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Luigi Bramati · Monique van der Steen ·
Maria R. Haberfeld · Gohar A. Petrossian *Editors*

The Policing Gap in NATO Operations

Defining the complexity of Internal Security Architecture

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Preface

A very unique approach to conducting a field research with multiple professional and organizational backgrounds of its stakeholders, from a number of different countries, is not just an interesting and worthy replication project but, at the same time, a cautionary note to those who will try to undertake a similar approach in the future.

From the first meeting between the group leader, Colonel Bramati from the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence, through the final days of writing and editing the current brief, the challenges and hurdles seemed, at a time insurmountable, however, as these final words are been written, it became quite clear that it was a very worthy effort.

An attempt to understand how law enforcement can be delivered and supported in the most effective manner in countries transitioning from a totalitarian regime into a more open and democratic form of government is definitely a very timely and future oriented undertaking. As this initiative originated at the Center for Excellence in Policing, under the auspices of NATO it was, by default, guided by its staff, with a clear law enforcement rather than academic background. An addition of the Dutch Military staff added yet another practitioner lens to the project. When the researchers from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice joined this initiative, some immediate concerns emerged that needed to be addressed and resolved to enable this collaboration.

Academic researchers tend to identify the problem, create the research questions and hypothesis, and assess the appropriate research methodological approach, to data collection and analysis. Once this is done, the next step is securing an approval from an Institutional Ethics Review Board, and this is usually done prior to any collection of the data. In case of the current brief, the academic team attempted to secure such an approval from the City University of New York Institutional Review Board (IRB) however, due to the fact that the collaboration included partners from non-academic institutions in foreign countries, such an approval was not granted, solely based on these considerations and not the content of the proposed research project and/or data collection protocols.

As the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence needed to move forward with the first phase, upon multiple deliberations, it was decided that the data collected

without prior IRB approval will not be handled by the John Jay College researchers, and their role will be limited to the background literature review and secondary analysis.

While John Jay College researchers participated in numerous workshops and meetings, their input into data collection was non-existent. However, further active participation of the academic team was conditioned upon creation of a formal IRB by the Center, and their post factum approval of the data collection protocols. Once such an Institutional Review Board was created and the Board approved the initial research protocol, the John Jay College researchers took a more engaged role in the final editing process of the findings and analysis of this project.

A number of team members, two doctoral students from John Jay College, Bryce Barthuly and Sumita Das, as well as three members from the Dutch Military ceased participating in the project while it was still ongoing. The departure of these members of the original research team further altered the final structure of this brief.

One of the lessons learned from such a collaborative venture is that their members may leave the project, at any given time, and their replacement does not always make it possible to include all the original contributions that were envisioned for the final product.

In our case, we decided to eliminate the extensive literature review related to the original conceptualization of this project, as the data was collected prior to the approval of the newly created IRB, and thus was rendered less relevant than originally envisioned. The questionnaires used for data collection were only tangentially informed by the extensive literature review and, therefore, less relevant to the analysis of the findings.

While the decision to eliminate some initially conceptualized aspects of this research was, primarily, driven by the integrity of the research protocols, it certainly created a unique, data analysis driven summary, that focuses on the current findings rather than on what was previously researched. Nevertheless, this approach that is essentially more ethnographic than sociological in nature, provides the readers with a wealth of unique and valuable accounts from subjects who were directly involved in the transition processes, and either acted, directed, observed, or participated in some unique experiences that, frequently, were unprecedented in nature.

It is our hope that the readers of this brief will focus on this unique contribution to our understanding of *The Policing Gap in NATO Operations* through Defining the Complexity of Internal Security Operations.

New York, USA Prof. Maria R. Haberfeld

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Andrea Chiovenda and Luigi Bramati

This study marks a significant step toward reframing our Western military perspectives within theaters of conflict and war toward a more nuanced and realistic paradigm. Particularly, when confronted with operations of stability policing (i.e., actions carried out during and after a full-fledged military confrontation), the self-referential and Western-originated model for interpreting the situation on the ground can no longer be sufficient to obtain successful results—stability, security, and safety for the civilian/non-combatant component within the theater of conflict, and ultimately, pacification of the area of operations. The engagements that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have had in the past three decades, across a wide range of global regions, have painfully demonstrated that the so-called "top-down approach" to reading complex crises, which Barry Buzan and Ole Waever had already started to decry back in 2004 (Buzan and Waever, 2004; Krahmann, 2005), cannot continue to be the predominant paradigm. And yet, in those first examples of critique of a rigidly realist and neorealist analysis of power dynamics within and between states, the focus switched to regional and local *institutional,* or para-institutional, centers of power, legal legitimacy, and political influence. In other words, the attempts made in the late-1990s and early 2000s aimed to provide a different lens for interpreting conflict contexts, shifting the focus away from the central and centralizing state apparatus toward nominally subordinate and localized centers of institutional power. While this shift was certainly welcome and necessary, over time, it became clear that additional factors had to be considered. The insertion of NATO Countries' personnel into non-NATO countries with the ostensible objective of helping stabilize an ongoing conflict or a post-conflict environment, in the interest of the civilian population inhabiting the same area, is a scenario that has dramatically increased its stakes and its frequency in

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the past three decades. This is precisely where the "top-down approach", so widely accepted in recent security analyses and theorization, came to show its deficiencies and inadequacy.

Focusing on Internal Security Architecture

This is also where the concept of Internal Security Architecture, which is the core focus of the present study, comes fully into fruition. The concept of internal security is as old as the concept of the state. While there does not exist a firm consensus in the literature on the definition of internal security, most authors proceed heuristically with a conventional understanding of the concept that still allows theorization about its ramifications. For the purpose of this study, we chose to focus on the following operationalization: ***by and large, internal security is associated with the idea of the exclusive sovereignty of the state, modeled after the centralized and univocal Western paradigm of state*** (Bossong and Rhinard 2013, Buzan 2007, Kostrubiec 2021, Zedner 2003).

The persistence and the centrality of the state, almost as an ontological category, unchallenged by parallel or even outside actors, is taken as the paramount value. Of course, the reality on the ground in any state, be it a functional and productive one or a "failed" and dysfunctional one, is that the legally legitimate apparatuses of the state always have to coexist, and, sometimes, compete with informal, parallel, and legally-not-so-legitimate institutions that are nonetheless present on the territory. These parallel institutions may often be the spontaneous, longstanding, and autonomous expression of localized lifeways, social structures, cultural values, allocations of power and authority, which do not necessarily need validation from the state to be socially compelling, and exert authority over a specific group of people geographically positioned. Only a few contributions in the literature have recognized the critical role played by these informal governance structures, and the role that they should play in the assessment and management of a system of internal security (Ebohon and Ifeadi, 2012; DeLeon and DeLeon 2002). Thus, while Buzan and Waever, in 2004, were starting to timidly assert the importance of building what they called "securitization" from the bottom-up, paying particular attention to local and regional actors (Buzan and Waever, 2004: 48–76; Hoogensen, 2005, Krahmann, 2003), in 2012, Ebohon and Ifeadi could claim with more assertiveness that "the Nigerian state rather than being a source of security is a source of insecurity" (2012, 17), and that the possible solutions to this seemingly intractable problem included, among others, "[moving] from a state-centric to a human security paradigm, [moving] from an elite-centered to a people-centered security management approach" (2012, 1). Studying and assessing the unofficial, informal components of the structures that provide-or fail to provide-security for civilian populations within a state's sovereign territory is crucial for shifting away from the traditional internal security paradigm centered on the overarching and all-encompassing reach of the central state. Instead,

it encourages recognition of the existence and role of parallel and informal security actors.

The reality of the matter is that, as military ground personnel and anthropologists alike have realized for a long time, human populations in any given territory are typically organized along the lines that are almost always culturally localized and compelling. Such lines cover most aspects of social organization, including security and legal norms. While these norms and precepts are often not recognized and legitimized by the central state, they are, nonetheless, what mostly directs the communal lives of people. While such state of affairs is more likely found in contexts where the central state is weak or ineffectual, it appears to exist also in Western, industrialized contexts, where the reach of the state is pervasive. In other words, while most observers would expect to find parallel informal structures for security and legality in, say, Afghanistan with its so-called *jirgas* and *shuras* (Chiovenda, 2020), or in India with its *panchayat* (Lawrence 2017), the same observers should also direct their attention, for example, to the longstanding *codice barbaricino* of rural Sardinia (Pigliaru, 1975; Zene 2005), or the unwritten rules for social equilibrium among men in highland Crete (Herzfeld, 1985).

Anthropological studies have long recognized the importance of these clusters of local legitimacy for the broader objective of maintaining safety, peace, and balance in the management of human communities. In the eyes of the individuals involved in these social contexts, a distant and possibly hostile state does not hold more legitimacy in maintaining order and security than the closer and more inclusive informal institutions that sprout from the communities themselves. Internal security, and all the ramifications that this concept has for modern policy-making, must necessarily take into consideration the existence of these localized realities. A true understanding of how safety and security are achieved for the civilian populations in any given context requires close attention to these localized dynamics. That is, the assessment of the Internal Security Architecture of any given geo-socio-political milieu must necessarily bring to the fore, and factor in, layers of securitization that do not depend on the presence of, or input from, state apparatuses.

The present study is premised precisely on this assumption. The very idea of Internal Security Architecture is the expression of such a conviction. The individuals who have been selected for this study to comment and reflect on the existence of the inescapable reality of informal and parallel institutions for local or regional securitization, were either members of NATO-affiliated armed forces who were involved on the ground in the management of the internal security of countries with high domestic volatility, or autochthonous members of government institutions from the same countries. In either case, the respondents for the present study had many years (sometimes decades) of direct on-the-ground experience in dealing with these issues and conundrums. As will become evident in the following chapters, the vast majority agree that informal and complementary legal and security institutions-those operating alongside the state- that contribute to the stability of the social contract in a sovereign country, must be taken seriously to understand who or what underpins equilibrium and order within a sovereign context, and, conversely, the sources of instability. To enhance the capacity of external police forces to promote stability in conflict-ridden

contexts necessitates a thorough understanding of what this study terms the Internal Security Architecture. The present study offers the clearest and most direct evidence of that necessity. Through a combination of structured questionnaires and open-ended interviews, the experts who contributed to this research provide both an informed assessment of the relationship that must develop between a stability-oriented police force and the local securitization structure, and a forward-looking vision of the steps that must follow.

A Methodological Opportunity

If it is true that the only way to devise a valid, effective, and realistic intervention plan for a NATO stability policing force in non-NATO country is by attaining a sufficiently advanced understanding of that country's Internal Security Architecture, then the most promising method for achieving this goal is through an ethnographic, on-the-ground research approach. By employing this approach, the intention is to establish field research practices widely employed by anthropologists and, more generally, by researchers across the social sciences. Ethnography entails a sustained, on-the-ground direct engagement with stakeholders and common people, as well as with the social phenomena, facts, and dynamics of the environment in question. It is qualitative work that privileges open-ended interviews and interactions over structured ones, questionnaires, or surveys. The final objective is not a statistically-based and quantifiable set of narrow data, but rather a broader, narrative assessment of a ground situation of power equilibria and a network of social ties, as the field-worker observes them in their dynamic unfolding on the ground. This also means an interpretation of the *meaning* that each of these power balances and social networks acquire for each relevant individual or group of individuals. The type of fieldwork outlined here also facilitates the shedding of preconceived and possibly prejudicial ideas about how local dynamics operate on the ground, by allowing the acknowledgment and acceptance of the data stemming from on-the-ground observation. At the same time, it is an epistemological shift from previous colonially-minded attempts at achieving the same result, as well as a moral shift. Indeed, this practice allows the possibility on the part of the field worker to consider legitimate and functional all those localized, and so-called informal, practices that stem from the very core of each socio-cultural milieu. In fact, and to reiterate, such practices are often seen by local inhabitants equal to, if not more legitimate than, those stemming from the authority of the central state.

Such an ethnographic approach to studying a locale's internal socio-political dynamics can be carried out both prior to deployment and concurrently within it. It would require specific operators, and even units, trained and employed ad hoc for this purpose. While it certainly entails its own specific risks, it should appear clear that those risks will not outweigh the potential benefits acquired by this course of action. The Afghan, US-trained anthropologist Alef Shah Zadran, who studied precisely the informal web of norms and unwritten rules that ordered rural Pashtun

society in Paktia province, Afghanistan, during the late twentieth century, established a principle according to which the degree of resistance of a local environment to top-down legal and social impositions is directly proportional to the degree of perceived external provenance of such normative impositions. In other words, the more local inhabitants will perceive one as an outsider with little connection to their milieu, the more they will be inclined to resist (even violently) their legal and social impositions—including, of course, control and surveillance over a geographical territory for security purposes (Zadran, 1977). A corollary to Zadran's empirical principle, we might argue, is that only through an adequate knowledge of the actual situation and dynamics on the ground will it be possible to design the appropriate stability policing intervention. In turn, such intervention should necessarily take into consideration the local actors and "centers of power" (as they are termed in this study), as well as the way they operate within the fabric of society in any given locale (that is, the Internal Security Architecture), and, thus, design ways through which the presence of an external stability police force may be harmonized with those same informal centers of power. By the same token, this kind of harmonization may become the bridge through which the central state of the country in which the stability police force in question is operating, could come to work in equal harmony and complementarity with the informal and parallel centers of power at the local level.

Further, the harmonization of the stability police force (and, at a later stage, the central state) with local centers of power does not necessarily have to result in what is known historically in colonial history as "cooptation" (one of the most glaring and longstanding cases, is that of the British Raj with Pashtun local power brokers in what today is Pakistan, within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA (Ahmed 1976, 1980)).

The objective of the stability police force is not supposed to be that of creating "political agents" of reference, but rather that of helping create a functional and harmonious system of securitization and governance that could prove to be stable, respectful, and equitable enough to stand the test of time for all inhabitants of a certain geographic area.

The present study shows its value precisely because it shines a light on the importance of such harmonization between informal centers of power, and both a stability police force and the central state. The vast majority of the experts interviewed for this study not only acknowledge the existence of the local centers of power, but, more importantly, recognize their legitimacy and the necessity to work alongside them in order to create a safer and more representative environment for the local inhabitants of any volatile context in which NATO forces are called to operate. While only a few of the same experts go as far as to envision a long-term qualitative work in the field to create such room for knowledge production, it is clear to those who have operated stably and deeply on the ground in theaters of conflict or violent instability, whether in uniform or as independent researchers, that this approach holds enormous promise, is feasible, and it may, in fact, very well be the best option available. It only takes the will to implement it.

Team Composition

The composition of the research team somehow reflects the complexity of the research objectives, where both academic, policing, and military worlds are represented. Certainly, a source of complexity, but also undeniably a strength- this approach holds the potential to translate research findings into actionable operational insights.

Part of the team is composed of subject matter experts of the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence (NATO SP COE), in Vicenza (Italy), promoter and co-founder of the research. The NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence is one of the thirty currently established NATO-Accredited Centers of Excellence. NATO SP COE supports NATO in the field of Stability Policing doctrine, with academic-level research activities, doctrinal proposals, Education & Training, and Lessons Learned products. The NATO SP COE is comprised of Italy as a framework nation, followed by the Czech Republic, France, Greece, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Türkiye as Sponsoring Nations. The NATO SP COE experts assigned to the research are subject matter experts with police and army backgrounds, with solid and extended experience in many theaters of operations in crisis areas, as well as an academic background in domestic and international law.

The second, relevant part of the team is comprised of academics from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of New York (USA), with whom the NATO SP COE has a long-term cooperation relationship. John Jay College of Criminal Justice is one of the most globally prominent academic institutions committed to enhancing justice in its many dimensions, including policing and in general security, creating and advancing knowledge in support of educating for justice, public awareness, and civic engagement. John Jay's experts assigned to this research cover an impressive field of expertise, focused on policing and rule of law under several perspectives, from capacity-building to performance analysis and legal considerations.

The third entity participating in this research project is the 1 Civiel en Militair Interactiecommando (Civil Military Interaction Command) of the Koninklijke Landmacht (The Netherlands Royal Army). The 1 CMI CMD based in Apeldoorn (The Netherlands) is a state-of-the-art unit of the Dutch Army that combines expertise in Civil Military Collaboration with Psychological Operations to effectively support missions, working with governments and organizations to protect citizens and cultural heritage, connecting people, and limiting side damages of the military operations. The experts assigned to research bear both a substantial academic background in the field of international and domestic law, and extensive expertise in stabilization operations in crisis areas across the globe.

Furthermore, the research team was supplemented by the participation of an anthropologist from the Georgetown University of Washington, DC (USA) and a Carabinieri Officer currently serving as a Police Commander in Southern Italy.

The combined expertise represented within the research team covered an enormous thematic area, ranging from International and Domestic Law, Rule of Law,

Social Sciences, Anthropology, History, Political Science, Internal/External Security Science, UN & NATO Doctrines (in general), and NATO Operations' Planning. Most importantly, this huge cognitive range was supported both by academic knowledgeability of the components of the research team and by a vast experience on the field in multiple military and civilian stabilization operations in crisis areas, in conflict or post-conflict contexts.

As evident, the added value of the extension of the expertise made available to conduct the research vastly surpassed the complexities of the interactions within the team, determined by different habits and/or applied procedures in the respective remits. All difficulties and complexities were resolved through dialogue and a set of frequent meetings between the participants, whether in-person or through online platforms, and thanks to the strong commitment of all the components of the research toward a result that was considered relevant from all the points of view represented in the team.

Ethical Scrutiny

One of the first challenges that the team had to face was the achievement of the necessary ethical scrutiny for the proposed research, considering the aspiration of conducting the activity in the form of primary research, involving human subjects.

The composite nature of the research team was considered a significant obstacle to the achievement of a single, overarching ethical clearance, due to the non-academic partners of the team. For this reason, the NATO SP COE, first among all NATO-accredited bodies, decided to issue its own Ethical Board, composed of academic experts not structurally connected with the Center and regulated by specific *Terms of Reference*.

The NATO SP COE *ERB* (Ethical Research Board), issued by the Center's Director under the form of a permanent advisory working group, assesses research projects proposed for an ethical review according to the NATO Code of Conduct, the *European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity,*[1] the EU Regulation EU 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (GDPR), and all applicable international research ethics standards and regulations.

In September 2024, the NATO SP COE *ERB* (Ethical Research Board) was requested to validate the ethical protocol issued in support of the present research according to the ERB *Terms of Reference*. In December 2024, in its first session, the ERB validated the research's ethical protocol and cleared the envisaged primary research activity.

Considering the peculiar legal implications, for each researcher, for participating in a research project whose ethical clearance had been issued by an entity connected with an international military organization, such as NATO SP COE, it was decided

[1] Issued by ALLEA (All European Academies) and ESF (European Science Foundation), ed. 2023.

to leave to each single researcher the freedom to decide, based on guidance and regulations issued by the institution of belonging, to participate in the primary investigation, or to support the research through literature review and/or secondary data analysis. In this way, any potential involuntarily infringement of internal regulation was averted, and the team members could openly and serenely contribute, each one according to his/her own limitations and caveats, to the research without risks of objections from the respective institutions.

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Chapter 2
Methodology

Luigi Bramati and Lieutenant Colonel Michele Apollo

Research Structure: Complexity Turned into Opportunity

The research methodology was designed in response to the research questions and several key considerations. As a first point, both the research questions and the diverse backgrounds of the research team reflected the interdisciplinary nature of the investigation: both the research questions and the researchers belong to cognitive worlds as diverse as the academic world, the military environment, the policing expertise, the community of the NATO Think-Tanks—the "Centers of Excellence"—and the peculiar police capability that is the one pertaining to the so-called "Gendarmerie-type forces". Also considering only the academic world, the research objective and questions denote a marked multi-disciplinarity, ranging from social science, anthropology, political science, and other disciplines. This complexity motivated the research team to identify a method that would transform this diversity from a challenge into a strength.

The complexity and multi-domain nature of the research theme also determined, as a second factor considered by the researchers, a substantial scarcity of literature material on the chosen topic as a whole. This, on one hand, confirmed the need for an investigation that could fill the gap between all these cognitive domains, while, on the other hand, resulted in the mentioned scarcity of usable/useful papers to support or deny the research drivers.

Finally, *vis a vis* of this scarcity on the literature side, on the military and policing side, the research team could access a significant variety of expertise, whose careers varied considerably, in terms of knowledgeability, from a theater of operations to another, from a managerial or executive role to another, from one crisis context to another, from an education level to another.

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From the outset, the team recognized that the research topic lies in a 'grey zone'—a conceptual space often overlooked by traditional academic disciplines but crucial for planning and executing military or policing operations.

It was then deliberated to structure the research with the aim to *embrace* this complexity of the proposed research theme, valorizing its results and pivoting on the unicity of the composition of the team investigating the assigned topics. Considering the recognized vast availability of experts on the reach of the research team, it was decided to pivot the core of the investigation into a form of primary research, based on the interviews of those experts considered relevant for the research conduction. It is important to note that the scarcity of decisive literature on the chosen subject determined the unavailability of robust definitions of the investigated concepts.

As we will better highlight in the following chapters, accepting the risk of negatively influencing the extraction and interpretation of data from the interviewees, the terminology used in the administration of the interviews was willingly non supported by agreed definitions. In this way, the team could deliberate its own tentative working definitions of concepts—sometimes innovative—mentioned in the interviews, based on the findings of the interviews themselves rather than proposing interpretations that could have resulted in an inopportune—and methodologically incorrect—influence over the witnesses' testimonies.

