixon and other leaders of the American government in Hawaii and spoke frankly with them on the issues related to China. This deepened our understanding of one another. Sino-Japanese normalization is something that has been undertaken within the bonds of US-Japan friendship. I would like to take this opportunity to make clear that our firm friendship with the United States remains the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy and that I believe that the future development of our relations with China will happen in a manner compatible with this fact.⁴⁴

Ōhira, for his part, had given a speech on Sino-Japanese normalization at the Research Institute of Japan on October 6 in which he had emphasized that normalization had been "carried out on the basis of the San Francisco system." He had forcefully argued that "it was because of our steadfast adherence to [the San Francisco] system as it exists now – and our absolute faith in that system – that we were able to devote ourselves to Sino-Japanese peace without any concerns about the future."⁴⁵

Normalization enjoyed support from across the political spectrum. But even so, there were those within the opposition parties who considered the relationship between the US-Japan security treaty's Far East clause and the Sino-Japanese joint statement to be a problem. Among these was Socialist Party Secretary-General Ishibashi Masashi, who voiced his concerns on this point at the November 2 meeting of the House of Representatives' Budget Committee.⁴⁶

When asked by Ishibashi about the boundaries of the "Far East," Tanaka told him that "it is a region north of the Philippines, centered on Japan . . . as always, it would not be a mistake to take a commonsense interpretation of the government's boundaries for the Far East" and that "Taiwan is within the Far East."⁴⁷

Ōhira also testified about Taiwan at the November 8 meeting of the same committee:

Our nation takes the stance that it fully understands and respects the position of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory. Accordingly, I believe that the issue of the confrontation between the government of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan is, basically, an internal Chinese matter. Our nation hopes that this question will be resolved in a peaceful manner by the parties involved and believes that there is no realistic possibility of it developing into an armed conflict.⁴⁸

Kuriyama made the following comment on Ōhira's description of the Taiwan issue as "basically, an internal Chinese matter":

Should Taiwan unite with the People's Republic of China as a result of talks between the involved parties, the Japanese government would accept this

(this is what the language of the Sino-Japanese joint statement means). But [Taiwan] is only an internal Chinese matter so long as it is being discussed peacefully. Should the impossible happen and China seek to achieve unification with Taiwan through force (i.e., an “armed liberation” of the island), the Japanese government would not consider this an internal [Chinese] matter. This is what [Ōhira] meant when he included the word “basically.”⁴⁹

In other words, Kuriyama claimed that the inclusion of the caveat “basically” by Ōhira implied that Japan would not accept unification through force.

Ōhira embarked on a foreign tour from October 10 to October 25, visiting Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the Soviet Union. While President Nixon accepted his explanation of Sino-Japanese normalization,⁵⁰ the Soviets were critical of the inclusion of Article 7 in the joint statement (which stated that China and Japan opposed any state seeking hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region) as having been aimed at them. Ōhira was not allowed to meet Secretary Brezhnev.⁵¹

In December, shortly after his visits, Australia and New Zealand also established diplomatic relations with China. They were followed by Malaysia and Thailand. The strongly anti-communist Asia and Pacific Council that had been promoted by South Korea died a natural death as a result.⁵² The normalization of relations between China and Japan brought about an easing of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, and Ōhira would later go on to play a major role in the conclusion of a civil aviation agreement with China.

Similar trips were undertaken by other Japanese officials. Former foreign minister Aichi Kiichi visited Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines to gain their acceptance of Sino-Japanese normalization. Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Aoki Masahisa traveled to Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos to explain the meaning of the joint statement, and Diet Member Kimura Toshio visited South Korea.⁵³

Zhou Enlai's domestic persuasion

While Japanese popular opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of normalizing relations with China, the reaction in China was more complicated. Prior to Tanaka's visit, public meetings had been held across the country as part of an effort to convince the public of the desirability of normalization. That these meetings had been needed shows how harsh Chinese popular sentiment was toward Japan.

And the Chinese public must have been unhappy about the fact that China was renouncing its right to wartime compensation. Particularly in Shanghai, 140,000 employees in leadership positions received training on the government's position. Deputy Director Feng Guozhu of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee emphasized the need to “distinguish between Japanese militarism and the Japanese people.”⁵⁴ This logic that “the Japanese people were also victims” also served as the rationale for China's renunciation of compensation, but it was intolerable for the Chinese public.

Foreign Affairs Councilor Nakae wrote that

Zhou Enlai went to great efforts on this . . . I heard that he dispatched people across China to persuade the public [that China should give up reparations] by dressing up the act in flowery language, telling them that “a socialist China should not extract reparations from workers and citizens like themselves” and the like.⁵⁵

According to one of the individuals involved with these efforts on the Chinese side, Zhou worked to persuade the public both before and following Tanaka’s visit and gave several speeches on the topic to the party central committee and its external organs. Meetings of the party leadership were held in large cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin and in regions like the northeast to communicate Mao and Zhou’s instructions on this to them.

They said that Mao’s words on the need to oppose the Soviet Union’s “socialist imperialism” left the most lasting impression on them and that Mao had asserted that it was necessary to join forces with the Japanese. Also, he said that normalizing relations with Japan would be beneficial for the struggle to liberate Taiwan.

Zhou elaborated on these points and gave three reasons that China should renounce reparations. First, the work of building a socialist China was to be accomplished through the country’s own resources; China did not need money from any foreign nation. Second, Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan had renounced reparations. And third, reparations would place a burden on the Japanese people and forever prevent the achievement of Sino-Japanese friendship. This final point was the most persuasive.

Despite the reluctance of the Chinese public to renounce the country’s right to compensation, Mao and Zhou had stated what was going to happen. They thus had no choice but to accept the Sino-Japanese joint statement.

Notes

- 1 Ishii et al., *Kiroku to Kōshō*, 69–74.
- 2 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972).
- 3 Interview with Kuriyama, October 15, 2009; Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 91.
- 4 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972, evening edition); Lin Jinjing, *Sengo no Nikka Kankei to Kokusaihō* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1987), 116.
- 5 Message from Prime Minister Tanaka to the President, Tianzhong Neige Yufei Gouda (Dianbao) Vol. 2, 11-EAP-00574, 005.22/0012, AH. See also: Lin, *Sengo no Nikka Kankei*, 116; *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972, evening edition).
- 6 From Ambassador to Japan to the Foreign Ministry, September 29, 1972, Tianzhong Neige Yufei Gouda (Dianbao) Vol. 2, 11-EAP-00574, 005.22/0012, AH; Huang Zijin, and Jian Jiahui, *Lin Jinjing Xiansheng Fangwen Jilu* (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2003), 83–84.
- 7 Telegram from Acting Foreign Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to Uyama, September 29, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2010–271. Nakasone to Uyama, September 28, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2010–452. See also: *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972, evening edition).