This approach also permitted the "*freedom of movement*" of the inductive process of the researchers in exploring—and testing—more than one paths, in the attempt of answering the research questions, filling the possible doctrinal gaps with new concepts and theories, based on the observations from the primary research and at the same time tested through the experience and opinions of the interviewed experts. This approach allowed the team to develop its own definitions of the Internal Security Architecture—that is the main focus of the whole research—and the description of its components that led to the proposal of an original "***theory of the Internal Security Centers of Power".***

It is important to note that these innovative findings are not the results of a mere academic speculation, rather they constitute the inductive product of the experts' attempt, based on their experience, to fill an acknowledged gap in the relevant literature. In this sense, the research can be considered a bridge between the academic and field worlds, where the research team "*distilled*" the elements of knowledge from the interviewees and utilized those elements to build the theoretical constructs that constitute the research conclusions.

Questionnaires

There are several methods in administering questionnaires - *a highly structured process that requires a rigorous approach*—each tailored to fit specific contexts, objectives, audiences, available budget, time constraints, and, lastly not for importance, and type of data required.

The researchers' first major decision was selecting the appropriate method, considering limitations, such as budget, mobility, and whether certain candidates could meet in-person at the interview location.

The "*videoconference*", a face-to-face confrontation mediated by a digital platform, where the interviewer asks (*starting from a set of questions validated in advance by the team*) and the interviewee answers, was considered the best method for this research. Eventually, only three out of twenty-one interviewees were interviewed in-person, at the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence (*NATO SP COE*) in Vicenza, without any cost, while the remaining participants were all interviewed via videoconference. Given the sensitive nature of the topic, the researchers adopted an approach designed to reduce pressure and avoid introducing bias, helping interviewees respond freely and comfortably.

For this reason, the research team adopted a flexible approach to the interviews schedule, trying to accommodate the needs of the candidates and create a positive atmosphere during the meeting. The establishment of a relaxed environment was intended to balance the induced impersonality of the digital interface, in so doing permitting the interviewees to provide natural and reflective responses. Special attention was paid to mitigating the potential stress caused by the lack of physical presence: to ease the interview's relationship with the interviewers, simple introductory questions - *not included in the acknowledged questionnaire* - were introduced, with the aim to help the interviewees to feel comfortable and begin speaking freely, avoiding any potential misunderstanding that could skew the results, ensuring that the general contents of the answers remained always aligned with the questions.

To help the creation of a "*positive atmosphere*" during the interview, the researchers opted, additionally, for a "*hybrid approach*", sending the questionnaire to the candidates before the virtual interview, giving them the opportunity to read and answer while still in their "comfort zone", without the interviewer's influence: once the responses were submitted, a follow-up virtual meeting was conducted (*the interview*) to discuss the contents of the answers, review them together, clarify any potential ambiguities (*if present*), and dive deeper into details (*if required*). This method had several advantages: by sending the questionnaire in advance, the interviewee could read and properly understand the questions, reducing the possibility of misunderstandings during the interview.

Later, in the executive phase (*the interview*), the established atmosphere encouraged both parties to engage more deeply, for the benefit of the overall quality of the research: interviews scheduled for approximately ninety minutes (*considered sufficient time for the purposes of the research*), in some cases, it resulted in discussions that extended beyond the planned time.

The interactive and proactive relationship established between the interviewers and interviewees helped to fill the hunted doctrinal gaps rising out in the questions. The participants' anonymity was safeguarded: before starting the interview, interviewees were reminded of their right to confidentiality (*the agreement foreseen to ensure total anonymity of the interviewee*), unless they explicitly agreed to publish their identities, as in the cases of Mr. Christoph Buik, Major General of German Police (*Ret.*), and Ms. Hosna Jalil, who authorized the publication of their interviews.

NATO SP COE personnel and 1 CMI CMD were responsible for administering the interviews and for ensuring the integrity of the entire process: a neutral stance was ensured—also through a standardized method of summarization and comparison of the results—to avoid influencing the responses and their interpretation and adhered to the principle of using "*aseptic language and format*", to minimize biased outcomes. As mentioned earlier, all findings were collected into a standardized format ensuring participants' anonymity (*identified only by a number*). The reports, once shared within the research team for further analysis and comments, were summarized and all the documents collected were stored in a dedicated secure NSPCOE database.

Questionnaire Composition

The selection of the questions that comprise in a questionnaire directly impacts the quality and reliability of the data collected. A well-designed set of questions, even in a semi-structured format, is vital for ensuring valid and credible research findings, aligning with the study's objectives and reducing the risk of bias or misinterpretation. Thus, the researchers decided to choose a clear and simple language to ensure the correct comprehension of the questions, also using a culturally sensitive and accessible approach, focusing on the following "*key aspects*":

- The questions included a certain level of ambiguity in the lack of agreed definitions in the adopted terminology, since the expected answers were due to contribute to a better definition of the very topics that were investigated, and ultimately, potentially, to the study's objectives too.
- The questionnaires covered different perspectives, encouraging in-depth responses and providing enough openness to allow the interviewees to explore unforeseen themes and topics, if deemed relevant.
- The questionnaires should have allowed each interviewee to personalize their answers (*this is possible only using open-ended questions*).

As a bottom line, the administration of the questionnaires was intended to gather information from individuals with direct expertise in the stabilization operations and stability policing fields: for this reason, it was considered essential to allow the interviewers to explore the counterparts' personal (*and thus unique*) points of view, preserving the difference and even the nuances connected to geographic areas also much far from each-others.

Defining the Research Questions

The questions deliberated by the research team focused, as a main theme, on the relationship between police effectiveness and the respective internal security frameworks, on the detection and description of these frameworks in all their components,

including entities tentatively denominated "*Internal Security Centers of Power*", eventually framed in a well determined definition and theory. Also, these proposed questions reflect a strong connection with the military doctrine and the military planning procedures and techniques.

The research questions were initially drafted as follows:

- *To which extent is police effectiveness conditioned by the internal security framework of a given geographical area?*
- *Is it possible to keep separate police effectiveness assessments from a broader analysis of the Internal Security Architecture?*
- *Can police effectiveness analysis/assessment be used as a tool for detecting the actual centers of power— formal or informal — framework/asset?*
- *To which extent the relationship between formal and informal centers of power might influence governance within a given internal security framework?*
- *Is it possible to combine, within a legal framework, formal and informal centers of power, with the aim of achieving an efficient internal security architecture? Can police agencies play a role in this endeavor?*
- *Is it possible to define a method for the detection/analysis of the internal security framework of a given area? Is it possible to achieve this goal through police performance analysis?*
- *Is it possible to combine tribal/religious centers of power with centralized state governance? Are there any successful examples of this approach?*
- *Can "policing gap" be mitigated, based on the identification of the formal and informal centers of power, including the level or lack of a gender-responsive approach, in the given geographic areas?*

An initial analysis of the reports of the first half of the interviews allowed to identify potential issues of clarity. For this reason, to avoid misunderstandings and for the sake of the research results' clarity and attribution, the questionnaire was revised as follows:

- *To what extent is police effectiveness influenced by the internal security framework within a specific geographical area?*
- *Can police effectiveness be evaluated independently of a broader analysis of the internal security architecture?*
- *Can assessments of police effectiveness serve as a tool for identifying the actual centers of power -both formal and informal - in a given framework or system?*
- *To what extent does the relationship between formal and informal centers of power affect governance within a specific internal security framework?*
- *Is it possible to integrate formal and informal centers of power within a legal framework to enhance internal security architecture efficiency? What role can police agencies play in this process?*

- *Can a method be developed to detect and analyze the internal security framework of a given area? Is police performance analysis an effective approach to achieving this goal?*
- *Is it possible to merge tribal or religious centers of power with centralized state governance? Are there any successful examples of this approach?*
- *Can the 'policing gap'be mitigated through the identification of formal and informal centers of power in specific geographic areas? (or "does the inclusion or absence of a gender-responsive approach within these formal and informal centers of power influence the policing gap?")*

This revised version of the questionnaire allowed a more concise and direct administration of the interviews without introducing significant changes in the concept touched by the interviews, in this way avoiding unwanted alterations of the interviews overall results.

Selection of the Convenience Sample

The selection of the candidates for the interviews is a pivotal step in any qualitative research, since the individuals participating in any study play a crucial role in shaping the quality of the data collected and could directly influence the validity and quality of the findings. Diverse backgrounds and experiences allow for the opportunity to provide a complete and better-defined picture of the topic discussed. An effective sampling method begins with defining clear criteria for selecting interviewees who are well-positioned to:

- provide insights related to the research questions, due to their experience and expertise aligned with the study's objectives (*relevant for research*),
- offer a range of relevant knowledge and experiences at various levels and from various points of view (*multiple perspectives*),
- have specific knowledge about the general topic—in this case the concept, yet not defined, of internal security architecture—to ensure that the data collected could be both meaningful and deeply rooted in the available doctrine (*depth of knowledge*),
- offer their availability for interviews and their willingness to provide honest and thoughtful responses (*willingness and availability*). In summary, individuals who could provide valuable insights aligned with research objectives-particularly those capable of helping the researchers understand the unique characteristics of each deployment context, the local internal security architecture, the actors involved, and the solutions adopted or proposed in response to dysfunctionalities-represented a significant added value to the study.

Defining "*Criteria*"

In accordance with the principles mentioned, to ensure that the selection process was properly structured, the researchers defined a few clear criteria for identifying the ideal candidates:

- professional roles, experiences, or expertise related to internal security architecture, prioritizing individuals with firsthand experience in security management, policy formulation, or law enforcement, particularly in the framework of crisis response or stabilization operations,
- experience at various levels - *tactical, operational, and strategic* - of security management, so enlarging the possibility to offer a better understanding of the research topic. This implied the need for individuals involved in the day-to-day operations of law enforcement and security, mid-level professionals who oversee the implementation of security policies and strategies and senior officials involved in policy development, governance, and coordination of security efforts at higher levels.
- a mix of participants, representing different organizations, sectors (e.g., *police, civilian, and armed forces*), gender and professional levels, enhancing the richness of the insights gathered.

Special attention was given to maintaining a balance in the gender representation of the interviewees: despite the study having only five female participants out of twenty-one, this number was considered appropriate, given the context and scope of the research. The researchers recognized the importance of ensuring gender diversity and, where possible, will increase this representation in future studies. The researchers also considered the geographical dispersion of participants to ensure that data was gathered from various NATO areas of interest.

The aim was to capture, seeking the geographical diversity of the interviewees, different perspectives on the architecture of any "*internal security system*". Thus, Sub-Sahara Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya were the four geographical areas of interest chosen within the broader scope of international intervention zones in the global scenario, first and foremost due to their peculiar characteristics, which provide a valuable diversification both geopolitically and in terms of intervention strategies, and secondly, help prevent an excessive broadening of the research scope.

Recruitment Process

Once the potential candidates list was drafted based on the established criteria, candidates were contacted through various channels, including professional networks, academic institutions, and direct communication (via email or phone) to assess the availability and willingness to participate in the study. Participation was voluntary,

with no financial incentives offered, and participants were informed they could withdraw at any time—ensuring the study remained ethical and respectful of individual autonomy.

To enhance the credibility of the research and ensure that participants felt more confident in their involvement, all candidates were engaged through official NATO channels: formal requests (*including the questionnaire*) were enhanced by the NATO SP COE to the chain of command of each candidate—if belonging to an official institution—who had provided their availability to support the research project. The interview phase could be implemented only after receiving official authorization from the candidate's organization/chain of command, ensuring that the interview process adhered to NATO's standards for research and data collection.

While most organizations promptly responded to the requests, challenges arose when trying to engage personnel from Africa and the Middle East: unfortunately, not all responses were received from those regions, which limited the geographic diversity of the sample. Nonetheless, many participating organizations were able to provide suitable candidates for interviews.

The subjects selected for the research are all international experts from law enforcement and internal security bodies at various levels of government - *local, regional, and national*—within NATO and its partner countries, and they have been all selected for their direct experience in interacting with internal security frameworks in conflict zones, such as advisors, trainers, or mentors working in governmental or law enforcement contexts.

Ethical Considerations and Informed Consent

The method of administration of the questionnaires was rigorously defined by a specific ethical protocol. The research team ensured that all candidates had been fully informed about the study's goals and their role in the process since the very initial contact: interviewees were provided with a brief explanation of the research objectives and theme, including the specific questions they would be asked and how their responses would be used. They were also reassured that their identities would remain confidential, and that any sensitive information shared during the interview would be managed with the best care and not disseminated.

To guarantee that participants understood and agreed to the study's parameters, informed consent was obtained from them at the beginning of the process in order to clarify the voluntary nature of their participation and to assure the participants that their contributions would be anonymized to protect their privacy. Data security measures were also put in place to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information.

Lastly, the entire project, including the questions, was submitted to the scrutiny of the NSPOCOE Ethical Research Board (*NSPCOE ERB*): to ensure the academic-level quality and rigor of its research products, NSPCOE has started a project aiming

to provide it with an Ethical Research Board (ERB), as a form of permanent internal audit in the field of research.

The NSPCOE ERB, composed primarily of representatives from academia, will independently evaluate all NSPCOE research projects to ensure compliance with relevant rules and regulations in governing the protection of human subjects in scientific research, such as in the present study which involves interviews third-party participants.

Interview Process

Once the needed authorizations were obtained, we proceeded with the interviews, with each participant contributing valuable insights, focusing on understanding the complex relationships between different components of the internal security architecture, including law enforcement and security governance. All interviews were transcribed for analysis, and the transcriptions became a key part of the research outcomes. The data collected from these interviews provided an in-depth examination of the challenges, vulnerabilities, and opportunities within the internal security framework. The careful selection of interviewees was fundamental to ensure the success and validity of this research. The interviewees provided the depth and breadth of data necessary to answer the research questions and offered meaningful conclusions about the internal security frameworks in NATO areas of interest.

The following Table 2.1 presents the background and assigned knowledgeability level of the interviewees. The identities of the interviewees are kept confidential, except for Mr. Buik and Ms. Jalil who wished to be identified.

Interviewees' Knowledgeability Rating

The "*knowledgeability rating*" of the interviewees played a crucial role in the research. The diversity of the experience and expertise of the convenience sample required a measure for its harmonization, in the way that the positions expressed by each witness could be "*weighted*" not in terms of reliability—all interviewees were carefully selected, and the assumption is that all of them were highly reliable in their testimonies—but in terms of *knowledgeability*. Through this categorization, the researchers could assess the depth of expertise or familiarity that interviewees had with each topic touched during the interviews, ensuring that the data gathered were both relevant and credible, valuable and accurate, enhancing the validity of the research conclusions drawn from these interviews.

Recognizing the diversity of interviewees' expertise as a strength rather than a limitation, the research team incorporated both formal education and field-based experience into the knowledgeability rating. This reflected the team's belief that "*real-world expertise*" should be valued alongside academic credentials, without

Table 2.1 Interviewees background and knowledgeability

Nr.	**Interviewees background and knowledgeability**
1	**Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara/horn of Africa **gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, substantial executive experience in stabilization operations as Trainer/staff officer/liaison officer with local law enforcement **Education/managerial level:** College/Quadre **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 3.8
2	**Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara, Libya **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, substantial executive and managerial experience in stabilization operations as Trainer/Manager/liaison officer with local law enforcement **Education/managerial level:** College/mid-management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.0
3	**Category:** International staff, Balkans, Afghanistan **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, executive experience in stabilization operations as observer/liaison officer in the aid & reconstruction field, PoC with local law enforcement **Education/managerial level:** College/mid-management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.0
4	Gen. (ret) Christoph BUIK **Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara Africa **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Civilian law enforcement, managerial experience in stabilization operations and as Trainer/planner/liaison officer in the police capacity-building remit **Education/managerial level:** College/high management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.8
5	**Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara Africa **gender:** Male **field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, executive experience in stabilization operations as Trainer/liaison officer with local law enforcement **education/managerial level:** College/executive **assessed Knowledgeability:** 3.5
6	**Category:** International staff, Haiti, Afghanistan **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force with past experience in the Army, Quadre/managerial experience in stabilization operations as Trainer/liaison officer with local law enforcement **Education/managerial level:** College/middle management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.2
7	**Category:** International staff, Afghanistan **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Other armed services, executive/technical experience, also on institution building in crisis areas, including local law enforcement **Education/managerial level:** College/middle management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 3.6

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Nr.	**Interviewees background and knowledgeability**
8	**Category:** International staff, Palestine, Libya **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, executive/Quadre police experience, also in stabilization operations as Trainer/Manager in support/relation with local law enforcement **Education/managerial level:** College/middle management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.0
9	Ms. Hosna JALIL **Category:** Local security forces/governmental institution, Afghanistan **Gender:** Female **Field/professional experience:** Gov. institution, high management/policy maker on security governance/issues **Education/managerial level:** Post-graduate/high management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.6
10	**Category:** International staff, Libya, Timor Est, Iraq **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, executive/mid-management experience, on training/advising/liaising/institution building of local law enforcement in crisis areas **Education/managerial level:** College/middle management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.5
11	**Category:** International staff, Balkans, sub-Sahara Africa, Iraq **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, executive/mid-managerial experience, on training/advising/liaising/institution building of local law enforcement in crisis areas. **Education/managerial level:** College/middle management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.2
12	**Category:** International staff, Ukraine, Afghanistan, sub-Sahara/horn of Africa **Gender:** Female **Field/professional experience:** Civilian international staff, mid/high-managerial experience, on institution/capacity-building, connected with local law enforcement in crisis areas **Education/managerial level:** Post-graduate/mid to high management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 5.0
13	**Category:** International staff, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie-type, mid-management, with extensive, executive experience, on police capacity-building, training, advising, liaising **Education/managerial level:** College/Quadre to mid-management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.6

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Nr.	**Interviewees background and knowledgeability**
14	**Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara Africa **Gender:** Female **Field/professional experience:** Peacekeeping/building civil administration, substantial executive and managerial experience in stabilization operations as Advisor within institutional bodies and international organizations on security/internal security matters **Education/managerial level:** Post-graduate/management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.8
15	**Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara Africa/South Sudan, Tunisia **Gender:** Female **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, substantial executive and managerial experience in stabilization operations as Advisor/liaison officer with local law enforcement and international organizations and civil experience as women's participation and protection officer **Education/managerial level:** College/mid-management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.0
16	**Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara/Africa, Libya **Gender:** Female **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie type force, substantial executive and managerial experience in stabilization operations as Advisor/liaison officer with local law enforcement and international organizations **Education/managerial level:** College/mid-management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.5
17	**Category:** International staff, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie-type, mid-management, with extensive, executive experience, on police capacity-building **education/managerial level:** College/Quadre to mid-management **assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.6
18	**Category:** International staff, Iraq, Afghanistan, sub-Sahara Africa **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gendarmerie-type, executive/mid-management, on police capacity-building, training, advising, liaising **Education/managerial level:** College/Quadre **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.1
19	**Category:** International staff, academic, sub-Sahara Africa **Gender:** Female **Field/professional experience:** Academic on security/internal security from stabilization to capacity-building. Also has experience as Advisor within institutional bodies and international organizations on security/internal security matters **Education/managerial level:** Post-graduate/management **assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.5

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Nr.	**Interviewees background and knowledgeability**
20	**Category:** International staff, sub-Sahara Africa **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Armed forces, substantial executive and managerial experience in stabilization operations as a program director/Advisor/liaison officer with local governmental organizations, military and police organizations. Advisor to the minister of Defense and minister of interior **Education/managerial level:** High level management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.7
21	**Category:** Local security forces/governmental institution, Afghanistan **Gender:** Male **Field/professional experience:** Gov. institution, mid-management/Quadre on security governance/issues **Education/managerial level:** Post-graduate/mid-management **Assessed Knowledgeability:** 4.0

prioritizing or excluding participants based solely on official qualifications. This inclusive approach proved especially helpful in achieving a more comprehensive understanding of the research topic, enabling the collection of insights from strategic, operational, and tactical "*points of view*", in a field where literature remains limited.

For the purpose of assessing the knowledgeability of the interviewees, a set of "*key indicators*" was defined.

These indicators were regrouped and were assigned a number of points, each of them with a different "weight" with respect to the whole available score, as indicated in the following Table 2.2.

Each of the indicators chosen to assess the interviewees' knowledgeability was clearly defined by the research team, and the respective scores were assigned with the aim of valorizing the aspects deemed more relevant and at the same time ensuring a balance of different expertise:

- **Educational level.** A fundamental indicator, but not the only one to be considered to determine the knowledgeability of the candidate. In fact, higher educational qualifications might indicate more comprehensive knowledge, yet still needing the comfort of practical experience to be best value for the research purposes. In any case, this parameter was assigned a significant weight, with the minimum score of three points.
- **Managerial experience/leadership.** A quality considered important to ensure the individual's broadness of view, in connection with the responsibilities assumed in the roles assumed along his/her career. It was, in fact, assessed that managerial skills could likely indicate the capacity of the interviewee to express a broader understanding of a subject that by definition is multi-disciplinary and multi-factorial. The team assigned to this quality a lesser relevance than the *education* parameter, scoring from 1 to 5 points, in this way giving weight to the positions of high management.