- 8 Interview with Ogura, June 1, 2010.
- 9 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972, evening edition).
- 10 Joint Statement of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, September 29, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2009–258. This is slightly different from the account given in Kazankai, *Nicchū Kankei*, 428–429. The English translation of the joint statement is slightly modified from that found on the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html).
- 11 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972, evening edition).
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Abe Atsushi, “Chūgoku no Ōhira-san,” in Kimura, *Sōri no Hinkaku*, 117.
- 14 Itō Masaya, *Jimintō Sengokushi*, Vol. 1, 105.
- 15 Kuriyama, *Sōri no Hinkaku*, 52–53. According to Jin Chongji, ed., *Shū Onrai-den 1949–1976*, Vol. 2, trans., Liu Junnan, Tan Zuoqiang, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), 340–341. “The Chinese agreed to not touch on the “Japan-Taiwan” treaty in the joint statement.”
- 16 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 131–133, 125. See also: Kuriyama Takakazu, “Nicchū Kyodō Seimei no Kaisetsu,” in Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 211–222.
- 17 *People's Daily* (September 30, 1972).
- 18 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 143–144.
- 19 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 53–54. See also: *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972, evening edition; September 30, 1972).
- 20 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 29, 1972, evening edition).
- 21 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (April 8, 2010, evening edition).
- 22 *Global Times* (August 26, 2002). See also: Ruan Hong, *Yige Waijiaojia De Jingli – Han Xu Chuan* (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2004), 148.
- 23 Nikaidō, “Chūnankai no Ichiya,” 71.
- 24 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (April 8, 2010, evening edition). See also: Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 15.
- 25 “Shanghai Renmin Guangbo Diantai Guanyu 1972 Nian Tanaka Yixing Suifang Jizhe Canguan Maqiao He Shiwuta Xuexiao De Jiti Anpai” [Regarding the Shanghai People's Radio Station: Specific Arrangements for the 1972 Tour of Maqiao and the Municipal Dancing School by the Reporters Accompanying the Tanaka Party], B92–2–1594, SMA. “Shanghai Renmin Guangbo Diantai Guanyu 1972 Nian Jiedai Tanaka Bangongshi Ge Zumingdan Ji Gongzuo Renyuan Dengjibiao” [Regarding the Shanghai People's Radio Station: Staff Registers and Name Lists for the 1972 Reception for Tanaka], B92-2-1596, SMA; Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 54.
- 26 Interview with Kiuchi, June 19, 2010.
- 27 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 54; *Asahi Shimbun* (September 30, 1972).
- 28 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 15–16. See also: Honda, *Ni/Chū/Tai Miezaru Kizuna*, 35–36.
- 29 “Rifei Jianjiao Ziliao” [Materials on the Establishment of Relations Between Japan and the Bandits], 11-EAP-00570, 005.22/0008, AH; *Central Daily News* (September 30, 1972). See also: *Asahi Shimbun* (September 30, 1972); Kazankai, *Nicchū Kankei*, 434–435.
- 30 Nakae, *Ajia Gaikō*, 156.
- 31 Lin, *Ume to Sakura*, 308.
- 32 *Yomiuri Shimbun* (September 30, 1972, evening edition). See also: *Asahi Shimbun* (October 2, 1972).
- 33 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 30, 1972, evening edition).
- 34 *Yomiuri Shimbun* (September 30, 1972, evening edition). See also: *Asahi Shimbun* (September 30, 1972, evening edition).
- 35 Kazankai, *Nicchū Kankei*, 436. See also: *Asahi Shimbun* (September 30, 1972, evening edition).
- 36 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 30, 1972, evening edition).

- 37 Kazankai, *Nicchū Kankei*, 437–446.
- 38 *Asahi Shimbun* (October 1, 1972).
- 39 Hata, *Kokorozashi*, 80–82.
- 40 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 198–210. See also: Lin, *Ume to Sakura*, 321–323; *Asahi Shimbun* (October 1, 1972).
- 41 Interview with Kiuchi, June 19, 2010.
- 42 Diary of Morita Hajime, September 30, 1972.
- 43 Satō Akiko, *Tanaka Kakuei Nikki*, 123, 125.
- 44 Nichibei Kyōkai ni Okeru Tanaka Supīchi [Speech by Tanaka at the Japan-America Society], October 18, 1972, *Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka/Kokkai Kankei*, SA.1.2.2, Yō Kōkai Junbi Seidō 2010–6241, MOFA.
- 45 Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu, *Nicchū Fukkō*, 195–196.
- 46 Ishibashi Masashi, “*Nicchū Seijōka Mondai*” [The Sino-Japanese Normalization Issue], November 2, 1972, Ishibashi Masashi Kankei Bunsho 37, NDL. On Tanaka being met by the non-communist opposition parties at the airport upon his return to Japan, see: *Asahi Shimbun* (September 30, 1972; September 30, 1972, evening edition).
- 47 Minutes of the 70th Diet – House of Representatives’ Budget Committee, No. 2 (November 2, 1972).
- 48 Minutes of the 70th Diet – House of Representatives’ Budget Committee, No. 5 (November 8, 1972).
- 49 Kuriyama, “*Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka*,” 49–50.
- 50 Kajima Institute of International Peace, *Nihon Gaikō*, Vol. 3, 74, 76; Ōkawara Yoshio, *Ōraru Hisutorī Nichibei Gaikō* (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2006), 139.
- 51 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 121–122, 126.
- 52 Nagano Nobutoshi, *Gaimushō Kenkyū*, 76; Ōba Mie, *Ajia Taiheiyō Chiiki Keisei e no Dōtei: Kyōkai Kokka Nichigō no Aidentiti Mosaku to Chiiki Shugi* (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 2004), 200.
- 53 Kajima Institute of International Peace, *Nihon Gaikō*, Vol. 3, 74.
- 54 N.H.K. Shuzaihan, *Shū Onrai no Ketsudan*, 133–136. See also: *Asahi Shimbun* (August 27, 1997); Kawashima Shin, Mōri Kazuko, *Gurōbaru Chūgoku e no Michinori – Gaikō 150 Nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 125.
- 55 Nakae, “*Fū Yaopan*,” 27.