Table 2.2 Knowledgeability assessment matrix

	1	2	3	4	5
Education	NA	NA	Secondary School	College Graduate	Postgrauate
Managerial Experience/Leadership	None	Quadre Low	Quadre High	Manager/Executive	Manager
Level of Engagement with Local Stakeholders	Trooper	Trainer Instructor	Master Trainer	Advisor/ Executive	Advisior
Scope of Expertise	NA	NA	1–2	3–4	>5
Law Enforecement Expertise	NA	NA	<10 Years	10–20	>20
Deployments	NA	NA	<1	2–4	5

- **Level of engagement with local stakeholders**. A valuable parameter used to assess how actively the interviewee engaged with and was exposed to the perspectives of local counterparts, whether official stakeholders, such as law enforcement or governmental agencies, or community leaders. Those experts that had gathered greater expertise in this field were deemed likely to provide their insights with a better understanding of local dynamics. The scoring attributed to this quality, ranging from 1 to 5 points, was designed to reflect varying levels of engagement with the local counterparts, as well as to acknowledge the diverse roles assumed by the experts during their operational deployments.
- **Scope of expertise.** This indicator was assigned a particularly significant rate (3 to 5 points) in its capacity of reflecting the *breadth* of knowledge of the interviewees across the various sectors/disciplines characterizing the research. A broader expertise suggested the participants' ability to connect different aspects of internal security, and to provide more comprehensive insights.
- **Law enforcement expertise.** This characteristic is intended to reflect the specific professional expertise of the interviewee in the sector of policing or in general law enforcement, not only as a policeman, but also as a professional involved in managing or coordinating policing-related activities. To properly reflect this aspect, strongly connected with the idea of professionalism in the law enforcement sector, a score ranging from 3 to 5 points was assigned to this.
- **Deployment experience.** This was also a relevant factor to be considered in assessing the knowledgeability of the interviewees. The underlying assumption was that individuals with extensive deployment experience were more likely to have developed broader, firsthand understanding about the research topic, particularly in areas where interdisciplinary literature is limited. Long-term deployments were considered as a key factor in providing invaluable insight into the realities of operational frameworks. Also, a decision was made to assign a high scoring, ranging from 3 to 5 points, based on the number of deployments.

The variation in scoring across the indicators considered in the "rating system" was intentional, aiming to strike a balance among the characteristic considered relevant to the research, while assigning greater weight to those deemed most significant. The scoring system revealed extremely helpful in determining the weight to assign to each interviewee's statement, especially when discrepancies emerged between participants' responses: it also allowed the researchers to detect potential biases related to the experiences, backgrounds, or organizational affiliations of the interviewees.

Limitations

As previously mentioned, the research team, from the first stages of the planning of the activity, had intended to benefit from the vast range of expertise made available for the research thanks to the diverse institutions participating to the inquiry. To validate this diversity, the selection of the candidates for the interviews was conditioned by four factors:

- geographical areas of expertise: it was deliberated a primary interest for the region of Sub-Sahara Africa/Horn of Africa, Libia, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
- gender balance,
- managerial level, meaning that the candidates should have represented the widest hierarchical/responsibility levels possible,
- *supporting* experience, as member of an international body/mission, and *supported* experience, as representative of the host nation.

The gender balance among the interviewees was less than optimal, however, the inclusion of five female interviewees was considered acceptable given the general composition/gender ratio typical of military operations.

In fact, according to a survey conducted by EUROMIL,[1] the overall participation of women in the European Armed Forces in 2023 is 13%. The same survey reports an *opinion* provided by the FEMM Committee of the European Parliament to the annual CSDP Report, according to which only 5% of women participate in the EU CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) military missions. Under this perspective, having ensured about the 24% of female representativity of the convenience sample allowed the research team to validate the final list of interviewees as acceptable also under a gender perspective.

From a geographical perspective, the selection was completely satisfactory, since the interviewees represented a range of geographical experience larger than the one originally deliberated. In fact, through the analysis of the candidates' deployment experiences, the team realized that the majority of the interviewees had accrued experience in multiple theaters of operations. For this reason, it was possible to benefit from the experience gathered in the following areas/theaters of operations (Table 2.3):

[a]An interviewee can have expertise in more than one country or region, therefore, this number does not reflect the total number of interviewees, but rather their collective expertise.

This diversity of expertise added substantial value and significantly enhanced the overall findings of the research, supporting the validation of the interviewee list. Similarly, the range of managerial expertise was completely satisfactory, ranging from a typical quadre/executive field expertise to a very high level of responsibility, expressed in particular by three of the interviewees.

[1] European Organization of Military Associations and Trade Unions (2023). *EUROMIL survey - Gender Equality/ Women in the Armed Forces*, p.1. Euromil aisbl, Bruxelles

Table 2.3 Geographical areas of expertise of the Interviewees

Country or Region of expertise	Number of Interviewees with direct experience in the indicated geographical areas
Sub-Saharan Africa/horn of Africa	12
Afghanistan	9
Libya	5
Iraq	5
Palestine	2
The Balkans	2
East Timor	1
Tunisia	1
Haiti	1
Ukraine	1
TOTAL	**39**[a]

With reference to the ration *supporting/supported*, a significant diversion from the interviews plan of work occurred. In fact, the original selection validated by the research team included a number of experts to be selected among the units/governmental entities *supported* in occasion of stabilization/capacity-building missions. The idea was to collect the experiences of those entities supported on occasion of international stabilization operations, to validate the points of view of the international *supporting* experts. In total five experts from Iraqi Police Forces and Somali Police Forces had been indicated as potential candidates for the interviews, in addition to Ms. Jalil and interviewee #21, both from Afghanistan. Moreover, another Sub-Sahara national police had been requested to propose a number of experts of their choice to be interviewed. Unfortunately, the research team only had access to the experts from Afghanistan, while for the other designated experts no authorization was granted in a workable timeframe.

The research team assessed the encountered limitation and deliberated that the level and diversity of expertise gathered among the international experts would have granted a level of thoroughness and impartiality sufficient to support the research aims and methodology.

In fact, the testimonies of the *supported* bodies could have been fundamental if the research objectives had been focused on the performance and the effects of stabilization or capacity-building operations as such. In that case, a "reality-check" on the effectiveness of the international effort—under multiple aspects, also practical—would have been essential, and a lack of information from the counterparts could have impaired the results of the research.

Instead, as the interviews were progressing, it became increasingly clear that the research direction was clearly aiming to fill a doctrinal gap more than an executive one, and for this reason, the insight provided by the international experts—in the majority—had been assessed as sufficient to validate the results of the investigation.

A second limitation identified in the research planning process was the diverse experiences and backgrounds of the team members, which had the potential to affect both the conduct and interpretation of the interviews. In fact, the interviews were not administered always by the same researchers/groups. Under these circumstances, it is plausible that the interview results may have been influenced by the varying skills of the interviewers who came from three different organizations. To mitigate this risk, the team limited interviewer discretion by adopting a semi-structured model based on a pre-validated questionnaire, rather than relying on the individual initiative of each interviewer.

As an additional measure intended to minimize the risk of an asymmetrical interpretation of the interviews results, each discussion was summarized using a standardized form. This form was completed by a member of the research team other than the interviewer, except in cases where multiple interviewers conducted the session, in which case, one of them could complete the summary form, with a reduced risk of biased interpretation. Interview summary examples are provided in the following Table 2.4.

The critical insights from each interview, summarized using pre-determined forms, were subsequently compiled using a synoptic spreadsheet accessible to the entire research team. This allowed for the assessment of the consistency of the results and the identification of any notably divergent or conflicting opinions recorded by the interviewers. In cases where discrepancies or unexpected responses emerged, the interview's transcriptions were re-examined. When necessary, the recordings were replayed to clarify any ambiguities. The research team concluded that the measures adopted effectively mitigated the identified risks, thereby supporting the validity of the results.

Table 2.4 Interview #1 summary Extending the concept of the Policing Gap: Internal Security Architecture Interview #1

1	Timeframe and type of the interview, participants Timeframe: August seventh, 2024, from 3.00 to 4.30 pm (CET) Type of interview: Semi-structured, via audio-video digital platform, NOT recorded Interviewer(s): – Col Luigi Bramati, NSPCOE director. – Lt col Michele Apollo, NSPCOE ICDE branch head.
2	Interviewee background. Category: International staff, sub-Sahara/horn of Africa, male Field/professional experience: Gendarmerie type force, substantial executive experience in stabilization operations as Trainer/staff officer/liaison officer with local law enforcement Education/managerial level: College/Quadre
3	General assessment of the interview. The interviewee, currently deployed within an international organization framework in a crisis area, looked confident and well aware of the topics proposed. In general, it emerged a strong western approach of the interviewee to the topic proposed, particularly with reference to the informal centers of power and their interaction with the internal security architecture. Also, the impellent security issues of the area of deployment/expertise of the interviewee conditioned its assessment of those relations, as well as his consolidated law enforcement background. The interview may be considered relevant to the purposes of the research, considering the transition phase of the interviewee current area of operations toward a "policing model" issued at central level, whose difficulties in the implementation the interviewee punctually observed, particularly under the perspective of the relationships between formal and informal Centers of power. Assessed Knowledgeability: 3.8
4	General elements of knowledge expressed In general, the interviewee proposed his vision where the law enforcement agencies/police is the pivot of the internal security architecture, and therefore not separable from it. The western approach of the interviewee drove him to assign a clear prevalence to a "legitimist approach" (the prevalence of the positive right) both to the analysis of the internal security architecture of a given area (meaning that the study of the legal framework of an area is the main instrument of understanding/detecting the internal security architecture) and to the setting of the relationships between formal and informal centers of power (where the formal centers of power, because supported by the positive right, must prevail over the informal centers of power). On the same perspective, the need to include, according to the interviewee, the judicial system in the internal security architecture analysis.

(continued)

Table 2.4 (continued)

5	Elements of relevance for the research purposes Based on the field experience of the interviewee, the informal centers of power look to be an obstacle to the implementation of an effective internal security, often engaging in a competition with the official system. At the same time, according to the interviewee, the lack of governance in certain geographical areas determine the growth in power and relevance of those centers of power, basically filling a void left by the official institutions. In this sense, they are also needed, to ensure a basic level of security/justice. On this perspective, the interviewee seemed to not consider—Or to consider in a limited manner—The impact of traditions/ethnical customs and the need to harmonize them with the official legal system. Instead, he puts the accent on the competition (for power) with the official authorities. Forms of cooperation/coexistence of the different systems are deemed possible, yet they are seen hard to achieve, due to the mentioned tendency of the centers of power to compete against each-others. It is significant, in one of the examples made by the interviewee, the role of police—If existing—In those areas governed/ruled by informal centers of power, being it capable to cooperate despite the lack of an official regulation of the relationships among systems.
6	Considerations on gender perspectives highlighted by the interviewee The interviewee seemed to have detected a limited relevance of a gender perspective in its area of reference. This approach might have been biased by the consideration difficult security situation of his current geographical area of reference. Aside of the formal interview, the interviewee referred to the presence of female police officers in the hierarchical structure of the local law enforcement agencies as a more formal requirement, ensured by local authorities to be granted international funds, without a serious commitment to ensure a gender perspective.
7	Miscellanea The research team will collect and file in the COE mass-storage—Not for publication—The CVs of the interviewees.

Appendix 1

Major General Christoph Buik
See Picture2.1

Picture 2.1 MG. Christoph Buik in occasion of an official visit to NATO SP COE

Major General Christoph Buik is a senior member of the German Federal Police and has more than 45 years of policing and law enforcement experience at national and international levels. As a senior commander he oversaw major investigations related to national security and the fight against organized crime in the western region of Germany. Major General Buik has successfully studied at the College of Public Administration of the Federal Republic of Germany and completed a senior degree in public administration and police science at the German Police Academy, what is nowadays the German Police University.

His international career includes the role as Head of Mission of the European Advisory Mission in Iraq from January 2020 to May 2022. Gen Buik's previous assignment was to serve as the Director of the UN Standing Police Capacity in Brindisi, Italy, from January 2018 to January 2020. Prior to this, he served as the Police Commissioner for the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) from September 2015 to January 2018. Head of Mission Buik's previous assignments were with two European Union Crisis Management Missions: EU AMIS in Darfur (2006–2007) and EUCAP Nestor in Djibouti (2012–2013). Additionally, he served with the UN in 2002 working as the Police Station Commander with UNMIK in Kosovo until 2003. In 2008–2009 he returned to UN peacekeeping in Darfur with UNAMID and served one assignment with the OSCE in Kosovo: KVM (1998–1999).

Ms. Hosna Jalil
See Picture2 2

Picture 2.2 Ms. Hosna Jalil in occasion of an official visit to NATO SP COE

Ms. Hosna Jalil is a young and brilliant Afghan scholar and politician, whose background lays mostly in her experiences within the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government, where she served within different Ministries since 2015.

Ms. Jalil started working in the Office of the Afghan President, at that time Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, then moved to the Ministry of Mining, where she worked in the policy and research sector.

In this position, Ms. Jalil main portfolios were the fight against illegal mining and the protection of mining sites.

After this experience, in 2018, at the age of 26 years old, she moved to the Ministry of Interior, where she was appointed as Deputy Minister. She was in fact the first Afghan woman ever appointed to such a high position within the Ministry.

Then she moved to the Ministry of Women Affairs, where she was appointed Deputy Minister for Policy and Planning, in the lead, in particular, of the Women Peace and Security portfolio.

Ms. Jalil is currently "Research Fellow" at the US National Defence University, where she is researching, in particular, on state legitimacy in Afghanistan in the last 20 years, with a specific focus on the law enforcement and the protection of civilians in Afghanistan.

Reference

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Chapter 3
Analysis

Jaap Hoogenboezem and Monique van der Steen

Methodology

The study conducted 21 interviews with military police, gendarmerie officers, and the civilian staff. The analysis adhered to a straightforward approach, taking interviewee responses at face value without delving into discourse, tone, or voice. Responses to specific interview prompts were examined qualitatively to identify and highlight either commonality or dissent in perspectives. The findings offer direct, clear, and valuable insights and were generally summarized in a narrative that answers the research questions.

Study Results

To Which Extent is Police Effectiveness Conditioned by the Internal Security Framework of a Given Geographical Area?

The relationship between police effectiveness and the internal security framework is considered highly significant by nearly all interviewees. The police cannot function in isolation; it requires a well-defined structure to operate effectively. This structure encompasses surrounding organizations, and clarity on this structure and the role of the police within it. This is essential, as informal entities and leaders can undermine police efficacy. Additionally, a clear legal framework is crucial. In states where the law is ambiguous, its consistent application becomes challenging. The broader

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security framework also supplies essential resources, such as salaries, materials, and communication tools, which are vital for the operational success of the. Furthermore, it is critical that there exists a single, formal internal security structure. The presence of dual or informal structures complicates the police's ability to define its role and establish clear lines of authority.

Is It Possible to Keep Police Effectiveness Assessments Separated from a Broader Analysis of the Internal Security Architecture?

Ninety percent (90%) of the interviewees believe that police effectiveness assessments cannot be isolated from a broader analysis of the Internal Security Architecture. The police, as a key actor, do not operate independently within the complex security framework; rather, its actions are intricately interconnected with other components of the security system.

The concept of police effectiveness itself has also been questioned, particularly regarding its definition and the authority to determine whether the police are effective. Assessments of effectiveness may vary depending on local security needs and the expectations of the population in a specific area. For example, communities without police presence or those reliant on alternative security providers may have a different perception of what constitutes effective policing. Moreover, it has been noted that the concept of police effectiveness is rooted in Western paradigms, which may not align with the host nation's vision of its internal security architecture.

A comprehensive evaluation of police effectiveness requires a holistic understanding of the broader internal security environment in order to identify systemic strengths and weaknesses accurately. This assessment should encompass various sectors, including security sector governance, the judicial and penitentiary systems, and educational frameworks, reflecting a comprehensive governance approach.

As a tool for assessing police effectiveness, one interviewee suggested using public surveys, though this approach is complicated by the challenge of obtaining honest and reliable responses, as public opinion may be swayed by informal centers of power. Another interviewee highlighted the importance of the entity conducting the survey; external actors, such as NATO, may face difficulties in obtaining accurate assessments due to the need for nuanced local context. While separate assessments of police effectiveness may be useful for local police commanders aiming to improve and standardize police operations within a specific area, such assessments should be approached with consideration for the broader security and governance structures at play.

Can the Police Effectiveness Analysis/Assessment Be a Tool for Detecting the Actual Centers of Power—Formal or Informal Framework/Asset?

It is crucial to gain an understanding of the power dynamics within a country or region where a stability policing mission is being conducted. Stability policing intents to serve as a tool to mitigate the policing gap and to make an effective use of it, a comprehensive sociological and political analysis is essential. This might not be within the capabilities of the police force deployed. They might not have access to relevant sources or simply do not have enough time to carry out the assessment within their mission period. Moreover, they may not be within the capabilities of forces involved in stability policing, the question arises as to whether more basic assessments of police effectiveness can provide insights into both formal and informal centers of power. A majority of interviewees believe this is feasible, though they acknowledge that the process is not straightforward.

An analysis of police effectiveness can reveal the types of operations and areas of focus within the police force. These operations, which result from decisions made by the police, may offer insight into the interests of the power centers that influence the police. By examining the activities undertaken by the police, and perhaps more importantly, the activities that are deprioritized, one can infer the influence exerted by external actors. For example, in a region where drug trafficking is a prominent issue, a police force that fails to actively combat drug trade activities may suggest that drug trade has a significant influence over the police. However, it is essential to remain cautious, as there may be other legitimate reasons for such inaction. Thus, it is important to consider additional sources of information and context before drawing conclusions. This could include military intelligence, as well as insights gained through discussions with the local population and community leaders. In this way, understanding police effectiveness can be a valuable step in uncovering the local or regional power structure.

Nevertheless, some respondents emphasize the need for caution in such analyses. Non-Western societies often operate under systems that are unfamiliar and distinct from those in Western contexts, and making broad conclusions from a limited evaluation of police effectiveness can be perilous. Understanding the intricacies of a society's operations typically requires years of engagement, and most personnel involved in missions do not have the time to develop such in-depth knowledge. Therefore, conclusions should be drawn cautiously and with awareness of the limitations of available information.

To What Extent Might the Relationship Between Formal and Informal Centers of Power Influence Governance Within a Given Internal Security Framework?

The existence of informal centers of power is widely recognized by the respondents. The impact of these centers, however, is context-dependent, and understanding their influence is both crucial and challenging. Informal centers of power can serve as either facilitators or obstacles to the mission's objectives. They may be beneficial when they help maintain order, but they can hinder progress if the order they uphold conflicts with the mission's goals.

However, reliance on informal structures to achieve mission objectives presents its own set of challenges. Their effectiveness, coupled with the visible ineffectiveness of formal institutions, can erode public trust in official power structures. Given that police missions are designed to support formal centers of power, this dynamic can create a dilemma.

Another dilemma arises when effective informal power structures undermine the Western conception of the rule of law. In instances where local, informal leaders enforce punishments, they may introduce variations in the application of the law, thus undermining the principle of equality before the law. Therefore, while informal centers of power may contribute to maintaining order, their success could potentially undermine the broader success of the mission.

In conclusion, informal centers of power are significant and their impact on mission success can be varied. As one interviewee aptly noted, drawing on lessons from missions across various countries: "T***here are informal centers of power, and we were not going to understand them when we first arrived***". Thus, it is essential to approach these structures with caution and refrain from making hasty conclusions.

Is It Possible to Combine, Within a Legal Framework, Formal and Informal Centers of Power, with the Aim to Achieve an Efficient Internal Security Architecture? Can Police Agencies Play a Role in This Endeavor?

Although a clear definition of an efficient Internal Security Architecture (ISA) is not provided, more than half of the interviewees believe it is possible to integrate both formal and informal centers of power within a legal framework to achieve an effective ISA. Both formal and informal actors play significant roles in maintaining security and should operate in parallel to one another. To ensure long-term sustainability, such integration is deemed essential.

One interviewee raised an interesting question regarding the necessity of creating a legal framework when informal systems appear to function effectively. This perspective may reflect a Western-centric view of security governance and its emphasis on

formal legal structures. The degree of efficiency achieved in a particular area is also contingent upon the local context, underscoring the importance of situational awareness when selecting actors to collaborate with.

In contrast to the idea of combining formal and informal centers of power, two interviewees expressed concerns related to gender issues. They argued that local informal systems might have a negative or biased impact on the security of women, potentially working against their interests.

The reliability of actors involved in such a combination is a critical factor. Respondents expressed varying opinions on the credibility of formal versus informal powers. One interviewee contended that informal powers are unreliable due to their failure to adhere to the central government's rules, while another respondent asserted the opposite, emphasizing that informal actors often maintain the most trusted relationships with local populations.

Any informal group integrated into a formal security structure must undergo thorough evaluation. These groups need to be trained and, importantly, be open to such training. They must also be willing to become part of the formal system. Tribal groups, which often play significant roles in managing local villages or areas, are another example of informal structures that could be adapted into a formal framework. While these groups typically enjoy the confidence of the community, their adherence to tribal law—rather than national law—may disqualify them from fulfilling policing duties.

Thus, while it may be beneficial to incorporate existing informal structures into a new security framework, their compatibility with the formal structure must be carefully assessed. Without such scrutiny, informal groups could undermine trust in the formal system rather than strengthening it.

Regarding the role of the police, there is some disagreement among respondents. Some assert that the police can only be effective if they are respected and trusted by the community, thereby influencing local security dynamics. Community policing is highlighted as a potential strategy for the police to foster this essential relationship.