Conclusion

The spirit of Sino-Japanese peace

A “Japanese” strategy

It has been argued that the release of the Sino-Japanese joint statement created a “1972 System.” What seems to be meant by this claim is that the joint statement established principles for how the two countries would handle Taiwan and history, principles that have served as the underlying basis for modern Sino-Japanese relations.¹ But while there is no question that 1972 marked the beginning of a new era in the relations between the two countries, it is probably an exaggeration to describe it as demarcating a new “system.”

The continuation of the San Francisco System had always been a Japanese prerequisite for normalizing diplomatic relations with China, and the joint statement did not bring about any changes to either the US–Japan security framework or Japan’s diplomatic focus on its relations with the United States. Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira Masayoshi, and the foreign ministry officials involved all had a shared understanding that the San Francisco System took precedence over relations with China.

Japan’s conditions for normalization were maintaining the US–Japan security framework and having Taiwan remain subject to the Far East clause of the US–Japan Security Treaty (Article 6). To this day, the Japanese government has never stated that the Far East clause is not applicable to Taiwan.² From the Japanese perspective, the effort of Sino-Japanese normalization also involved confirming its traditional diplomatic focus on the United States.

As mentioned in Chapter 7, Zhou Enlai told Tanaka that “as for the US–Japan security treaty, we do not believe that Taiwan will be liberated through force. And you bear no responsibility for the joint statement which Nixon and Satō released in 1969.” China’s decision to not push back against the US–Japan security framework helped ease the path for Sino-Japanese normalization.

While the Japanese foreign ministry contained a faction that believed that relations with China should be prioritized over those with the United States (the Beijing faction), these officials were sidelined from the policymaking process on normalization. Normalization had to be carried out within the framework of the San Francisco System. Avoiding making any major changes to the nation’s

foreign policy was a subdued strategy but one that could also be considered typical of Japan. Had normalization caused Japan to depart the San Francisco System, its foreign policy would have become unanchored. This was not something that either Japan or China considered desirable.

China touted a major policy (its strategy against the Soviet Union), but Japan did not have a grand global strategy. And it was for that very reason that normalizing relations with China would not become unfavorable to Japan.

Of the three principles for the restoration of relations that China had put forth, the only one which it had unquestionably secured agreement on was the first; the other two had not gone as it had wanted. As this has already been discussed in Chapters 7 and 9, the details of this will not be repeated here. It was unquestionably the political leadership of Tanaka and Ōhira that enabled the coexistence of the US–Japan security framework and the Sino-Japanese normalization.

The degree to which these things are actually understood in modern China is a separate issue. Chinese domestic reporting on the signing of the joint statement acted as if Japan had accepted all three principles. And the Chinese government's frequent calls for Japan to “return to the starting point of 1972” reflect a misconception that Japan had agreed to the three principles without any reservations.

And, as was shown by the interactions between the United States, China, and Japan over the new US–Japan defense cooperation guidelines adopted in 1997, the possibility of a future conflict arising over Taiwan still exists.

Tanaka's political leadership

During the lengthy period in which the Liberal Democratic Party held power, the formation of a new government generally did not bring with it major changes to foreign policy. Factional dynamics within the party did not necessarily reflect leaders' designs for foreign policy, and stability in foreign policy was valued even when a new figure became prime minister. Tanaka may have changed the direction of Japan's foreign policy toward China, but he made strenuous efforts to steadfastly adhere to its US-centered focus. It was self-evident to him that he should not replace US–Japan cooperation with a new global strategy.

Bearing that in mind, how did Tanaka apply his famous approach of “decisiveness and action” to the normalization of relations with China?

As explained by former Treaties Division Director Kuriyama Takakazu, Tanaka's goals for normalization were straightforward:

While the restoration of diplomatic relations was itself something that Tanaka wanted to achieve, he also had two other goals. One was for normalization to not interfere with the security treaty. And the [other] was for working-level ties with Taiwan to be maintained.³

These goals made up Tanaka's fundamental policy toward normalization. He left the details of how to achieve them to Ōhira and the officials of the foreign ministry.

Tanaka is strongly associated with money-driven politics. But what did the officials who worked with him think of him? Kuriyama gave the following assessment of the man:

While I believe that the legacy that Kakuei left behind for Japanese politics is negative in a number of ways, he made skillful use of government officials to actually do the things that he wanted to do. And in that sense, he was decisive and had a kind of charisma. He had a generosity that allowed him to make skillful use of the officials at this command. And because of all that, I think he was an outstanding prime minister.⁴

Former China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi echoed these thoughts:

He was, of course, a star. I don't care whether Kaku did bad things or not. That doesn't matter. As long as he got good work done, that's good enough. It was that way the first time I met Zhou Enlai as well. It felt the same as it had the first time I met Kaku.⁵

Konaga Keiichi (a former secretary to the prime minister and MITI minister, and a former MITI vice-minister) provides clear analysis of Tanaka's leadership:

I think he was a genius as a politician. When analyzing a politician's leadership, I think you have to look at their ability to make plans, their ability to put those plans into actual practice, their decisiveness, and their human tolerance. Looking over Tanaka's life, he excelled in each of these areas.

Let's take his introduction of the gasoline tax [in 1949] as an example of his ability to make plans. Today, this is viewed as if it had been some kind of cunning scheme on his part. But it was an era when Japan's roads were in poor condition and in which it is said that only 20% were paved. He introduced the gasoline tax [to serve as a source of income] for highways, and he did it as a private member's bill in only his second year in the Diet or so, something that may have been unprecedented in Japan.

I feel that this is a perhaps the best example of a politician displaying an ability to make plans. His book, *Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago*, is another example of his strength in this area.

And I believe that his negotiations on textiles are a supreme example of his ability to put plans into practice.

His decisiveness was on display with Sino-Japanese normalization. He decided to take on the most difficult problem facing him when he was at the height of his power. He showed that you should act when the conditions for your counterpart are most in alignment with your own.

Regarding his human tolerance, he had grown up in poverty, the eldest son of a farming family. He was extremely careful to take others into account and attempt to intuit their feelings as he acted, even after he had become powerful.

He would leave the prime minister's office before 5 p.m. and head to his personal office when he didn't have anything he needed to do so as to not put too much work on the prime minister's office's telephone operators and security guards. Doing so allowed the office to be put on a night footing and reduce the amount of work for the operators and guards. That's how much he tried to take others into account.⁶

Konaga identified four elements of leadership: planning, implementation, decisiveness, and tolerance. And he felt that Tanaka possessed them all.

Ōhira's leadership

What of Ōhira, Tanaka's ally? Kuriyama described him this way:

Ōhira was extremely intellectual. And, as you know, he was also a Christian. He really stood in marked contrast with Tanaka Kakuei. Well-read, he was very much an intellectual. But there are downsides to that. Intellectuals get distressed when things don't go the way they thought they would. . . . He had a great amount of trust in the working-level officials in the foreign ministry.⁷

Ōhira's political leadership emphasized the importance of acting judiciously on the basis of scrupulous preparations. Nikaidō commented that "Foreign Minister Ōhira was extremely meticulous as he took on the burden of moving Sino-Japanese normalization forward."⁸ If Tanaka's leadership style was centered on "decisiveness and action," then Ōhira's can be said to have been focused on careful consideration and coordination.

While their respective positions of prime minister and foreign minister played some role in the two men's different approaches to leadership, their personalities were a more important factor. By being in positions that matched their individual characteristics, each was able to make the most of their particular nature. For Tanaka to perceive that Ōhira possessed qualities that he himself lacked and appoint him as foreign minister was a skilled example of personnel management.

Furui Yoshimi, who advised Ōhira on China policy, described the relationship between the two men:

Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ōhira represented an unprecedentedly ideal combination. Ōhira was cautious and meticulous. Tanaka told him, "I don't know anything about foreign policy, so I'm going to leave all of that up to you, Ōhira. But I'll take full responsibility." Mediocre men pretend to understand things that they do not and they seek to evade responsibility. I believe that Prime Minister Tanaka was an outstanding figure and was of the right caliber to be a leader. And – as far as I'm aware – he was the one to actually make all major decisions. Naturally, I have to also recognize the abilities of Foreign Minister Ōhira and the skill with which he laid out the policy options available to Tanaka before him.⁹

The leadership of the two men was supported by their friendship; together, they were even able to turn one another's shortcomings into strengths. This contrasted greatly with the estranged relationship between Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru during the negotiations over Japan–Soviet normalization in the 1950s.