Is it Possible to Define a Method for the Detection/Analysis of the Internal Security Framework of a Given Area? Is It Possible to Achieve this GOAL Through Police Performance Analysis?

Most interviewees agree on the importance of analyzing the Internal Security Architecture and believe that it is possible to define a method for conducting such an analysis. However, they emphasize that no universal approach currently exists, and that a tailored, context-specific framework should be developed. A combination of both top-down and bottom-up approaches has been identified as a key factor in this process. Suggested methods for ISA analysis include surveys, studies on

public perception, direct observations, and the creation of flow diagrams to illustrate interactions between various actors.

Respondents acknowledge that while police performance analysis is not the primary tool for assessing the ISA, it should nonetheless be considered as a supplementary source of information. The police, as an actor in the law enforcement chain, can contribute valuable insights to enhance the awareness of environmental and contextual factors, and to support a broader understanding of the security sector.

Although police performance analysis can be an essential component in constructing a comprehensive security assessment, its reliability has been questioned. To address this, one interviewee recommends not relying solely on police-generated data, but also incorporating public opinion on police effectiveness. Such perceptions are influenced by cultural factors and are deeply embedded in the local context of the area being analyzed.

Is It Possible to Merge Tribal or Religious Centers of Power with Centralized State Governance? Are There Any Successful Examples of This Approach?

The majority of interviewees believe that it is possible to integrate tribal or religious centers of power with a centralized state governance, citing examples from Burundi, Rwanda, and Somaliland. Several interviewees emphasize the importance of incorporating these informal centers of power, as they are deeply embedded in the local community and exert significant influence over the local population. When successful, the integration of these informal powers into the formal governance structure is seen as contributing to enhanced security and a more inclusive Internal Security Architecture.

However, interviewees also highlight the associated risks and challenges, particularly the need to acknowledge existing power dynamics. They suggest establishing a balanced framework in which competition between different power centers does not undermine effective governance.

Additionally, it has been noted that the process of merging these structures may slow down overall progress, and it should not be expected that the resulting governance model will align with Western administrative standards. Emphasizing the importance of respecting local standards and avoiding the imposition of structures that do not fit with the local system is considered essential. One interviewee further cautioned that certain activities involved in this integration process may not align with NATO's mandate, and planners must always consider this factor when shaping their approach. The mandate might for instance prohibit liaising with non-official actors or to negotiate with informal centers of power.

Can "Policing Gap" Be Mitigated, Based on the Identification of the Formal and Informal Centers of Power?

The majority of interviewees agree that the policing gap can be mitigated through the identification of both formal and informal centers of power. A comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and the key actors, both formal and informal, is considered essential. This understanding should not only encompass the presence of these actors but also the roles they occupy and the status they hold within the local population. To effectively identify these actors, a multi-disciplinary analysis is deemed crucial, as it can provide a nuanced understanding of the environment. Such an analysis is necessary for NATO planners to develop informed strategies and plans.

One challenge highlighted by interviewees in analyzing formal and informal power structures is the potential fear of these actors losing their power and authority. This makes it very political and may hinder effective and sustainable cooperation. Additionally, interviewees note that achieving solid situational awareness requires time, which may not always be available. This process is further complicated if there is no shared understanding with local counterparts or host nations, or if mutual trust has not been established. Building such trust is a gradual process, and time constraints often pose a significant obstacle for many international missions.

Can the "Policing Gap" Be Mitigated, by Including a Gender-Responsive Approach, in the Given Geographic Areas?

The importance of adopting a Gender Responsive Approach is acknowledged by the majority of interviewees. The successful implementation of such an approach, however, may be hindered by the social context and local culture, where traditional values and norms are deeply ingrained. Consequently, it is vital to gain a comprehensive understanding of both the security framework and the local culture, avoiding the premature imposition of Western ideas.

The capabilities of the local police force must also be taken into account when considering the implementation of a Gender Responsive Approach. Interviewees emphasize the importance of recognizing the unique security needs of all segments of the population, not solely women. However, they also highlight the significant role women can play in enhancing the understanding of the local social context. Furthermore, interviewees stress the importance of engaging informal power structures when implementing a Gender Responsive Approach.

It can be concluded that where a Gender Responsive Approach has been successfully introduced in a given geographical area, it has the potential to mitigate the policing gap and improve overall security. Such an approach would contribute to a more inclusive and responsive policing framework.

Key Emerging Themes

Based on the narratives mentioned earlier, this section provides an overview of the key findings relevant for this study.

Situational Awareness

Achieving good situational awareness is essential for assessing the security architecture and identifying key actors. This requires time, trust-building, and a shared understanding with local counterparts, which is often difficult due to time constraints in international missions. It may also not comply with the NATO mandate.

Analysis and Analytical Tools

A holistic, comprehensive, multi-disciplinary analysis of both formal and informal power structures is essential for NATO planners to plan effective police activities during their mission. Understanding the roles of these actors and their relationship with the local population is vital.

It involves understanding both formal and informal centers of power, which is crucial for effective stability policing in order to mitigate the policing gap.

An analysis of police effectiveness also requires understanding various components of the internal security architecture. To achieve a complete and accurate picture of the security framework, this also includes, for instance, security sector governance, the judicial, penitentiary, and educational systems. It's the whole of governance approach. However, challenges include the time needed to gain a deep understanding of the environment, the potential resistance from local actors, and the difficulty in balancing local traditions with international standards of governance. No standard analysis tool has been mentioned to either assess police effectiveness nor the internal security architecture. To be effective a tailormade tool is required.

Police Effectiveness

Evaluating police effectiveness is complex and cannot be done in isolation. It should be considered in a broader internal security environment. Ambiguity in the law or the presence of informal power structures can undermine police efficacy and complicate the police's role. The broader security framework provides essential resources, and a unified internal security structure is necessary for clarity and success.

There are challenges in defining what constitutes effective policing, as expectations may vary between different communities and security needs. The concept of effectiveness, often rooted in Western ideals, may also not align with local or host nation perspectives and require a careful contextual understanding.

Informal Centers of Powers

Informal power structures, such as, for example, tribal or religious groups, play significant roles in local governance and security. While integrating these actors into the formal security framework can enhance security and inclusivity- especially in regions where informal power structures are deeply embedded- it also presents challenges, including the potential for undermining trust in formal institutions, the compatibility of tribal law with national law, gender bias and equity, and community trust in policing. Careful evaluation and training of informal groups are therefore essential and should also include an assessment of the ***reliability and credibility of these actors***.

Challenges also exist in balancing power dynamics, preventing competition between different centers of power from undermining governance, and respecting local standards without imposing Western models. The presence of both formal and informal security structures complicates the police's role and authority. Dual structures can cause confusion and hinder the police's ability to function efficiently, highlighting the need for a clear, single security framework.

Gender Responsive Approach

A gender-responsive approach can help mitigate policing gaps and enhance security. However, traditional norms and local cultural values can hinder its success. A comprehensive understanding of local culture and security frameworks is necessary, and engaging informal power structures is vital to addressing the unique security needs of all populations, particularly women.

Challenges in Policing Gap Mitigation

Mitigating the policing gap requires a comprehensive understanding of both formal and informal actors in the security sector. The analysis should consider the role and status of these actors, using a variety of tools, such as public perception surveys, which can be influenced by informal power structures.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter draws from 21 expert interviews that highlight the critical importance of understanding the internal security architecture as a foundation for assessing police effectiveness and addressing the policing gap in conflict-affected and fragile states. The findings reveal that police performance is, in essence, inseparable from the broader socio-political and institutional system within these states, especially the interplay between formal and informal centers of power. These findings also acknowledge that while such informal actors as tribal and religious leaders, can enhance local security, their involvement in governance frameworks would need to be carefully scrutinized, because, otherwise, it may lead to undermining the legitimacy and rule-of-law principles of the policing work that is based on formal principles.

Taking into consideration the context-specific, multi-disciplinary analytical approach, in combination with top-down and bottom-up approaches would assist in accurately mapping the power dynamics, as well as support stability policing efforts. An effective internal security architecture would need to incorporate elements of community trust, legal clarity, coherence, and gender-responsive approaches in order to be both effective and inclusive. Nevertheless, such carefully-planned and executed approaches often take time and require deep situational awareness, as well could potentially pose ongoing challenges for NATO and international actors, factors that would need to be considered in planning stability policing efforts. In essence, designing tailored, context-aware strategies that prioritize local realities over standardized external frameworks that are often based on Western approaches are necessary for effective stability policing.

Chapter 4
Discussion

Luigi Bramati

Police Effectiveness

The first *research question* was intended to reconceptualize *police effectiveness*, not as an isolated quantitative metric, but as a qualitative element connected with a broader security framework. Stability policing uses the measurement of police effectiveness, or capabilities, as a baseline for planning its missions, through the analysis of the "policing gap". The Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.22 by Nato Standard (2019) defines the "policing gap" as "*the lack of indigenous police capability to provide a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), public security and the Rule of Law (ROL). Stability Policing is intended to close the policing gap*" (AJP-3.22, para. 0210).

Bramati's (2021) "Lessons Learned from the Chilcot Commission" review highlighted how a lack of comprehensive understanding of the internal security framework can impair the planning and conduct of any stabilization operation,[1] independently from the intent to set up a Stability Policing mission or not. Not surprisingly, the experts interviewed on this point provided an almost unanimous answer: **it is not possible to assess the level of efficiency of a given internal security entity without considering the broader framework within which that agency operates**. Among many, Interviewee #1 justified his position as follows:

> *The assessment of the police effectiveness should be part of a comprehensive analysis of the whole Security Architecture. A police force does not operate separately from the other Law*

[1] NATO doctrine defines "Stabilization" << *an approach used to mitigate crisis, promote legitimate political authority, and set the conditions for long-term stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, re-establish Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and rule of law, and end social, economic, and political turmoil* >>. AJP-3.28 "Allied Joint Publication for the Military Contribution to Stabilization", ed. 2023, para. 1.0.

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> *Enforcement entities. Therefore, in assessing the effectiveness of the Police there is the need to analyse all the institutions interacting with the Police.*

In general, the most common observation is referred to a security framework that "*conditions*" the performance of a law enforcement agency. Yet the description of *how* a security framework can influence the efficiency of a Police Service was not unanimous, depending—and this was one of the first finding of the research—on what the interviewee considered as the "Internal Security Framework". Gen Buik, for example, provided a sophisticated and holistic observation, describing the internal security framework as encompassing.

> *various factors, including* ***legal structures, organizational practices, community engagement, resource allocation, and inter-agency cooperation****.*

Other interviewees were less precise or chose a different approach. For instance, Interviewee # 8 mentioned, in particular, the effects of an **inefficient overall system**, where.

> *in an area in which the security system is not working properly and there is chaos, also the police could suffer from that and consequently be ineffective.*

Interviewee #17 further highlighted the relevance of a holistic *knowledge* of the internal security framework, underlining that "*community sentiment should be fetched"*.

A second point of interest that was possible to observe in the attempts of the interviewees to describe the internal security framework, was the relevance given—or not—to the *formal* nature of the structures and procedures defined "*internal security framework*". From the very first stages of the interviews, the researchers were, in fact, able to detect how *naturally* most of the interviewees referred to a form of internal security framework described by its *formal* components. Only after prolonged discussions, most of the interviewees convened on the relevance also of those entities (defined as "*centers of power*", in the questionnaires) not included in the number of the official institutions, yet capable to influence the performance of the law enforcement agencies operating within their reach.

It was starting to emerge what in following stages of the research was confirmed to be a strong bias against those social actors not included in a *positive law* framework of security.

After having interviewed about half of the candidates, the emergence of these differences in the *understanding* of the internal security framework convinced the research team to engage in an attempt of its definition as an essential element of the research. A first set of possible definitions—proposed and discussed in occasion of the second workshop of the research—of *Internal Security Architecture* were, therefore, outlined, with the intent of testing them within the second round of interviews.

Internal Security Architecture: A Working Definition

As a first step toward definition, the team debated under which *name* to refer to the internal security framework. The team opted for "**Internal Security Architecture**", considering necessary to underline—with the use of the word *architecture*—the strong connection of the internal security framework with the *human* intervention, in general tending to an *equilibrium of forces*. This choice proved relevant, since as the research confirmed later, Centers of Power tend to compete or to coexist to an end state of *equilibrium* that can be both static or dynamic, referred by Lewin (1947) as the "*quasi-stationary equilibria*".

Also, the idea of "Internal Security Architecture" seemed reflective of both the nature of the entity object of the study—as a solely human/social product—and of the potential *operationalization* of the concept from a social/security engineering perspective.

Indeed, the label "Internal Security Architecture" was tested through the comments and objections of the interviewees: some of them seemed reluctant to refer to internal security as a form of "*architecture*", preferring the word "*framework*", while the majority of the experts referred to the word "*architecture*" and "*framework*" interchangeably. In general, the interviews didn't highlight forms of incompatibility with the proposed name, allowing the research team to validate it as *suitable* to describe the concept object of the research.

Internal Security Architecture: A *Deterministic* Definition

The first attempt to define *Internal Security Architecture* led the research team to opt for a "descriptive approach", focused on listing all possible components of what was starting to materialize—after the first set of interviews—as a complex and multi-faceted entity.

This "*deterministic*"[2] approach was intended to include in the definition the many different understandings, also carried by the research team members.

The research team decided to explore this possibility, also as a test of the differences in the understanding of "internal security" existing within the research team. This first tentative definition was modeled on the already existing definition of "National Security", proposed in the Bearne et al. (2005). The result of this adaptation was the following:

Internal Security Architecture refers to the complex of management, decision-making, and oversight structures and institutions, supported by national policies, strategies, and plans, aiming to ensure Public Security within a given national entity. Coordination measures and policies are an essential part of the Internal Security Architecture.

[2] Deterministic (*adj.*): believing that everything that happens must happen as it does and could not have happened any other way or relating to this belief (Cambridge online English Dictionary).

This definition reflected some of the consideration expressed by the interviewees, who extended the concept of *Internal Security Architecture* beyond entities, to the set of **measures of coordination** and **the relationships among them**. It was then needed to clarify the concept of "*Public Security*". To do so, the team adopted the following definition, proposed by Finszter, G. (2009), and the subsequent listing of the *components of the Internal Security Architecture:*

"*Public security is a product of cooperation, which is a sum of the official services provided by the state, and the individual and collective accomplishments of self-defence*. The Internal Security Architecture components *might* include:

- **executive and advisory bodies**
- **legislative/parliamentary committees**
- **ministries of internal affairs/security**
- **customary and traditional authorities (*informal centers of power*, if not regulated)**
- **financial management bodies**
- **civil society organisations**".

This definition, since the very beginning of the discussion, seemed **not satisfactory**, in particular because it was linked to a listing that was not exhaustive, considering the different variants of internal security frameworks—and because it failed to provide a description of the characteristics needed to qualify a potential additional element as part of internal security architecture. The problem appeared nested in its *deterministic nature.*

A different approach seemed needed, capable to describe a concept that appeared complex in its components and their relations, "fluid" in its evolutionary pattern, and not necessarily—rather rarely—bound by artificial constructs originated by positive law.

Internal Security Architecture: A *Relativistic*[3] Definition

The decision to opt for a *relativistic* approach was determined also by the results of the first set of interviews (ten, conducted by NATO SP COE researchers on July–August 2024), where a strong (Western) bias against *informal institutions* had started to emerge. The idea of a *relativistic* approach—where "*nothing can be true or right in all situations*"[4]—based on the dynamics observed on the field, independently from legal constructs, appeared more suitable to resolve the problems emerged when taking a *deterministic approach* to the *Internal Security Architecture* definition. To not be conditioned by the Western legalistic approach to internal security, it was decided

[3] Relativistic (*adj.*): based on the belief that truth and right and wrong can only be judged in relation to other things and that nothing can be true or right in all situations. (Cambridge online English Dictionary).

[4] Ibid.

to focus the definition of *Internal Security Architecture* around non-denominational "**centers of power**".

After the first round of interviews, it emerged that the *Internal Security Architecture* was strongly relying on entities that could not be precisely characterized by legal standards: these entities were, in general, attributed a para-official role of internal security providers, despite not having the formal set of powers recognized to official entities. This category of actors includes tribal councils, self-protection militias, religious leaders, warlords, and even criminal organizations, often blurred or overlapped with the officially recognized internal security agencies. The overlapping of influences and interests, and the competition or collaboration of entities of different nature had appeared of almost impossible categorization under a *deterministic* approach. Therefore, a working *relativistic* definition was proposed as the following:

> Part 1:
> ***Internal Security Architecture is the organizational structure resulting from the entirety of relationships existing between Internal Security Centers of Power.***
> Part 2:
> ***Internal Security Centers of Power are the expression of an individual or collective will, capable to exercise or directly influence the monopoly of force within a given interest group, for the establishment of a secure environment, functional to its individual/collective interests.***

The wording of this definition was carefully considered and amended over time, based on the findings of the research. It is possible to analyze all components of this new definition as follows.

"*Organizational Structure*"
The wording "*organizational structure*" was intended to reconduct its notion to a **form of arrangement** of **entities** dedicated—or intended—**to work together** in **an organized way** (or tending to an organized way) for **a shared purpose**.[5] The focus was kept on:

- the human relevance in the management of (or influence over) the internal security, exercised through *structured relationships*, and the subsequent decision-making, between the many interested stakeholders;
- the necessity to analytically consider internal security as a whole, through the detection and description of its "structure".[6]

"Resulting from the entirety of relationships existing between Internal Security Centers of Power"

As discovered by Bramati (2021) and confirmed by the first set of interviews, the most difficult aspect of the theory of internal security is the description of the

[5] "organizational", adj., defined as "*relating to planning*". From "organization", defined as "*a group of people who work together in an organized way for a shared purpose*". Cambridge online English Dictionary.

[6] "*the way in which the parts of a system or object are arranged or organized, or a system arranged in this way*". Ibid.

intertwined relationships between stakeholders. It was maybe the trauma of the "spaghetti bowl" from Afghanistan[7]: all interviewees were highlighting the **difficulty of detecting the relationships** between internal security actors. For this reason, it was decided to reinforce this particular aspect also into the definition of Internal Security Architecture. In this way, the distinctive elements of *Internal Security Architecture* outlined by its definition and as they were emerging from the first stages of the research, were:

- a number of *centers of power* composing it
- the *relationships* that connect those centers of power

"Internal Security Centers of Power"

At this point, the research team was in need of defining and "labeling" the entities that comprised the Internal Security Architecture, before describing their relationships.

On one side, the referral to the noun "entities" would have been too vague, also from a scalability perspective (it would have been necessary to specify to which extent an entity should have had to be considered *relevant enough* to be included in the Internal Security Architecture). On the other side, the use of the reference to "*stakeholders*" or "*actors*" could have implied—wrongly or not—the exclusion of the description of more complex entities, such as police forces or law enforcement agencies, possibly limiting their relevance to the influence (and power) of their leaders.[8]

Although the interviewees showed familiarity with the term "stakeholders", it became evident that a more adaptable category was needed- one capable of encompassing the full range of entities to be observed and analysed, from individual actors to complex organizations. The decision was to refer to "Centers of Power", intended as entities capable of expressing a **direct influence—through the exercise of power**—over the internal security.

In this way, the *power* expressed by the relevant entity can be considered independently from its origin: it could be a political-based influence (connection with a powerful political power, as example), or it could be a power connected with an organization (a law enforcement agency), or simply by the exercise of violence (militias, organized crime, etc.).

But it could also be a power originated by religious influence, or economic means.

It was decided to mention the characteristic "center" to focus on the capacity of expression of a will, ineluctably connected to a decision-making process or to a decision-maker. In this case, as an example, a fragmented reality, such as the

[7] "Spaghetti bowl" was the nickname commonly attributed to a PowerPoint slide presented by Gen. Stanley McChrystal on summer 2009, meant to portray the complexity of American Military strategy in Afghanistan.

[8] Stakeholder: a person such as an employee, customer, or citizen who is involved with an organization, society, etc. and therefore has responsibilities towards it and an interest in its success.

Also (belonging to the business/legal lingo), a person or group of people who own a share in a business (Cambridge online English Dictionary).

thousands of law enforcement agencies operating a decentralized level in the Anglo-Saxon policing systems could not express a single recognizable will and, therefore, can be considered centers of power only at a local level (the local police command). A different story could be, as an example, a *Union* representing thousands of policemen, even though not connected to a formal chain of command. They certainly could potentially be considered as *internal security centers of power* if the analysis detected the possibility to directly influence internal security management—as an example acting at a governmental level—given the absence of an official body representing the law enforcement.

In this sense, the notion of *center of power* seemed to be sufficiently adaptable to a vast number of possibilities, yet ensuring an adequate level of detail aimed at facilitating the selection, for analytical reasons, of the elements characterizing the entity as *centers of power*, distinct from mere *factors* in the internal security picture.

In the initial phases of the definition of ISA, it is important to note that it was decided to not specify "*formal*" vs. "*informal*" Centers of Power. This general reference was also confirmed in the second part of the definition—the description of the Internal Security Centers of Power—in order to avoid the temptation to enumerate the many possible variables, starting precisely from the differences between them (falling in a sort of "*deterministic trap*"). Also, the need to distinguish between the *formal* and *informal* "natures" could have been affected by a typically western bias against societies based on oral traditions rather than written laws. In any case, also for the detailed definition of the Internal Security Centers of Power, the wording was carefully chosen, as per the criteria outlined in the following section.