The relationship between Tanaka and Ōhira differed from that between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Zhou always made sure to obtain Mao's agreement on any items of importance. Tanaka, however, only laid out an overall strategy and entrusted Ōhira with full authority to carry it out. With Tanaka's full trust, Ōhira was able to break through any number of difficult situations. Ōhira's role was critical, as it was he who would press Tanaka to make decisions.

Despite their excellent leadership, Tanaka and Ōhira had to also rely heavily upon officials at the foreign ministry. The work of modern diplomacy is not so simple that the leaders at the top are able to make every decision; they have no choice but to leave the finishing touches to the officials working under them. It was these diplomats who wrote the majority of the Sino-Japanese joint statement. Tanaka and Ōhira made skillful use of these officials and worked alongside them during normalization. Kuriyama recounted this work:

Those at the top trusted those below them, and this trust was returned in kind. All worked towards a particular purpose, and these efforts bore fruit. I believe that Sino-Japanese normalization stands out in the postwar history of Japanese foreign policy as an excellent example. Of course, we were personally involved. I remember it fondly.¹⁰

We have no way of knowing when Japan and China would have normalized their relations in the absence of Tanaka and Ōhira's leadership. These relations were finally established via the resonance of the two men's leadership styles and their skillful use of government officials.

Zhou Enlai's last words

How should China's diplomacy be assessed? While it had put forward three principles for the restoration of relations with Japan, realistically speaking, China under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai was focused on a higher level: its strategy toward the Soviet Union. Zhou, suffering from cancer, was cognizant of his limited remaining life span. When Tanaka asked Zhou to visit Japan, the latter told him that "I will likely never visit Japan again in this life."¹¹

Hashimoto's perception was that due to their Soviet strategy and Zhou's declining health, China was in more of a rush to normalize relations than Japan was:

They wanted to improve relations with America and Japan, no matter what it took. This was part of resisting the threat of the Soviet Union. So that's why they brought about Nixon and Tanaka's visits to China. It was for their global strategy, their strategy towards the Soviets.¹²

According to Asia Bureau Director Yoshida Kenzō, “The impression I received at the time was that China was also in a hurry to normalize relations. Zhou Enlai himself gave the fall of Lin Biao as the greatest impetus for this.”¹³

But just because Sino-Japanese normalization was achieved within a short time frame does not mean that it proceeded without any difficulties. Had things been ironed out at the working level in advance of the negotiations in Beijing, it is likely that incidents such as Zhou’s strong rebuke of Takashima’s explanation of the Japanese draft could have been avoided.

But at the same time, there is no question that, had everything not been done all at once at high-level talks, the negotiations would have been significantly more protracted. China may have made harsher demands of Japan, such as asserting its territorial claim to the Senkaku Islands, and normalization may have stalled. It is possible that this would have led to an upsurge of complicated popular sentiment and domestic conditions in both countries and that, with the deaths of Mao and Zhou, normalization would have become impossible.

The only option to avoid this was to proceed via top-level talks and then present the normalization to both publics and those who opposed it as a *fait accompli*, seeking their understanding. While a feeling that things had been rushed in undeniable, September 1972 was the best time for the attempt to be made. Tanaka was at the height of his popularity and power, and Mao and Zhou were still relatively healthy. Tanaka was cognizant of the timing and, while Zhou put forward three principles for normalization, he showed flexibility during the actual negotiations in order to allow them to proceed.

Zhou passed away in January 1976. Six months before his death, he met with former foreign minister Fujiyama Aiichirō at a hospital in Beijing. Wearing a Mao jacket, Zhou slowly emerged from his hospital room. His face was pale, and he had lost a great deal of weight.

At the time of their meeting, the greatest issue of contention between the two countries was the ongoing negotiations over the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Despite his poor health, Zhou spoke forcefully on the subject:

The issues of the past – our rights to indemnities and compensation for damages – were completely settled with the Sino-Japanese joint statement that Prime Minister Tanaka and I signed when diplomatic relations were restored between our countries. This treaty must be something that lays out how China and Japan can maintain everlasting friendly relations moving forward.

As he spoke passionately, overcoming his poor health, his tendency to monopolize conversations returned. As if pushed forward by some invisible force, Zhou spoke fluently and logically about Sino-Japanese relations for some ninety minutes. He was aware that these would be his final words to the Japanese.¹⁴

What is the spirit of Sino-Japanese peace?

The Sino-Japanese normalization process neglected the feelings of the Chinese people, those who had been forced to experience the devastation of war on an

unprecedented scale. While this was largely due to the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system, it is also a negative legacy of the agreement having been reached through a brief burst of negotiations.

Following the First Sino-Japanese War, China had been forced to pay a massive indemnity. And, given the sentiments of the Chinese people and the indescribable suffering they had experienced, it is likely that even if reparations had been demanded of Japan on an astronomical scale, it would not have been sufficient. Despite these facts, Mao and Zhou had unilaterally renounced China's right to compensation.

Once China's charismatic leaders like Mao and Zhou had died, it was likely that these suppressed feelings of the Chinese people would resurface. This was not lost on Japan's leaders. When Ōhira later embarked on a policy of offering yen loans to China during his time as prime minister, it was clearly done with the intention that these loans serve as a substitute for compensation. The yen loans and China's renunciation of compensation "were thoroughly linked within Ōhira's mind."¹⁵

Both Ōhira and Tanaka have since passed away. Zhou, Mao, Ōhira, and Tanaka have all died and nearly fifty years have passed since Sino-Japanese normalization. The number of politicians and government officials able to speak about the actual state of affairs behind the process that led to normalization has dwindled to become small enough to be easily counted.

Nonetheless, the Japanese have not forgotten the war, and the Chinese take that as a given as they themselves approach Japan with a spirit of forbearance. Together, China and Japan are establishing a relationship of good neighbors. That is the spirit of Sino-Japanese peace. The process that led to Sino-Japanese normalization provides extremely modern lessons to those living today. It is a history that deserves to be repeatedly turned to and referenced.

Notes

- 1 Jin Xide, *Zhongri Guanxi – Fujiao 30 Zhounian De Sikao* (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2002), 87–128; Jin Xide, *21 Seiki no Nicchū Kankei – Sensō/Yūkō kara Chiiki Tōgō no Pātonā e*, trans., Dong Hong, Zheng Cheng, and Sudō Kentarō (Tokyo: Duan Press, 2004), 83–123; Mōri, *Nicchū Kankei*, 90–94. On Japan–Taiwan "working level ties" and the "1972 System" in the sense of the external environment for the Taiwanization of the Republic of China, see: Matsuda Yasuhiro, "Taiwan Mondai no Shintenkai," in Ichika Ryōko, Matsuda Yasuhiro, and Duan Ruicong, eds., *Kiro ni Tatsu Nicchū Kankei – Kako to no Taiwa/Mirai e no Mosaku* (Kyoto: Kōyō Shobō, 2007), 217; Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan no Seiji – Chūka Minkoku Taiwanka no Sengoshi* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2008), 118, 367–368, 425.
- 2 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 117–118, 125, 136.
- 3 Ibid., 132.
- 4 Ibid., 128.
- 5 Interview with Hashimoto, November 1, 2008.
- 6 Interview with Konaga, June 11, 2010.
- 7 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 129.
- 8 Nikaidō, "Chūnankai no Ichiya," 66.
- 9 Furui, "Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka no Hiwa," 147. See also: Nakae Yōsuke, "Rekishī Ninshiki Mondai o Megutte," *Gaikō Fōramu Rinji Zōkan – Chūgoku* (1997), 121.
- 10 Kuriyama, *Gaikō Shōgenroku*, 213.

- 11 Yoshida Shigenobu, “Nagai Tabi,” 64. See also: Amako Satoshi, *Kyoryū no Taidō – Mō Takutō vs Ton Shaopin* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2004), 220.
- 12 Interview with Hashimoto, November 8, 2008.
- 13 Yoshida Kenzō, “Taichū Keizai Kyōryoku no Makuake,” *Gaikō Fōramu Rinji Zōkan – Chūgoku* (1997), 125.
- 14 Fujiyama, *Waga Michi*, 224–225.
- 15 Morita, *Kokoro no Ittō*, 205.

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