The "expression of an individual or collective will"

The term "*Center of Power"* was intentionally chosen to emphasize the entity's capability to express *will*, capacity in a decision-making process, distinguishing it from passive *factors* that lack the ability to form or influence "relationships" with other Centers of Power. Eventually, the capability to express a *will* was chosen as the *key aspect* to define a Center of Power. This option was also chosen for its significance with relation to the NATO Operations' Planning Process.[9]

According to the most comprehensive guidance on Operations' Planning—at the strategic and operational level[10]—there is a substantial difference between a *factor* and an *actor*. In particular, what distinguishes the *actor* from a *factor*, is precisely—in synthesis—the **capability to express a will**, which might be in favor, neutral, or opposite to the mission's intent. An Internal Security Center of Power characterized

[9] Described, in particular in the NATO publications/directives AJP-5 "Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations", and NATO Comprehensive Operations' Planning Directive (COPD), by the Allied Command Operations (ACO).

[10] Strategic Level: <<*the level at which a nation or a group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them* >>.

Operational Level: <<*the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations* >>(COPD).

by its capability to express a will, from a planner's perspective, would qualify as an *actor*, to be analysed through a more sophisticated set of tools, intended to highlight points of strength and weakness, interests and trajectories.[11] Also, the idea of the "expression of a will" allowed the team to solve the problem of the entities numerically large ("the police", as example), but incapable to play an active role as "centers of power" because of their fragmentation.

The mention of the *individual* or *collective* characterization of the *will* was deemed necessary to represent the characteristics of the *centers of power*, capable to assume the form of an *individual* authority or personality (as example a cleric, a warlord, or a specific political leader), or the nature of a *group* (a militia, a police force, a tribe, a political party, criminal group). Their *will* can stem from an individual stance, or emerge as the outcome of a collective decision-making process. It follows that, being the very nature of a center of power anchored to the *will*, its operationalization is "*the expression*" of that will, that is, the *center of power*, to be defined as such, must *willingly* influence the internal security, transforming its *will* into *effects* (that are *the expression of* the *will*).

"Capable to exercise or directly influence the monopoly of force"

Having described the essential traits of the Centers of Power, it became necessary to to anchor these entities to the broader concept of *internal security*. The first distinctive element is the capability *to exercise* the monopoly of force or *to directly influence* the monopoly of force. The term "*exercise of the monopoly of force*" (also referred to as the "*monopoly of violence*") refers to the authority wielded by the institution of the "state", following the Weberian (Weber M., *Politics as a Vocation*) view of society (also closely aligned with the *social contract* theories of Rousseau and Hobbes).

In referring to the "monopoly of (legal) force",[12] the adjective "legal" was intentionally omitted to avoid the deterministic challenge of defining what constitutes legal versus illegal force. An Internal Security Center of Power, to be defined as such should, therefore, be the expression of a will (collective or individual), *capable of exercising the force* in a monopolistic fashion, that is a trait—according to Max Weber's vision of a State. As a consequential observation, the Internal Security Center of Power's **intent is to *impersonate* the state authority**—a *Western* understanding of it—in the exercise of force.

It is important to note that this definition requires *the actual capability to exercise* the monopoly of force, and not just the aspiration, allowing a substantial selection of the entities eligible to be considered Internal Security Centers of Power.

A second and alternative characterizing element would be the capability to *directly influence* the monopoly of force. This might be the case of a "formal" entity, or Center of Power, legally in charge of the internal security, whose actions and policies are

[11] In particular, the "Analysis of the Centre of Gravity".

[12] <<For Max Weber, the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force—henceforth 'monopoly of force'—was the feature that distinguished the modern state from all other forms of political organization. It has two elements—the monopoly of the use of force and the legitimacy of its use >>. Markus Jachtenfichs, "*The Monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as usual?"*, Cambridge Press, Aug 2010.

directly influenced by another center of power. It is important to observe the relevance of the adverb *directly*: to be considered an Internal Security Center of Power, according to this formulation, the observed entities should be able to *directly* impose their will to the controlled entity. This specification is intended to avoid the extension of the analysis to dynamics more connected to the political relationships, as in the case of political parties operating through the rules of democratic representation. A political party would come into relevance as an Internal Security Center of Power only if it is capable of exercising sufficient power to *directly* influence—outside the ordinary political action—the activity (the "monopoly of force") of police (for example), to the point of overruling the will expressed by the controlled entity through its own decision-making process.

"*Within a Given Interest Group*"
Without falling in the deterministic trap of relying on artificial boundaries, it was, nonetheless, necessary to impose geographically *limit* on the detection and analysis of Internal Security Centers of Power. The *exercise of the will* of the Centers of Power should have been considered in its effectiveness inside (*within*) a given area, while the *nature* of the centers of power would not have been limited to a physical extension. As an example, a tribe whose extension prescinds from the political border between states could be considered an Internal Security Center of Power, given its capability to exercise the monopoly of force in a specific area of reference.

For this delimitation purpose, it was decided to refer to the notion of "*interest group*".

This characterization could, in fact, have applied to a political entity, such as a State, or to non-traditional forms of aggregations, such as the areas of influence of a Tribe, or even smaller geographical agglomerates, such as a village or the human settlements in a remote mountain valley. The characterizing factor of the area of interest would then be the *group* (intended *human group*), whose members would associate for a *common purpose or feeling*, such as the belonging to a state, a tribe, or a village.

"For the establishment of a secure environment, functional to its individual or collective interests"

The team decided to furtherly characterize the Internal Security Centers of Power with a specific *aim*, or *objective*, as a common overarching *driver* of their *will*. In this sense, the *scope* of the exercise of power should be focused on the establishment of a *secure environment*, not necessarily for a philanthropic attitude—yet possible—but with the objective of pursuing *interests*, whether *individual* (in case of an individual will) or *collective* (in case the center of power was the expression of a collective will).

Both the *deterministic* and *relativistic* definitions were kept standing, as *working definitions*, for the duration of the research. Yet the considerations over the experiences reported overall by the interviewees, and the discussions over the *existential* need to avert preconcepts, supported, as a final proposal, the *relativistic* option. The following section will further elaborate on this discussion.

The Theory of ISA Centers of Power

Formal Versus Informal

As a first point, the use of the adjectives "formal" and "informal", with reference to the Internal Security Centers of Power, was considered not satisfactory and deceiving from a purely scientific perspective (for this reason it was decided to not use this distinction in the definition of ISA).

Yet it was decided to use these references, in the discussion with the interviewees and in the elaboration of the theory of ISA Centers of Power, for the sake of simplicity, having in mind that what can be considered "informal" from a Western perspective, is far from it in other societies.

To better characterize the "Internal Security Centers of Power", and in particular the *Informal* ones, the team asked the interviewees about their experience and understanding of these entities, also as a test of the "working definition" defined after the first interviews. First of all, although the team intentionally chose not to provide interviewees with a reference definition of formal and informal centers of power, all interviewees appeared to be somewhat familiar with the concept, despite the absence of a shared or uniform understanding.

The experts interviewed reported encountering entities that, while not formally defined or regulated by positive law, were nonetheless considered highly relevant to internal security dynamics. Some experts pointed out how the Western approach to internal security often proved unprepared to address the "interference" exerted by Informal Centers of Power over "legitimate" (according to Western standards) institutions. In particular, Ms. Hosna Jalil observed that in Afghanistan, a strong Western bias against certain informal actors led to their exclusion from the nation's institution-building processes, ultimately pushing many of them toward insurgent positions.

The Western Bias Against Informal Centers of Power

The bias highlighted by Ms. Hosna Jalil regarding Informal Centers of Power was also reflected in the interviews carried out by the research team. A degree of certain *mistrust* toward these entities was evident among several participants. In particular, nine interviewees openly acknowledged their bias, each offering different justifications for their skepticism. The first argument was based on the tendency of informal entities, as experienced by the interviewees, to *compete* with formal institutions. This attitude, in particular, was seen as conducive of conflict and instability.

Some of the interviewees also described the Informal Centers of Power as "unreliable", whether because they were uncapable to perform governmental duties (interviewee #6) or because they were untrustworthy in general ("*…an official policing system is based on laws, that are created by the government that don't change every*

week. ***Whereas the tribal leader can change is posture on security***"—interview #3), depending on their convenience (Interviewee #6).

Interviewee #7 considered Informal Centers of Power conducive of *chaos*, while other experts (#8, #21 and #18) suggested a rigid (formal) set of rules to "control" them. Two other interviewees described the presence and activity of Informal Centers of Power as typical of the "Global South" (interview #16 and #15), not compliant with "Western Standards".

On one hand the research showed a "problematic" understanding of Informal Centers of Power, while on the other hand, the same entities were also recognized as inevitable components of the Internal Security. Roughly half of the interviewees openly recognized that the Informal Centers of Power were relevant in their interactions with security institutions, and also critical in filling the voids left by the official institutions, in a sort of *complementarity* with them, in some cases establishing a para-legal sharing of competences.

Three of the interviewees also highlighted as the participation of Informal Centers of Power to the Internal Security management actually represented a form of democratic participation of local communities in their own security: a sort of "community policing". Maj Gen Buik suggested that the cooperation of the informal centers of power—in particular tribal or religious entities—with the governmental institutions was essential for a more inclusive, culturally sensitive, and stable governance. In this sense, he referred to the influence of Informal Centers of Power as determining fairness, effectiveness, and even the legitimacy of the internal security framework, citing as positive examples South Africa, Botswana, Indonesia, Jordan, and Morocco.

Interviewee #5 referred also to the Informal Centers of Power, in some contexts, as the foundation of the state itself, while interviewee #15 mentioned how Informal Centers of Power, in some cases, were trusted more than the official ones. All the interviewees agreed that, for an internal security system to perform well, Formal and Informal Centers of Power must cooperate.

Informal Centers of Power and Tribal Societies

The majority of the interviewees seemed to implicitly identify the Informal Centers of Power with tribal institutions. That means that the bias described in the previous paragraph was, in reality, due to the substantial lack of understanding (and trust) of the tribal social model. An example of this bias is the recurring reference to the "unreliability" of Informal Centers of Power. This biased assumption perfectly matches with tribal dynamics, where tribal entities consider themselves not so distant from post-Westphalian states (see for example the customary reference to tribal groups as "Nations"): for this reason, such decisions must be understood as reflecting interests tied to a specific timeframe, and are, therefore, subject to change when circumstances shift. Despite the Western disappointment, this alleged unreliability is not far from the experience of almost all the European conflicts in nineteenth and

twentieth centuries, including the two world wars, involving breaking of treaties and/or mutual defense pacts.

It is important to note that all the interviewees, regardless of whether they trusted the Informal Centers of Power, acknowledged that, to some extent, cooperation between these entities and formal institutions was possible. In fact, none of the interviewees suggested the idea of the elimination of the Informal Centers of Power from the general picture of internal security, even if mistrusted.

The Possibility of Combining Formal and Informal Centers of Power

Different Opinions and More Bias

All the interviewees agreed on the need for cooperation between Formal and Informal Centers of Power, however, not all the experts expressed a clear idea on *how* to achieve this cooperation.

A group of six interviewees considered the possibility of a cooperation between Formal and Informal Centers of Power only if strictly "*framed*" within a *formal* set of regulations. That conviction was, in part, determined by the formulation of the question itself that asked if the interviewee deemed possible the coexistence, within a legal framework, of the two types of entities. This group of interviewees particularly stressed the idea that only a strict regulation could allow stability. At this point, the research team engaged in a deeper assessment of this perspective.

The team could not exclude that this position was the result of a biased point of view, also because the idea of a strict legal regulation of the relationships between Formal and Informal Centers of Power looked very much like a process of *transformation* of the informal entities into formal organizations.

This option would eventually lead to the de facto elimination of Informal Centers of Power. From this perspective, Interviewee #12 explicitly stated that there is no need for a *formalization* of Informal Centers of Power: her assumption was that the very existence of Informal Centers of Power implies, first of all, *a need* for those entities, and, secondly, the *acceptance* of the local population. In the expert's argument, these two elements were sufficient to establish a degree of legitimacy for the entities, even if they operate *informally*, as perceived by the local population.

Subsequently, the proposed "formalistic" option was excluded for a logical consideration, since it would have led to the invalidation of the Internal Security Architecture model itself (that is composed by both Formal and Informal Centers of Power). Apart from this extremely legalistic option, all other interviewees agreed on the possibility of normalizing (making it *legal*) the cooperation among the different actors under two main sets of conditions. The first group (five interviewees) proposed, as a typical form of interaction between Formal and Informal Centers of Power, a relationship

of ***subsidiarity***, where the informal institutions would be covering those areas (not only geographical) not sufficiently or efficiently covered by the formal ones.

Some of the interviewees mentioned how, typically, the only form of security management in the peripheral areas of a country was expressed by informal institutions, while formal institutions were capable of playing their security role only in the Capitals' regions.

A second group of experts proposed a form of ***complementarity of institutions not based on their geographical presence/authority, instead based on their competence on different matters.*** In fact, in some cases mentioned by the interviewees, the official institutions were granted the authority to deal with a certain set of crimes (in general the most serious crimes), while misdemeanors were left to the competence of the informal institutions. In both cases, the experience suggested the absence of any formal crystallization of this alternance of competences.

A mixed form of cooperation was reported, by Interviewee #1, to have been established in the Horn of Africa, with the coexistence of at least three judicial systems, connected to three different Centers of Power, one formal (governmental) and the other two Informal (religious, applying the *Sharia* law, and traditional, applying a legal system denominated by *Xeer*), utilized by the locals based on their "preferences":

> *A recent study […] clearly shows that there are* ***three forms of conflict resolution mechanisms****:* ***traditional justice*** *(Xeer),* ***Sharia law****, and* ***formal justice system****. […] The three systems work together at various levels in various locations to resolve disputes across […]. Respondents in most locations of the study stated the* ***stakeholders involved in the arbitration of justice include clan elders/leaders****,* ***religious leaders****, and* ***government officials*** *in the justice system, with the police taking the role of security provider in areas where it has a presence. Most of the participants reported that* ***traditional justice and the Sharia were the preferred justice mechanisms in the community as they are more accessible, cheaper, and flexible than formal justice when it comes to dealing with community issues. […] Elders resolve the conflict through the Xeer while the perpetrator is held in police custody. There are circumstances however whereby cases that start with the police are referred to elders to find solutions****.*

In summary, it appeared that a cooperation based on the geographical distribution of the prevalence of one of the other types of Centers of Power might also be considered a *transitional* condition. Yet the example of the "mixed" cooperation, what Interviewee #19 defined as a "*hybrid*" system, led the research team to refrain from categorizing the observed models as either definitive or transitional. The observed reality of the dynamics of power teaches that often "there is nothing more definitive than a temporary measure".[13]

Interviewee #12 also mentioned how, in her experience, the rise and eventual decline of these entities were *strongly connected with their utility*, meaning that when a Center of Power was no longer seen as necessary by the local population, it was inevitably displaced by a more effective alternative. That means that in situations where Informal Centers of Power operate in a subsidiary role to the Formal ones, this does not necessarily follow that, over time, formal ones will inevitably prevail.

[13] Italian said.

The second group (of four interviewees, plus two whose positions were implied by the researchers, more than openly stated by the interviewees themselves) that sustained the feasibility of a "light" legal framing of the Formal/Informal Centers of Power *per subject ratio*, actually highlighted a very interesting option, very much applicable to the tribal experience of society. The idea of a division "per subjects" suggests a form of **partition of interests**. These interests might be aimed at ensuring a certain level of security to local communities, or at partaking local resources, or simply driven by the recognized need for mutual support intended to preserve power. The key point is that only the subtle *fil rouge* of the mutual convenience is capable to keep connected—and away from competition—Formal and Informal Centers of Power.

This assumption looked particularly promising to be proposed as a **typical model of cooperation**. The first reason was that it is also compatible with the *subsidiarity* model, meaning that the *subsidiarity* relationship could be an effect—and not the reason—of a balanced cooperation of the two types of entities. Secondly, as we already pointed out, if we look at the tribal dynamics, the interest-motivated behavior of the Formal and Informal Centers of Power in their respective relationships is similar to the relationships between international actors. This is another reason to consider this model as the most suitable to describe a paradigm of cooperation between Formal and Informal Centers of Power. Confirming this parallel, Ms. Hosna Jalil described some dynamics observed in alliances among Informal Centers of Power, noting that, in some cases, the association of one group with the Central Government triggered neighboring groups to form their own coalition as a "security measure". From this perspective, even the fundamental act of positive law- the Constitution—can be seen less as a tool for engineering a new order and more as a treaty among internal actors, intended to formalize an existing status quo. This interpretation of the Constitution would allow the inclusion of Informal Centers of Power within a legal system, without the implicit requirement of a change in their nature that would result in the non-applicability of the Internal Security Architecture model.

The Dilemma of the "Criminal" Centers of Power

Complementing the discussion presented thus far, and serving as an additional test of the concept and definition of Internal Security Architecture, was the consideration of the role and categorization of the criminal entities as Internal Security Centers of Power. Based on the adopted working definition, criminal organizations may qualify as Informal Centers of Power, although not all criminal organizations demonstrate the intent to "*express a will determined to ensure a secure environment*" in a way that serves their interests.

According to the working definition, an Internal Security Center of Power must represent the expression of a *will* and possess the *capacity to exercise force in a monopolistic manner*, a characteristics that is traditionally associated with Max

Weber vision of a State. A first problem to validate this assumption with reference to criminal entities was the difficulty to adapt the categories of "criminal/illegal" to the proposed *relativistic* Internal Security Architecture model.

In a contingency, as an example, where Informal Centers of Power openly compete (or fight) against official institutions, these Centers of Power would be easily labeled as "illegal", or "criminal". Paradoxically, other organizations that could easily be compared to drug cartels, in contexts of the absence (or acquiescence) of the official government, and where the opium cultivation constitutes the predominant agricultural activity, may come to assume a certain degree of legitimacy.

The very definition of "*legal*" or "*illegal*" are relative concepts, and a reference to these concepts might be misleading in the analysis of the Formal and Informal Centers of Power.

Once the overall landscape of all Centers of Power has been outlined, it becomes the responsibility of the decision-maker to assess the appropriateness and feasibility of engaging with entities considered criminal or illegal, based on their role, responsibilities, mandate, and other factors.

The (negative) experience accounted by Ms. Hosna Jalil showed how a (political?) decision to not interact with some of the Informal Centers of Power active on the field led to an unwanted polarization that eventually favored the insurgents.

Formal and Informal Centers of Power: The Role of the Police

All the interviewees-some explicitly and other implicitly through their arguments-on the strong influence that both Formal and Informal Internal Security Centers of Power exert over law enforcement. It follows that belonging to one or the other sphere of influence doesn't necessarily reflect the legal/official security framework. It is also true that a single law enforcement agency can play the role of a Center of Power (as was considered by interviewee #8), whether formal (exercising the powers allowed by the legal framework on place) or also, paradoxically, informal (as example when the decision-making and its effects transcends the set of powers that the law assigns to the specific agency).

According to the majority of the interviewees, the police are not merely influenced by Centers of Power, but they also serve as a critical instrument *to achieve a balance* between Formal and Informal Centers of Power. Effective policing requires the cooperation of citizens. To achieve common security goals, in many cases, police *obliged* the involved parties, whether formal or informal, to play their role. A significant example of this role, connected with the idea of *subsidiarity* between Formal and Informal Centers of Power, was reported by interviewee #1.

Another interesting point of view, proposed by interviewee #18, was the idea of the police as the entity capable to aggregate the shared interests of more Centers of Power to security. This perspective gives even more relevance to the conclusion that Informal Centers of Power might represent a form of cooperation of the communities to their security, in this case to the Policing endeavor. Examples from various theaters

of operation demonstrate that the representativeness of police forces is a key factor in their effectiveness and in enhancing their leverage for pacification and stabilization (Bramati, 2021).

Other interviewees (in particular Interviewee #21) highlighted a Police structural fragility that determined an obligation to cooperate with all Centers of Power active on the territory. On the other hand, Centers of Power are at the same time forced to cooperate with each other in the presence of inefficient police due to the common goal of achieving a secure environment (Interviewee #16).

A relevant aspect emerging from the discussion with the interviewees was that Police, in order to be efficient, need the trust and recognition by the local communities, usually representing themselves, in terms of collective will, by Informal Centers of Power. In this sense, it appeared true that police *must* also cooperate with informal centers of power.

The Detection of Formal/Informal Centers of Power

After clarifying a working definition for Formal and Informal Centers of Power, along with their characteristics and the types of relationship that link them, it becomes necessary to operationalize these descriptive elements. This enables analysts to detect these Centers of Power and incorporate them into the broader framework of the Internal Security Architecture.

The first difficulty descends from the *fluidity*—meaning the "*non-characterizability*"—of the relationships that might connect Centers of Power. Since those relationships are an essential component of the Internal Security Architecture, their complexity represents the first major challenge for the analyst and serves as a critical test of the robustness of the Internal Security Architecture model and its definition.

Yet, as was correctly pointed out by the Interviewee #3, complexity should not be viewed as an obstacle for the researcher, on the contrary, the excessive simplification—often characteristic of military approaches to problem-solving—has often proved counterproductive. Thus, the challenge is not the complexity of the model itself, but the method used to address it.

The second difficulty lies in the limited access to reliable sources of information. For the analysis to be truly functional from a mission planning perspective, it is essential to have access to:

- adequate sources of information
- a consolidated method of collection and evaluation
- a suitable method for the description of the results of the analysis

At this stage of the research, the team, supported by insights from the interviewed experts, sought to identify the most suitable method for collecting, categorizing, and analyzing the necessary information, including the suggestion of incorporating a set

of indicators that might be used to "uncover" those aspects of the Internal Security Architecture that remain invisible under traditional, deterministic approaches.

A Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Approach

If Internal Security Architecture had been based only on *formal entities*, the method of detection/description of the overall system would have been simple, based on the positive norms issued to regulate the sector, starting from the Constitution down to the lower hierarchical levels of law applicable to the given context. It would have described a system starting from its apex—say the Minister of Interior, or Homeland Security—down to the Ministerial Directorates, Agencies and Corps, at central, regional, and local level: i.e., "**top-down approach".**

Internal Security Architecture model, as defined in the present research, is characterized by entities much more *evanescent* and fluid. The two characteristics of the system, and of the process of analyzing it, were defined by many of the interviewees with two adjectives: *fragmented* and *complex*. Of all interviewees, only two (#1 and #13) proposed the *Top-down approach* as a viable approach to analyze Internal Security Architecture, and for different reasons. Interviewee #1 called it a "*legitimistic approach*", meaning to underline the need to preserve the "officiality" of the observation, while interviewee # 13, instead, sustained the validity of the Top-down approach as a form of exclusion from the picture of the *illegal* Centers of Power, suggesting that "*The presence of any Informal Power Centers within the internal security architecture is dangerous and must be always resisted. […] the illegal ones must be penetrated, contrasted and dismantled").* Yet the category of "illegal" was not considered sufficiently univocal to be considered.

The vast majority of the interviewees (fifteen in total) found the "top-down" to be insufficient. Of them, nine proposed a "bottom-up" approach, meaning **an approach that privileges the information coming from field observations** (direct or through adequate sources of information), while six others opted for a combination of the two approaches (bottom-up and top-down). One of the reasons for preferring a *bottom-up approach* was the non-trustworthiness of the official authorities, at a governmental level, particularly when the analysis would lead to the assessment of the implementation of the formal security structures and mechanisms. Interviewee #16, as an example, observed that.

> *…you ask the questions to the local population and not to the government.* ***In countries like*** [a country in which the interviewee possesses subject-matter expertise, whose mention is omitted] ***you get a generic answer based on what they think the international world wants to know***

On this position also interviewee #12, who proposed a sort of *explanation* of this non-reliability of the official authorities as sources of information mentioned that.

> *The host nation usually* ***depicts reality that is the mirror of western structures, in order to "speak the same language"****. In reality the structures described are often empty boxes that are useful to westerners to orient themselves. But the real powers are elsewhere.*

This observation of Interviewee #12 is particularly important, first of all for the exceptional knowledgeability of the interviewee herself, and secondly, because it introduces the concept of the existence of a "filter" between local and Western approaches, the latter not really geared to understand different systems. This observation confirms the idea of a persistent Western bias that risks influencing the results of the analysis.

Regarding the method of collection of information, interviewee #15 proposed a deep interaction with "locals", in order to have an idea of the real players in the Internal Security landscape. He noted:

> *Look at the structure of the population. What is the opinion of the elderly, what of the young.* ***The community leaders know what's going on****.* ***You can find out which actors in a particular area are in charge****.*

Also, he introduced the instrument of ***surveys***, in order to gather enough information from the field, as agreed by Interviewee #14, along with the creation of *focus groups.* Interviewee #19 proposed, as viable sources of information, the embassies located in the area of interest, while interviewee #7 suggested that an effective research, if conducted in the field, should aim to interact with the local law enforcement agencies, taking into consideration that one would "have to rely on **middle managers** like me, commanders, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors". Under these perspectives, interviewee #10 correctly pointed out that a bottom-up approach—that he was proposing as the only viable method—is also, inevitably, a long-term process that requires significant investment of time.

Talking about a combination of both approaches, Interviewee #6 proposed a *cyclic process*, where the information gathered from one source/method is confirmed/integrated from different sources. The interviewee suggested to "*make it cyclic, but let it be interactive with the country you are helping and not just sending your structure and letting work according to that model*".

Interviewee #17 proposed three different options, in his bottom-up model:

> *a) primary sources –* ***interviews*** *with domestic stakeholders - as a consequence of a preliminary FFM ahead of the deployment; b) secondary sources like* ***ad hoc reports****; c) interviews with non-domestic stakeholders like international GOs/NGOs.*

Interviewees #6 and 11 emphasized the importance of cultural and social dimensions in understanding the Internal Security Architecture. Similarly, interviewee #17 advocated for a "*holistic approach*" that would incorporate "***community sentiment*** [that] *should be fetched in order* ***to better understand the human terrain"***.

In line with the idea of Internal Security Architecture, which is grounded not only in formal and informal entities, but also in the relationships between them, Interviewee #15 highlighted the importance of analyzing the interconnections among centers of power as a key factor contributing to the system's complexity, stating that.

> *You have to map the entire ecosystem. Everything affects each other, like a waterbed. If you press something, it flows to something else. In that sense, you want to actually map everything.*

In summary, the picture presented by the interviewees appeared complex, although it was clearly oriented toward a bottom-up analysis. This approach—and a long-term commitment to it might certainly work for academic research, but looks substantially impractical in the case of the planning of a military operation.

Of course, it is important to acknowledge that that "*top-down*" information alone is insufficient to assess an internal security framework. In this way, planners can, at the very least, orient an information-gathering campaign, accessing not only readily available official data, but also more nuanced and contextually relevant insights. For this reason, the team considered it important to propose a set of **indicators**.

The Detection of Informal Centers of Power: Indicators from the Field

In general, the interviewed experts were not particularly specific in describing which type of indicators or source to consider. However, once prompted by the interviewers, many provided interesting suggestions that could inform more structured approaches to information gathering, whether for academic inquiry or operational analyses.

Interviewees #1 and #2 provided interesting suggestions in this regard, proposing to observe, as a relevant indicator of the presence and activity of Informal Centers of Power, the **judicial system** of a given area.

For instance, interviewee #1 suggested that.

> *The analysis of a security framework should start form the **assessment of the legal structure** related to the security apparatus and then move on to evaluate **if the Laws and regulations are applied thoroughly**.*

We can assume that the administration of justice is one of the most evident expressions of power, to the point that the justice *administrators* themselves might be considered a Center of Power. It was Interviewee #1 who reported the coexistence of more systems of security, as a form of complementarity. In his description of the observed system, pertaining to the Horn of Africa he also mentioned that.

> ***the stakeholders involved in the arbitration of justice include clan elders/leaders, religious leaders, and government officials in the justice system**, with the police taking the role of security provider in areas where it has a presence.*

In this sense, the dynamics of the administration of justice can reveal the influence of Informal Centers of Power involved in justice intended as exercise of power.[14]

Interviewee #2, referring to his experience in North Africa, reported that.

> *…**a useful indicator of the relevance/existence of informal centers of power can be the observation of the Judicial system and the applicable law/procedure**. In my experience in […], as example, after initial not realistic indications received on the penal law applied in the*

[14] *<<Not every exercise of a power by a judge is the exercise of a judicial power >>*. Webber, G. (2017), Australasian Legal Information Institute, 2018.

> *[…] tribunals, it emerged that the applied law was a mix of religious and tribal traditional code. This fact can definitely be considered a* ***relevant indicator of a structural weakness of governance in a given area of interest, and therefore an indicator of the presence of informal/non centralized centers of power in the internal security landscape****.*

According to this interviewee, the absence of a sufficiently shared and known reference law might constitute an indicator of a structural weakness, intended as a lack of governance, that typically would underpin the subsidiary role of an Informal Center of Power.

Another significant proposal, in terms of indicators of the operativity of Informal Centers of Power, according to the Interviewee #16, is the **election process** that might happen (or have happened) in a determined area. According to this expert, referring about his experience in West Africa,

> *[…] you could clearly see that people did not really have an opinion but simply voted for who they had to vote for according to* ***their religious leaders or village elders****.*

This aspect, in reality, can also be considered from a broader, political perspective. The picture becomes clearer when considering the capacity of Centers of Power to interfere in the *security* of the electoral process, as furtherly described by the same interviewee:

> […] *in certain villages, in addition to the religious leader and the village elders, you also have ethnic groups that are at odds with each other or that compete for power.* […] ***the inspector of police started rotating his police commissioners just before the elections****. Two months in advance you saw that certain commissioners were sent to other regions. That of course says something. You could even assume that these are the henchmen of that inspector general who in turn communicates that to the president. In certain swing states, a different police commissioner then came to power. In* […]*, you have the option of not counting certain votes in a region if there are irregularities. For example,* ***if there are serious protests or things get out of hand, then you can completely cancel those votes****.* ***If you have the right commissioner in the right region, then he can of course ensure that there are also real irregularities and thus have the opportunity to cancel the votes****. And you saw that very clearly.*

Moreover,

> […] *has* [number of states] *states within the federation, but it is still a federal body. So they all ultimately report to the same* [Police] *inspector general who is chosen by the president. The president in that case came from the North, from the* [ethnical group of the President] *group and what we saw was that his police commanders who he had had in the same states for years, suddenly started rotating to states that we knew were swing states two months before the elections. For example, [the Capital of the observed Country] has certain neighborhoods where the* [ethnical group of the President] *are not very popular. And what we also saw and were able to follow reasonably well on Twitter is that many of those kinds of neighborhoods had huge protests or that there was theft. I had a regular taxi driver there* […]*. The taxi driver indicated that on election day they cannot go outside. I have heard this and cannot confirm it, but apparently* ***the police allow certain taxi drivers who are affiliated with a certain ethnic group to do their thing****.* ***To ensure that certain neighborhoods are no longer accessible****.* ***They know that in that neighborhood people vote for X, so the moment you make that neighborhood unsafe, you also ensure that those people do not vote and then*** [ethnical group of the President] ***gain the upper hand****. You saw that very clearly.*

The key point for the analyst is that an event like elections very likely would provide relevant information on Internal Security Architecture, including the presence and capabilities of Informal Centers of Power.

As observed by the Interviewee #16, "***Events such as elections are really factors that make the ground shake***".

Interviewees #11 and #17, requested to propose further indicators useful to detect Internal Security Centers of Power, generically—but significantly—indicated a thorough analysis of the societal structure of a given environment, beyond the formal structures. For instance, Interviewee #11 observed that.

> *… it is necessary a modern approach basically focused on societal structures, meaning* ***economical, religious, political, etc.*** *(formal and informal). This kind of approach might help to identify, for each sector/area which naturally matches with a specific center of power,* ***if there is one or more than one center, which is the field or the fields of interest and so gathering all the related and relevant information that would be useful to better understand the specific environment****.*

While interviewee #17 reflected this point of view, linking Informal Centers of Power—turned to quasi-formal security entities—to a wider set of interests and trajectories, that might help in their detection. He observed, considering his experience in North Africa, that.

> *In […], one of the major players is a militia turned Counter-Terrorism-oriented force under the Presidential Council. The security structure is not only expression of one of the most influential districts in [the Capital], but it is also* ***ideologically rooted, being the organization affiliated with the quietist version of Salafism****. The informal-turned-formal police force* ***exerts its clout on major economic players of its area of operation*** *which is at the same time source of income and platform of influence.*

Centers of Power do not live in a vacuum, and the extension of their interest might well reflect the type of influence the exercise, extending the range of the indicators that might reveal their presence. The set of indicators proposed thus far– though by no means exhaustive—appears innovative from an internal security perspective, and is also practically applicable for information gathering, as it highlights specific domains to consider in conducting structured research. But to address another core research question, the team examined the relationship between the traditional approach to analysis—which particularly seeks to assess "police effectiveness"[15]—and the emerging understanding of Internal Security as an integrated system, encapsulated in the concept of Internal Security Architecture.

[15] For example, the NATO Publication AJP 3.22 "Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing" focuses the planning of the Stability Policing mission on the "Indigenous Policing Gap Analysis".

Police Effectiveness Analysis as an Indicator of Informal Centers of Power

The majority of the Interviewees (eleven) explicitly agreed on the *usefulness* of conducting a police effectiveness assessment to detect the elements of the Internal Security Architecture, including Informal Centers of Power. Interviewee #21, for instance, observed that "*The only organization that could provide information about the centers of powers […] are the police forces themselves*" The remaining interviewees, in their description of the elements to be considered in the assessment of the Internal Security Architecture, also with reference to the initial assumption that **it is impossible to separate the assessment of the effectiveness of a law enforcement agency from the assessment of the whole system around it**, agreed on the fact that the majority of the information on the Internal Security Architecture is accessible through a focused analysis of the police services on the field.

The complexity of the police performance analysis appeared well known to the interviewees, since almost all of them mentioned different indicators, none of whom being described through mere numerical data (such as the number of arrested criminals, etc.): all the proposed elements unveiled a sensible awareness of the multifaceted activities of a Law Enforcement Agency.

Despite the question posed to the Interviewees focused on the "police effectiveness" assessment, the answers provided by the experts inevitably diverted to elements that widened considerably the very understanding of the term "effectiveness", including aspects pertaining to the social acceptance and integration of the service within the human context of reference.

Interviewees #2 and #15 tackled the problem of the Informal Centers of Power directly by proposing an analysis of the *priorities* of the local law enforcement agencies in order to detect the Informal Centers of Power.

> *… it would be important to gather elements of information on the scale of priority for a local police agency/unit, and the information flow towards its external leadership - the "real" center of power, to whom the local law enforcement is made accountable. (Interviewee #2)*

Interviewee #15 is more explicit in proposing *Police Performance*, or *Police Action* versus the idea of *Police Effectiveness* in the research of a method to assess Internal Security Architecture, stating that the.

> *Analysis of police performance can help to expose these layers as the police are often in contact with both formal and informal actors. Where's the police and where's not. How the community views the police and with whom the police cooperate and what types of crime or conflict are common and how the police respond to them.*

In other words, *Police priorities*. Interviewee #13 took the same position, observing that to detect Informal Centers of Power, it would be useful to *measure* the intensity and frequency of the interactions of the Law Enforcement with other entities of the Internal Security landscape. That analysis could provide enough information to uncover the *layers* mentioned by Interviewee #15, and, therefore, the *priorities* of the

observed agency. In this sense, the Interviewee also add the opportunity to *visualize* these relationships through **graphical methods**:

> *…a flow diagram that reconstructs interactions, their intensity and frequency across institutional borders in the security field may be the tool of choice to clarify the interaction between formal and informal structures. A dynamic representation of powers (formal/informal) can support the analysis to understand the placement of the internal security actors in the given area.*

The reference made to the "*dynamic representation of powers*" and the "*interaction between formal and informal structures*" is **compatible with the working definition of Internal Security Architecture, and a confirmation of its validity**.

More articulated, yet connected to the idea of a need of depicting inter-agency relationships, is the suggestion of Interviewee #18, who presents a set of key performance indicators, intended to reflect the level of inter-agency collaboration. Also, he assigns a substantial relevance to indicators that focus—once again—on the priorities of the Law Enforcement:

> *By evaluating police effectiveness, resource allocation, and operational outcomes [all aspects connected to the priorities of the analyzed entity] valuable insights can be gained into the strengths and weaknesses of the broader security framework. Key performance indicators—such as response times, case resolution rates, and levels of community engagement—reflect the support systems and inter-agency collaboration that underpin the internal security structure.*

Interviewees #10 and #16 highlighted another interesting aspect of Law Enforcement Agencies that might be useful in revealing structures and entities of the Internal Security Architecture. Specifically, interviewee #10 suggested that **recruitment procedures** and the subsequent levels of representativity of ethnicities or various forms of minorities should be observed. Reversing the logical process that assigns to Law Enforcement a role of *representation* of Informal Centers of Power, the assessment of the recruitment procedure and of the recruitment distribution among groups of interest, might reveal those groups of interest. Interviewee #16 also connected Police effectiveness to its ethnical representativeness. The explanation of this syllogism is easy, using the Internal Security Architecture model, where the system is efficient when the Centers of Power cooperate, and don't compete.

Internal Security Architecture Analysis: The Operations Planning Perspective

The Military Planners' Way

As stated in the introduction, the objective of this research is twofold: to examine the concept of Internal Security Architecture from a Social Science perspective, and to offer a practical analytical tool for operational planners tasked with engaging with

it. The ultimate research objective was the redefinition of the "policing gap", and the identification of a viable analytical/planning tool for this search for understanding the Internal Security Architecture.

The source of NATO doctrine on Planning of Operations is the Allied Joint Publication AJP-5 "Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations".[16]

According to the AJP-5, "*NATO operations usually take place in a dynamic environment in which actors are constantly changing the* ***political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII)*** *elements*".

As stated, the doctrine recognizes the multi-disciplinary nature of the environment, as well as provides the analysis tool to examine it, that is the so-called "PMESII". PMESII was first designed by joint planners and introduced in the US Army Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations in 2006. The US Army later added PT (*Physical*, *Time*) in 2008, with the publication of the Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, February 2008).[17]In particular, PMESII (or PMESII-PT) comes into use in the assessment of the operations' environment (from an Intelligence perspective), at many levels.

Also, to analyze a complex environment, the doctrine utilizes the concept of the *PMESII Systems* since "*understanding the Operational Environment requires a holistic view that encompasses the physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these are the* ***adversary, friendly, and neutral PMESII systems, subsystems, objects, and affiliated attributes, and their relationships and interdependencies*** *that are relevant to a specific joint operation*".[18]

At first sight, PMESII would be suitable to describe an Internal Security Architecture as a subsystem made of interconnected objects and affiliated attributes. The problem is that PMESII does not consider Internal Security as a whole. The so-called "PMESII Spectrum"[19] only takes into consideration the following subsystems[20]:

(a) *Political Subsystems* (Table 4.1)

(b) *Military Subsystems* (Table 4.2)

As one can note, the notion of the "Military Subsystems" includes the "Internal Security" subsystem that encompasses the "Law Enforcement".

(c) *Economic Subsystems* (Table 4.3)

[16] All references to the NATO Publication AJP 5 are related to the version published on the website of NATO MILMED COE, Edition A, v.2, May 2019.

[17] This manual has been superseded by ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations.

[18] US Joint Publication 2–01.3 "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment".

[19] So defined in the AJP-5.

[20] As described in the US Joint Publication 2–01.3 "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment".

Table 4.1 Political Subsystems

Central Government		Political Parties and Interest groups	Local Governments	Regional/ International
Executive	*Head of State / Government*	*Political Parties*	*State Provinces*	*Other Countries*
		Ethnic Groups	*Districts*	*International Political / Security Organizations*
	Advisors	*Religious Groups*	*Municipalities*	*Multinational Corporations*
	Cabinet	*Civil Bureaucracy*	*Autonomous/ Special Areas*	
	Ministries	*Trade Unions*		
	Departments	*Security Elements*		
	Embassies	*Corporations*		
Legislative	*Upper House*	*Professional Groups*		
	Lower House	*NGOs*		
Judicial	*Supreme Court*			
	Appeals Court			
	Local Court			
	Special Court			

Table 4.2 Military Subsystems

Leadership	Armed Forces	Internal Security	Military-Industrial Complex	Sustainment
Commander in Chief	*Army*	*Intelligence Apparatus*	*National Arms Production*	*Resources*
National Military Committee	*Navy / Marine Corps*	*Elite Security Forces*	*Foreign Arms Trade*	*Storage & Distribution*
National Defense Staff	*Air Force*	***Law Enforcement***	*Spare Parts / Maintenance*	*Education & Training*
Service Chiefs / Leaders	*Strategic Forces / Weapons of Mass Destruction*	*Paramilitary*	*R&D*	*Recruitment*
Headquarters Elements	*Special Forces*		*OT&E*	
Security Elements	*Reserve Forces*			
Command & Control Networks				

Table 4.3 Economic Subsystems

Production	Distribution	Consumption	Informal Economy
Industrial	*Wholesale*	*Industrial Inputs*	*Terrorism Financing*
Industrial	*Retail*	*Domestic Markets*	*Narcotics Trade*
Services	*International Trade*	*Foreign Aid*	*Human Trafficking*
		Foreign Investment	*Unregulated labor*

(d) *Social Subsystems* (Table 4.4)

(e) *Infrastructure Subsystems* (Table 4.5)

(f) *Infrastructure Subsystems* (Table 4.6)

According tothis interpretation of PMESII, despite the fact that "Internal Security" is included in the Military System, to analyze the Internal Security Architecture as

Table 4.4 Social Subsystems

Basic Needs		Institutions	Affinity Groups
Identity (tribe, clan, ethnic group, caste, class)		*Religion*	*Unions*
Sustenance management	*Water*	*Health*	*Associations*
	Food & Nutrition	*NGOs (welfare, humanitarian & human rights)*	*Displaced Persons*
	Shelter	*Leisure*	*Refugees*
	Sanitation	*Education*	*Gangs & Criminal Enterprises*
	Security / Safety		*Insurgents / Separatists*
	Environment		*Terrorists*
Critical Resources	*Natural*		
	Socioeconomic		
	Cultural		

Table 4.5 Infrastructure subsystems

Utilities	Transportation	Industry	Public Facilities
Electric Power	*Road Network*	*Heavy Manufacturing*	*Emergency Facilities*
Water	*Rail Network*	*Light Manufacturing*	*Public Gathering Places*
Natural Gas	*Light Rail / Metro*	*Petroleum*	*Places of Worship*
Waste	*Airports*	*Agriculture*	*Government (nonmilitary)*
	Seaports	*Mining*	*Nongovernment Buildings*
	Inland Waterways / Ports	*Nuclear*	

Table 4.6 Infrastructure subsystems

Global Information	National Information		Defense Information (Military Systems)
International Memberships	*National Organizations*	*Regulatory Agencies*	*Strategic*
International Information Technology		*Intelligence Agencies*	*Operational*
Global Grid Connectivity		*Information Operations*	*Tactical*
	National Architecture	*Public Switched Telephone Network*	
		National Packet Switched Network	
		Dedicated Networks	
		Postal / Courier	
		Storage	
	Mass Communications	*Broadcast*	
		Print	
		World Wide Web	
	National Information Technology Sources		

a whole, including all its components, the analyst should move from a system to another, as follows:

- **Political system**: all entities connected with *governance*, for example Ministries, Governors, Mayors, Departments, etc., at central and local level. It also included the Judicial System, groups of relevance such as religious or ethnical groups, and cryptic "Security Elements". It does not include ***policing*****, despite its definition is "a function of governance**[21]**"**.
- **Military system**: the "Internal Security" subsystem appears incongruous. While, in general, the military subsystems show a certain grade of uniformity, for the Internal Security, the "Law Enforcement" subsystem appears not to be connected with the rest of the picture.
- **Social system**: this category includes the notion of *Identity*, including tribes, clans, ethnical groups, etc., all elements that supposedly would play a central role in the Internal Security Architecture. Moreover, the same *Social* category includes, for example, religious institutions (while *religious groups* are included in the *political* remit) and criminality/criminal organizations.

[21] According to the UN doctrine, Policing can be defined as <<***a function of governance*** *responsible for the* ***prevention, detection and investigation of crime****; the* ***protection of persons and property****; and the* ***maintenance of public order and safety*** >>. UN Sec. Council S/2016/952 10 Nov. 2016—Report of the Secretary-General on UN policing.

There are also parts that are missing. For example, there's no mention of the prison/correction systems, that are a key element of the Rule of Law. We must conclude that, in general, the PMESII system of systems appears inadequate—as it is currently formulated—to support the analyst in considering Internal Security Architecture as a defined whole.

If we look at the Comprehensive Operations' Planning Directive, where PMESII is described in a footnote, the discrepancy of the proposed model from reality is even more evident. The single elements (called "domains") of PMESII are described as follows[22]:

(1) **Political**—any grouping of primarily civil actors, **organizations, and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule** within a specific geographic boundary or organization through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties, and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic, and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.
(2) **Military**—the armed forces and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed, and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organizational security objectives. This also covers the **internal security aspects of a country**.
(3) **Economic**—composed of the total sum of production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or organization. It includes not only the economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.
(4) **Social**—the interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable, and acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and lifegoals within hereditary and non-hereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers social aspects, such as religion, a **society's structure**, **the legal and judicial system**, **policing** and supporting infrastructure, and humanitarian considerations.
(5) **Infrastructure**—the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organization, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, and geography, among others.
(6) **Information**—the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. This encompasses the information and communications media.

According to these indications, even more confusing, the COPD de facto would divide Internal Security Architecture between:

– the *political* domain ("*organizations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule*". Meaning: *governance*);
– the *military* domain ("***internal security** aspects of a country*");
– the *social* domain ("*society's structure, the legal and judicial system, **policing***").

[22] COPD v.1.0, Dec 2010. Currently, the COPD has reached the 3.1 version, dated November 2023.

Clearly, as the current PMESII model is defined, there is no room for a structural analysis of the Internal Security Architecture as a whole.

The Answers of the Experts

The research team received the same feedback from some of the interviewees. Not many, in reality, showed the level of expertise on the Operations' Planning Process—and in particular of the Military/NATO one. Interviewee #2 observed that "***PMESII is not reliable*** *for its structural inadequacy to consider* ***Internal Security Architecture as a whole***". The reason for this inadequacy was that "*the information about the Internal Security is always* ***fragmented***, ***misleading*** *and in* ***continuous evolution***". In other words, the interviewee highlighted another weakness of the PMESII framework, its ***static*** nature, which makes it ill-suited to capture the dynamics of an evolving phenomenon. For this reason, he suggested that "*PMESII should be considered as a "living document", or assessment, to be updated continuously during the planning and execution of the mission*".

Interviewee #14, without mentioning PMESII, proposed another analytical tool. In particular, referring to the experience gathered in the analysis of coup in Niger of 2023, the interviewee mentioned that "*we did a* ***political economy analysis*** *focused on how* ***power and resources*** *[…] It gets beneath formal structures to reveal underlying interests, incentives and institutions that enable or frustrate change*".

For this reason, "*a well-executed* ***PESTEL analysis*** *can also yield good results*".

PESTEL focuses in particular on the *economic* analysis of the context.

A PESTEL analysis is a framework or tool used by marketers to analyze and monitor the **macro-environmental** (external marketing environment) **factors that have an impact on an organization, company, or industry**. It examines **the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal factors** in the *external environment*. A PESTEL analysis is used to identify threats and weaknesses which appear in a SWOT analysis.

On one side, the PESTEL framework demonstrates a greater capacity than PMESII to account for evolving situations, as it focuses on identifying and analyzing *trends*, rather than static conditions, However, its applicability is limited by its inherently **business-oriented perspective**. Regardless of its business origins, the PESTEL perspective inherently adopts a "fortress" mindset, distinguishing between an "inside" that must be protected—and an "outside" that must be analyzed to detect a potential threat.

In an internal security context, PESTEL would frame the observation of the reality through the perspective of the observer (the "fort"), possibly misleading in the results of the observation. A second limitation is its economical/financial orientation, which misses critical elements relevant to the military (and not only) planner, particularly those related to the monopoly of use of force. In addition to these two potential downsides, it must be recognized that military planners have been using PMESII for more than 20 years. As such, proposing an entirely new analytical tool, especially

one focused on only a segment, albeit a significant one, of the broader operational landscape, would encounter understandable resistance.

Internal Security Architecture and PMESII. A Possible Solution.

If PMESII is to be used for Internal Security Analysis—as it appears to be the only viable option—it is paramount to determine which *domain* should encompass the Internal Security Architecture, without compromising the logical coherence of each of the areas of analysis. To find the best compromise, the current apportionment of the elements pertaining to Internal Security Architecture was first considered.

These elements were subsequently prioritized, with top priority (*priority focus*) status given to those elements directly related to the internal security domain (such as the police forces, or the criminal organizations). Other subsystems were assigned a lower level of priority (*overall relevance*), acknowledging their significance in broader disciplinary contexts (e.g., from a merely economic or social perspective). The result is shown in the following diagrams (Tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12), where the *priority focus* and the *overall relevance* of the analyzed subsystems are highlighted, respectively, in red and green, and put in connection with the *indicators* suggested for the detection and assessment of Internal Security Centers of Power.

Based on the prevalence of the *priority focus* subsystems, the most appropriate allocation of the Internal Security Analysis appeared to be within the *social* domain of PMESII (Table 4.10). Yet the majority of the *overall relevant* subsystems was allocated to the *political* domain (Table 4.7). This circumstance was due to the prevalence, within this domain, of all the *governance* aspects of the PMESII analytical tool (correspondent to eight different subsystems). For this reason, it was found more appropriate to allocate the analysis within the "*political*" domain.

Additional considerations in favor of this choice included the acknowledgment that a legalistic (or *deterministic*) approach to a socio-political framework is still the most common, and the fact that, according to the current understanding of PMESII, within the *political* domain is nestled the *governance* structure, directly connected to the already mentioned definition of policing.[23] According to these observations, the recommendation for the analyst would then be to:

- consider Internal Security Architecture *as a whole*, within the "P" *Political* domain of PMESII;
- detect and describe structure, components, relationships, and characteristics of Internal Security Architecture, not confined only to the Political domain of the analysis, but transversal to the full spectrum of the PMESII;

[23] See footnote 21.

Table 4.7 Internal security architecture subsystems: Political subsystem

Central Government		Political Parties and Interest groups	Local Governments	Regional/International
Executive	*Head of State / Government*	***Political Parties***	***State Provinces***	*Other Countries*
		Ethnic Groups	***Districts***	*International Political / Security Organizations*
	Advisors	***Religious Groups***	***Municipalities***	*Multinational Corporations*
	Cabinet	*Civil Bureaucracy*	***Autonomous/Special Areas***	
	Ministries	*Trade Unions*		
	Departments	***Security Elements***		
	Embassies	*Corporations*		
Legislative	***Upper House***	*Professional Groups*		
	Lower House	*NGOs*		
Judicial	***Supreme Court***			
	Appeals Court			
	Local Court			
	Special Court			

Connected Indicators	***Executive***: Power Dynamics Resource Flow	***Rel Groups & Ethnic Gr.:*** Societal Structure	***Local Gov.***: Power Dynamics Resources' Flow	
	Legislative: Electoral Process	***Pol. Parties***: Power Dynamics Resources' Flow		
	Judicial: Judicial system	***Security El.***: Police Effectiveness, Response Patterns, Sel. Enforcement, Resources alloc./prior., Public Trust/Leg., Response to Crisis, Inter-Agency Coop., Crime Trends		

Table 4.8 Internal security architecture subsystems: Military subsystem

Leadership	Armed Forces	Internal Security	Military-Industrial Complex	Sustainment
Commander in Chief	*Army*	***Intelligence Apparatus***	*National Arms Production*	*Resources*
National Military Committee	*Navy / Marine Corps*	***Elite Security Forces***	*Foreign Arms Trade*	*Storage & Distribution*
National Defense Staff	*Air Force*	***Law Enforcement***	*Spare Parts / Maintenance*	*Education & Training*
Service Chiefs / Leaders	*Strategic Forces / Weapons of Mass Destruction*	***Paramilitary***	*R&D*	*Recruitment*
Headquarters Elements	*Special Forces*		*OT&E*	
Security Elements	*Reserve Forces*			
Command & Control Networks				

Connected Indicators		***Internal Security***: Police Effectiveness Response Patterns Sel. Enforcement Resources alloc./prior. Public Trust/Leg. Response to Crisis Inter-Agency Coop. Crime Trends	

Table 4.9 Internal security architecture subsystems: Economic subsystem

Production	Distribution	Consumption	Informal Economy
Industrial	*Wholesale*	*Industrial Inputs*	***Terrorism Financing***
Industrial	*Retail*	*Domestic Markets*	***Narcotics Trade***
Services	*International Trade*	*Foreign Aid*	***Human Trafficking***
		Foreign Investment	*Unregulated labor*
Connected Indicators			***Informal Economy*:** Police Effectiveness Response Patterns Sel. Enforcement Response to Crisis Inter-Agency Coop. Crime Trends

- orient the information research based on the set of indicators previously discussed in the present paper;
- extend the analysis to further domains and subsystems, if deemed necessary, not limiting the research within the domains and subsystems of belonging to the mentioned set of indicators.

While all the needed information will never be immediately available to the analyst, it is important to guide the analysis using the proposed indicators, so that the research and data collection efforts are strategically aligned. The COPD mentions that "*The SOPG* [Strategic Operations Planning Group] *members working with the Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) and other designated organizations* ***must carry out research and collection of information about the area of interest to expand the knowledge base****. Critical to this activity is the* ***functional organization of information based on a systems understanding of the principal actors and systems in the area*** *related to the principal security interests in the area"*.

A key point is not the information already available, but how the analysts will be able to orient and direct the research for the valuable information, possibly through a dedicated ***Request for Information***, accordingly with this revised PMESII model.

The Elephant in the Room: The Center of Gravity Analysis

> *In case of internal security, even if fragmented, all centers of power tend to keep that power, and* ***should be considered not as mere factors of the crisis, but as actors of the crisis*** *(capable to express their own will, that can be in favour, against or neutral with respect to the mission's objectives), with the subsequent set of tools to analyse them,* ***such as the "Center of Gravity Analysis"****.* (Interviewee #2)

This observation by Interviewee #2 allows us to highlight another critical issue related to operational planning and Internal Security. Typically, if the planner lacks specific

Table 4.10 Internal security architecture subsystems: Social subsystem

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Basic Needs</th><th>Institutions</th><th>Affinity Groups</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Identity
(tribe, clan, ethnic group, caste, class)</td><td>Religion</td><td>Unions</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="6">Sustenance management</td><td>Water</td><td>Health</td><td>Associations</td></tr>
<tr><td>Food & Nutrition</td><td>NGOs (welfare, humanitarian & human rights)</td><td>Displaced Persons</td></tr>
<tr><td>Shelter</td><td>Leisure</td><td>Refugees</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sanitation</td><td>Education</td><td>Gangs & Criminal Enterprises</td></tr>
<tr><td>Security / Safety</td><td rowspan="4"></td><td>Insurgents / Separatists</td></tr>
<tr><td>Environment</td><td>Terrorists</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Critical Resources</td><td>Natural</td><td rowspan="3"></td></tr>
<tr><td>Socioeconomic</td></tr>
<tr><td>Cultural</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Connected Indicators</td><td>Identity:
Soc. Structure</td><td>Religion:
Soc. Structure</td><td>Displaced Persons/ Refugees:
Police Effectiveness
Response Patterns
Sel. Enforcement
Inter-Agency Coop.
Crime Trends</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Safety/Sec.:
Police Effectiveness
Response Patterns
Sel. Enforcement
Resources alloc./prior.
Public Trust/Leg.
Response to Crisis Inter-Agency Coop.
Crime Trends</td><td>Gangs & Criminal Enterprises
Insurgents / Separatists
Terrorists
Police Effectiveness
Response Patterns
Sel. Enforcement
Inter-Agency Coop.
Crime Trends</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Critical Res.:
Power Dyn.
Resource Flow</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

expertise and analytical tools to examine the Internal Security Architecture as a whole, all the elements that influence internal security are usually considered within the *factor analysis* (Table 4.13).

According to the COPD, "*throughout the strategic assessment process, the SOPG identifies the key factors that define the problem and which must ultimately be addressed when resolving it. They analyze these factors, making deductions about strategic implications and drawing conclusions relevant for further analysis and planning. This is a continuing process that provides the foundation for developing and maintaining a current strategic appreciation of the situation*".

The factor analysis is not sufficient to describe the complexity of an Internal Security Architecture. There's also another analytical tool in the availability of the

Table 4.11 Internal security architecture subsystems: Infrastructure subsystem

Utilities	Transportation	Industry	Public Facilities
Electric Power	*Road Network*	*Heavy Manufacturing*	*Emergency Facilities*
Water	*Rail Network*	*Light Manufacturing*	*Public Gathering Places*
Natural Gas	*Light Rail / Metro*	*Petroleum*	***Places of Worship***
Waste	*Airports*	*Agriculture*	*Government (nonmilitary)*
	Seaports	*Mining*	*Nongovernment Buildings*
	Inland Waterways / Ports	*Nuclear*	
Connected Indicators			***Places of Worship*:** Soc. Structure Police Resp. Patterns Selective Enforcement

planner, much more sophisticated, intended to analyze the *actors* of the crisis, which is the *Center of Gravity Analysis*.

> "*The CoG analysis model is used to analyze an* ***actor*** *as a system in order to identify conditions and effects that need to be established to achieve own objectives*".[24] By the definition provided by the Directive, a Center of Gravity is described as the set of "*Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight*".

Specifically, "*The SOPG must determine the COGs of* ***friendly and opposing actors*** *and to determine what vulnerabilities can be exploited in opposing actors and what Alliance and friendly actors vulnerabilities must be protected.* ***Based on the system (PMESII) analysis of potential adversaries, partners and others, the SOPG will examine the foundations of each actors/system that gives it strength and determines possible strategic COGs****"*.

This guidance applies not only at the strategic level, but also—elsewhere in the directive -at the operational level.

As is evident, the tool used to analyze an *actor* is fundamentally different from the used for "factor analysis". For this reason, Interviewee #2 appropriately proposed that a Center of Power should always be regarded as an *actor of the crisis*. This type of analysis would be reserved to major actors—at strategic or operational level, depending on the phase of the planning—or to groups of actors/centers of gravity assimilated by common characteristics.

Another important recommendation is to adequately prepare analysts by equipping them to identify *atypical* strengths and weaknesses, such as those arising from the complex connections and reciprocal influences between Formal and Informal Centers of Power. As previously discussed, the Internal Security Architecture is

[24] Allied Joint Publication AJP 5 "*Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*".

Table 4.12 Internal security architecture subsystems: Information subsystem

Global Information	National Information		Defense Information (Military Systems)
International Memberships	*National Organizations*	*Regulatory Agencies*	*Strategic*
International Information Technology		***Intelligence Agencies***	*Operational*
Global Grid Connectivity		***Information Operations***	*Tactical*
	National Architecture	*Public Switched Telephone Network*	
		National Packet Switched Network	
		Dedicated Networks	
		Postal / Courier	
		Storage	
	Mass Communications	*Broadcast*	
		Print	
		World Wide Web	
	National Information Technology Sources		
Connected Indicators	***Intelligence Agencies & Information Operations*** Police Effectiveness Response Patterns Sel. Enforcement Resources alloc./prior. Public Trust/Leg. Response to Crisis Inter-Agency Coop. Crime Trends		

Table 4.13 Factor analysis

Factor	Deduction	Conclusion
A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has strategic (or operational/tactical, depending of the level of the relevant planning) implication	The implications, issues or considerations derived from the fact(s) with strategic (or operational/tactical, depending on the level of the relevant planning) significance	The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis

defined not only by the sum of description of its components (i.e., Centers of Power), but also by the nature, frequency, and intensity of the relationships that connect them.

The Center of Gravity Analysis applies to crisis *actors*, and what distinguishes an *actor* is its *capacity to express a will*- an attribute that aligns closely with the definition of the Centers of Power adopted in this study.

Considering the elements of complexity of an Internal Security Architecture, it is reasonable to assume that combining a revised, better tailored, general analytical model (such as the PMESII), with the elements of the Internal Security Architecture as potential *actors* of the crisis—at the respective levels—can offer planners a more detailed and realistic picture of the Internal Security Architecture. Such an integrated approach is essential for the planning and execution of stabilization operations and other related missions.

Internal Security and Gender-Equality Policies

As part of the research activity, this study also examined the level of field-based understanding regarding the implementation of gender-equality policies within the Internal Security Architecture. Nearly all interviewees acknowledged the positive effects of the structural inclusion of women in Internal Security frameworks.

Gender Equality as a Stabilizing Factor

Interviewee #2 explained his position mentioning the role of women played, in general, within the respective societies, as a general factor of balance.

> *Definitely a gender inclusivity can bring equilibrium to the internal security architecture, thanks to that specific role that women play in those societies.*

In particular, referring to his experience in the Northern African quadrant, the interviewee mentioned that.

> *In such a fragmented/clanic society, woman plays a relevant role, as a means through which traditions are passed on through generations, and as "family/clan manager/planner".*

Interviewee #13 was of a different opinion, linking the need for a gender equality within the security forces as a means to reach out to wider portions of society:

> *A gender-responsive approach will amplify* ***the capability of the Security Forces to reach a wider audience****, […] as the occasion for* ***the empowerment of social categories deserving of protection*** *and* ***improving the level of building integrity****.*

This position is significant because the idea of promoting the integrity of the institutions contrast to some post-colonial positions that consider corruption as an endemic characteristic of some areas of the globe.

Interviewee #18 proposed a different perspective:

> *By integrating gender-responsive policies, police agencies can address* ***critical gaps in service delivery****, particularly* ***for marginalized groups*** *that are often overlooked in traditional frameworks.* Adding that *This […]* ***fosters trust, strengthens community relations, and helps bridge the policing gap by aligning operations with the social dynamics and gender-specific needs of the area****.*

It is interesting how this expert links gender-equality policies to the *policing gap*: in his perspective, gender-equality allows for a better understanding of that part of the *policing gap* that pertains to the "*gender-specific needs*". That means that, if not addressed, these gaps would likely remain unattended. He also linked the utility of this kind of policy to the experience of Informal Centers of Power, suggesting that.

> *When informal centers of power […] are* ***engaged in security efforts alongside gender perspectives****,* ***policing becomes more inclusive and responsive****.*

This might definitely be a clear indication for the stabilization operator: once again, the role of women and of gender-inclusivity policies are vectors of balance and stability.

Interviewee #15 also referred to the importance of gender-inclusive policies within Internal Displaced People camps. According to this expert.

> ***Gender plays a big role in UN camps****. If I look at, for example, the neighbourhood watch, we wanted women to come in. And they did,* ***and they had a whole different idea of what was important. They were more likely to connect with children and other women****.*

The inclusion of women's perspective is essential in developing a comprehensive understanding of security—one that encompasses vulnerable groups, such as children –and serves as a critical bridge that *connects* the segments of society that are otherwise difficult to engage.

This consideration of the relevance of the women's role to reach to—and protect—the groups that are considered more vulnerable in a given society is also shared by Interviewees #16 and #20, who expressed that.

> *here* [country of East Africa] ***women are also much less harassed by police officers at night.*** *[…] you see that* ***much less because there is also a woman present at every checkpoint. And that does have an effect on safety****.* (Interviewee #16)
>
> *…are there […]* ***enough women within a unit so that it becomes a safe environment for those women****. So that they can function in a* ***safe environment****.* (Interviewee #20)

Again, a safer environment for women means a safer and more secure environment in general.

A Diffused Bias

The interviews also highlighted a bias on the level of "readiness" of the receiving societies to the gender-inclusivity policies. While some of the interviewees convincedly affirmed the relevance of these policies, other experts expressed concern about the

effectiveness of these policies, arguing a lack of *readiness* of the receiving societal bodies. This opinion—identified by the team as a *bias* of post-colonial influence—is recurrent also in other areas (for example about corruption corruption). For instance, Interviewee #3 affirmed that.

> *to **change a mindset** on making the genders equal is extremely important. I think that the problem is often that […] **you need to change people's mindset first**.*

To "change people's mindset" one has to start somewhere. It is through the implementation of policies, and through gathering consensus around the positive effects of those policies that a change in the general understanding of a problem might be achieved. For this reason, the proposition of Interviewee #3 appears not sustainable. Interviewee #6 expressed a similar position, although mentioning "time" as a factor of justification, stating that.

> *…we believe that the Afghan police will be better when there's 10 or 20% women in it, but **it's not the right time**. And it's also conflicting with their failures that you have to give them time to change that.*

This reflects, to some extent, an implicit acquiescence to the structural or cultural inadequacies of the host society. One could also argue that what are often perceived the "failures" of these societies, are, in reality, the *failures of Western* approaches and interventions. The acceptation of a policy by the local population is more likely when the benefits of that policy, assuming it is appropriately tailored to the specific context- are clearly acknowledged by the receiving society. In this light, both positions risk serving as self-absolving narratives for the shortcomings of Western-led efforts. Interviewee #8 mentioned a generic "*Arab culture*", as an obstacle to the effectiveness of gender-inclusion policies. He also mentioned this alleged characteristic to explain his perception of women within armed services, where "*their roles* […] *usually were **more administrative than operational***".

This cultural reference appears too vague to be considered. Again, cultural aspects are certainly relevant when a policy is studied and implemented. Yet the results cannot be ascribed only to a given societal characteristic. This approach would rather justify the non-implementation of the policy from the very beginning, and this is not acceptable.

Interviewee #10 affirmed that sometimes the receiving societies are "not ready" for gender-inclusivity or gender-equality policies. One could oppose to this position with the same observation made for Interviewee #6: "if you want to change the mindset of a given group, one way is showing the positive effects of it".

As a second consideration, there is not such absolute category of the *unpreparedness* of a society to something. By definition, societies evolve, therefore a static concept, such as "unpreparedness" will be very difficult to apply. Besides the extreme position of Interviewee #17, that defined gender-equality policies as a "*waste of time*", it is worth to mention Interviewee #21, who stated that:

> *If police is not involved in fighting and is sufficiently trained about gender, human right, etc., then a police force sensible to the gender could have been created and developed, but unfortunately in the Afghan situation, with the fighting and casualties, **this kind of approach***

> ***was not possible. There was no sufficient program of training for gender issues also for the need to quickly deploy fresh police for fighting duties.***

While this position might be understandable, from a practical point of view, conflict doesn't imply the impossibility to implement gender policies. Gender equality within security services is needed even more in wartime than in peacetime, when the most vulnerable groups are more exposed to abuses, violences, and hate crimes.

As previously noted, none of common preconceptions or doubts regarding the effectiveness of gender-inclusivity or gender-equality policies appear to be sustainable. They might be rooted in the practical experiences of the witnesses, yet their reasons are more connected to a failure in planning those policies than to structural failures of the receiving parties. Again, these positions appear self-absolutory, and may be influenced by a non-unusual, generalist, subtle post-colonial bias.

Gender-Inclusivity Policies: A Problem of Methodology

To solve the problem of the implementation of gender policies within the security sector, a relevant group of interviewees proposed an interesting set of considerations. Four of them openly advised against the *imposition* of these policies. In particular, the message of the interviewees was oriented toward necessary care about the *messaging* utilized to implement the policies.

The recommendation was to find a method to stimulate the collaboration of the receiving party *convincing* of the positive effects of that model. In this sense, Major General Buik recognized a very important obstacle to the implementation of gender policies, asking himself "*…do we really think that males voluntarily will give up the power they have over women?*". The obvious answer to his own question was "*it's hard to believe that they would do it. To a certain extent,* ***they will accept to bring women into the police service but we will not find those women in officers or staff officer positions****"*.

> This position clarifies the real nature of the problem: *the real obstacle is power, and the refusal to share it.* This observation radically changes the understanding of the problem and influences, consequently, the method of implementation of the policies. According to Gen. Buik *We need to do this in small steps, maybe with such an approach of 10 or 20 years, and I'm saying we cannot lose this: we need to have this inside, but we have to follow realistic steps…* and
>
> *Based on my experience […]* ***we are fighting each other saying that we need to make it possible, but nobody wants to stand and to say to the political accountable persons that this is not possible at the moment>.***

Meanwhile, interviewee #12 stated that.

> *About Gender Equality, I think that* ***the biggest mistake is to impose models stranger to the context****. It is correct to try to support the gender equality, but with* ***methods that are acceptable for the local society****.*

On this pattern, the same interviewee also proposed an alternative model, very interesting and unique, with reference to the other interviewees:

> *In* [area of the Horn of Africa] *we are trying to* ***build a network made of all the women that are serving within the security forces****. We think that this might be an* ***alternative instrument to create mutual support and cohesion*** *among them.*

Thus, once again, empowering women proves to be a catalyst for fostering acceptance and balance- an enlightening approach that demands sensitivity,care, knowledge, and understanding.

Another interesting perspective is the one proposed by the Interviewee #2. As a method to foster acceptance of gender-inclusivity policies, he proposed that.

> *the international community can* ***condition their (also financial) help*** *to the reach of a certain level of inclusivity within a specific policing system. This doesn't solve the issue in the short-medium term (where women will be recruited and* ***put in high hierarchical position only in order to achieve the international support/funds****), but in the* ***long term can be the key for an actual role played*** *by the women in the internal security governance.*

This suggestion is both practical and effective—in the long term—in achieving a gender balance within public institutions (including police). Although it must be acknowledged that, in the short to medium term, such initiatives risk being perceived as a form of "imposition", and may even be misused to justify the misallocation of international funds and resources. Interviewee #19 proposed a very reasonable and interesting approach, suggesting that to effectively implement a gender-inclusivity policy, the receiving body needs to be convinced of *the need* of that form of support. Only recognizing that need, the policy will be accepted and will eventually become structural.

In conclusion, issues in implementing gender-inclusivity policies are not related to the receiving societal body, rather they depend on a wrong method of implementation of those policies. Finding the method of implementation tailored to the characteristics of a specific society appears to be the key for success, also considering that these processes require time and resources, along with a deep knowledge of the social environment of relevance. All the seemingly non-sensical biases mentioned earlier are, in fact, rooted in either a subtle post-colonial mindset or a form of self-absolution stemming from an overly superficial approach to complex and multifaceted issues.

Ms. Hosna Jalil's Perspective

The experience and expertise of Ms. Hosna Jalil was particularly valuable in the Gender-equality and Gender-Inclusivity sector. At the beginning of her interview, Ms. Jalil immediately clarified her position on the topic, talking about *equity*, and not *equality*, with reference to the policies applied to gender issues.

> *I am in general not considered a feminist. This is because I have a peculiar idea or gender equality policies, and their implementation. First of all, I would refer to gender equity, and not only equality. Equity among genders, in different sectors.*

I do believe that in this era there is not any sector of human activities reserved only to one gender.

In her insightful interview, Ms. Jalil consistently emphasized the importance of gender-oriented policies that clearly articulate *the benefits* of women's contribution to security, and subsequently, the essential *need* for their inclusion.

Gender equality, without explaining – to the citizens, also – why there should be equality is not beneficial.

What we changed was, considering Afghanistan being a traditional country, with a vast majority of Muslim people, to underline the fact that, as a matter of security, as example we couldn't have a man to search a woman. We couldn't have, in certain conditions, a man to enter a house, because it was against tradition, and also against Islam. ***That's why we needed women, not just being respectful of values***.

The solution, and the change of policy, as described by Ms. Jalil, eventually started working:

… I think that the success of these policies is based on a ***change of the narrative: women can bring a set of skills complementary to those of men***. *In this way we were able to have women in many areas, including investigations; and we had very good investigators.*

The problem of gender-*equity* policies, seemed therefore to be linked to the *method* of its implementation.

… the critical factor for the success of these policies was to identify a sector where women skills were absolutely relevant, and to propose women's positions as such.

In this sense, Ms. Jalil provided the team a clear example of the mistakes made in Afghanistan for the vast majority of the Western operations in the Country.

In the first 18 years of the western operations in Afghanistan, we were […] ***concentrated on numbers***. *We received incentive (economical) based on numbers.*

As a second point, ***we didn't have a clear indication on which position would have been more beneficial for a woman to cover it***. *When in 2018 we did a mapping on the positions actually covered by women in the security services, we discovered that* ***many women officers were used to serve "a coup of tea" to the provincial commanders****, despite the actual position was totally different.*

In 2018 we tried ***to boost quality vs. quantity, traying to "normalize" presence of women among law enforcement***.

Referring to the *justice* perspective, Ms. Jalil mentioned that.

51% of population was made of women, and that majority of population needed to be served well as the other portion of society.

It was, in fact, a matter of *justice* to ensure that women received the same protection from law enforcement as men, but it was also a matter of *necessity*.

It's a matter of effectiveness. *Like having to deal with women in Burkha. […] in Afghanistan nobody would touch a woman in burkha, for whatever reason. And this might result in a lack of security. So, to fill a* ***security gap*** *would certainly mean* ***to include women in the security institutions, whether formal or informal***.

Yet Ms. Jalil warned against a subtle way of hampering the implementation of this policies, mentioning that *"to have an investment on women working,* ***it is needed to invest in their qualification. A more holistic approach***". This observation is particularly important, since the lack of qualifications—meaning: the lack of *opportunities* for women to obtain qualifications—might conceal the refusal to accept their empowerment.

Finally, talking about non-binary individuals, Ms. Jalil mentioned that.

> *…non-binary individuals are often* ***major victims of insecurity*** *in Afghanistan. And in Afghanistan the best advocates for the rights of children and non-binary individuals were women.*
>
> *So, talking about the overall stability of systems, women should be included because they are the first defenders of the minorities as those just mentioned.*
>
> *So* ***the security sector should invest on women****, as qualification but also as assigning the right job.*

To summarize she affirmed that, "*certainly,* ***the absence of women in security institutions represent a security gap***".

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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Way Forward

Maria R. Haberfeld and Gohar A. Petrossian

Much of the contribution from this project resides in the unique composition of the research team involved in its conceptualization, execution, and dissemination. This very successful collaboration between NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence, the Italian Carabinieri, the Dutch Military, and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, despite being so unique, in many positive ways from conceptual through implementation phases, was not without y challenges that the authors of this chapter would like to highlight for readers interested in future collaborative approaches.

1. Operationalization of the topics
2. Ethical Review Board
3. Methodological hurdles
4. Background biases
5. Interpretation biases
6. Dissemination challenges

Operationalization of the Topic

When three, very different, groups of scholars embark on a research project that requires an agreement on the topic under study, many challenges and hurdles need to be addressed.

A number of these challenges need to be mentioned, not just for the benefit of the current project but for those who will be enticed to embark on a similar experience which, in the opinion of these authors, is a much-needed collaboration.

To start with, the very diverse background of the research team presented an operationalization challenge – what it is exactly that needs to be addressed, some

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of the questions that emerged at the early stages had to do with the diverse understanding of what "effective policing" is. As academics, we are heavily biased in our understanding of the "effective policing" concept, predicated upon our exposure to the western world definition of the latter. Same, at least to a certain degree can be said about our counterparts from the Italian Carabinieri. However, the military background of the colleagues from the Netherlands added a new level of understanding or, maybe, misunderstanding, of what it is exactly that we are searching for. Furthermore, we were joined by an academic colleague who had, in addition to his scholarly training, real field experience in the countries that we aimed at studying.

The abundance of riches, one might say, in terms of the extensive and diverse experience we all brough to the discussion table, which was, indeed, one of the major assets for this project. On the other hand, it was also a big challenge for achieving a consensus of thoughts and the final operationalization. Achieving an agreed upon consensus was also heavily predicated upon the background of one of the co-editors of this brief, who brough a wealth of experience working with the NATO forces and writing reports that were skewed toward the preexisting military doctrines.

Needless to say, we managed to achieve the consensus but, going forward, it is highly recommended to consider the background of potential collaborators as, replicability of any such project will be highly dependent upon operationalization of the research constructs.

Ethical Review Board

As academics, we are trained to stay away from any project that might not pass the scrutiny of the Ethical Review Board (ERB). That said, as social scientists, we are also acutely aware of the fact that various attempts to assure the integrity and ethics of research projects frequently create obstacles and hurdles that impair our scientific knowledge.

One example that comes to mind; after decades of research related to police ethics and integrity, one of the co-authors of this chapter faced an ongoing dilemma when distributing anonymous questionnaires to members of various police forces around the world. One of the requirements of the ERB was to require the participants to sign off on an "informed consent form" (ICF) that explained the nature of the research, assured anonymity of the participants and their ability to withdraw their participation at any given moment. While the intention of this informed consent form is very noble, it does not take into consideration the suspicious nature of police officers, as many commented to us that being anonymous does not include signing their names on the ICF. Over the years, many potential and valuable subjects and their knowledge and contribution to our understanding of the ethical side of policing, were lost due to their hesitance to sign off on the ICF.

In the case of the current project, given the fact that the idea for the study originated with the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence, the abovementioned academic concerns were not factored in and, by the time the academics joined the

project, some of the initial stages were already put in place, and these did not include the ERB approvals. As mentioned by one of the co-editors of this brief, this situation led to the establishment of a new entity with the NATO Center, a new Ethical Board Unit, which approved the various steps taken by the initial group of researchers. However, as also previously mentioned, for John Jay College participants, it was a no go from the standpoint of being actually involved in the interview process and restricted our collaboration to the literature review and background research participation Going forward, John Jay College participants plan on conducting a secondary analysis of the data collected by our colleagues and, thus, eliminating the need for prior ERB approval.

The final lesson learned from this experience is to make sure that the second step in creating any collaborative initiative is to assure that the ERB requirements for any given institution are thoroughly vetted and implemented, prior to any commencement of field research that included human subjects. Had we achieved this understanding with our colleagues prior to the commencement of this study, our participation would have been much more meaningful for the study of "effective policing" in countries of transition.

Methodological Hurdles

What follows, in a natural transition, is the choice of research methodologies that felt most comfortable for the members of the team. It was quite clear from the start that the research will rely heavily on a convenience sample of practitioners recruited from the field, with a variety of backgrounds, from military, law enforcement, NGOs and other political affiliations and positions in the countries of interest.

Much has been written about the pros and cons of the convenience samples but, given the complexity of the topics it was decided that this approach is most beneficial. However, "convenience sampling" means different things to different audiences, and it took a process to iron out what exactly we needed to pay attention to when recruiting this available population.

Going forward, it is highly recommended to agree upon the population to be studied, ahead of any concrete recruitment, and seriously consider the pros and cons of various potential contributors as representing their own personal experience versus knowledge that can be of use to other parties in other areas of the world.

During the workshops created for exchange of ideas on the best methodology for the project, we clashed back and forth, based on our individual experiences and backgrounds. The criminologist in the group advocated for individual interviews to be conducted by one of the team members, the anthropologist preferred to record the interviews, the police and military practitioners did not have much of a preference but felt comfortable in conducting the interviews by more than one person.

The importance of having a consensus on the way the data will be collected, ahead of recruitment of the research subjects, cannot be overstated. Adding to the complexity are numerous challenges presented by the various geographic areas

where, for example, participation of the female subjects, could have created an insurmountable obstacle.

Background Biases

In any collaborative research team experience, the personal background biases will raise their heavily opinionated heads. The more experience the participants have, the more biases there will be. Putting aside the importance of experienced researchers and practitioners' personal biases, there are well known methodological biases that need to be addressed here, all of which are outlined in the following section.

Sampling Bias

This research used a convenience sample of 21 interviewees, most of whom were affiliated with NATO or similar institutions. While their depth of experience and knowledge should not be undermined, their institutional homogeneity may raise concern about the representativeness and epistemic diversity of opinions, experiences, and knowledge, all of which may reflect on the conclusions drawn from these interviews and the subsequent findings of this research (Creswell & Poth, 2016). In essence, the complexity of the type of cross-continental research that was conducted here and the limited resources in terms of personnel, access, time, and significant logistical constraints limited the team's ability to incorporate the opinions and perspectives from local stakeholders, potential civil society actors, and non-NATO professionals, whose opinions and lived experiences in these post-conflict states may have potentially differed from that of the interviewees in the current research project. Nevertheless, as a first study in this regard, it offers the foundational knowledge base on which future studies can build on and be drawn from. Such a holistic approach will significantly enrich our understanding of the complex security environments.

Interpretation Bias

Despite the rigorous methodological planning, as detailed in Chapter 2, several interpretation biases should be acknowledged. The team made a deliberate decision not to provide pre-defined definitions of key concepts (e.g., Internal Security Architecture), which allowed them the make inductive theory-building based on the information gathered from interviewees. However, this may have possibly introduced the risk of terminological ambiguity (Cook et al., 2002), and potentially inconsistent interpretation across interviews with 21 respondents. Moreover, considering the interviewers came from different professional backgrounds, it is possible that this may

have brought interviewer variability bias (Cook et al., 2002). Nevertheless, important steps have been taken to minimize this bias by, for example, using a pre-validated semi-structured instruments rather than leaving it up to individual interviewers to interpret the conversations they had with the study subjects. Moreover, using third-party summarization of interview results increased subjectivity and reduced potential interpretive bias.

Conceptual Ambiguity

Some of the key constructs, such as "police effectiveness", and "internal security architecture" were not defined during the interview process, as the goal was to allow interviewees to offer their own interpretations, instead of relying on pre-defined terms to offer their interpretations. Given the exploratory nature of this research, and considering that this research is first of its kind and is qualitative in nature, this inductive approach is defensible and even necessary. For example, this approach allowed the team to infer and later provide both the deterministic and relativistic definition of the "Internal Security Architecture" construct. Such an inductive approach would not have been possible if the pre-determined definitions guided the interview procedures.

Instrumental and Response Biases in Questionnaire Design

When designing the questionnaire for the current research project, the team deliberately avoided standardized or highly structured interview questions, opting, instead, for open-ended questions. Such an approach fostered organic, natural, and nuanced responses that were not confined to the rigid structure of the questions asked, and allowed interviewees to elaborate on each question to the extent that their knowledge, experience, and expertise allowed. Of course, such an approach runs the risk of creating potential for response bias (Maxfield, Babbie and Schuck (2011), as interviewees may have interpreted questions differently or responded according to expectations that they perceived the interviewer had of them. This is especially true for critical terms, such as "legitimacy", "effectiveness", or "security architecture", which could have potentially been interpreted inconsistently. Given the potential for this bias, the research team made the efforts to clarify responses through follow-up discussions, third-party coding of the data/information obtained from the interviews, as well as, at times, reviewing the recorded interviews to clarify potential ambiguities and interpretation inconsistencies. Such an approach allowed the team to reduce this bias as much as possible, so that having the flexibility of using open-ended questions to solicit in-depth responses was not compromising the accuracy and the clarity of the information solicited from interviewees.

In conclusion, while this research makes a pioneering contribution to the understanding of the Internal Security Architecture through an expert-informed, inductive, and qualitative research approach, several limitations outlined above may have potentially affected its generalizability. Nevertheless, the methodological choices made in this research reflect a balance between flexibility and rigor, and the information exerted from the interviews offers a rich foundation for future research that can incorporate larger samples, potentially standardized tools that can build on the ones provided here, and cross-cultural comparative perspectives that will account for local perspectives, such as non-NATO actors, civil society actors, and local stakeholders.

Dissemination Challenges

Dissemination challenges for this unique collaboration cannot be over emphasized given the three very different audiences that constitute the potential audience for this brief, from the practitioners in the law enforcement world, through the military and the academe. Starting the with the law enforcement/practitioner audience, presenting our findings is restricted by a very specific set of needs, namely what lessons can be learned and how the approaches presented can be implemented in the future deployments. There is very little, if any, interest in what has been researched in the past, by others, or what kind of larger implications it may have in terms of generalizability of the findings. In simple terms, the findings need to be presented in a very succinct and report-like format, ready for immediate consumption.

On the military side, there is a very similar need to look at a report that is even more succinct than the one presented to law enforcement audiences, however, this will depend on the branch of the military involved, and in this case the NATO member audience, there might be more of interest to tie our findings to the previous deployments and conceptual frameworks that were developed based on these experiences. NATO has its own standards for dissemination that sometimes mirror more the ones used in the academe than the ones accepted in the law enforcement environments.

Finally, the ivory tower of the academe presents its unique challenge of accepting research findings more in the form or peer reviewed journal articles than field reports. Now seeing a solid literature review of what has been done and known, prior to the commencement of the current research can, in most cases, render the findings as not fully replicable. However, there is always the ethnographic approach to case study research that allows for omitting the literature review of what we knew from prior studies in favor of focusing on the case studies in point.

For this brief, we have chosen a blend of the three approaches by focusing, exclusively, on the case studies rather than an overview of what was already published on a similar topic, in favor of directing the attention of our three, very different audiences, to the present and the future. It is our belief that such an approach will constitute a solid template for future research, either collaborative or one-dimensional.

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